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This thesis examines the sources and method used by Sir James Dalrymple, 1st Viscount 
Stair, when writing and revising his seminal work, the Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland (1681). In doing so, it focuses particularly on Stair’s titles on the law of 
obligations.  
The thesis shows how Stair used learned authority and continental legal treatises. 
It demonstrates that Stair relied particularly upon Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis 
(1625), Petrus Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo (1620), and Arnoldus Vinnius’ 
Commentarius academicus et forensis (1642), and, to a lesser extent, Vinnius’ 
Jurisprudentia contracta (1624-1631) and Arnoldus Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos 
(1642). It establishes when, in the process of writing and later revising the Institutions, 
Stair first used and when he returned to these continental legal treatises. It explains 
Stair’s pattern of borrowing from these treatises, and shows how his method and pattern 
of borrowing changed as he revised the Institutions. It establishes Stair’s purpose in 
consulting each of these works and how he was influenced by them. Overall, the thesis 
explains Stair’s method of writing and his use of sources and authorities, places his work 
in the context of continental jurisprudence, and thus significantly enhances current 
understanding of Stair’s Institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Every body of men has its own special idol, and of Scots lawyers it is safe 




Black here aptly summarized the importance of Stair’s Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland, deduced from its originals, and collated with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal-
Laws; and with the customs of neighbouring nations (Edinburgh, 1681).
2
 This treatise is 
an example of institutional writing, a genre of early-modern legal works which set out 
national private law.
3
 Institutional writing is a feature of every Western-European legal 
system where Roman law has been received. Scots law was never codified and thus puts 
peculiar emphasis on such treatises. Since the nineteenth century,
4
 certain Scottish 
institutional works have been regarded as sources of law.
5
 Stair is considered the most 
important of these Scottish institutional writers. His Institutions remains a source of law 
and has thus had a profound impact on the development of certain areas of Scots private 
law.6  
Since 1981 (the tercentenary of the first printing of the Institutions), there has 
been an increased interest in Stair’s intellectual influences and use of authority.
7
 One 
                                                 
1
 “The Institutional Writers, 1600-1829” in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of Scots 
Law, by various authors, with an introduction by the Rt. Hon. Lord Macmillan (Stair Society series 
volume 1, Edinburgh, 1936) 59, 63. 
2
 The Institutions will be cited “S.first edition\second edition”. All quotations are drawn from the first 
printed edition unless otherwise indicated.  
3
 On institutional writing in Europe, K. Luig: “The institutes of national law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries” [1972] Jur.Rev. 193-226 generally. 
4
 J.W.G. Blackie: “Stair’s later reputation as a jurist” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies 
(Stair Society series volume 33, 1981) 207, 219-227. 
5
 J.W. Cairns: “Institutional writings in Scotland reconsidered” (1984) 4 J.L.H. 76, 90. 
6
 The Scots law of promise was shaped by Stair’s rejection of opinions expressed by Hugo Grotius [on 
whom, below, ch.4]: W.W. McBryde: “Promises in Scots law” (1993) 42(1) I.C.L.Q. 48-66, 54-56. Stair’s 
acceptance of Grotius’ rejection of Franciscus Connanus [on whom, below, 3.2.2.2] in relation to 
consideration in contract “sealed the fate of consideration in Scots law”: G. Lubbe “Formation of contract” 
in K. Reid & R. Zimmermann (eds): A History of Private Law in Scotland volume 2 (Oxford, 2000) 1, 15. 
7
 e.g. D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 
generally; W.M. Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law” in A. Harding (ed): Law-Making and Law-Makers in 
British History: papers presented to the Edinburgh Legal History Conference, 1977 (Royal Historical 
Society Studies in History series volume 22, London, 1980) 120 generally. 
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area of interest has been the continental treatises on which Stair relied.
8
 Gordon’s study 
of Stair’s choice and use of such sources allowed a new level of critical insight; he 
showed that Stair, like most jurists of the period,
9
 did not always acknowledge his 
sources and could not be assumed to have read everything he cited.10 Yet Gordon’s was 
not a comprehensive study, and, because there have been few subsequent articles which 
have built on Gordon’s findings, knowledge of Stair’s choice and use of sources remains 
limited. 
This thesis will build on Gordon’s pioneering research and examine Stair’s use 
of continental legal literature in his titles on obligations. First, it will identify the 
treatises on which Stair relied. Three treatises acted as Stair’s principal sources in 
writing and revising these titles of the Institutions: Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis 
libri tres (Paris, 1625), Petrus Gudelinus’ Commentaria de iure novissimo libri sex 
(Arnhem, 1620), and Arnoldus Vinnius’ In quatuor libros institutiones Imperliales 
commentarius academicus et forensis (Leiden, 1642). Stair’s use of two minor sources 
will also be discussed, specifically Arnoldus Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta sive 
partitiones juris civilis libri IIII (The Hague, 1631) and Arnoldus Corvinus’ Digesta per 
aphorismos strictim explicata (Amsterdam, 1642).
11
 
                                                 
8
 e.g. A. Rodger: “Molina, Stair and the jus quaesitum tertio” [1969] Jur.Rev. 34-44 (Parts one and two) 
and 128-151 (Parts three and four) generally; J. Cameron: “James Dalrymple, 1
st
 Viscount of Stair” [1981] 
Jur.Rev 102-109 passim; W.M. Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions” in Roman 
law, Scots law and Legal History: selected essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law series volume 4, Edinburgh, 
2007) 255 generally; T. Richter: “Molina, Grotius, Stair and the jus quaesitum tertio” [2001] Jur.Rev 219-
222 generally; T. Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?” (2003) 7(3) Edin.L.R. 367-378 generally; J.D. 
Ford: “Stair’s title ‘Of Liberty and Servitude’” in A.D.E. Lewis and D.J. Ibbetson (eds): The Roman Law 
Tradition (Cambridge, 1994) 135 passim; and J.D. Ford: Law and Opinion in Scotland during the 
Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2007) passim. 
9
 On Grotius’ borrowing, see R. Feenstra: “L’influence de la Scholastique Espagnole sur Grotius en droit 
privé: quelques expériences dans questions de fond et de forme, concernant notamment les doctrines de 
l’erreur et de l’enrichissement sans cause” in P. Grossi (ed): La seconda Scolastica nella formazione del 
diritto privato moderno (Milan, 1973) 377, 382-385; S.M. Villa: “The philosophy of international law: 
Suárez, Grotius and epigones” (1997) 37(1) International Review of the Red Cross 539-552 generally. 
10
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions” generally. 
11
 This thesis will follow the naming conventions of R. Tuck (ed): The Rights of War and Peace, from the 
edition of Jean Barbeyrac (Natural law and Enlightenment series, Indianapolis, 2005) [on which, volume 
3, 1763-1814]. For jurists not given by Tuck, the Latinised versions of jurists’ names will be preferred.  
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It will also investigate when Stair used these sources. Stair wrote the first version 
of the Institutions in 1659-1662.
12
 His work was copied and circulated as manuscripts. A 
stem of manuscripts (the earliest of which dates from 1662) developed from this first 
version. He thereafter revised his text three times. His first revision was made in 1666-
1667. Stair did not revise his text extensively but rather updated it according to recent 
case law and other Scottish authorities. This second version gave rise to a second 
manuscript stem, dating from 1666.
13
 Stair revised his text again when preparing the 
Institutions for print in 1681. This was the third version of the Institutions. The fourth 
version was the second printed edition (Edinburgh, 1693). The two printed editions 
included changes to the text, his pattern of citation, and his choice and use of sources. It 
will be shown that the continental legal sources Stair used varied for each of these four 
versions of his text. His three most important sources were all used for the first version, 
as was Corvinus. None were re-examined for the second version. When preparing the 
first printed edition, Stair again used Vinnius’ commentary and Grotius’ De jure belli, 
and consulted Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta as a new source. When preparing the 
second printed edition, Stair re-examined all three of his principal sources but neither 
Corvinus nor Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta. 
This thesis will also set out Stair’s pattern of borrowing from these sources. 
Gordon demonstrated that Stair used his sources at points in the Institutions in which 
they were not cited.
14
 This thesis will investigate whether there was a pattern to Stair’s 
borrowing, and what material and/or information Stair took from his sources. It will be 
shown that he borrowed: citations of other early-modern jurists, Roman law, Canon law, 
and writers of classical antiquity; references to continental legal systems; structure of 
sentences or paragraphs; wording and phrasing; and substantive points of law. This 
thesis will establish that Stair generally did not check the citations borrowed from these 
sources for the first version. He did, however, check the citations of Roman law which 
                                                 
12
 Below, 1.1.1. 
13
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 67. Below, 1.1.2. 
14
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions” generally. 
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he borrowed when preparing the third and fourth versions. Indeed, Stair generally 
increased the detail and accuracy of his citations for the printed editions.
15
  
Finally, this thesis will establish for what purpose and to what extent Stair used 
these continental juristic sources, and his method in doing so. It will show that he 
selected recent continental treatises for specific purposes. Stair used Vinnius’ 
commentary as an important source for Roman law, to consult indirectly continental 
treatises, and to engage with continental juristic debates.
16
 Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo 
was his principal source for comparative law as well as another important source for 
Roman law.17 Stair consulted Grotius for natural law, and thus borrowed citations of the 
writings of classical antiquity as well as of Roman law and of continental jurists from 
Grotius.
18
 Finally, he used Corvinus as his principal source for Canon law when writing 
in 1659-1662.
19
 This use of continental sources locates Stair within the European 
intellectual tradition and shows that he was using modern works to access recent law and 
jurisprudence. This thesis will also show that he was critical in using these treatises: he 
often disagreed with them and, when preparing the printed editions, he checked 
borrowed material. It will demonstrate how his method and use of sources changed as 
the Institutions was revised. It will prove that the method which he applied to his 
continental juristic sources was also applied to his sources of Scots law. This research 
will locate these aspects of Stair’s use of his sources and authorities within the context of 
seventeenth-century continental jurisprudence, and significantly enhance current 
understanding of Stair’s Institutions.  
The focus of this thesis has been limited to Stair’s titles on the law of 
obligations.
20
 There are two reasons for this. First, this is the area of law which is 
traditionally, and correctly, considered to be the most heavily influenced by Roman law 
                                                 
15
 Below, 3.1.3. 
16
 Below, ch.6. 
17
 Below, ch.5. 
18
 Below, ch.4. 
19
 Below, ch.7. 
20
 S.3/1.3-S.11/1.18. 
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and the civilian tradition.
21
 Secondly, it is in these titles where most of the citations of 
continental jurists, Roman law, writers of classical antiquity, and Canon law are found.  
 
                                                 
21
 Luig: “The institutes of national law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”, 198. 
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1 
STAIR AND HIS INSTITUTIONS  
 
In order to understand this work and its author, it is necessary to draw together three 
seemingly-disparate topics: the Institutions, Stair’s intellectual background, and the 
collection and use of continental legal literature by seventeenth-century Scottish 
advocates.  
The first part of this chapter will consider the Institutions. It will establish 
Stair’s timeline for writing and revising the four versions of the Institutions. It will 
consider the textual accuracy of the printed editions by examining seventeenth-
century Scottish printing. It will also look at how the pattern of citation, structure and 
content of the Institutions differed in the four versions. It will examine the sources he 
used for Scottish case law. Overall, this part of the chapter will set out aspects of the 
Institutions which are relevant to this thesis.  
The second part will examine two aspects of Stair’s intellectual background: 
his education and lecture for admission as an advocate. This will show that Stair was 
already familiar with some of the sources subsequently cited by him in the 
Institutions. It will show that his education would have exposed him to humanism 
and scholasticism. Humanist influence can also be seen in his lecture for admission 
as an advocate. Both humanist and scholastic influences are apparent in his 
Institutions. Overall, this part of the chapter will set out Stair’s early intellectual 
influences, and allow findings on such influences in the Institutions to be set in the 
context of his life. 
The third part investigates which examples of continental legal literature were 
being sought by Scottish advocates during the seventeenth century, and to what 
extent Stair’s contemporaries engaged with such sources. An examination of the 
catalogues of three private libraries shows that Stair’s principal sources were 
popular. A brief review of the secondary literature shows that some of Stair’s 
contemporaries had thorough knowledge of continental legal literature whereas 
others were more pedestrian in their choice and use of sources. This brief survey 
indicates that there was significant variation in the knowledge of and engagement 
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with continental legal literature by Stair’s contemporaries. This in turn puts Stair’s 
choice and use of sources in the contemporary Scottish context. 
The three parts of this chapter set up and give context to the research detailed 
in the later chapters. The first is a necessary preamble to the subsequent chapters, and 
the other two allow the broader conclusions of those chapters to be drawn in the 
context of Stair’s life and contemporary Scottish knowledge and use of continental 
literature. 
 
1.1 THE INSTITUTIONS  
 
1.1.1 When did Stair write the first version? 
 
Various dates have been suggested in the secondary literature as the period during 
which Stair wrote the first version.
1
 Ford, who has recently published the results of 
his systematic examination of the manuscripts,
2
 plausibly concluded that it was 
substantially written in 1659-1661 but revised and completed in 1662.
3
 This was 
                                                           
1
 Hutton suggested that Stair wrote the Institutions and collected decisions simultaneously during the 
period 1657-1663 [G.M. Hutton: “Stair’s aim in writing the Institutions” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair 
Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 79, 81]. Hutton’s suggestion 
that Stair wrote from the date of his appointment to the Bench agrees with that of the nineteenth-
century compiler of Stair’s correspondence [J.M. Graham (ed): Annals and Correspondence of the 
Viscount and the First and Second Earls of Stair volume 1 (Edinburgh, 1875), 55]. Hutton wrongly 
dated the completion of the earliest version of Stair’s Institutions to 1664 [Hutton: “Stair’s aim in 
writing the Institutions”, 79]. In doing so, he followed a tract by one of Stair’s contemporaries [Baron 
J. Somers & Sir W. Scott: Collection of scarce and valuable tracts, on the most interesting and 
entertaining subjects volume 11 (2
nd
 edition, London, 1809), 550]. Stair’s biographer also referred to 
this tract [A.J.G. Mackay: Memoir of Sir James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair President of the Court 
of Session in Scotland and Author of the “Institutions of the Law of Scotland”: A study in the history 
of Scotland and Scotch law during the seventeenth century (Edinburgh, 1873 rept. Boston, 2005), 152 
n.1]. This suggestion must be inaccurate because copies of the manuscript tradition survive from 
1662. 
Earlier dates have been suggested. In 1649, Stair was appointed to a commission to review 
and revise Scots law, to draw on all previous statutes and customs to create “a constant, certain and 
known model and frame of law according to equity and justice” [R.P.S., 1649/1/306: Commission for 
Revising the Laws 1649 <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1649/1/306>, accessed 16
th
 July 2010; Ford: Law and 
Opinion, 175-176]. More, editor of the fifth edition of the Institutions, stated: “it is not improbable 
that Lord Stair’s appointment, as one of the Commissioners, may have first turned his attention to the 
preparation of his ‘Institutions’.” [J.S. More (ed): The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Deduced 
from its Originals, and Collated with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of 
Neighbouring Nations by James, Viscount of Stair, Lord President of the College of Justice: a new 
edition with notes and illustrations by John S More, Esq. Advocate (5
th
 edition, Edinburgh, 1832) 
volume 1, xii]. This suggestion has not found recent support.  
2
 Ford: Law and Opinion, esp. 63-73. 
3
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 72.  
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based partly on the pattern of citation of Scottish cases found in a manuscript held by 
the University of Glasgow, MS.Gen.1495.
4
 
 It is possible to determine the period during which Stair wrote the first 
version by examining the manuscripts. Stair’s work circulated in manuscript for 
around twenty years before it was printed in 1681. The Advocates’ Library’s 
catalogue currently lists fourteen manuscript copies and the National Library of 
Scotland’s four.
5
 Ford identified another fourteen manuscripts held by the National 
Archives, the Signet Library, the Mitchell Library, the libraries of the Universities of 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen, and of the School of Law at Harvard.
6
 Many of 
these manuscripts bear the date that they were copied. The earliest surviving known 
manuscript of Stair’s Institutions dates from 1662. Taking this date as a starting 
point, it can be deduced that Stair must have completed the first version and allowed 
it to be copied by 1662.  
The manuscripts of the 1662 stem, which represent Stair’s earliest version, 
cite recent cases. These citations show when Stair wrote the first version. Here his 
pattern of citation of cases heard during the 1650s and early 1660s is most important. 
During the 1650s, judicial business in Scotland was undertaken by the Commission 
for Justice, the interregnum court which replaced the Court of Session.
7
 The 
Commission’s Bench predominantly consisted of English lawyers during this time, 
which caused tension with the Scottish legal community.
8
 The Commission closed in 
                                                           
4
 Ford noted that “these two manuscripts [seemingly MS.Gen.1495 and Adv.MS.25.1.10] contain a 
dozen references to cases decided between November 1661 and February 1662” [Ford: Law and 
Opinion, 71]. However, the Glasgow University library catalogue stated wrongly that MS.Gen.1495 
contained no references to cases or other legal authorities dating after 1659 [Glasgow University 
Library Special Collections Online Catalogue entry for MS.Gen.1495 
<http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/manuscripts/search/detaild.cfm?DID=2830> accessed 16
th
 July 2010]. 
Examples of such citations in the body of MS.Gen.1495 include E. Lauderdale v Tenants of Swintoun 
1662 [M.10023. MS.Gen.1495, fol.54 wrongly cited this case as having been heard in 1660] and L. 
Musbon v Lawrie of Macvissorms 1662 [MS.Gen.1495, fol.55. Probably Monsual’s Children v Laurie 
of Maxwelton 1662 [M.2614,], heard by Stair 14
th
 February and cited again, S.30.74/3.8.74].  
5
 In the Advocates’ Library: Adv.MSS.25.2.2-25.2.3, Adv.MSS.25.1.7-25.1.11, Adv.MS.31.2.11, 
Adv.MS.25.4.17, Adv.MS.25.1.5, Adv.MS.25.1.14, Adv.MS.25.1.13, Adv.MS.25.1.12, and 
Adv.MS.24.2.10. In the National Library of Scotland: MS.5434, MS.5058, MS.3721, and MS.3172. 
The National Library of Scotland catalogue also identifies MS.7116 as a transcript of Stair’s 
Institutions.  
6
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 60 n.258. 
7
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 92-122. 
8
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 123-151. 
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Six manuscripts were checked for citations of cases heard during the 1650s 
and early 1660s, three from the 1662 stem (representing Stair’s first version) and 
three from the 1666 stem (representing his second version).
10
 It can be deduced from 
an examination of these manuscripts that Stair gave c.130 citations of cases heard 
during the interregnum.
11
 With very few exceptions, each citation was found in all 
six manuscripts, although there were variations in the spelling of the names of the 
parties, and sometimes in the date given. These variations seem to be errors made by 
individual copyists. An examination of Stair’s use of these citations supports Ford’s 
observation that Stair was “treating these decisions in the same way as he treated the 
decisions of the session.”
12
 Stair viewed the decisions of the Commission as equally 
authoritative as those of the Session. This research also supports Ford’s conclusion 
that almost all of these citations referred to cases which were heard after Stair was 
promoted to the Bench,
13
 specifically c.120 of the c.130 citations. Indeed, Stair cited 
in the titles on obligations thirty-five-plus cases heard in the winter session of 1658-
1659. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the high number of cases heard 
in the winter session of 1658-1659 cited in the first version suggests that Stair 
probably began writing after the Commission closed. Secondly, that so many cases 
from 1657-1659 were cited suggests that Stair focused on recent case law. There is 
an obvious parallel here between his focus on recent case law and his use of recent 
continental legal literature as sources for the Institutions. 
For the second version, Stair added numerous citations of cases heard both 
before and after but not during the interregnum. All c.130 citations of interregnum 
cases were retained. However, Stair removed the citations of interregnum cases when 
preparing the third version, with one exception. The citation of Ross v L. May 1657 
                                                           
9
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 116-121. 
10
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8, 25.1.10, and 25.1.11. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7, and 
25.1.12. 
11
 Ford wrongly stated that the manuscript which he examined from the 1662 stem, Adv.MS.25.1.10, 
contained sixty-six citations of cases heard during the 1650s. [Ford: Law and Opinion, 122 n.189]. 
Eight of the c.130 citations were missing from Adv.MS.25.1.10 but appeared in other manuscripts 
from this stem.  
12
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 121. 
13
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 122 n.189. 
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was only removed for the second printed edition.
14
 Taking the five citations of 
interregnum cases in “Recompense” as a typical example, it can be seen how Stair 
removed these citations.
15
 Four were removed without significant change to the 
surrounding passage;
16
 the same points were made but the authority for them was 
removed. Stair still adhered to the points of law which the cases established or 
clarified; he was simply omitting the supporting citations. Only one citation, of 
Viscount Dudope v Marquess of Argyle 1659 [not found], was removed with several 
lines of text.  
Stair’s removal of these citations for the third version may help to establish 
the date when Stair was close to completing the first version. Ford argued that Stair 
had substantially written the Institutions by the time that an Act of 1661 was passed
17
 
which “condemn[ed] the rulings of the Interregnum court”.
18
 The 1661 Act 
Concerning the Judicial Proceedings in the Time of the Late Usurpers said that the 
Commissioners “did sometimes proceed in an arbitrary way, contrary to law and 
justice, and at other times many of them, being strangers and ignorant of the law, did 
proceed unwarrantably and unjustly”.
19
 It allowed appeals against the decisions of 
the interregnum court. The decisions were to “stand in full force” unless challenged 
by the summer of 1662; even after this deadline, other appeals were approved by 
parliament.
20
 This meant that the cases heard during the interregnum that Stair had 
cited could be overruled by the Session. The authority of these cases was no longer 
sound. Yet the high number of citations of cases heard 1657-1659 suggests that Stair 
was focussing on cases from that period, hence Ford’s argument that Stair had 
substantially completed the first version by 1661. This argument is credible, but not 
                                                           
14
 D.E.J., 97. S.24.52/3.2.53. Smith v Muire [M.9858] said to have been heard 23
rd
 December 1660 
[S.27.52/3.5.52] was actually heard in 1668 [Walker (ed): Institutions, 724].  
15
 A sixth citation, of Seaton v tenants of Forbes, was cited as having been heard in 1656 in 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 9.24 and Adv.MS.25.1.7, 9.23. The other manuscript from the 1666 stem gave 1506 
[Adv.MS.25.1.12, 9.23-24]. All three manuscripts from the 1662 stem gave the year 1566 
[Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 9.23; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.84R]. Possibly Seyton v Forbes, heard 9
th
 
January 1566 [M.685] or a later action between these same parties. Although there was no mention of 
his tenants in this action, the case was on the relevant point of law.  
16
 A case heard 18
th
 July 1657 [not found]; Viscount Dudope v Marquess of Argyle 1658 [D.E.J., 218]; 
McBryde v Agnous 1654 [not found]; and Hope v Clackmannan 1655 or 1658 [not found]. 
17
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 121-122. 
18
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 122. 
19
 R.P.S., 1661/1/117 <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1661/1/117>, accessed 16
th
 July 2010. 
20
 E.g. R.P.S., 1663/6/103: Act for a Review to [William Kerr, Earl of] Lothian of Some Decreets 
given Against Him <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1663/6/103>, accessed 16
th
 July 2010. 
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certain. It is hard to establish precisely why Stair removed these citations. His change 
in use of cases heard during the interregnum between the four versions may be a 
result of the passing of the 1661 Act. It may, however, have simply been a reflection 
in the change in the political situation since he originally wrote, and of his hesitation 
to commit citations of interregnum cases to print in post-Restoration Scotland.  
 There is, however, another indication that Stair had written the substantial 
part of the first version by the time the Session reopened: his citation of cases heard 
in the early 1660s. No cases heard after 1662 were cited in the first version. In the 
titles on obligations, there were only two citations of cases heard during the winter 
session 1661-1662, and none of cases heard during the summer session 1662.
21
 This 
corroborates Ford’s research; he found only twelve citations of cases heard in the 
winter session 1661-1662 throughout the first version. These twelve citations can be 
compared to the thirty-five-plus citations of cases heard in the winter session 1658-
1659. There were around three times as many citations of cases heard in the last 
session of the 1650s as there were of those heard in the first session of the 1660s. 
This may simply be indicative of reduced court activity during the 1661-1662 winter 
session, although this seems unlikely. What seems more likely is that Stair had 
already written the substantial part of the first version by then, and in 1662 went back 
over his work for a final edit, completed it, and took the opportunity to include some 
recent case law. Stair’s citation of cases heard in 1662 shows that he continued to 
work on his earliest version in 1662. Given that a manuscript which was copied in 
1662 survives, he must have allowed the first version to be copied for circulation 
very soon after its completion. In order to do so, the substantial part of the first 
version must have been written before the winter session of 1661-1662. In the 
following break between court sittings, Stair revised and updated his draft, 
completing the first version. Ford’s conclusion “that Stair worked on his book no 
later than the vacation from March to May 1662” is therefore correct.
22
 This 
proposition that Stair used the break between sessions to complete his first version is 
                                                           
21
 It has not been determined whether this was typical of the Institutions; brief examination of later 
titles suggests that this may have been the case. 
22
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 71. 
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compatible with Ford’s suggestion that Stair later used the time between sessions to 
prepare the second version in 1666 and 1667.
23
 
Given what has been set out above, it is possible to determine when the first 
version was written. Stair wrote the greater part of it between 1659 and the 
resumption of judicial business in November 1661 (possibly by the passing of the 
1661 Act). No copies survive of a version completed in 1661. It thus seems plausible 
(although not certain) that Stair did not allow his manuscript to be copied at that 
time. He finished the first version after the winter session of 1661-1662. He then 
allowed the manuscript to be copied and to be circulated, resulting in the many 
surviving copies belonging to the 1662 stem. This confirms Ford’s conclusion that 




1.1.2  When did Stair revise his text? 
 
Stair’s second version can be extrapolated from the 1666 stem. Ford examined the 
citations of Scottish cases in the manuscripts from that stem and concluded that:  
 
Stair revised the first part of his book during the vacation from March to 
May 1666, that he revised the second part during the vacation from 
August to October 1666, and that he revised the whole text again and 




Ford stressed that these revisions “do not appear to have been extensive”.
26
 This 
research supports Ford’s conclusion that Stair did not make significant changes to the 
text, but rather made changes to his wording, added sentences or small paragraphs, 
and added around 500 citations.
27
  Most seem to have been of recent case law. 
Stair carried out a major revision of the Institutions for its first printing in 
1681.
28
 This was the third version. Much material and authority was added such as 
                                                           
23
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 70, 72. 
24
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 72. 
25
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 70. 
26
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 70. 
27
 This corroborates the view of Ford: Law and Opinion, 65 
28
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 70, 73, 431-435. 
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numerous citations of cases, including of those heard in 1681.
29
 Again, Stair tried to 
cite recent cases where possible, and must have sent his work for printing very soon 
after completing the third version. This is the same practice as was seen with his 
allowing the first and second versions to be copied soon after their completion.  
When preparing the second printed edition (the fourth version), he added 
citations of cases heard in the 1690s. There does not seem to have been quite the 
same focus on very recent case law in this final version. He cited cases heard in 1691 
and 1692 but none heard in 1693 in the titles on obligations.
30
 This suggests that 
Stair completed the fourth version (or at least that version’s titles on obligations) in 
1692 rather than 1693. There are three possible explanations to this. First, the printer 
may have caused the delay. Secondly, perhaps Stair simply delayed sending the 
fourth version for printing after its completion. This would differ from his previous 
practice: he allowed the first and second versions to be copied and sent the third for 
printing soon after completing them. Finally, it is possible that he revised each of the 
four books of the fourth version in turn and thus stopped working on the titles on 
obligations (found in the first book) earlier than he completed that version overall. If 
this was the case, it would also represent a break with his previous method. He 
previously seems to have revised the entire Institutions title by title and then gone 
back over it for a final quick edit, incorporating very recent authority as he went. If 
this final suggestion is correct, the lack of cases heard in 1693 may indicate that he 
omitted to go back over the fourth version for that final editing stage. 
 
                                                           
29
 In the titles on obligations: Gordon v Inglis 1681 [M.5924, 6180], S.4.15/1.4.19; Robertson v Gray 
1681 [M.7134], S.6.38/1.6.38; Spence v Foulis 1681 [M.11437], S.8.1/1.8.2; Bathgate v Bogil 
[Bowdoun?] 1681 [S.Dec.2.841], S.9.15/1.9.15; Neilson v Ross 1681 [M.1045], S.9.15/1.9.15; Master 
of Balmerinoch v Laird of Pourie 1681 [M.Supp.2.270], S.10.46/1.12.17; Home v Home 1681 
[M.2142], S.10.90/1.17.7. Bruce v Hepburn 1681 [M.13554], S.11.1/- is removed for the second 
printed edition. 
30
 In the first book: Sandilands v L. Niddrie 1692 [not found], S.1.6.18; Fletcher of Aberlady v Murray 
of Blackbarony and others 1691 [not found], S.1.6.36; E. Lauderdale and Lord Haltoun v Earl of 
Aberdeen 1692 [M.Supp.2.130], S.1.9.8; Creditors of Lantoun and Cockburn 1691 “competing” 
[possibly M.1290], S.1.9.15; Hume v Hamilton 1691 [not found], S.1.11.7; Lord Hatton v Earl of 
Aberdeen 1691 [Harcarse, 154], S.1.17.11.  
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1.1.3  The printed editions 
 
1.1.3.1 Printing in the seventeenth century 
 
Proper understanding of the printed editions of the Institutions requires detailed 
consideration of their printing. The method of printing in use in the seventeenth 
century was moveable-type printing. This method used reliefs of individual letters 
arranged to make words or pages which were subsequently imprinted onto multiple 
sheets of paper.
31
 There were problems with moveable-type printing. First, the 
carved letters became eroded and the lettering appeared less clear on the printed 
page. Secondly, if the press was knocked after a page was type-set, it could upset the 
lettering, which would then need to be reset. Two books from the same edition or 
print-run could thus differ. Cairns found that this was the case with Mackenzie’s 
Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1684).
32
 This research has found 
similar variations in the second printed edition of Stair’s Institutions.
33
 Finally, 
printing standards required that the lines of text on the page be justified. In order to 
achieve lines of equal length, the printers – and not the author – would determine the 
setting and spacing of letters, spelling, punctuation and any abbreviations.
34
 These 
features of the printed text of the Institutions were therefore fixed by the printer 
rather than Stair.
35
 No assumptions about Stair’s intention can be based on these 
accidents of printing. 
Both the first and the second printed editions of the Institutions were printed by 
the Heirs of Andrew Anderson in Edinburgh. Anderson had been the King’s Printer 
since 1671, giving him a monopoly “so extensive that no one in the kingdom was at 
liberty to print any book, from a bible to a ballad, without a license from Andrew 
                                                           
31
 On the invention of moveable-type printing, e.g. F.G. Kilgour: The Evolution of the Book (Oxford, 
1998), 85-92; M. Pollack: “Printing in Venice – before Gutenberg?” (1975) 45(3) Library Quarterly 
287-308 generally.  
32
 J.W. Cairns: “The moveable text of Mackenzie: bibliographical problems for the Scottish concept of 
Institutional Writing” in J.W. Cairns and O.F. Robinson (eds): Critical Studies in Ancient Law, 
Comparative Law and Legal History: Essays in honour of Alan Watson (Oxford, 2001) 235, 242-244. 
33
 Below, 6.1.1.2, 6.4.1, introduction to ch.8. 
34
 See e.g. M.B. Parkes: Pause and Effect: An Introduction to the History of Punctuation in the West 
(Berkeley CA, 1993), 50-61 esp. 53. 
35
 An argument based on the punctuation in the printed editions is found in Rodger: “Molina, Stair and 
the JQT”, 131. 
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Anderson”.
36
 The poor quality of his printing resulted in this monopoly being 
reduced to Bibles and Acts of Parliament within the year after his printing a New 
Testament so inaccurate that it had to be withdrawn by the Privy Council.
37
 On the 
death of Anderson in 1676, his widow ran the printing house as ‘the Heirs of Andrew 
Anderson’. Aldis, who researched printing in Scotland before 1700, said of 
Anderson:  
 
A considerable portion of his type and ornaments had been in use in 
Edinburgh by a succession of previous presses, and are in a much worn 
condition. His productions, and those of his successors, are among the 




It is possible that the poor quality of Anderson’s printing was exacerbated by the 
quantity of printing he undertook. Aldis identified the printers of sixty of the eighty-
three items printed in Scotland in 1681. Forty-three were printed by the Heirs of 
Andrew Anderson.
39
 This includes: five of the six printed Acts of Parliament; four 
items printed on behalf of Charles II; thirteen of the fourteen proclamations of the 
Privy Council; and a large proportion of the treatises by private individuals, 
including Stair’s Institutions and Modus litigandi, or Form of process observed 
before the Lords of Council and Session in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1681) and 
Mackenzie’s Idea eloquentiae forensis hodiernae: una cum actione forensi ex 




                                                           
36
 C.H. Timperley: A Dictionary of Printers and Printing, with the Progress of Literature, Ancient and 
Modern (London, 1839), 546. On the origins of printing privileges in Europe, E. Armstrong: Before 
Copyright: The French book-privilege system 1498-1526 (Cambridge Studies in Publishing and 
Printing History series, Cambridge, 1990 rept. Cambridge, 2002), 1-20. 
37
 Timperley: Dictionary of Printers, 546. 
38
 H.G. Aldis: A List of Books Printed in Scotland Before 1700 including those printed furth of the 
realm for Scottish booksellers with brief notes on the printers and stationers (Edinburgh 
Bibliographical Society occasional publications series, Edinburgh, 1904), 107.  
39
 Although one gave “the Relict of Andrew Anderson”. Aldis: List of Books Printed in Scotland 
Before 1700, 60-62. 
40
 Later translated into English and printed as G. Mackenzie: An Idea of the Modern Eloquence of the 
Bar: Together with a pleading out of every part of law (Edinburgh, 1711). Aldis: List of Books, 60-62. 
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1.1.3.2 The printing of the Institutions 
 
The quality of the printing of the Institutions by the Heirs of Andrew Anderson was 
poor. Stair himself mentioned his dissatisfaction at the level of inaccuracy in the first 
edition,
41
 although this was a standard complaint.
42
 There is no guarantee that the 
second printed edition was more accurate as the same printers were used. Indeed, 
variations in the print-run have been found in the second printed edition.
43
 
Additionally, not all of the errors made by the printer in the first printed edition were 
corrected for the second.
44
 That citations appeared correctly in the manuscripts (and 
thus presumably in the first and second versions) but not in the first printed edition 
suggests that the errors were probably made by the printer. The occurrence of these 
same errors in the second printed edition may suggest that Stair used the first printed 
edition, rather than his own manuscript of the third version, to prepare the second. 
This seems plausible, as Stair may well have sent his own hand-written copy of the 
third version to the printers, and not have had it returned. He would therefore have 
had to use a printed copy of the third version to consult his treatise. It would thus 
have been difficult for him to remove errors from citations as they would not be as 
evident as, for example, errors in the spelling of legal terminology.
45
 Removing these 
errors would require him to have checked every citation. Although some were 
checked for the second printed edition,
46
 there is no evidence that Stair checked all 
his citations at that time. 
The poor quality of the printing of the Institutions means that errors found in 
the first and second printed editions cannot necessarily be presumed to have been 
made by Stair. Both printed editions and manuscripts from both stems will be 
examined each time a passage of the Institutions is discussed. This will provide 
evidence on whether errors were made by the printer or whether they can be 
                                                           
41
 S.-/ first page of the advertisement.  
42
 T. Craig: Jus feudale tribus libris comprehensum: quibus non solum consuetudines feudales, & 
praediorum jura, quae in Scotia, Anglia, & plerisque Galliae locis obtinent, continentur, sed 
universum ius Scotium, et omnes fere materiae iuris clare & dilucide exponuntur, et ad sontes iuris 
feudalis & civilis singula reducuntur  (London, 1655), last two pages of Burnet’s preface, “Ad 
Lectorem”. 
43
 Below, 6.1.1.2, 6.4.1, introduction to ch.8. 
44
 e.g. the citation of Connanus [below, 4.1.6.1]. 
45
 e.g. “multilinimve” was corrected to “utilium inutiliumve”, S.2.5/1.2.5. 
46
 e.g. D.16.3.31.1 [below, 4.1.3.2]; D.13.6.3 [below, 4.1.4.3]; C.5.37.24 [below, 5.1.3.2]. 
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attributed to Stair. If errors found in the first printed edition frequently occur in the 
manuscripts then it is more likely that they were made by Stair and were merely 
preserved by the copyists and by his printer.  
 
1.1.4  What revisions did Stair make? 
 
Ford correctly stated that the first printed edition was the first extensive revision of 
the Institutions.
47
 He demonstrated this by detailing the amendments made to Stair’s 
passage on the sources of Scots law.
48
 This was the only passage which he examined 
in detail in the four different versions. The extent and nature of Stair’s revision of the 
Institutions can be examined by considering the changes to his pattern of citation and 
the structure and content of the Institutions more generally.  
 
1.1.4.1 Stair’s pattern of citation 
 
Ford’s examination of one manuscript from each stem demonstrated that: “It is in the 
citation of sources that the manuscripts differ most frequently from each other and 
from the first edition.” In Adv.MS.25.1.10 from the 1662 stem, he found “some two 
thousand references to decisions and statutes, to texts on the civil, canon and feudal 
laws, and to books by later jurists”. In Adv.MS.25.1.5 from the 1666 stem, he located 
“five hundred or so more references than [in] the earlier copy, a few of which date 
from 1667”. Finally, in the first printed edition he found “about a thousand more 
[than in the manuscript from the 1666 stem] to a total of around three thousand five 
hundred, mostly through the addition of references to decisions and statutes from the 
1660s and 1670s.”
49
 These figures have not been checked. What is most relevant to 
this research is the number of citations given of continental jurists, Roman law, 
Canon law, and writers of classical antiquity in the titles on obligations in the printed 
editions and in the manuscripts. These have been counted, which has allowed 
comparison between the extent and use of such citations between the four versions of 
the Institutions.  
                                                           
47
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 70, 73. 
48
 S.1.15/1.1.16. Ford: Law and Opinion, 414-439 esp. 431-435. 
49
 All quotations in this paragraph from Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
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The title “Restitution” provides a typical example of the types of changes that 
Stair made. There were two main changes to the content of the title. First, there was a 
lengthy discussion of restitution from public enemies in the sample manuscripts from 
both stems which was removed for the third version. This may have been because 
Stair added a long discussion of prize law to “Rights Real” at that time. It may have 
seemed unnecessary to retain such a similar discussion in “Restitution” given the 
new addition to “Rights Real”.
50
 Instead, he cut the passage in “Restitution” so that 
there remained only a brief discussion, based on the opening lines of that in the 
manuscripts.
51




There were two changes to Stair’s pattern of citation in “Restitution”. First, 
the removal of much of Stair’s discussion of restitution from public enemies meant 
the removal of citations of relevant authority: of Xenophon, Aristotle’s Politics, 
Plato’s De legibus, and the Bible.
53
 The citations in the discussion of restitution from 
public enemies were not given in the new (perhaps replacement) discussion of prize 
law in “Rights Real” in the third version. Secondly, Stair added references to recent 
cases. He cited three cases in “Restitution” in the first and second versions.
54
 For the 
third version, Stair removed one of these (Bissat) and added twelve new citations of 
cases. This meant that Stair gave: six citations of cases heard before 1659;
55
 two of 
cases heard in 1666;
56
 and six of cases heard in 1666-1681.
57
 Most of the cases added 
                                                           
50
 This is certainly suggested by his cross-reference to S.12.43/2.1.3. It is interesting that this cross-
reference was not updated in the second printed edition to take account of the new division into four 






 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 7.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.62L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.6; Adv.MSS.25.1.7, 7.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 7.5 wrongly cited “Cato de legibus”. 
Below, 4.1.8. 
54
 Inglis v Kirkwood 1627 [M.3976]; Capt. Crawford v L. Lamingtoun 1629 [M.12374]; Bissat v 
Bissat 1624 [M.12368] was removed. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 7.9; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.65R. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.10; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 7.9; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 7.10.  
55
 Home v Wilson 1610 [not found]; Inglis v Kirkwood 1627 [M.3976]; Capt. Crawford v L. 
Lamingtoun 1629 [M.12374]; Carmichael v Hay 1623 [M.11404]; [Wallace of] Eldersly’s Bairns v 
his Heir 1624 [Durie, 145]; and Valence [Wallace] v Crawford 1625 [Durie, 167], all S.7.14/1.7.14. 
56
 Brown & Fountain v Maxwel of Netheryet 1666 [M.3978]; and Fairly v Dick’s Executors 1666 
[M.12278], both S.7.14/1.7.14. 
57
 Ramsay v Robertson 1673 [M.2924], S.7.9/1.7.9. Hadden and Lauder v Shaorswood 1668 
[M.16997], Dick v Oliphant 1677 [M.6548], McLurg v Blackwood 1680 [M.845], Bain v McMillan 
1677 [M.11495], and Campbel and Cunninhame v Bain and McMillan 1678 [M.9128], all 
S.7.14/1.7.14. 
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for the third version were heard in time to have been included in the first or at least 
the second version.  
 
1.1.4.2 The structure and content of the Institutions 
 
The Institutions set out the traditional areas of private law. Although Stair called his 
work the Institutions, his arrangement did not follow the order of Gaius and 
Justinian, which was commonly followed in books of this kind.
58
 The first edition 
was divided into two parts. Part one consisted of twenty-two titles. The first eleven 
discussed the law of obligations. The remaining titles in the first part examined 
property law, ending with the title “Prescription”. The nine titles of the second part 
covered loss of proprietary rights, including succession. Although the arrangement of 
these titles was logical, there was no formal break between the titles on obligations 
and those on property law. In the fourth version, this was achieved by dividing titles 
into different books. 
The fourth version was divided into four books, more akin to the institutional 
division.
59
 Stair described the division: “I have divided this Edition into Four Parts. 
The first being of Original Personal Rights: The Second of Original Real Rights: The 
Third of the Conveyance of both: And the Fourth of the Cognition and Execution of 
the whole”.
60
 The first book contained the eleven titles on obligations. There were 
eighteen titles in the first book of the second edition as “Obligations Conventional”, 
which had been c.40,000 words long, was divided into eight titles. The second book 
was the other eleven titles from the first part of the earlier versions. The most 
substantial change in the substance of these titles seems to be the addition of the 
discussion of prize law added to “Rights Real” for the third version. It was c.8,000 
                                                           
58
 On Stair’s structure, A.H. Campbell: Structure of Stair’s Institutions, being the twenty-first lecture 
of the David Murray Foundation in the University of Glasgow delivered on 24
th
 of February, 1954 
(Glasgow, 1954) generally; D.M. Walker: “The structure and arrangement of the Institutions” in D.M. 
Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society Series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 100, 103-
105; D.M. Walker (ed): The Institutions of the Law of Scotland Deduced from its Originals, and 
Collated with the Civil, Canon and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations. in 
IV books by James, Viscount of Stair, Lord President of the Session 1693 (6
th
 edition, Edinburgh, 
1981), 17-18; N. MacCormick: “The rational discipline of law” [1981] Jur.Rev. 146-160 passim. 
59
 On comparison with Mackenzie’s structure, Blackie: “Stair’s later reputation as a jurist”, 217. 
60
 S.-/first page of the advertisement. 
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words long, constituting over a third of “Rights Real”.
61
 It was added in recognition 
of the “many questions as to the Rights and Interests of Allies, and Newters [sic], 
very fully and accuratly [sic] debated, and decided in the Session, upon occasion of 
the late [Anglo-Dutch] Wars”.
62
 The second lasted 1665-1667 and the third 1672-
1674; during these Scottish privateering became a lucrative industry.
63
 The third 
version was the first revision of the Institutions after these wars; Stair revised it to 
incorporate recent law. In the fourth version, Stair separated prize law out into a 
discrete title, resulting in twelve titles in the second book.
64
 The third book was taken 
from the nine titles in the second part of the earlier versions. No significant structural 
changes were made. The material for the fourth book was taken from Stair’s Modus 
litigandi or Form of Process (1681).  
The Modus litigandi was a guide to court procedure in Scotland. It circulated 
in manuscript form as the Form of Process before being printed in 1681. Ford 
located twelve manuscripts.
65
 Although three bore the date 1666 and another 1667, 
he suggested that these four manuscripts were actually copied in the 1670s and 
1680s.
66
 Both he and Mackay believed that “Stair did work on his books [i.e. the 
Institutions and Form of Process] in 1666 and 1667.”
67
 The Modus litigandi was, like 
the Institutions, written in the vernacular. It was only forty-four pages when printed. 
The text was continuous, rather than divided into paragraphs or titles, and did not 
include an index. It was printed by the Heirs of Andrew Anderson and bound with 
the first printed edition of the Institutions.  
                                                           
61
 S.12.42/2.1.1-2, S.12.43/2.1.3 and S.12.44/2.1.4-26. He also added a detailed overview of a 1667 
case on prize to his discussion of acquisition by occupation [S.12.33/2.1.33]. 
62
 S.12.44/2.2.4. On these contentions e.g. A.J. Carty: “The law of nature and nations as a source” in 
D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society Series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 127, 
128 and passim. S. Murdoch, A. Little and A.D.M. Forte: “Scottish privateering, Swedish neutrality, 
and prize law in the third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674” (2003) 59(1) Forum navale 37-65, 43-53 
discussed cases involving Swedish ships. 
63
 Murdoch, Little and Forte: “Scottish privateering, Swedish neutrality, and prize law in the third 
Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674” generally; G. Rommelse: The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) 
(Hilversum, 2006), 172-173; C.A. Whatley: The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 2006 rept. 
Edinburgh, 2007), 75; E.J. Graham: A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790 (East Linton, 2002) 
19-28. On Scottish prize law generally, J.D. Ford: “The law of the sea and the two unions” in T.C. 




 Ford: Law and Opinion, 71 n.306. 
66
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 71 n.311; Mackay: Memoir, 152 n.1. 
67
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 71; Mackay: Memoir, 152 n.1. 
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Stair later said that he had “designed the [Institutions] to be divided into three 
parts” with the Modus litigandi being the third part.
68
 Watson disputed this by 
showing: first, the Form of Process was not (generally) included in the manuscripts 
of the Institutions;
69
 and secondly, that the omission of an account of procedure was 
also true of Grotius’ Inleydinge on the law of Holland and, extrapolating from this, 
seventeenth-century “books on local substantive law” generally.
70
 Rather, Watson 
believed the Modus litigandi was “intended as a separate work of very short 
compass.”
71
 This was accepted by Ford, who suggested that “although the ‘Form of 
Process’ was never meant to be the third part of the Institutions, it may have been 
written as an alternative to the third part”.
72
 This is plausible but cannot be confirmed 
as there was no preface to the Modus litigandi.  
The only authority cited in the Modus litigandi was Scottish statutory law. 
Stair made no reference to Scottish cases or law books. He made three references to 
Roman law but did not include any citations in support.
73
 He referred once to the 
subscription of writs in France, Germany, England and Ireland,
74
 but did not cite any 
continental jurist. This pattern of citation stands in sharp contrast to that seen in the 
Institutions, which was written less than ten years before the Modus litigandi and 
gave many citations of Scottish case law, Roman law and continental jurists. This 
suggests that he used a very different method when writing these two different 
works. When the Modus litigandi was incorporated into the fourth version of the 
Institutions, it underwent extensive change. It was much enlarged and divided into 
fifty-two titles. The titles were divided into paragraphs, as with the other three books. 
                                                           
68
 S.-/first page of the advertisement. 
69
 A. Watson: The Making of the Civil Law (Cambridge MA, 1981), 31. He stated a privately-owned 
manuscript written by Robert Baillie of Jerviswood completed 1679 (identified by Watson as 
belonging to the 1666 stem) had the Form of Process before the Institutions  [Watson: Making of the 
Civil Law, 31 n.16]. Adv.MS.25.1.12 from the 1666 stem also included the Form of Process at the end 
of the manuscript.  
70
 Watson: Making of the Civil Law, 29-32 esp. 30. However, it should be noted that those more 
rigidly based on the institutional scheme would have naturally consider actions to some extent, 
including Mackenzie. It is worth noting that Stair did not rely on Grotius’ Inleydinge tot de 
Hollandsche rechts-geleertheyd (Edition consulted: Haarlem, 1631) [A.L.M. Wilson: “Stair and the 
Inleydinge of Grotius” (2010) 14(2) Edin.L.R. 259-268 generally]. 
71
 Watson: Making of the Civil Law, 31.  
72
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 71. Hutton, although noting that the Form of Process was “originally a 
separate compilation in Ms”, said it was “incorporated as the third and last part of the First Edition of 
1681” [Hutton: “Stair’s aim in writing the Institutions”, 79]. 
73
 Stair: Modus litigandi, 11, 21, 35. 
74
 Stair: Modus litigandi, 14. 
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Citations of Scottish cases, Grotius,
75
 Seneca and Cicero were added.
76
 The new 
fourth book on actions was still markedly different to the other three in its 
formatting, but Stair’s revision of it in the 1690s made it more akin to the rest of the 
Institutions. 
 
1.1.5  Stair’s source for his citations of Scottish cases 
 
Much of what has been said so far has been based on Stair’s use of Scottish case 
decisions. A further insight into both Stair’s method and use of authority is had by 
identifying his source for these citations of cases. Stair’s citations of cases can 
helpfully be grouped into three categories: those of cases heard before the 
interregnum, those heard during the interregnum, and those heard after 1661. 
For cases heard before the interregnum, he used earlier practicks.
77
 Ford 
showed that Stair cited cases from Durie’s practicks “over six hundred and sixty 
times” in the first version.
78
 To this must be added the 280 citations of Hope, 150 
citations of Spottiswoode, 100 of Haddington,
79
 seventy of Nicholson
80
 and 
occasional citation of Sinclair, Maitland and Balfour.
81
 The practicks of Durie, Hope, 
Spottiswoode, Haddington and Nicholson were also those used most heavily in the 
printed editions (although Stair removed Durie’s name from the citations of his 
practicks
82
). Stair used the most recent practicks. This is consistent with his focus on 
recent interregnum cases, and his choice of the most recent continental legal treatises 
as sources.  
For cases heard after the Restoration, Stair used his own collection of case 
notes, later printed in part as his Decisions.
83
 All the cases in his Decisions were 




 Both S.-/4.3.41. 
77
 On the practicks, H. McKechnie: “Practicks, 1469-1700” in An Introductory Survey of the Sources 
and Literature of Scots Law, by various authors, with an introduction by the Rt. Hon. Lord Macmillan 
(Stair Society series volume 1, Edinburgh, 1936) 25 generally. 
78
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 84. 
79
 All three statistics from Ford: Law and Opinion, 84. 
80
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 471. 
81
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 84. 
82
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 471. 
83
 As has been found in this research, and as can be seen from e.g. surveying the citations in Walker 
(ed): Institutions. 
 - 30 - 
heard by him as a Lord of Session.
84
 Most of the citations which he added for the 
second, third and fourth versions of the Institutions are found in his Decisions and 
were thus of cases he had heard. His addition of citations of recent cases to the 
second, third and fourth versions is comparable to his focus on recent case law in the 
first version. That he used his own case notes suggests that he was using a source 
with which he was familiar and to which he had easy access; he does not seem to 
have consulted other collections of contemporary case notes.  
It is more difficult to determine his source for his citations of cases heard 
during the interregnum; he did not cite them as he did cases in collections of 
practicks and it is improbable that he maintained his own collection of notes on 
decisions during the 1650s.
85
 Stair stated in his Decisions that: “I have marked them 
from the first of June 1661. until the first of August 1681” because after the 
interregnum “the Session was almost wholly new, therefor [sic] it was very necessary 
that their Decisions should be Observed, which induced me (being one of that 
Nomination) to undertake that Task”.
86
 In his Apology: “I did, carefully and 
faithfully, observe the debates and decisions of the Lords of Session, during all the 
time I was in it”.
87
 The implication here is that he began collecting notes on decisions 
in 1661 when the Session was reopened, although it does not prove that he did not 
collect them from 1657 when he was appointed to the Bench.
88
 However, even had 
Stair kept such notes from 1657, these were not his source for his citations of 
interregnum cases. Although most of the interregnum cases cited in the earliest 
version dated after his appointment to the Bench, Stair was not the judge who heard 
the majority of them. The twenty-nine cases heard in the 1650s cited in the titles on 
obligations have been checked against the relevant general minute books.
89
 Fourteen 
                                                           
84
 S.Dec.1, penultimate page of the “Dedicatory”. 
85
 Hutton suggested that Stair began to collect notes on cases from 1657 [Hutton: “Stair’s aim in 
writing the Institutions”, 81]. Ford is sceptical, stating that Stair “could conceivably have made 
separate reports of [cases heard in the 1650s], but this can be no more than speculation.” [Ford: Law 
and Opinion, 72 n.315].  
86
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87
 J. Dalrymple, Viscount Stair: An Apology for Sir James Dalrymple of Stair, President of the 
Session, by Himself (Edinburgh, 1690 rept. Bannatyne Club series volume 6.13, Edinburgh 1825), 13. 
88
 Walker accepted that Stair began collecting notes on cases in 1661 but (wrongly) suggested that 
Stair started writing the Institutions at the same time [Walker (ed): Institutions, 16]. 
89
 N.A.S. CS8/23–CS8/30. 
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of these cases have been found;
90
 the judge was listed for thirteen of them. Only two 
were heard by Stair. This does not reflect the sum total of his activity; Stair heard 
more cases than any other judge during the late 1650s, sitting “in the outer house for 
fifteen of the forty-four weeks during which hearings were heard between November 
1657 and February 1659.”
91
 Had Stair maintained his own collection of notes on 
decisions, it is likely that more cases heard by him would have been cited in the first 
version given his heavy reliance on his own collection when preparing the later 
versions. He must have used an alternative source. 
That half of the cases cited did not appear in the general minute books on the 
date given suggests that he did not rely on court records. Additionally, given his 
extensive use of the earlier practicks and his own case notes, that would not seem to 
have been his usual method for citing Scottish cases. Although he would have been 
familiar with the general minute books (he would have had to sign them as a sitting 
judge), there is no reason to believe that Stair used them for the Institutions.  
What about other practicks? Stair said that notes on decisions “have been 
intermitted” between the death of Durie and “the Kings return” in 1661.
92
 It seems, 
however, that Stair used collections of practicks for his citation of cases heard during 
the interregnum. Case notes must have been maintained during the period. The 
Decisions of the English Judges [D.E.J.], printed from Adv.MS.24.3.1, included 
notes on cases heard between November 1655 and February 1659.
93
 A second 
manuscript, Adv.MS.24.4.1, also contained notes on cases heard in the 1650s. When 
and by whom were these manuscripts written? It seems likely, as Ford suggested, 
that Adv.MS.24.3.1 was written “long after the Interregnum”;
94
 McMillan proposed 
                                                           
90
 This represents about half of these citations. Six citations were not specific enough to locate the 
case as they omitted either part of the date or the names of the parties. These omissions appeared in all 
six of the manuscripts checked, and thus were presumably made in Stair’s first and second versions. 
The other interregnum cases cited in the first and second versions cannot be found on the dates 
specified. There could be three reasons for this: Stair may have incorrectly written them down; they 
may have been incorrectly transcribed by the copyists of the manuscripts checked and thus become 
corrupted; or the general minute books may be inaccurate or incomplete.  
91
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 115. 
92
 S.13.3/2.3.3. The wording is slightly amended for the fourth version, but the meaning is not 
changed. 
93
 The editors declared that they “print[ed] the Manuscript just as it stood, rather than endeavour to 
make the sense complete”. [D.E.J., advertisement] A brief examination of Adv.MS.24.3.1 suggests 
this is generally correct, although the printed version included cases heard until 23
rd
 February 1659 
but the manuscript only those heard until 29
th
 July 1658. 
94
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 111 n.118. 
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that it was compiled by William Downie, one of the clerks of court during the 
interregnum.
95
 Adv.MS.24.4.1 was described by a later hand as Fountainhall’s 
practicks; these case-notes could not originally have been made by Fountainhall, who 
was only a child at the time.
96
 They were probably written by an unidentified 
practitioner active during the 1650s.
97
 Ford argued that Adv.MS.24.3.1 was “clearly 
based on” Adv.MS.24.4.1.
98





 January 1658 while the D.E.J. included many cases heard then. 
There must have been other collections of notes on cases used as sources for 
Adv.MS.24.3.1 in addition to Adv.MS.24.4.1. There is clearly much still to be 
learned about the origins of the D.E.J. and the availability of collections of notes on 
cases heard in the 1650s.  
Did Stair rely on such collections? Approximately half of the c.130 cases 
cited by Stair are found in the D.E.J. on the date given by Stair.
99
 Some of the cases 
cited by Stair appeared for the same dates in the D.E.J. and Adv.MS.24.4.1 but not 














 The apparent errors in the citations of these 
cases may indicate that Stair used manuscripts which were later incorporated into the 
D.E.J. If this is correct, it shows that Stair was relying on practicks for his citations 
of interregnum cases, which is the same type of source he was relying on for earlier 
decisions of the Session. There therefore seems to have been continuity in his choice 
of sources for Scottish case law as he wrote and revised the Institutions. 
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 A.R.G. McMillan: “The judicial system of the Commonwealth in Scotland” (1937) 49(3) Jur.Rev. 
232-255, 245. McMillan gave no evidence to support this assumption. 
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 D. Allan: “Lauder, Sir John, second baronet, Lord Fountainhall (1646–1722)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 
2004; online edition) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16115>, accessed 19
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 August 2010. 
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 Ford: Law and Opinion, 111 n.118. 
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 Ford: Law and Opinion, 111 n.118. 
99
 Some other cases were listed on dates other than those given by Stair; as parties often litigated more 
than once, these have been disregarded. 
100
 D.E.J., 218. Adv.MS.24.4.1, 188. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 9.21 gave the year 1628; 
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101
 D.E.J., 78. Adv.MS.24.4.1, 78. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 11.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.127R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 11.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12 gave the date 15
th
 November 
1655, 11.6. The case was not listed in either CS8/28 or CS8/29 on this date. 
102
 D.E.J., 99. Adv.MS.24.4.1, 99. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 11.7; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.129L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 11.7; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 11.7. The case appeared in 
neither CS8/28 nor CS8/29 on this date. 
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1.2 STAIR’S EDUCATION AND HIS LECTURE FOR ADMISSION AS AN 
ADVOCATE 
 
1.2.1  Stair’s education 
 
1.2.1.1 Pre-university education in seventeenth century Scotland   
 
The First Book of Discipline (presented in 1560; printed in 1621), a Scottish 
Reformation text, called for a school to be founded in every parish and, in more 
important towns, for an independent schoolmaster who could “teach Grammar and 
the Latine tongue”.
103
 It also suggested that the Catechisms be taught in the 
schools,
104
 and prescribed study of “three years or foure at most sufficient to the 
Arts, to wit, Logick and Rhetorick, and to the Greek tongue 4 years”.
105
 The Privy 
Council later decreed that there should be a school established in each Scottish 
parish
106
 and that pupils:  
 
be exercised and trayned up in civilitie, godlines, knawledge, and 
learning, that the vulgar Inglishe toung be universallie plantit… [and] be 





The Privy Council’s decreet did not have the same references to the arts, wit, logic, 
rhetoric or Greek as in the First Book. Although “it is today generally agreed” that 
the lowland network of parish schools was not complete until the late seventeenth 
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 J.K. Cameron: The First Book of Discipline with Introduction and Commentary (Edinburgh, 1972), 
130, 133. R Anderson: “In search of the ‘lad of parts’: the mythical history of Scottish education” 
(1985) 19(1) History Workshop Journal 82-104, 83. 
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 Cameron: First Book of Discipline, 130, 133. 
105
 Cameron: First Book of Discipline, 134. 
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 Act Ordering that There Be an English School in Every Parish of the Kingdom R.P.C., 1616 
volume 10 671-672. Ratification of the Act of Council Regarding Plantation of Schools 1633: R.P.S., 
1633/6/20 <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1633/6/20> accessed 16
th
 July 2010. 
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 R.P.C., 1616 volume 10 671-2. Donaldson and Rait gave this decreet as an example of the Privy 
Council’s legislative capability [G. Donaldson: Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh History of 
Scotland series volume 3, Edinburgh, 1965), 287-288; R.S. Rait: The Parliaments of Scotland 
(Glasgow, 1924), 10]. Goodare showed it was “less a statute than a declaration of intent” [J. Goodare: 
“The Scottish parliament and its early modern ‘rivals’” (2004) 24(1) Parliaments, Estates and 
Representation 147-172, 161-162]. 
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century,
108
 Stair is thought to have attended a parish school at Mauchline in 
Ayrshire.
109
 Ford observed that Stair’s Latin must have been of a satisfactory level 
for him to have matriculated at the University of Glasgow at the normal age of 
fourteen.
110
 This supports Anderson’s research, which shows that schoolmasters 




1.2.1.2 Liberal arts curriculum at Glasgow 
 
Stair enrolled at Glasgow as a student of the liberal arts in 1633. Shepherd showed 
that Glasgow in the early seventeenth century adopted a different method of teaching 
to that of Aberdeen, Edinburgh and St Andrews. The method in the latter universities 
was the ‘regent’ system, where the class was allocated one regent who taught every 
subject during the four years of study. She suggested that this system allowed “little 
opportunity for specialization, and insufficient time to keep abreast of new trends in 
philosophical and scientific thinking”,
112
 although this need not have been true of all 
masters. Glasgow practised the ‘professorial’ system, by which each professor taught 
a specific subject and the class was taught by more than one professor.
113
 Shepherd 
found that this system operated at Glasgow until 1642; it would have been in effect 
while Stair was a student.
114
  
The liberal arts curriculum in seventeenth-century Scotland was still heavily 
influenced by the sixteenth-century scholar and principal of Glasgow, Andrew 
Melville. Melville studied at St Andrews, Paris and Geneva. While at Paris he was 
influenced by Petrus Ramus, a humanist and critic of Aristotelian philosophy who 
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 R. Anderson: “The history of Scottish education, pre-1980” in T.G.K. Bryce & W.M. Humes (eds): 
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nd
 edition, Edinburgh, 2003 rept. Edinburgh, 2006) 219, 219. 
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 C.M. Shepherd (then King): Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish 
Universities in the Seventeenth Century (Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1975), 18. 
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 Shepherd: Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum, 19. 
114
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Stair (1619-1695)”; Shepherd: Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum, 372; Munimenta Alme 
Universitatis Glasguensis: records of the University of Glasgow from its foundation till 1727 volume 
3 (Maitland Club series, Glasgow, 1854), 378-382.  
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became famous for his systematising of knowledge.
115
 Melville’s Ramist curriculum 
replaced the regenting system with the professorial system. It “epitomized the new 
humanist values designed to replace the old scholasticism.”
116
 Set subjects were 
studied in each year of the arts: Greek grammar and rhetoric in the first year; oratory 
and elementary philosophy in the second; mathematics, Aristotle’s Logic, Ethics and 
Politics in the third; and physics, cosmography, history and Hebrew in the fourth.
117
 
Stair thus studied works of classical antiquity, most notably those of Aristotle. 




The extent to which Melville’s curriculum fully replaced the earlier scholastic 
teaching has been debated. Shepherd found that the early scholastic commentators of 
Aristotle (Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham) were referred to in almost all the surviving 
seventeenth-century student dictates from Glasgow’s course on Logic.
119
 
Additionally, “The theses [on Logic] for graduation of 1646, 1663, and 1671 are 
Aristotelian and scholastic.”
120
 She also found that “Aristotle and the scholastic 
commentators provided both the framework and the body of the teaching” of 
metaphysics in the early seventeenth century.
121
 Reid said that “The arts curriculum 
of Scottish universities was overwhelmingly both Aristotelian and scholastic 
throughout the seventeenth century.”
122
 Reid also showed that Glasgow library “held 
all of the major works of Aquinas”.
123
 Yet, although there was still scholastic 
influence and texts used in seventeenth-century teaching, Shepherd argued that: 
 
The 1640 curriculum statements make it clear that the Commissioners 
and the representatives of the various universities intended that this 
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 J. Kirk: “Melville, Andrew (1545-1622)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
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Renaissance and humanistic approach to the text of Aristotle should be 




This means that Stair’s formal education would have exposed him to the methods 
and influences of both humanism and scholasticism; the implications of this will be 
considered below.  
 
1.2.1.3 Stair’s appointment as a regent at Glasgow  
 
Stair returned to the University in 1641 as linguae Graecae professor, to teach Greek 
and Dialectic to first-year students.
125
 This agrees with Forbes’ statement that, while 
working at Glasgow, Stair “studied hard the Greek and Latin Languages, with the 
History and Antiquities of Greece and Rome”.
126
 Stair’s appointment strongly 
implies that he was proficient in Greek. Yet, as will be shown, Stair borrowed all the 
Greek terms in the third version from seventeenth-century legal treatises, although he 
would clearly have understood their meaning.
127
  
The year after Stair’s appointment, Glasgow returned to the regenting system. 
Stair retained his current students for all four years of their education.
128
 He would 
have revised and refreshed his knowledge of the entire curriculum. Some insight into 
the subjects Stair taught and the material he used to do so can be gained from looking 
at his Theses Logicae, Metaphysicae, Physicae, Mathematicae et Ethicae (1646), a 
collection of some of the theses debated by his students. A manuscript entitled 
Methodus instituendae disputationis philosophicae written in 1670-71 from the 
dictations of James Pilan, a regent at Edinburgh, described the disputation of 
theses.
129
 The students selected a thesis put forward for debate by one particular 
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 Shepherd: Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum, 340. 
125
 Ford: “Dalrymple, James, first Viscount Stair (1619-1695)”. 
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student. That student then defended or, if the text was ambiguous, explained the 
thesis. An opponent was selected who then attempted either to present an argument 
which the defending student could not answer, or to find evidence against the 
thesis.
130
 Stair’s collection was divided into five subjects: logic, metaphysics, 
physics, maths and ethics.
131
 Shepherd stated that “Dalrymple’s Theses metaphysicae 
are thoroughly scholastic”
132
 and categorised his theses on ethics as “Aristotelian”.
133
 




1.2.1.4 Did Stair’s formal education before 1648 influence the 
Institutions? 
 
The purpose of this short investigation is to determine, first, whether Stair would 
have been familiar before 1648 with any of the works cited in the Institutions and, 
secondly, whether Stair would have been familiar with or influenced by any 
particular schools of thought. It is clear that by 1648 Stair would have had a thorough 
knowledge of Aristotle, whose Logic, Ethics and Politics were the basis of teaching 
for the third year of the liberal arts degree. Stair graduated as the highest achieving 
member of his class.
135
 He would have acquired and been able to demonstrate a high 
level of knowledge and understanding of the subjects on the curriculum, including 
Aristotle. Additionally, as Aristotle was cited in Stair’s printed Theses,
136
 Stair used 
him when teaching. Yet all the citations of Aristotle which appear in the Institutions, 
as well as the majority of those of other writers of classical antiquity, were borrowed 
from seventeenth-century legal treatises.
137
 Secondly, Stair’s education would have 
introduced him to the principles and methods of both humanism and scholasticism. 
This had a profound impact on his writing. Reid has found evidence of scholastic 
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influence in Stair’s titles on obligations.
138
 Humanist influence has been found in the 
Institutions and in Stair’s lecture for admission as an advocate in 1648 by this 
research.
139
 Although there is no evidence to suggest that Stair consulted directly any 
scholastic or humanist jurists for the Institutions, the influence that these movements 
and methods had on his intellectual formation can be seen clearly in that work. 
It should be noted that not having studied law at university made Stair 
untypical of the advocates. Mackay suggested that Stair’s education in the liberal arts 
served him well: 
 
When he came to write on law he wrote, not as a mere lawyer, but as one 
who had reasoned and taught in other subjects, especially philosophy, ... 
His mind, as we see it exhibited in his Institutions, never forgot the 
search for principles which had formed its early training. It is this which 
constitutes the distinction of that work, making it worthy to be read by 




Although this is hyperbole, Mackay’s underlying point is correct. Stair wrote as an 
educated man, and his reasoned thinking is evident throughout his writing. Yet his 
lack of formal training in law did have an impact on the Institutions, which did not 
display the same breadth of civilian opinion that can be found in the collected works 
of his predecessor Thomas Craig, thought to also have studied law in France,
141
 nor 




1.2.2  Stair’s lecture for admission as an advocate 
 
Stair’s lecture for admission as an advocate is the earliest evidence of what Stair may 
have been studying and of the extent of his knowledge of the law at that point in his 
life. It was given on 15
th
 February 1648. In the lecture he cautioned against the 
creation of a new superior between the existing superior and his direct vassal, which 
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would put the vassal in a worse position than he was previously.
143
 Stair explained 
that he had seen a case, likely heard in the summer session of 1647,
144
 where a 
prelate’s superiority had been abolished, leaving the baron as the direct vassal of the 
king. The defenders had then “obtened from the king and gotten them erected in 
temporal livings qherby they are interponed betwixt the king and the barrons 
persewers as intermediat superiors”.
145
 Stair argued that this should not be allowed, 
stating: “we will abhorre that intention”
146
 and advised the judges: “the politick is 
stored with monstruous & new conceptions, by your hurculean courage to cutt in 
peeces this Gordian knot.”
147
  
It was unusual for a lecture to be on Feudal law.
148
 Cairns noted that “the norm 
was to read a lesson on civil law” and that this was “sufficiently expected for the 
entry in the Books of Sederunt to be formulaic”.
149
 Indeed, he observed that even 
Stair was recorded as having given a lesson on Roman law.
150
 Stair explained his 
choice: 
 
I turned over so many vast volums of leaves lyke Sybillaes leaves by an 
indigested digested & confused Cod and the glosses of commentaries 
written theron with there counsells & decisions the wearisomnesse therof 
is well knowne to such qho hes stragged in these bywayis without a guide 
so that I know [not] qhat first to speake in such a variety of things I was 
inhibite to handle any title or chapter of the civil Law by the copious 




Stair’s comment that he found Roman law unmanageable likely referred to the 
medieval juristic literature rather than to the Corpus iuris civilis itself. Ford also 
interpreted this passage in this way, and noted that “it had long since become 
conventional for lawyers to complain about the unwieldy proportions and the 
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labyrinthine meanders of the civilian literature.”
152
 This was a regular complaint 
made by legal humanists, who “concentrated their efforts on ridding the texts of the 
glosses and commentaries that engulfed them.”
153
 The concern of legal humanism 




That Stair did not lecture on a point of Roman law must be considered in the 
broader context of his life. Ford suggested that:  
 
It was expected that regent masters in the liberal arts would spend their 
time outside the classroom in studying one of the higher academic 
disciplines, and Stair had evidently applied himself to the study of the 





Ford pointed to Forbes’ declaration that Stair “studied hard the Greek and Latin 
Languages, with the History and Antiquities of Greece and Rome, in order to the 
Study of the Civil Law”.
156
 This classical learning was the currency of all educated 
men. Yet Stair used no Greek or Latin in his lecture and, as Richter has shown,
157
 
little Greek in his Institutions. Additionally, Cairns showed that Stair borrowed his 
history of law in Europe from Craig.
158
 Nonetheless, that Stair dedicated himself to 
learning law in his spare time as a regent is plausible: “Stair himself claimed in 1681 
that he had been engaged in ‘the Study and Practice of Law’ for ‘little short of fourty 
[sic] years’, which clearly implies a period of study before his admission to 
practice.”
159
 A “little short” of forty years suggests Stair began studying law 
sometime during the 1640s. As the case on which Stair gave his lecture was likely 
heard in the summer session of 1647,
160
 Stair must have been observing cases in 
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court in Edinburgh within a short period of his resignation of his office at Glasgow in 
April 1647. It is possible to deduce what Stair studied by examining the authorities 
cited by him in his lecture.  
By 1648 Stair was already familiar with “our learned countryman m
r.
 Tho. 
Craig [and] his learned book of the fewes”.
161
 Craig also insisted that new superiors 
could not be interposed above a vassal.
162
 Additionally, Stair cited statutes of James 
VI.
163
 Stair therefore had some knowledge of Scots law before being admitted as an 
advocate; this was not true of all candidates.
164
 Craig’s Jus feudale was used by those 
who had recently passed as an advocate to acquaint themselves with Scots law. 
Indeed, Cairns stated that “reducing that law to an ordered science, thereby making it 
easier for students to learn” was Craig’s intention;
165
 compendia indicate that Jus 
feudale was used in this way.
166
 
Stair also cited continental authority, specifically five Italian lawyers. The 
first was Obertus de Orto (d.c.1175), who was a compiler of the Libri feudorum.
167
 
The second was Francischinus Curtius (1470-1533);
168
 Ford suggested that the 
relevant passage was in Curtius’ Tractatus illustrium iurisconsultorum.
169
 The 
citation of the third jurist – “Capit” – is less clear.
170
 This may be to the Frankish 
capitularies, the collection of imperial legislation issued by the Carolingian kings.
171
 
Stair did refer to certain Holy Roman emperors, specifically “emperour [sic] 
Frederick” (Frederick I Barbarossa) and “Conrad” (likely Conrad II).
172
 Legislation 
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promulgated under these emperors was included in the Libri feudorum. Yet Stair 
referred to “the learned men in thir places Curtius and Capit”, which seems to 
indicate a jurist rather than the capitularies.
173
 Ford argued the reference was to the 
Investitura feudalis of Antonius Capycius (1450/70-1545), often cited in works on 
Feudal law.
174
 Stair’s reference to “Capit” could plausibly be to either the 
Capitularies or to Capycius. If the reference was borrowed from another source, it is 
likely that the source would need to be identified before the reference could be 
verified with certainty. The fourth jurist cited was “Bardus also in his 16 counsell p. 
436”
 175
 probably Baldus, whom Stair also cited in the Institutions (although only 
indirectly through Craig).
176
 Finally, Stair cited “Fulgo in his 9 counsell”,
177
 whom 




Stair’s choice of citations of continental legal sources for his lecture is 
markedly different to the sources he used for his Institutions. In his lecture, the five 
continental jurists referred to by Stair were all older authorities, dating from the 
twelfth to the mid-sixteenth centuries. There were no citations to recent continental 
jurists in the lecture. In his Institutions, although Stair cited some older authorities, 
all the treatises which Stair consulted directly were recent, having been written in the 
seventeenth century. It is possible that between writing his lecture and writing the 
first version Stair changed how he selected or what he looked for in his sources. This, 
however, seems unlikely. First, it is a significant change to go from using such old 
sources to using exclusively recent sources. Secondly, it seems unlikely that so early 
in Stair’s career he was familiar with these older authorities when later he borrowed 
all his references to such authorities from other works. Such a change in his method 
of research and writing seems improbable. What is perhaps more likely is that Stair 
borrowed his references to the older authorities in his lecture from another source, 
which has yet to be identified. If this is correct, it would mean that there was 
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continuity in this aspect of his method between the point at which he wrote his 
lecture and when he wrote the Institutions. 
There is not really any treatment of Roman law in Stair’s lecture. Stair 
mentioned the Digest and Codex and, if this reading is correct, dismissed the great 
body of civilian literature. He did not select a topic of Roman law for the basis of his 
lecture.
179
 Eleven years later Stair wrote the Institutions. More than 140 citations of 
Roman law have been found in the sample manuscripts from the 1662 stem (and thus 
presumably Stair’s first version). Many of the citations of Roman law will be shown 
to have been borrowed from continental jurists.  
It is hard to determine with certainty whether Stair studied Roman law before 
1648, as Forbes and Ford suggested.
180
 Certainly, Stair did not always use the 
knowledge he had acquired: he did not use much Greek in the Institutions, and 
borrowed his citations of Aristotle from other seventeenth-century jurists. He may 
have had knowledge of Roman law, but merely chose not to utilise that knowledge in 
his lecture. What can be said is that by 1648 Stair had already focused on the needs 
of legal practice and had acquired knowledge of Scots law, Feudal law and Craig’s 
Jus feudale. 
 
1.3 CONTINENTAL LEGAL LITERATURE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
SCOTTISH LIBRARIES AND WRITING 
 
In principle nothing can be ruled out as a possible source for the Institutions. 
However, it is possible to deduce the sort of continental legal treatises that Stair 
would likely have examined by considering which were being sought by Scottish 
advocates during the seventeenth century. Many advocates in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were keen book collectors. Amongst these men were: Clement 
Litill, whose donation founded the Edinburgh University Library;
181
 Scot of 
Scotstarvit, who donated numerous volumes to St Andrews University Library and 
encouraged others to do the same; and Thomas Hamilton, who began the library of 
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the Earls of Haddington.
182
 It is probable that Stair had good access to books. 
Unfortunately, a catalogue of Stair’s own library has not survived. In order to 
determine which treatises were of interest to contemporary Scottish advocates, the 
catalogues of three libraries have been examined. The first catalogue to be examined 
is that of Lord Fountainhall, who was made a Lord of Session in 1689.
183
 The second 
appendix to his journal provides a list of those books which he acquired 1667-
1679.
184
 The second is that of Lord George Douglas, who was intended for a career 
as a diplomat before his death at the age of twenty-eight. His library was donated to 
the Faculty of Advocates in 1695 after his death.
185
 It included over 800 works, the 
majority of which were legal treatises.
186
 Finally, the 1683 and 1692 catalogues of 
the Advocates’ Library. The collections of the Advocates’ Library were generally 
acquired from the private libraries of the advocates (whether purchased or gifted).
187
 
This is in keeping with Wijffels’ conclusion that the growth of the law libraries of 
English institutions “seems to have been more often the result of individual 
benefactions of actual copies than the outcome of a policy of acquisition.”
188
 An 
examination of that library’s catalogues thus demonstrates the type of books that 
advocates of the period were collecting. The library had been acquiring books since 
1682, and produced its first catalogue in 1683, although it was only officially 
inaugurated in 1689.
189
 By 1683, its collection was extensive and continued to 
expand, as is seen in the 1692 catalogue.
190
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 The collective content of these libraries was extensive, containing works on 
Roman, Canon, Feudal, Scots, English, and continental law. Although this is a 
limited sample and may not be representative of advocates’ libraries as a whole, 
some conclusions can still be drawn. All the continental legal treatises which Stair 
consulted for his titles on obligations appeared in at least one of these three libraries. 
It therefore seems that these works were sought by Scottish advocates. Additionally, 
certain editions of these works seem to have been particularly popular. Both Lord 
George Douglas and the Advocates’ Library had the 1680 edition of Grotius, the 
1643 edition of Gudelinus, and the 1665 edition of Vinnius’ commentary. Gudelinus’ 
De jure novissimo was also owned by Fountainhall, although his journal does not 
record the edition acquired. Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta and Corvinus seem 
not to have been so widely sought, being held only by the Advocates’ Library. The 
sources Stair used were therefore being sought by his contemporaries, with his 
principal sources being popular. 
  To what extent did Stair’s contemporaries engage with the continental 
literature? The breadth of reading of some Scottish lawyers was impressive. Lord 
Cooper suggested that Mackenzie’s possession of “so extensive a knowledge and so 
acute a critical appreciation of the entire range of legal literature” was likely to have 
been unique or, at least, unusual for his day.
191
 This is hyperbole, but Chalmers, 
Gane and Leverick also recognised Mackenzie’s knowledge of continental legal 
literature:  
 
These works display very extensive scholarship and acquaintance with 
continental sources. Even assuming amanuenses to help him, Mackenzie 
must have devoted considerable time and thought regularly, despite the 
calls of other commitments, to research and writing. He clearly was well-
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Extensive citation of continental legal literature is also seen in Spottiswoode’s 
practicks, compiled roughly a generation before Stair. Brooks noted that “No other 
practicks surpass Spottiswoode’s range of authorities.”
193
 Cairns found that there was 
frequent citation of Civilian literature in Spottiswoode’s practicks.
194
 Indeed, he 
stated: “It is obvious that, for preference, Spottiswoode cited relatively 
contemporary, indeed modern, Civilian works on substantive law and that, among 
the authors he preferred, Humanists tended to predominate.”
195
 Other seventeenth-
century advocates also had good knowledge of continental literature, but did not 
engage with it to the same extent. Lord Cooper found Fountainhall’s “acquaintance 




 Not all legal treatises of this period demonstrated such learning. Cooper 
suggested that the Doubts by Lord Dirleton relied predominantly on four textbooks 
of the 1660s and 1670s. He thus said Dirleton “was content to lift ideas from a 
superficial perusal of a few second-rate modern handbooks.”
197
 However, this 
comment is probably unfair. The Doubts was published posthumously, after an 
attempted reconstruction of Nisbet’s original work from epitomized manuscript 
copies.
198
 The printed volume thus does not necessarily reflect accurately Nisbet’s 
learning. Further, Blackie has shown that the Doubts cited Covarruvias, Justus 
Clarus, Gregorius Tholosanus, Cujacius “and various Roman texts” when discussing 
consistorial courts.
199
 Presuming that these citations were in Nisbet’s original 
manuscript, they indicate that he did have knowledge of Roman law and the leading 
continental jurists of the early modern period. 
Nonetheless, this shows that not all the works by Scottish jurists of the mid-
seventeenth century (whether available in print or in manuscript copies) engaged 
with the continental legal literature. However, some Scottish jurists did have 
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extensive knowledge of that literature and incorporated this into their writing. It 
cannot be presumed that Stair or any other seventeenth-century lawyer was familiar 
with a wide range of the continental literature, despite that literature being popular in 
Scotland at the time of writing.  
 
1.4  CONCLUSIONS  
 
The first part of this chapter examined certain relevant aspects of the nature of the 
Institutions. The timeline for Stair’s writing and revising it has been established. 
Stair wrote the substantial part of the first version in 1659-1661 during the 
suspension of judicial business. He completed it only in 1662 during the break 
between court sittings. Stair’s own manuscript does not survive, so the first version 
can be seen only through the manuscripts of the 1662 stem. Stair revised the 
Institutions during the breaks between sessions in 1666-1667; this was the second 
version, and can be seen through the manuscripts of the 1666 stem. Stair revised the 
Institutions again for the third version, which was printed in 1681 as the first printed 
edition. He made his final revision for the fourth version, the second printed edition.  
Ford has shown that the greatest change which Stair made for the second and 
third versions was his increasing the number of citations of Scottish authority. Stair 
also added a number of citations of Roman law for the third version. It will be shown 
that Stair’s method changed when preparing the fourth version, when he more than 
doubled the number of citations of Roman law.
200
 Stair also made changes to the 
structure and content of the Institutions. Most important amongst these were, first, 
his division of the fourth version into four books according to the institutional 
scheme of Gaius and Justinian’s Institutes.
201
 The second important change was his 
incorporation into the fourth version of the Modus litigandi, written in the 1660s and 
bound with the Institutions when printed in 1681. Finally, he added a long discussion 
of prize law for the third version, which became a separate title in the fourth. This 
was almost certainly in response to the increased judicial activity caused by Scottish 
privateering during the second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars. 
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Stair was shown to have used collections of practicks, probably exclusively, 
as his source of Scottish case law. For cases heard before the interregnum, he used 
particularly those of Durie, Hope, Spottiswoode, Haddington and Nicholson. These 
were the most recent collections of case notes; this focus on recent sources is also 
seen in his selection of continental legal treatises. For interregnum cases, he also 
used collections of practicks. These have not been identified (they may not all have 
survived), but it is probable that he used manuscripts which were later used in the 
compilation of the Decisions of the English Judges. For cases heard after 1661, he 
seems to have used his own collection of case notes exclusively.  
When Stair completed the first, second and third versions, he shortly 
thereafter allowed each to be circulated (whether by copying from his manuscript or 
sending it for printing). There is no evidence in the titles on obligations of the fourth 
version that he continued to revise it until sending it to the printer. This may indicate 
that he was slowing down in his work habits. Alternatively, it may show that he 
revised each of the four books of the fourth version in turn and thus stopped working 
on the titles on obligations (in the first book of the second printed edition) earlier 
than he completed that version overall.
202
 If this second possibility is correct, it 
would be a change in his previous working habit: he seems to have gone back over 
the entire Institutions one last time before completing the first, second and third 
versions.  
The printing of the third and fourth versions by the Heirs of Andrew 
Anderson was sometimes inaccurate, and there are variations in the print-run of the 
second printed edition.
203
 There are also variations within the manuscripts. These 
variations raise doubt as to how reliable a reflection of what Stair actually wrote are 




The second part of this chapter examined Stair’s intellectual formation, and 
established three important points. First, Stair’s formal education exposed him to the 
methods and influences of both scholasticism and humanism. The Scottish liberal 
arts curriculum was traditionally scholastic, but there was during the seventeenth-
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century a greater emphasis on humanist methods and learning. This early exposure to 
humanism and scholasticism had quite an impact on Stair: the influences of both can 
be seen in his later work. Reid has shown that Stair’s titles on restitution and 
recompense showed intellectual influence from scholasticism. His lecture for 
admission as an advocate contained a declaration typical of legal humanism, and his 
writing of the Institutions will be shown to have been influenced by humanism also. 
The second important point to note is that Stair’s formal education meant that he 
knew Latin and Greek, and was familiar with Aristotle as well as other writers of 
classical antiquity. When writing and revising the Institutions, Stair did not draw on 
this knowledge. Richter showed that Stair used few Greek terms in the Institutions;
205
 
this research will show that he borrowed all the Greek terms in the first version from 
Grotius and Vinnius.
206
 It will also show that Stair’s citations of Aristotle were 
borrowed from the continental legal literature.
207
 The final point is that Stair’s lecture 
for admission as an advocate was untypical for the period as it focused particularly 
on Scottish legal practice rather than Roman law. He may have done so simply to be 
different, but the justification he gave was his lack of understanding of the civilian 
literature and possibly Roman law itself. Eleven years later, Stair wrote the 
Institutions, which contained a significant number of citations of Roman law and 
civilian literature. The question is then raised whether and to what extent Stair 
improved his knowledge of Roman law and civilian literature in the intervening 
decade. 
 
The third part of this chapter examined the collection, knowledge and use of 
continental legal literature by seventeenth-century Scottish advocates. Some 
seventeenth-century Scottish jurists had a detailed knowledge of continental legal 
literature, and engaged with these treatises in their writing. Others did not display 
such a comprehensive knowledge in their writing, and were more pedestrian in their 
choice and use of such sources. This gives some context in which to place this 
research.  
                                                           
205
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 369. 
206
 Below, 4.1.5, 4.1.7, 6.1.2. 
207
 Below, 4.1.2, 4.1.8. 
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All five treatises which will be examined as Stair’s sources in the titles on 
obligations were held by at least one of the three sample libraries. Stair’s three 
principle sources were held by more than one, sometimes all, of those libraries. 
Certain editions of Grotius, Gudelinus and Vinnius’ commentary appear to have been 
favoured. Although the small sample of libraries considered does not allow definite 
conclusions, this strongly indicates that all five treatises which will be examined in 
detail as sources for the Institutions would have been available to Stair. This in turn 
supports the conclusion that his references to these works were not borrowed from 
elsewhere but the product of his consultation of them. 




2.1 METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
2.1.1  Reading the Institutions 
 
The four versions of the Institutions were examined for this thesis. This revealed Stair’s 
method, choice and use of sources, and his patterns of citation. It also showed his 
purpose in writing each version, and how this changed over time. The necessity of 
consulting each version produced by Stair was complicated by the variations which 
existed within both the manuscript stems and the print-run of the printed editions.
1
 Two 
copies of each printed edition were thus consulted for this thesis. For the first printed 
edition, a digitized copy of that held in the Harvard Law School Library (now available 
through Early English Books Online2) and the writer’s own copy were used. For the 
second printed edition, the Edinburgh University Law Library copy
3
 and the Aberdeen 
University Historic Collections copy
4
 were consulted. Most of the variations found in 
the print-runs related to punctuation and other accidents of printing, but important 
variations were noted in certain citations in the second printed edition. Such problems 
were not found when comparing the copies of the first printed edition. Yet there were 
changes in punctuation in some of the citations, suggesting that the print-run was still 
not uniform. However, that only few and minor variations were found between the two 
copies of each printed edition suggests that they were pretty close to Stair’s own version, 
as one would expect. 
                                                           
1





 October 2010. 
3
 Shelfmark: *Fol.KK.Sta. 
4
 Shelfmark: pi MH f34702 Sta. 
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Sample manuscripts were also chosen for use in this thesis from the thirty-plus 
surviving manuscripts of the Institutions
 
forming the two stems.
5
 Variations in the 
manuscript stems included accidental errors or omissions and deliberate alterations by 
the copyists who “incorporat[ed] changes they had noted in other manuscripts”.6 Three 
manuscripts from each stem were consulted to ensure that such variations did not distort 
the perception of Stair’s writing at that time. All six were selected from those held by the 
Advocates’ Library: first, so that all six could be consulted together and thus compared 
as necessary; and secondly, because the stem to which each of the Advocates’ Library’s 
manuscripts belonged had already been identified.7 The accurate identification of the 
stem of each of the six manuscripts selected was affirmed by checking them for 
authorities dating after 1662 or 1667 and examining passages which Stair had revised for 
the second version. Although occasionally an authority dating after the completion of the 
relevant version was cited,
8
 or the text was otherwise updated according to a later 
version, the manuscripts were found to have been identified as belonging to the correct 
stem. These sample manuscripts were therefore taken as being representative of the 
stems generally, and thus Stair’s first and second versions. The manuscripts consulted 
for this thesis were: 
   From the 1662 stem:
9
  From the 1666 stem:
10
 
   Adv.MS.25.1.8  Adv.MS.25.1.5 
   Adv.MS.25.1.10  Adv.MS.25.1.7 
   Adv.MS.25.1.11  Adv.MS.25.1.12 
An important consideration when selecting manuscripts was to identify which were 
closest to Stair’s version. Of those from the 1662 stem, Adv.MS.25.1.10 had been 
                                                           
5
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 60. 
6
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 68. 
7
 Watson: The Making of the Civil Law, 31; Ford: Law and Opinion, 65 n.282-283. 
8
 e.g. Cranston v Wilkison 1666 [M.10340] was cited at the end of Adv.MS.25.1.11 [fol.355L], suggesting 
it was updated; the other two manuscripts from this stem end before this, citing Dingwall v Wanderson 
1619 [?M.4449?] [Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 31.19]. Yet Adv.MS.25.1.11 does not go on to discuss 
the opinion of Lord Gossford expressed in 1672 like Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7 from the 1666 stem 
[31.19 and 31.18 respectively]. Adv.MS.25.1.12, 31.19 also ends at Dingwall. 
9
 Also Adv.MS.24.2.10, 25.1.9, 25.1.14, and 25.4.17. These others have not been checked. 
10
 Also Adv.MS.25.1.13, 25.3.2, 25.3.3. These others have not been checked. 
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analysed by Ford, who showed that the manuscript was not updated by its copyist.
11
 It 
does not feature the date of its completion, but it must have been before November 1667 
when it was acquired by a William Primrose, as is recorded on the front leaf. Despite the 
possibility that it was copied after Stair had already completed the second version, 
Adv.MS.25.1.10 is close to Stair’s first version. Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.11 were 
selected for use in this thesis from the remaining six manuscripts from the 1662 stem in 
the Advocates’ Library as a control. Adv.MS.25.1.8 bore neither the date nor the 
copyist’s name but was obviously contemporary, judging by the handwriting.
12
 
Adv.MS.25.1.11 did not bear its date of completion, but it must have been between 1666 
and 1685: the manuscript was acquired by a David Strachan in 1685; Cranston v 
Wilkinson 1666 [M.10340] was cited at the end of the manuscript.
13
 This manuscript was 
thus updated by its copyist. It was selected nonetheless, first, because the titles on 
obligations did not appear to have been extensively amended by the copyist and, 
secondly, because it was deemed useful to see what sort of amendments had been made. 
Of those from the 1666 stem, Adv.MS.25.1.5 was selected as Ford showed it had 
also not been updated by its copyist.
14
 It was completed in April 1678 and thus was 
copied before Stair had the third version printed. It was thus presumably close to Stair’s 
second version. The other two manuscripts used for this thesis were chosen as controls. 
Adv.MS.25.1.7, apparently completed in February 1677, was chosen because Ford 
found that it varied little from Adv.MS.25.1.5 and was therefore also presumably close 
to Stair’s version.
15
 These two manuscripts were found by this thesis to be similar 
enough to suggest that Adv.MS.25.1.5 may have been a direct copy of Adv.MS.25.1.7. 
Adv.MS.25.1.12 did not bear the date on which it was copied.
16
 Further examination of 
                                                           
11
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
12
 The bookplate of Henry Home of Kames is present but, given he was an eighteenth-century lawyer [A.J. 
Durie and S. Handley: “Home, Henry, Lord Kames (1696–1782)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13643>, accessed 18
th
 August 2010], this is not helpful in dating 
the manuscript. 
13
 Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.355L. 
14
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
15
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 67 n.293. 
16
 Its identification as being “ex libris archibaldi colquhoune” is not useful for dating the manuscript. 
There was an Archibald Colquhoun, son of William Colquhoun of Garscadden, who was examined for 
admission as an advocate in March 1684 [J.M. Pinkerton (ed): The Minute Book of the Faculty of 
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this manuscript showed that in some places it had been updated according to the first but 
not the second printed edition, and hence must have been copied between 1681 and 
1693. However, there were very few such deliberate amendments by the copyist; the 
manuscript is still fairly close to Stair’s second version. It was selected as it was 
considered useful to see how the manuscript had been amended in these places and to 




In selecting three manuscripts from each stem, a control was built into this 
research. This meant that the variations introduced by the copyists were more apparent 
in this research than, for example, in Ford’s, and could thus be identified and the 
implications discussed. Although Ford showed that Adv.MS.25.1.10 and Adv.MS.25.1.5 
were not updated by their copyists, there were apparent errors and omissions in the texts 
introduced by the copyists;
18
 using additional manuscripts as a control in this research 
allowed these variations to be identified and a more complete insight into Stair’s first 
and second versions to be had.  
After the printed editions and manuscripts had been selected, the titles on 
obligations in the Harvard copy of the first printed edition and the Edinburgh copy of the 
second were compared word-for-word and all dissimilarities were noted.
19
 Certain 
passages of the manuscripts were also compared word-for-word for evidence of Stair’s 
revising the text for the second and third versions. These sample passages were chosen 
as they were relevant to this thesis because, for example, they contained citations of 
continental jurists or authorities borrowed from Stair’s principal sources. These detailed 
comparisons of Stair’s wording between the four versions revealed the type of changes 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Advocates volume 1: 1661-1712 (Stair Society series volume 29, Edinburgh, 1976), 68] but also an 
Archibald Colquhoun, Lord Advocate 1807-1816 [G.F.R. Barker (rev. E. Metcalfe): “Colquhoun, 
Archibald Campbell- (c.1754–1820)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5986>, accessed 18
th
 August 2010]. The latter agrees with the 
book being donated to the Advocates’ Library in 1824, as was recorded by its book plate. 
17
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 67-68 esp. n.295. 
18
 e.g. Adv.MS.25.1.5, 4.7 omitted the citation of Wesenbecius. 
19
 As most of the variations found within the print-runs of the two different printed editions were minor, it 
was not necessary to compare all four copies word-for-word. 
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which Stair made to his text each time he revised it, and showed which passages had 
been substantially amended.  
 
2.1.2  Working out Stair’s pattern of citation 
 
Stair’s citations indicate the legal authorities which he thought authoritative and may 
have consulted. It was therefore necessary to continue this research by working out his 
pattern of citation. A list was compiled of his citations of Roman law, Canon law, 
foreign statutes, continental legal treatises and writers of classical antiquity in the titles 
on obligations in the manuscripts and both printed editions (and, extrapolating from this, 
all four versions). This has four important functions. First, the addition of citations 
during a revision could indicate the initial or repeated use of a continental treatise. 
Secondly, his pattern of citation of a particular type of source (such as Roman law) is 
indicative of his use of that source and his perception of its authority, but can also reflect 
on the nature of legal authority more generally. His changes in the pattern of citation of a 
type of source could indicate a shift in Stair’s use of the source or his perceptions of it. 
Thirdly, determining the number of citations to any given authority made it possible to 
identify those places where Stair included more authorities and to recognise which 
authorities he found most compelling for particular discussions. Finally, the list of 
Stair’s citations of Roman law, Canon law, foreign statutes, continental legal treatises 
and writers of classical antiquity could be compared to lists of authority found in 
continental treatises to identify citations which may have been borrowed. 
 
2.1.3  Comparing the Institutions to continental treatises  
 
2.1.3.1 Identifying and verifying Stair’s citations of continental jurists 
 
For this thesis, the complete text of the printed editions of the Institutions was checked 
to ensure that any jurist cited outwith the titles on obligations, but who may have been a 
source for them, was not omitted from this research. Taking account of all four versions, 
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Stair cited twenty-six continental jurists in the entire Institutions. It was necessary to 
identify and check the treatises and passages to which Stair referred. Citations which 
gave only the name of the jurist but not the treatise presented a challenge. Later editions 
of the Institutions and the secondary literature were checked to see if the relevant treatise 
had already been identified (as was the case for Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos and 
Molina’s De justitia et jure).
20
 Where Stair had cited by name a treatise by the same 
jurist elsewhere, the other citations were invariably found to refer to the same work (as 
in the case of Grotius’ De jure belli). Where a jurist was renowned for a particular 
treatise, Stair’s citations were invariably found to refer to it (as was the case for 
Connanus’ commentary). Other treatises were identified as Stair’s citations were found 
to have been borrowed from another jurist who gave more detail (such as Faber’s 
commentary on Inst.3.23.pr, Wesenbecius’ Paratitla, and Mynsinger’s Apotelesma).  
Some, however, could not be identified. Stair borrowed a citation of Cujacius 
from Craig;21 neither Stair nor Craig gave the name of the treatise. As Cujacius was a 
prolific writer, the reference could have referred to a number of works. However, in this 
instance it is clear that Stair borrowed the citation without checking it, and thus there 
cannot have been direct influence from Stair’s reading of Cujacius. It is therefore less 
important to identify the treatise of Cujacius which Craig may have read. 
 
2.1.3.2 Treatises identified as possible sources of the Institutions 
  
An examination of the treatises cited by Stair often showed whether he had directly 
consulted them or borrowed his citation from a different source. Borrowing could be 
deduced where, for example, Stair’s citation or description of the text was incorrect. An 
instance of this is Stair’s citation of Balduinus for the customs of the “Neighbour 
Nations” in his discussion of written contracts;
22
 no such comparative reference is found 
                                                           
20
 e.g. Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16; Richter: “Molina, Grotius, 
Stair and the jus quaesitum tertio” passim; Rodger: “Molina, Stair and the jus quaesitum tertio” passim. 
21
 Below, 3.2.2.1. 
22
 S.10.11/1.10.11. 
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in the title of Balduinus cited.
23
 Stair’s inaccurate description of Balduinus is explained 
by the fact that he borrowed this citation from Gudelinus without checking it.
24
 In such 
cases, there could not have been direct influence from the treatise cited and thus it could 
be rejected as a possible source for the Institutions.  
Those continental legal treatises which appear to have been directly consulted by 
Stair were designated as his possible sources and were examined further by this thesis. 
These included: Grotius’ De jure belli; Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo; Vinnius’ 
Jurisprudentia contracta; Corvinus’ Digesta per Aphorismos; and Stephanus’ 
Oeconomia.25 Some treatises which were cited and probably consulted by Stair have not 
been examined further as they contained no parts which could reasonably have been 
used for Stair’s titles on obligations (specifically Gudelinus’ De jure feudorum and 
Zoesius’ De feudis). Treatises identified as possible sources of the Institutions by the 
secondary literature were also examined, including: Vinnius’ commentary;
26
 Vinnius’ 
Notae;27 and the three major works by Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), the famous 
Natural lawyer.
28
 His use of Scottish works cited in the Institutions (Craig’s Jus feudale 
and Skene’s De verborum significatione) was also analysed for this research, so that 
comparisons in Stair’s use of Scottish and continental treatises could be made. 
 
2.1.3.3 Editions of texts consulted  
 
Osler has shown the importance of selecting scientifically editions of treatises for use in 
legal-historical research.
29
 Some of the treatises on which Stair may have relied were 
                                                           
23
 F. Balduinus: Commentarij in libros quatuor Institutiones iuris civilis: Et eiusdem libri duo ad leges 
Romuli, & leges XII. Tabularum ab ipso autore denuo recogniti, & multo locupletiores facti (Edition 
consulted: Paris, 1554), 3.21.  
24
 Below, 5.1.4.2. 
25
 For an overview of the lives and works of these jurists, below, 3.2.6. The first three of these had already 
been shown by Gordon to have been sources of borrowing by Stair [Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the 
sources of Stair’s Institutions” passim]. This research has confirmed his findings. 
26
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257-258. 
27
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 374-375. 
28
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 371-373, 375-378. S. Pufendorf: De jure naturae et gentium libri 
octo (London, 1672), Elementa jurisprudentia universalis libri II. Editio novissima & emendatissima 
(Cambridge, 1672), and De officio hominis & civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo (Cambridge, 1682). 
29
 D.J. Osler: “Dies diem docet” (1991) 18 Ius commune 207-224, esp. 207-210, 222-224. 
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available in more than one edition before Stair wrote. It was important to consult copies 
of the continental treatises which were as close to what Stair would have read as 
possible. Three questions had to be taken into account when selecting editions of these 
treatises. First, which of Stair’s possible sources had more than one edition printed 
before 1693? Secondly, which of these editions were being sought by the Scottish legal 
community? Finally, what was the extent of the changes between editions? 
  Most of Stair’s treatises were available in more than one edition before 1693. 
Grotius’ De jure belli had eight authorised editions before 1659.
30
 Gudelinus’ De jure 
novissimo had three editions before 1693, in 1620, 1643 and 1661. Vinnius’ commentary 
was first printed in 1642, with subsequent editions in 1655, 1659, 1665 (perhaps 
reprinted in 1666), and 1692. Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta had four editions: 1624-
1631, 1647, 1664, and 1690. Vinnius’ Notae was first printed in 1646, with subsequent 
editions printed in at least 1652, 1658, 1663, 1669 and 1690.
31
 Corvinus had editions in 
at least 1642, 1649, 1656, and 1664. Pufendorf’s Elementa had editions in 1660, 1669, 
1672 and 1680. His De jure naturae had editions in 1672, 1684 and 1688. His De officio 
hominis also had only one edition, printed in 1682. Stephanus also seems to have had 
only one edition, printed in 1614.  
Certain editions of these treatises seem to have been sought after particularly by 
the advocates, as can be inferred from the four library catalogues consulted.32 The 
popular edition of Gudelinus (the 1643 edition) was printed before Stair wrote the first 
version. The editions of Grotius, Vinnius’ commentary and Corvinus which were held 
by the sample libraries dated after Stair wrote the first version (1690, 1665 and 1664 
respectively). Stair could not have used them when first writing the Institutions. The 
                                                           
30
 Plus unauthorised editions. J.S. Reeves: “Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis: a bibliographical account” 
(1925) 19(2) American Journal of International Law 251-262, 251-255. 
31
 The decrease in the frequency of the Notae’s printing was likely because after 1665 some of Vinnius’ 
Notae on certain texts were incorporated into editions of Vinnius’ commentary. R. Feenstra and C.J.D. 
Waal: Seventeenth-Century Leyden Law Professors and their Influence on the Development of the Civil 
Law: A Study of Bronchorst, Vinnius and Voet (Koninklijke Nederlandse akademie van Wetenschappen 
afd. letterkunde, nieuwe reeks volume 90, Amsterdam, 1975), 31. 
32
 Above, 1.3. 
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secondary literature revealed that the 1646 edition of Grotius’ De jure belli became the 
standard edition in the mid-seventeenth century; later editions were based on its text.
33
  
The editions to be used in this research had to be chosen on the basis of this 
information. Stephanus and Pufendorf’s De officio hominis had only one edition each in 
the seventeenth century (in 1614 and 1682 respectively). These were used in this 
research as they would have been the only editions available to Stair. The popularity of 
the 1643 edition of Gudelinus and 1646 edition of Grotius meant these were used in this 
research. Stair probably used either the 1642 or 1655 edition of Vinnius’ commentary 
for this first version; the 1655 edition was used in this research as the more recent 
edition. It was possible to show that Stair used the 1656 edition of Corvinus;
34
 it was 
used in this research. Unfortunately, availability of the texts meant it was possible only 
to consult the 1664 edition of Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta and the 1690 edition of 
Vinnius’ Notae. The 1672 editions of both Pufendorf’s Elementa and De jure naturae 
were consulted for this thesis. 
Of course, Stair may not have consulted these particular editions. This was not a 
problem: the changes made to each new edition of Grotius, Gudelinus, Vinnius’ 
commentary and Corvinus were found to be minimal. Reeves found that the 1646 
edition of Grotius was “practically the same as that of 1642 except for the correction of 
certain errors”.35 A comparison of various sample passages of the 1643 and 1661 
editions of Gudelinus showed there were no noteworthy amendments made (which 
included each passage discussed in this thesis). Sample passages of the 1655 edition of 
Vinnius’ commentary were compared to the 1665 edition
36
 and, again, no significant 
changes to the text seemed to have been made to those passages. Sample passages of the 
1642, 1649, 1656 and 1664 editions of Corvinus were checked. As with the other 
treatises, there was usually no significant change.
37
 It can be deduced that the extent of 
the revisions between the editions of these four works was generally limited. It is 
possible to extrapolate from this that the changes made to the other treatises between 
                                                           
33
 Reeves: “Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis: a bibliographical account”, 254. 
34
 Below, 7.2. 
35
 Reeves: “Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis: a bibliographical account”, 255. 
36
 Availability of texts meant the 1642 edition could not be checked. 
37
 Although see below, 7.1.1.4, 7.2. 
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editions may also have been minor. This means that, even if the editions selected for use 
in this research were not those used by Stair, they were likely sufficiently similar to 
those consulted by him to ensure that this research would not be misled.  
Editions of the Corpus iuris civilis, the Bible and texts of classical antiquity cited 
by Stair also had to be selected. Dionysius Gothofredus’ 1583 edition of the Corpus iuris 
civilis became authoritative;
38
 a second edition was printed in 1628. The most notable 
development of Gothofredus’ text was the third edition (printed in Amsterdam, 1663) by 
Simon van Leeuwen. Stair used a copy of the Corpus iuris civilis based on Gothofredus’ 
edition; he referred to texts by their position therein. The Van Leeuwen edition was 
printed after Stair wrote the first version. Stair must have used either the first or second 
edition of Gothofredus’ text, at least for the first version. A 1656 copy of the Institutes 
and Digest
39
 and a 1614 copy of the Codex and Novels
40
 have been consulted. It is 
possible that Stair acquired Van Leeuwen’s edition and used this for the later versions, 
but it is unlikely that this could be confirmed. The modern standard edition was also 
checked so that differences could be explained.
41
 Citations in this thesis conform to the 
modern standard arrangement.  
Citations of the Bible were checked against the King James version. Two 
versions of the Bible were used in Scotland during the seventeenth century: the recent 
                                                           
38
 e.g. D.J. Osler: “Legal humanism” published online, formerly at <http://www.mpier.uni-




 August 2010, 6.  
39
 Corpus iuris civilis Iustinianei universum: in quo pandectae, ad Florentinarum exemplarum fideliter 
expressae: … cum summariis, argumentis, epitomis, & indicibus CL. V. Dionysii Gothofredi (Geneva, 
1656).  
40
 Codicis Iustiniani … notis Dionysii Gothofredi illustrati (4
th
 edition) bound with Authenticae seu 
Novellae Constitutiones DN. Iustiniani Sacratis, principis quibus Leonis & aliorum quorundam 
Imperatorum additae, notis Dionysii Gothofredi illustrati (4
th
 edition) and with Canones sanctorum et 
venerandorum apostolorum per Clementem a Petro Apostolo Romae ordinatum episcopum, in unum 
congesti, Gregorio Haloandro interprete [without a distinct title page] and with Epitome feudorum, 
Dionysio Gothofredo iurisconsulto authore [without a distinct title page] and with Consuetudines 
feudorum [without a distinct title page] and with Constitutiones Frederici Secundi Imperatoris [without a 
distinct title page] and with Extravagantes, quas nonnulli ix. collationem appellant [without a distinct title 
page] (Geneva, 1614). 
41
 P. Krueger (ed): Corpus iuris civilis: Institutiones (Berlin, 1928); P. Krueger and T. Mommsen (eds): 
Corpus iuris civilis: Digesta (Berlin, 1928); P. Krueger (ed): Corpus iuris civilis: Codex Iustinianus 
(Berlin, 1906); R. Schoell (ed): Corpus iuris civilis: Novellae (Berlin, 1959). 
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King James and the older Geneva Bible.
42
 The King James version retained the 
Geneva’s numbering of the chapters and verses; it is thus less important to determine the 
exact version used by Stair.
43
  
Stair’s citations of the writers of classical antiquity were checked by this research 
against seventeenth-century copies of the texts. Modern editions were also consulted so 
that any differences could be explained, such as the different numbering of passages in 
Pliny the Elder’s Natural History.
44
 
There are dangers in using single copies of these texts. Osler showed that a 
treatise’s title page may not always record accurately the edition.45 Further, there may be 
variations within a print-run, as Cairns established was the case with Mackenzie’s 
Institutions and this research has shown with the second printed edition of Stair’s 
Institutions.
46
 It has, however, been necessary to put these issues aside: all copies of 
every edition of each treatise could not possibly have been consulted, both because the 
availability of copies is limited and because researching the varying title pages, editions, 
and print-runs of continental treatises and other texts is outwith the scope of this 
research. This has not proved to be a problem in this research, however, as a control has 
been built in through the comparisons of sample passages between editions of the four 
treatises examined as Stair’s sources. 
 
2.1.3.4 Using Stair’s citations to pinpoint borrowing from continental 
treatises 
 
The selected editions of the continental treatises identified as Stair’s possible sources 
were then compared to the Institutions. A list was made of all the citations within the 
titles on obligations of the continental treatises, which was compared to that of Stair’s 
                                                           
42
 I.M. Green: Print and Protestantism in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2000), 80-82. 
43
 V. Westbrook: Long Travail and Great Paynes: a politics of Reformation revision (Studies in Early-
Modern Religious Reforms series, Dordrecht, 2001), xxvi. 
44
 Below, 4.1.6.2. 
45
 D.J. Osler: “Turning the title-page” (1987) 6(1) Rechtshistorisches Journal 173-182 generally. 
46
 Cairns: “The moveable text of Mackenzie: bibliographical problems for the Scottish concept of 
Institutional Writing”, 242-244. Below, 6.1.1.2, 6.4.1, introduction to ch.8. 
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citations. All citations common to both treatises were recorded. The passages of Stair 
and the continental treatise surrounding these common citations were compared to 
determine to what extent, if any, Stair had used those passages of the continental treatise. 
Certain features were used for this thesis as indicators of borrowing or use by Stair, 
including shared citations of authority, collections of citations common to both jurists, a 
common use of an unusual citation such as a medieval-style citation Roman law,
47
 an 
error in a citation common to both jurists, shared hypothetical examples, shared 
metaphorical imagery, use of the same archaic term, use of the same Greek terms, 
similar structure of discussions, quotations from other jurists, scripture or writers of 
classical antiquity, and any inaccuracies in those quotations. There were, on some 
occasions, sufficient similarities between the texts to suggest that Stair had merely 
translated the passage of the continental treatise and incorporated it into the Institutions. 
On the other hand, sometimes a single indicator of borrowing was sufficient to establish 
Stair’s use of a treatise, such as common errors in citations. These indicators of 
borrowing revealed that certain legal treatises were used by Stair as sources when 
writing or revising passages of the Institutions. This method of comparing lists of 
citations: allowed focused comparisons of key passages of the treatises, overcame the 
problems of variations in the substantive text of the Institutions between revisions, and 
meant that the differences in language between Stair’s use of the vernacular and the 
continental jurists’ use of Latin did not hinder this research.  
When comparing citations, it was important to be aware that jurists could use 
authority for a variety of purposes. Although not concerned with historical material, 
Posner notes citations: “signify an acknowledgement of priority or influence, a useful 
source of information, a focus of disagreement, an acknowledgment of controlling 
authority, or the prestige of the cited work or its author.”
48
 Additionally, jurists could 
cite texts for direct authority or for an analogous legal rule, or to support a specific 
statement of substantive law or a larger discussion in more general terms. The treatise 
                                                           
47
 Below, 3.1.3. 
48
 R.A. Posner: “The theory and practise of citations analysis, with special reference to law and 
economics” John M. Olin Law and Economics working paper series number 83, published online by the 
University of Chicago <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/83.RAP_.Citations_40532.pdf>, accessed 
3
rd
 December 2008, 7.  
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may not always have clearly indicated how the authority was being used. If Stair 
borrowed citations from another jurist without checking them, this could result in error if 
he had misunderstood their context within or use by his source, as happened with his 
citation of Molina.49 Determining not only what authority Stair cited but also the reason 
for which he cited it was therefore critical to understanding Stair’s use and consideration 
of authority.  
It was also important to understand Stair’s use of a citation when making such 
comparisons. For example, Roman texts may have taken on new connotations in the 
civilian literature. Stair was most likely aware of this and used a text as authority in 
terms of its new interpretation. An example of this is D.19.2.33, which became 
associated with support for the burdening of the seller with the risk of theft or 
destruction before delivery in sale, although the text actually concerned return of key-
money where leased land was confiscated by the state.
50
 Alternatively, errors found in 
Stair’s citations may have been the result of careless printing; this problem was 
overcome by checking the citations against two copies of each printed edition and the 
three copies of each manuscript stem. Such possibilities will be discussed in regards to 
individual examples in subsequent chapters.  
These comparisons and analyses revealed which treatises were Stair’s sources 
and the extent to which he used them. It could, for example, be shown whether Stair 
used a particular continental treatise as a principal source for certain information, such 
as Corvinus for Canon law (in the first version) or Gudelinus for comparative law. His 
method of borrowing from these treatises could also be established, such as whether 
Stair checked the authorities he borrowed. It was deduced that he did not check the 
borrowed citation where it or his description of the text were wrong, or where Stair 
stated that information was found in the cited passage which could in fact only have 
been taken second-hand from his source. He could be shown to have checked the text 
where he discussed information found in the text cited which was not mentioned in his 
source. By establishing whether Stair was checking citations borrowed from his sources, 
                                                           
49
 Below, 4.1.6.1. 
50
 Below, 6.2.2. 
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a greater understanding of Stair’s use of a source was achieved. Working out the extent 
to which he did so reveals Stair’s knowledge and understanding of a particular source of 
law. This in turn helped to establish his general method.  
 
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THIS METHOD 
 
There are limitations to this method of research. First, it cannot be used to detect Stair’s 
use of a treatise if used as a source of ideas or inspiration rather than as direct authority. 
It is inevitable that works which Stair read earlier in his life influenced his later thinking 
and therefore indirectly the Institutions; the difficulty in trying to identify such works is 
evident in the study by Hutton, which suggested many possible sources of influence 
which could never be proved.
51
 Yet the purpose of this thesis is not to find which works 
may have subtly influenced Stair but to identify those treatises which he used when he 
wrote, and on which he based, his Institutions.  
Secondly, this method used a comparison of citations; it would thus not work 
with treatises which gave very few citations. As most of Stair’s possible sources 
extensively cited authority, this was not a problem. This was more challenging with the 
works of Pufendorf. He cited relatively little Roman law but cited often writers of 
classical antiquity. As Stair gave only seventeen citations of writers of classical 
antiquity, this left little to compare between the two jurists. Nonetheless, Pufendorf 
cannot have influenced the substantive content of Stair’s titles on obligations to any 
material extent. Richter notes that Stair would most likely have become familiar with 
Pufendorf’s works “in the 1670s and 1680s, when Pufendorf gained European-wide 
renown for his De jure naturae and De officio”, if at all.52 This means that Stair would 
only have consulted Pufendorf when preparing the third version.
53
 By this time, most of 
the content in the titles on obligations was already fixed; the greatest change made each 
                                                           
51
 G.M. Hutton: “Stair’s philosophic precursors” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair 
Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 87 generally. 
52
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 377. 
53
 Elementa jurisprudentia universalis was printed in 1660, but it is highly unlikely that this was used by 
Stair in 1659-1662 or when updating the manuscript in 1666-1667 [Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 
373]. 
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time Stair revised the Institutions was his pattern of citation. Those important changes 
which were made to the substantive content in later revisions have been identified as 
being the result of the political context or his reading of other continental treatises.
54
 
This means that even if Stair did examine Pufendorf, he could not have had significant 
influence over either Stair’s pattern of citation or substantive content. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that there is a chance that Stair may have made very limited 




Finally, different continental treatises might have given the same citation or 
citations as authority. Where this was the case, comparison of the surrounding 
paragraphs usually revealed which was more likely to have been Stair’s source.  
                                                           
54
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 414-439; below, e.g. 6.2.2. 
55
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 377-378. 
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3 
STAIR’S PATTERN OF CITATION 
 
This chapter examines Stair’s pattern of citation of Roman law and continental legal 
literature. The first part examines his citations of Roman law. This was the only type 
of authority borrowed from each of Stair’s four principal sources. It is therefore 
necessary to study his citation of Roman law in order to understand his use of these 
sources. Four aspects of Stair’s use of Roman law are examined: the changes to his 
pattern of citation between the four versions; the number of citations of the Digest, 
Codex, Institutes and Novels; the style and accuracy of his citations; and whether 
Stair used Roman law “for its equity”1 or as direct and binding authority for Scots 
law. 
The second part of this chapter examines Stair’s citation of continental jurists. 
First, it discusses Stair’s pattern of citation of continental jurists in the four versions. 
Thereafter, it examines the schools of scholarship to which the jurists who are cited 
in the titles on obligations belonged. Within these larger discussions, the individual 
jurists are discussed, specifically regarding their lives and works, the distribution of 
those works in Scotland in the later seventeenth century, and the use and citation of 
them by Stair. This allows a greater understanding of the views and methods by 
which Stair was influenced and on which he relied.  
 
3.1 STAIR’S CITATION OF ROMAN LAW 
 
3.1.1 How often Stair cited Roman law 
 
There were either 131 or 132 citations of Roman law in Stair’s titles on obligations in 
the first version, depending on the interpretation of a specific reference found in the 
sample manuscripts from the 1662 stem. Six citations of Roman law were added for 
the second version: five in the much-extended discussion of mutuum,2 and one in a 
                                                           
1 S.1.11/1.1.12. 
2 S.10.19/1.11.3-S.10.22/-; Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.19; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.18. 
 - 67 - 
new sentence explaining that “Restitution is to be made, cum omni causa”.3 Stair did 
not, however, add new citations of Roman law to existing passages for the second 
version. In the third version, the titles on obligations had 173 citations of Roman law, 
a net increase of almost forty since the second version.4 Citations were added to 
existing sentences, to new passages, and some replaced citations which had appeared 
in the earlier versions. Stair thus deliberately increased his citation of Roman law for 
the third version. In the fourth version, there were 353 citations of Roman law in the 
titles on obligations, almost double the number found in the third version; Stair 
added new citations to nearly all the titles on obligations.5 Only “Tutors & Curators” 
had fewer citations of Roman law in the fourth version; a paragraph containing four 
citations was removed. This increase in the number of citations of Roman law for the 
fourth version is also seen in the titles on property law: there were fifteen in the third 
version and sixty-one in the fourth.6 The number of Stair’s citations of Roman law in 
the titles on property law thus increased almost fourfold. Stair deliberately 
‘Romanised’ the fourth version; the reason for his doing so is unclear. He did not 
mention adding citations of Roman law to the fourth version in its advertisement; he 
stated merely that he “correct[ed] what [he] found wrongly cited”.7 He declared that 
he updated the Institutions “by occasion of new Statutes of Parliament, Acts of 
Sederunt, and Decisions since the treatise was written”. It would thus be expected 
that Stair would have increased the number of citations of Scottish authority to take 
account of developments in the law since 1681; this would have been consistent with 
his increasing the number of citations of recent Scottish authority in previous 
versions.8 Yet this was not the case. In “Restitution”, he added eight citations of 
                                                           
3 S.10.56/1.13.10; AdvMS.25.1.5, 10.37; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.36. 
4 “Common Principles” was the only title on obligations which contained no citations of Roman law. 
5 “Permutation and Sale” retained the same number of citations of Roman law, although a citation of 
D.18.1.2 was removed [S.10.69/1.14.7] and one of D.18.1.43 added [S.-/1.14.1]. 
6 “Rights Real” increased from nine to thirty; “Infeftments” increased from one to eight; “Superiority” 
had only one citation of Roman law in both the third and fourth versions; “Liferents” had none in the 
third version but eight in the fourth; “Servitudes Real” had none in the third version but seven in the 
fourth; “Prescription” increased from four to seven. McLeod has counted the citations in the sixth 
edition titles S.2.1, S.2.3-7, and S.2.9-11. As he did not count references to paragraphs of Roman law 
as separate citations, he found only twenty-nine in “Rights Real” and seven citations in “Liferents” 
[G. McLeod: “The Romanization of property law” in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds): A History of 
Private Law in Scotland volume 1 (Oxford, 2000) 200, 226 n.32]. He also included general references 
to Roman law as citations and thus found fifteen in “Prescription” [McLeod: “Romanization of 
property law”, 226 n.25].  
7 S.-/advertisement. 
8 e.g. above, 1.1.4.1. 
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Roman law but only one of Scottish authority.9 In “Recompense”, he added twenty-
one citations of Roman law, but removed a citation of a case in Haddington’s 
practicks (the surrounding passage remained the same).10 In the passages which 
remained in “Obligations Conventional”, citations of seventeen cases and one statute 
were removed and twenty-two citations of Roman law were added. Eight of these 
citations of Scottish cases were deleted along with Stair’s brief description of each 
case; the surrounding paragraphs remained substantially unchanged.11 The other nine 
citations of cases and that of the statute were removed along with a short passage;12 
this meant Stair gave no discussion of Scots law on enforcement of bilateral 
contracts, barring stating that it was consistent with Roman law.13 Stair added to 
“Loan” for the fourth version two citations of Scottish cases,14 one citation of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1681,15 and a citation of Bills of Exchange by John Marius, a 
seventeenth-century English civilian.16 Even here he added eighteen citations of 
Roman law, more than doubling the number found in the third version.17  
  The addition of citations of Roman law was the greatest change between the 
third and fourth versions. This was a departure from Stair’s previous method. When 
preparing the second and third versions, he included citations of recent Scottish cases 
and statutes. A possible reason for this change might be found in the circumstances 
of his life between completing the third and fourth versions. He spent much of the 
1680s in exile, principally in the Netherlands. Ford notes:  
                                                           
9 Ramsay v Robertson [M.2924], S.7.9/1.7.9. 
10 S.8.7/1.8.8, Harvey v Hunter 1630 [?M.13456/793?]. 
11 Five citations of cases were removed from S.10.9/1.10.9: L. Innerleith v Byres [date unknown; not 
found]; Adamson v Fullartoun [date unknown; not found]; Angus v Mckie [date unknown; not found]; 
Eglintoun v his Tenants 1620? [M.8917?]; and King’s Advocat v E. Nithisdale 1679 [M.Supp.2.248]. 
Two were removed from S.10.11/1.10.11: Skein and Thores v Ramsay 1665 [M.5634]; Jack v Fiddes 
1661 [M.5633]. One was removed from S.10.13/1.10.13 (Alexander v Kinneir 1531 [M.6278]). 
12 Citations of Park v Somervel 1668 [?M.3459?] and of the Act Regarding Playing at Cards and Dice 
and Horse Races 1621 [R.P.S., 1621/6/26 <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1621/6/26>, accessed 16th July 2010] 
were removed from S.10.8/1.10.8. Three citations of cases were removed from S.10.12/1.10.12: Rew v 
Houstoun 1668 [M.16484]; Ramsay v Robison [Robertson?] 1673 [?M.2924?]; Burnet v Ewing 1681 
[M.16494]. Five were removed from S.10.16/1.10.16: L. Keirs v Marjoribanks 1546 [?M.5036?]; 
Crichtoun v Crichtoun 1565 [Balfour, 391]; Lord Herreis v Provost of Lincluden 1581 [not found]; L. 
Ker[se?] v Panter 1548 [?Balfour, 391?]; E. Glencairn v Commendator of Kilwinning 1563 [not 
found]. 
13 S.10.16/1.10.16.  
14 Brown v Johnston 1662 [M.16802], S-/1.11.7; Hume v Hamilton 1691 [not found], S-/1.11.7. 
15 S.-/1.11.7. R.P.S., 1681/7/44: Bills of Exchange Act 1681 <http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1681/7/44>, 
accessed 3rd September 2010. 
16 S.-/1.11.7. 
17 Although one, of D.12.1.15, was removed. 
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…he returned during his years of exile to the life of a scholar. Shortly 
after arriving in the Netherlands he matriculated as a member of the 
University of Leiden … and he became acquainted with the professors of 
law both there and at Utrecht.18 
 
Stair would almost certainly have engaged with the local intellectual community. If 
Ford is correct, then Stair may also have discoursed with the leading law professors. 
Among the professors at Leyden and Utrecht at this time were Johannes Voet and 
Gerard Noodt, both highly acclaimed and influential scholars of Roman law. Stair 
might well have used his time in exile to undertake formal training in law, or at least 
to see these great men lecture. If so, his increasing the number of citations of Roman 
law in the fourth version of the Institutions could reflect a better working knowledge, 
or a greater appreciation, of Roman law after his time in exile in the centre of 
Roman-Dutch jurisprudence.  
 
3.1.2  Stair’s citation of the four parts of the Corpus iuris civilis 
 
Most of Stair’s citations of Roman law in the titles on obligations were of specific 
parts of the Corpus iuris civilis; these were not cited with equal frequency. Table one 
below shows that, taking account of all four versions, the Digest was cited most 
often, then the Codex, the Institutes, then finally the Novels (including the 
Authenticum and Collatio). The percentage of the citations of each part of the Corpus 
iuris civilis in relation to all the citations of Roman law in the titles on obligations 
varied little between the four versions. Stair also cited Roman jurists,19 Senatus 
Consulta,20 the Edict,21 and Lex Rhodia;22 presumably these were also drawn from 
titles of the Corpus iuris civilis or from some secondary source. The Gloss23 was also 
cited (once in the printed editions; twice in the manuscripts). 
 
                                                           
18 Ford: “Dalrymple, James, first Viscount Stair (1619–1695)”.  
19 Proculus, S.10.36/1.12.9; Sulpicius Rufus and Mucius, S.10.80/1.16.3. 
20 SC Vellianium, S.4.11/1.4.16 and S.10.19/1.11.3; SC Macedonianum, S.10.19/1.11.3. 
21 e.g. S 9.5/1.9.5; S.10.10/1.10.10. 
22 S.8.6/1.8.7. 
23 S.10.50/1.13.3. 
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Table One: 





































Showing the number of citations (and the percentage of the total) 
of each part of the Corpus iuris civilis in Stair’s titles on obligations  
 
That most of Stair’s citations were of the Digest was in keeping with the use of the 
Corpus iuris civilis in court in the 1660s and 1670s.24 The small number of 
references to the Novels was typical. Most of the Novels were in Greek, which was 
generally not read during the medieval period; texts were labelled Graeca non 
leguntur [Greek not read]. The Novels were consulted through the Authenticum,25 
which Scheltema showed contained alternative translations of each Greek term 
within 134 of the Novels as an aid for Latin-speaking students;26 it was not a 
translation of the texts. The Greek text no longer appeared with the Latin by the 
seventh century,27 so the Authenticum appeared corrupt.28 Irnerius, the eleventh-
century Glossator who discovered the Authenticum, believed it was a forgery.29 The 
complicated nature of the Authenticum discouraged its extensive use; jurists gave far 
fewer citations of the Novels than of the Digest, Codex and Institutes. For example, 
the third book of Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo, a principal source for Stair’s titles on 
obligations,30 gave over 900 citations of Roman law; only around eighty were of the 
Novels or Authenticum. Stair’s mere eight citations of the Novels or Authenticum 
were in keeping with this. 
Most of the Novels related to ecclesiastic matters or to private law where it 
                                                           
24 T.B. Smith: “Scots law and Roman-Dutch law: A shared tradition” [1959] Acta juridica 36-46, 39. 
25 e.g. J.H.A. Lokin: Graeca leguntur? The significance of Justinian's Novel 159 in the Württemberg 
v. William of Orange case (1544-1666) (Amsterdam, 2007), esp. 10. 
26 Lokin: Graeca leguntur?, 10 citing H.J. Scheltema: “Subseciva XI. Das Authenticum” (1963) 31(2) 
T.v.R. 275-279 generally.  
27 Lokin: Graeca leguntur?, 10. 
28 Lokin: Graeca leguntur?, 13. 
29 Lokin: Graeca leguntur?, 10. 
30 Below, ch.5. 
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related to such matters (e.g. marriage, legitimacy, succession and oaths), to 
procedural matters, or to public offices. Many of the Novels would thus not have 
been relevant to Stair’s treatise on private law. This may also have contributed to the 
low number of citations of the Novels in the Institutions. 
What is perhaps surprising is the comparatively low number of citations of 
the Institutes. One of Stair’s principal sources was Vinnius’ commentary on 
Justinian’s Institutes, which set out the Institutes passages before the relevant 
commentary. Stair must therefore have been familiar with more of the Institutes than 
he cited. Indeed, he gave synopses of texts which he did not cite. His use and 
knowledge of the Institutes was thus not adequately represented in the number of 
citations of it. 
 
3.1.3 The method by which Stair cited Roman law and the 
accuracy of his citations 
 
The first standard arrangement of the Corpus iuris civilis was by Dionysius 
Gothofredus (1583).31 There was thus no standard arrangement of the texts in the 
medieval period and much of the sixteenth century; citation could not have used a 
numbering system such as is standard now.32 Instead, citations began with the 
opening phrase of the paragraph then sub-paragraph if required. Then followed a 
siglum or abbreviation: ‘ff’ rather than the modern ‘D’ for the Digest, ‘C’ for the 
Codex, ‘Nov’ for the Novels, and ‘Inst’ for the Institutes. Finally, jurists would give 
the name of the title.33 So, Ulpian on pacts (D.2.14.1) was cited l. huius edicti ff de 
pactis. After Gothofredus, citations still identified the title by name but the paragraph 
by number; Ulpian would have been cited l. 1 ff de pactis. Here, for convenience, 
these will be referred to as the ‘medieval’ and ‘early-modern’ styles or methods of 
                                                           
31 Above, 2.1.3.3. For a discussion of the Littera Gothofrediana and of other editions and 
arrangements of the Digest, G.C.J.J. van den Bergh and B.H. Stolte Jr.: “The unfinished Digest edition 
of Henrik Brenkman (1681-1736): a pilot-survey and edition of Digest 9.2 ad legem Aquiliam” (1977) 
45(2) T.v.R. 227-305, esp. 227-230. M.H. Hoeflich: “A seventeenth century Roman law bibliography: 
Jacques Godefroy and his ‘Bibliotheca juris civilis Romani’” (1982) 75(4) Law Library Journal 514-
528, 516. 
32 Additionally, Bryson observed that, because in the Middle Ages numbers were written as Roman 
numerals, any such method of citation would have been confusing in the long and complex citations 
of the Corpus iuris civilis [W.H. Bryson: Dictionary of Sigla and Abbreviations to and in Law Books 
before 1607 (Charlottesville, 1975), 5]. 
33 Bryson: Dictionary of Sigla and Abbreviations, 4-9. 
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citation.   
Stair usually used the early-modern method of citation. Only eighteen (20%) 
of the 127 citations of the Corpus iuris civilis in the titles on obligations in the first 
version, and twenty-four (18%) of the 161 citations of the Corpus iuris civilis in the 
third version, used the medieval method. These medieval-style citations usually 
appeared in clusters, sometimes several in the same or neighbouring paragraphs.34 
These citations reveal something of Stair’s method. At least twelve of those in the 
first version were borrowed: eight from Gudelinus and four from Grotius.35 When 
preparing the third version, Stair removed four and added paragraph numbers to 
seven of these medieval-style citations. He also added ten new medieval-style 
citations to his titles on obligations, eight of which included the paragraph numbers 
for that version. When preparing the fourth version, he added the paragraph numbers 
to four of these citations and removed four. No new medieval-style citations were 
added for the fourth version. The result of these changes was that, like in the first 
version, there were twenty medieval-style citations in the fourth version. However, 
unlike in the first version, in the fourth only four of these citations did not also give 
the relevant paragraph numbers. Stair must have checked these citations for either the 
third or fourth version to have been able to add these numbers; he must therefore 
have made a deliberate effort to modernise his citations of Roman law for the printed 
editions.   
Similarly, he increased the detail of his citations for the third and fourth 
versions. Of the 113 citations of the Digest or Codex in the first version, sixty-one 
were of texts which had sub-paragraphs. Stair cited sub-paragraphs for only sixteen 
(26%) of these sixty-one. The small number of citations in which Stair gave a sub-
paragraph is representative generally of the low level of detail in his citations in the 
manuscripts. Stair specified sub-paragraphs in many more of his citations of the 
Digest or Codex in the third version. Of the 147 citations of the Digest or Codex, 
                                                           
34 The most pronounced example of this was in Stair’s discussion of loss of liberty by bondage, 
S.2.9/1.2.9.  
35 Below, 4.1.3.2, 4.1.4.3, 4.1.6, 5.1.2.3-5, 5.1.3.2, 5.1.4.2. The seven medieval-style citations in “Of 
Liberty” [S.2.9/1.2.9. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 2.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.18L-R. 
1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 2.9-10] (D.50.17.118, D.41.1.10, D.15.1.4, 
D.15.1.41, D.50.17.22, D.50.17.107, and D.15.1.41) were also borrowed from Gudelinus: De jure 
novissimo, 1.3, 3-4. These will not be examined further as they are outwith Stair’s titles on 
obligations. 
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eighty-two were of texts which had sub-paragraphs. Stair’s citations of forty-five 
(56%) of these gave sub-paragraphs. Stair increased the detail in his citations again 
for the fourth version. Of the 295 citations of the Digest or Codex in the titles on 
obligations, 176 were of texts which had sub-paragraphs. Stair specified sub-
paragraphs when referring to 116 (66%) of them. This means that Stair increased 
significantly the detail in his citations of the Digest and Codex when preparing the 
third and fourth versions. 
The citations which gave the number and opening phrase of the text are 
useful in determining the rate of error in Stair’s citations. Most of these citations 
were correct, at least to a sufficient extent as to identify the appropriate text, but a 
small number contained errors. In the third version, Stair cited “l. placet. 99. ff. de 
acquirenda haered.” for the power of the Roman paterfamilias over his sons.36 
D.29.2.99 began “Aristo in decretis” and discussed the denial of inheritance by a 
female heir; it was D.29.2.79 which began “Placet” and concerned persons alieni 
iuris. This was probably a printing error: the citation was given without the 
paragraph number in the manuscripts, suggesting Stair checked the Digest when 
preparing the third version.37 The error is unlikely to have been the result of Stair 
having a flawed copy of the Digest, as the citation was corrected in the fourth 
version. Additionally, Stair’s citation “l.in contractibus, ff. de non numerata 
pecunia”38 should rather have been a reference to the Codex; there was no such title 
in the Digest.39 The citation was corrected in the fourth version, and the relevant 
paragraph number was added.40 Again, this indicates that Stair consulted the text 
when preparing the fourth version.  
This rate of error is not necessarily restricted to the medieval-style citations; 
errors have also been found in Stair’s early-modern-style citations.41 Although some 
can be attributed to errors in printing, some were also present in the manuscripts and 
were thus likely errors made by Stair. Examples of such errors in citations, both of 
                                                           
36 S 5.11/1.5.11. 
37 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R gave “placet 1”. From the 
1666 stem, Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.10 gave “pluc”. 
38 S 10.11/1.10.11. 
39 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.11; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.91L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.11. Not all the manuscripts gave a siglum. 
40 Although there was still an error in the citation, in that the number fourteen should have been in 
front of rather than behind the siglum ‘C’, this is a minor point. 
41 e.g. D.19.2.25.9 [below, 5.2.1]. 
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Roman law and of other sources, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.1.4 Did Stair cite Roman law as binding authority for Scots law 
or “for its equity”? 42 
 
Stair declared in the Institutions that he used Roman law “for its equity” rather than 
as binding authority.43 William Forbes, writing a generation after Stair, accepted in 
his Great Body of the Law of Scotland Stair’s account of his use of Roman law: 
“Stair (Inst. Lib.1 Tit.1 §.16.) alledges, that the Civil Law (tho of great Weight with 
us for its Equity and Expediency in Cases where a formed Custom is wanting) hath 
no legal Authority.”44 Gordon also suggested that this was an accurate representation 
of Stair’s use of Roman law.45 He argued that only rarely did Stair use Roman law in 
the absence of Scottish authority,46 and that he did not follow Roman law 
automatically but rather critically examined and engaged with it.47 This suggestion 
was supported by Ford: 
 
Stair sometimes identified issues that the local sources had failed to 
resolve and drew attention to solutions available in the learned sources, 
his approach was to assess the equity of the proposed solutions so that an 
informed judgment could be made about how the issues should be 
resolved locally.48 
 
Gordon admitted that Stair seemed to occasionally cite Roman law as authority for 
Scots law.49 He alluded to subsequent legal practitioners’ misunderstanding of his 
use and context as the real cause of the subsequent absorption into Scots law of the 
Roman rules discussed, as opposed to over-reliance on or misuse of Roman law by 
                                                           
42 S.1.11/1.1.12. 
43 S.1.11/1.1.12. 
44 Forbes’ A Great Body of the Law of Scotland, containing the harmony thereof, and differences from 
the civil and feudal laws: and shewing how far the Scots and English law do agree and differ; with 
incident comparative views of the modern constitutions of other nations in Europe (1708-1739). 
[MS.Gen.1246, 1.2.4.3.1, 84]. Andrew Simpson helpfully directed me to this reference. 
45 W.M. Gordon: “Roman law as a source” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair 
Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 107, esp. 110; Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law” 
generally. 
46 Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law”, 122-3. 
47 Gordon: “Roman law as a source”, 112. 
48 Ford: Law and Opinion, 275. 
49 Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law”, 123-124. 
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Stair himself.50 Gordon’s results are generally confirmed by this research. It should 
be noted, however, that for Stair to have used Roman law critically he would have 
had to have consulted and understood the texts; this is not always the case. 
A different view is expressed by McLeod,51 who examined Stair’s citations of 
Roman law in sample titles on property law in the fourth version. He argued “There 
are only five occasions…when Stair says with any degree of explicitness that Scots 
law has adopted or should adopt the Roman rule given.”52 This was not many, but 
even here it is not so clear that Stair is adopting Roman law. First, McLeod pointed 
to Stair’s discussion on rights of way.53 Stair said that “amongst the Romans; and 
with us” there was a distinction between public rights of way and servitudes of 
access. At this point Stair was still introducing his topic and explaining the 
classification of access rights. In the following sentences, he outlined Scots law by 
citing two statutes and a case in Nicholson’s practicks on private rights of way. Stair 
was not using Roman law here as authority for Scots law but rather for comparison. 
Roman law as the basis of the ius gentium was the context of the second of 
McLeod’s examples.54 In the third, Stair again followed his discussion of Roman law 
with that of Scots law, in which he cited Scottish authority.55 The fourth example put 
forward by McLeod was of a passage in which Stair stated that the origin of relief 
was in a rescript of Constantine.56 Stair here was following Craig in giving a 
philological discussion typical of legal humanism and was not claiming the rescript 
(which was not identified) was authority for Scots law.57 McLeod’s final example 
was three citations of Roman law on accession.58 These citations were used in Stair’s 
discussion of the “contrariety betwixt the two Roman Juris-consults, Paulus and 
Caius” resolved by Justinian’s Institutes.59 Stair stated that “Positive law may 
determine this point either way, without injustice” before deciding along the same 
lines as Justinian on the basis of common sense. Although this could be regarded as 
                                                           
50 Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law”, 126. 
51 McLeod: “Romanization of property law”, 226-227.  





57 Below, 3.2.2.1. 
58 S.12.37/2.1.38-39 (incorrectly identified as S.2.2.38-9 by McLeod: “Romanization of property 
law”, 226 n.36). 
59 S.12.37/2.1.39. 
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reception, this can only have been a critical one as Stair then rejected the Roman rule 
of accession of writing, following “Grotius, Minsynger and others”. Further, these 
citations of Roman law (as well as those of Grotius and Mynsinger) were borrowed 
from Vinnius;60 Stair was not turning to Roman law as authority, but to other 
seventeenth-century jurists. 
McLeod thereafter suggested that:  
 
…there are thirty-three more instances [by which he meant references 
rather than passages; only thirty involved citations] where, although Stair 
is obviously describing Scots law, the Roman references given provide 
the only authority for the rules laid down in his text. The implication 
would seem to be that, in these areas, the Scots law rules are basically the 
same as the Roman ones. Although Stair would say that these rules 
should be followed in Scotland not because they are Roman, but because 
they are equitable, the source of the rules is clear.61 
 
Most of these thirty citations were used to establish general principles of law; Scots 
law was often not mentioned. Indeed, some were clearly not given as authority for 
Scots law.62 It seems that, in most of these thirty cases, Stair cited these texts for 
natural law or equity. As with the example of Roman law in accession, Stair was not 
advocating the uncritical reception of Roman law. 
An appreciation of Stair’s use of Roman law can only be had when the 
structure he used to set out the law is considered. Stair’s discussions typically had the 
same structure. First, he addressed general points of law and what he deemed to be 
the equitable position. It was during these introductory remarks on a topic that he 
normally cited Roman law, continental jurists, the Bible, and writers of classical 
antiquity. In citing these authorities, he was following the established humanist 
method of philological study and the new method of the natural lawyers, possibly in 
imitation of Grotius,63 of working out natural law using historical sources and by 
drawing on the common understanding of jurists. He thus put Scots law in the 
                                                           
60 Below, 6.2.3, 8.1.3. 
61 McLeod: “Romanization of property law”, 226-227. He did, however, state in a footnote to this 
passage that “The connection between Roman law and [natural law, equity and the ius gentium] must, 
however, be taken as implicit in all he says about property.” [McLeod: “Romanization of property 
law”, 227 n.38]. 
62 e.g. the three citations at S.12.23/2.1.23, which is followed by a discussion of Scots law in the next 
paragraph. 
63 Below, 4.4. 
 - 77 - 
context of this historical and intellectual tradition of the learned laws and continental 
jurisprudence. By doing so, he reinforced in each title of the Institutions his central 
claim of Scots law’s “nearness to Equity” and natural law.64 Thereafter, he outlined 
the position in Scots law. Here he cited statutes, practicks, cases and earlier Scottish 
writers such as Sir John Skene and Thomas Craig. In doing so, he often stated where 
Scots law agreed with or diverged from Roman law or continental systems, thus 
drawing out the unique or specific rules of Scots law, further demonstrating “the 
proportion and propinquity of it to Equity”.65  
The opening paragraphs of “Recompence” provide a good example of Stair’s 
use of Roman law. The entire title had three citations of Roman law in the first and 
second versions, ten in the third version, and twenty-nine in the fourth. Stair thus 
increased significantly the number of citations of Roman law in this title. He began 
his title with a discussion of recompense as an obligation under natural law, and said 
that donation is never presumed when a party is enriched. He excludes from this 
transactions by parents in the name of their children, which are presumed to be 
donation “because of the Parents Natural Affection, and Natural Obligations”.66 He 
discussed eight cases that were decided on the basis of various familial ties in 
Scottish courts 1665-1681. In the concluding words of this paragraph, Stair stated 
that “the delivery of any thing is not presumed to be a Donation, but for 
Recompense, or Loan”, and cited another Scottish case as authority. In the third 
version, these nine Scottish cases were the only authority cited in this paragraph. In 
the fourth version, the discussion was separated into two paragraphs. The division 
was made immediately following Stair’s explanation of recompense as a natural 
obligation; the discussion of donation became the second paragraph. Nine citations 
of Roman law were added to this second paragraph, all to the discussion of the 
natural rules and equitable justification of recompense and donation, not as authority 
for Scots law. 
In the next three paragraphs,67 Stair discussed negotiorum gestio. In the third 
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version, Stair cited Grotius and three texts of Roman law.68 Five citations of Roman 
law were added for the fourth version. Although Stair discussed the position of the 
absentee owner in terms of the plural first person, he did this as if ‘we’ were the 
absentee owner and ‘he’ was the gestor. Stair did not use the first person plural to 
indicate that Roman law was authority for Scots law; rather, he classified negotiorum 
gestio as part of natural law: “though there were no Positive Law for it, the very 
Light of Nature would teach, it ought to be Recompenced; and therefore, can be no 
other then an Obediential, or Natural Obligation, by the Authority of God”.69 Stair 
used Roman law to prove that these were rules of natural law.70  
In the remaining paragraphs, Stair examined the duty to recompense when 
unjustifiably enriched. He used citations of Roman law and Cicero’s De officiis here 
as evidence of such enrichment as “a most Natural Obligation”.71 He then discussed 
the need to recompense goods found after being thrown from a ship; all but two of 
the ten citations of Roman law given in this discussion were clearly used to support 
Stair’s declarations of the principles of natural law or equity.72  
In sum, when discussing a point of law, Stair first examined natural law, 
often citing Roman law (but also Canon law, writers of classical antiquity, 
continental jurists, etc) as evidence of natural law. He then declared whether this 
agreed or was at odds with the principles of Scots law, which he established by 
reference to Scottish cases and statutes. This pattern was typical of his use of Roman 
law in the titles on obligations. Even in the titles on property law, where some of the 
passages in which Stair cited Roman law did discuss Scots law, Stair usually used 
Roman law for general principles of law or natural law. Gordon and Ford were 
therefore correct in suggesting that Stair used Roman law to expound the principles 
of equity. 
 
                                                           
68 Two were of texts in the Digest title D.3.5. The paragraphs of this title of the Digest were 
renumbered in Krueger and Mommsen (eds): Corpus iuris civilis: Digesta. In the modern standard 
edition, the texts cited by Stair are numbered as D.3.5.9.1 and D.3.5.46. Stair cited them correct 
according to seventeenth-century copies of the Digest, as D.3.5.10.1 and D.3.5.47. Similarly, the 
Codex title Stair cited was renumbered in the modern standard edition. The text Stair cited is now 
identified as C.2.18.24, but was C.2.19.24 in seventeenth-century copies. 
69 For a comparison with Grotius’ views, below 4.1.4.1. 
70 S.8.2/1.8.3. 
71 S.8.5/1.8.6. 
72 S.8.6/1.8.7. In Walker (ed): Institutions, this passage appeared as 1.8.8. 
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3.2 STAIR’S CITATION OF CONTINENTAL JURISTS  
 
3.2.1 Stair’s citations  
 
3.2.1.1 The citations in the manuscripts and printed editions 
 
Stair cited twenty-six continental jurists in the entire Institutions,73 taking account of 
the four versions. These twenty-six jurists included some of the leading continental 
lawyers from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Stair drew on these jurists 
for the authority and reputation of their works rather than because he had sympathy 
with their religious views, as is made clear by his citation of three (Catholic) second 
scholastics.74 Stair did not directly consult all the jurists cited by him. Nonetheless, 
an insight into his method and thoughts on continental jurisprudence can be had from 
even the citations which he borrowed.  
Most of Stair’s citations of continental jurists remained unchanged from the 
first to the fourth version. However, some were added, amended, or removed. 
Citations of twenty-two jurists have been found in the manuscripts (and thus were 
presumably given by Stair in the first and second versions).75 No citation has been 
found in the manuscripts from one stem without being found in those from the other, 
proving Stair did not add or remove any citations of jurists for the second version. 
The greatest change in Stair’s pattern of citation of continental jurists was made 
when he prepared the third version. Stair added citations of jurists cited in the earlier 
versions, namely one of Connanus and one of Grotius.76 He also added citations of 
four jurists not cited in the manuscripts, specifically Gregorius, Mynsinger, Vinnius 
and Cujacius.77 Stair also removed four citations of jurists: Grotius78 and Connanus79 
                                                           
73 This category excludes Scottish jurists (e.g. Craig) and English jurists (e.g. John Marius, an English 
civilian jurist) who might nevertheless be considered to have been part of a pan-European intellectual 
community. 
74 Below, 3.2.3.2. 
75 Additional citations which do not appear in the printed editions may yet be found in later titles of 
the manuscripts. It was not feasible to examine the manuscripts to their full extent.  
76 Both at S.12.41/2.1.41. 
77 S.11.6/1.18.6 (Gregorius), S.12.37/2.1.39 (Mynsinger); S.5.4/1.5.4 (Vinnius), S.10.69/1.14.7 and 
S.14.26/2.4.26 (both Cujacius). 
78 Stair cited De jure belli, 2.13. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.78; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.77; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.123R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.77. Below, 4.1.8. 
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along with the surrounding paragraph; Corvinus because the surrounding paragraph 
was revised;80 and Gomezius although the surrounding passage and other citations 
remained substantially unchanged.81 Stair therefore cited twenty-five jurists across 
forty-four citations in the third version. Thirty-three (75%) of these citations were in 
his titles on obligations. When preparing the fourth version, Stair added two citations 
of jurists already cited in the Institutions, namely Cujacius and Grotius. No citations 
of jurists were removed during this revision, meaning the same twenty-five jurists 
were cited in the third and fourth versions.  
Stair cited most of these jurists only once. Four were cited twice, namely 
Connanus, Duarenus, Wesenbecius and, in the manuscripts, Corvinus. Only four 
were cited more often: Cujacius was cited twice in the third version but three times in 
the fourth; Stephanus was cited three times; Gudelinus six times; and Grotius nine 
times in the third version but ten in the fourth.  
 
3.2.1.2 How Stair cited the continental jurists 
 
Stair usually included in his citations the name of the jurist, the treatise, and the 
book, title and paragraph. Thirteen of his citations, including one added for the 
second edition, gave only the jurist’s name. An example is found in Stair’s title 
“Rights Real”, where he cited Connanus without any reference to a treatise: 
“Conanus is of the opinion”.82 Others cited in this manner are: Baldus, Cujacius, 
Donellus, Faber, Gregorius, Grotius (on three separate occasions), Mynsinger, 
Salmasius, Tiraquellus, and Wesenbecius. It is usually possible to deduce to which 
treatise, if any, the citation should have referred. This may be the case where one 
treatise by that jurist is cited often by Stair, such as Grotius’ De jure belli. 
Alternatively, if the citation is found to have been borrowed from another jurist, there 
is often greater detail found in the citation in that other treatise, such as a citation of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
79 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.78; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.124R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.78. Below, 4.1.8. 
80 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.3. This was first observed by Ford: Law and Opinion, 64-65. 
Below, 7.1.1.4. 
81 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6. Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the 
sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. Below, 4.1.6.1. 
82 S.12.41/2.1.41. 
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Wesenbecius which was borrowed from Vinnius.83 This was also the case with the 
citations of Faber, Mynsinger, and one of Grotius (all which were borrowed from 
Vinnius). 
Sometimes, Stair omitted the name of the treatise and only cited the book, 
title or paragraph. This was generally only the case where a jurist was famous for one 
particular treatise. The other of Stair’s citations of Connanus’ Commentaria iuris 
civilis libri decem. Argumentis tum ante singulorum librorum capita, tum cuiusque 
legis numero atque ordine in textu annotatis (Edition consulted: Hanover, 1610) and 
his citation to Molina’s De justitia et jure opus in sex tomos divisum (Edition 
consulted: Mainz, 1659) were given in this manner.84 Yet there was one occasion 
where this caused difficulty. Stair cited “Corvinus de pactis” in “Obligations 
Conventional”. This could have referred to either the father, Johannes Corvinus 
(1582-1650) or his son, Arnold Corvinus, (died c.1680), both of whom were notable 
jurists. Neither wrote a treatise called De pactis; the reference could have referred to 
a title inside any one of a number of their treatises. The 1759 edition of the 
Institutions wrongly identified this citation as being to Arnoldus Corvinus’ Jus 
canonicum per aphorismos strictim explicatum (Edition consulted: Paris, 1671), 
where “De pactis” was the name of the brief title 3.5. Gordon, however, correctly 
suggested that the citation referred to Corvinus’ Digesta per Aphorismos on D.2.14, 
the Digest title dedicated to pacts.85  
 
3.2.2  Legal humanism 
  
Legal humanism is usefully defined by Osler as: 
 
the school, active in the 16th century, particularly in France, which 
applied historical and philological methods to understanding the sources 
of Roman law that had survived from antiquity. It is also often taken to 
apply to the scholars who continued to practice this branch of legal 
                                                           
83 S.10.65/1.14.3. 
84 S.10.10/1.10.10 and S.10.5/1.10.5 respectively. 
85 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16. Ford wrongly ascribed 
this treatise to Johannes Corvinus [Law and Opinion, 65]. 
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scholarship, particularly in the Netherlands, in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.86 
 
The legal humanists applied their philological method to Roman, Canon and, to a 
lesser extent, Feudal law.87 Stair cited various legal humanist works, particularly 
those on Roman law, and was otherwise influenced by this method.  
Legal humanists sought to rediscover the classical texts of Roman law. This 
was aided by an understanding of Greek, which meant they were able to read the 
parts of the Corpus iuris civilis which had been ignored by earlier European jurists.88 
Stein noted that the early legal humanists “concentrated their efforts on ridding the 
texts of the glosses and commentaries that engulfed them.”89 Kelley suggested that 
this allowed the legal humanists to “rescue civil law from the clutches of the 
medieval commentators”.90 Criticisms of the earlier Italian schools were expressed 
by various legal humanists. Lorenzo Valla, a fifteenth-century Italian humanist, 
famously criticised the inelegant Latin of Bartolus and other Commentators,91 
claiming this was proof of their incompetence as jurists.92 A more colourful criticism 
was allegedly made during a lecture by Eguinarius Baro, a sixteenth-century French 
legal humanist, whereby he likened Bartolist commentators writing repeatedly on the 
same points to dogs marking their territory in the same spots.93 Stein related that 
Guilielmus Budaeus [Budé], a sixteenth-century French legal humanist, described 
such glosses and commentaries as “a malignant cancer on the texts, which had to be 
cut away.”94 Ulrich Zasius, a late-fifteenth- to early-sixteenth-century German legal 
                                                           
86 D.J. Osler: “Images of legal humanism” (2001) 9(1) Surfaces 101.6 
<http://www.pum.umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol9/osler.htm> accessed 1st October 2010.  
87 e.g. D.R. Kelley: “The rise of legal history in the Renaissance” (1970) 9(2) History and Theory 174-
194, 176-190. 
88 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (4). Below, 3.2.2. 
89 Stein: Roman Law in European History, 76. 
90 Kelley: “Rise of legal history in the Renaissance”, 179. 
91 Stein: Roman law in European history, 75; L. Nauta: “Lorenzo Valla” in E.N. Zalta (ed): The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 edition) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/lorenzo-valla/> accessed 9th February 2010. On 
the Commentators, F. Wieacker: A History of Private Law in Europe, translated by T. Wier and with a 
foreword by R. Zimmermann (Oxford, 1995), 55-61; N. Horn: “Die legistische Literatur der 
Kommentatoren und der Ausbreitung des gelehrten Rechts” in H. Coing (ed): Handbuch der Quellen 
und Literatur der neueren Europäischen privatrechtsgeschichte volume 1 (Munich, 1973) 261, 
generally. 
92 Stein: Roman law in European history, 75. 
93 Kelley: “Rise of legal history in the Renaissance”, 180. 
94 Stein: Roman law in European history, 76. 
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humanist who was cited by Stair, described them as “a giant creeper which had taken 
root around the texts.”95 Stair’s statement in his lecture for admission as an advocate 
that “the glosses and commentaries written theron with there counsells & decisions 
the wearisomnesse therof is well knowne”96 echoed these humanist remarks.  
Osler noted that works of textual criticism were printed from the early 
sixteenth century, bearing titles such as Annotationes, Observationes and 
Emendationes.
97 In these, legal humanists tried to reconstruct the original wording of 
classical texts. Stein noted that in doing so the humanists “relied largely on 
conjecture, using their knowledge of antiquity to guess what the text ought to be.”98 
This observation is illustrated in Osler’s outline of legal humanist writings on 
D.28.5.41(40), a passage of Julian on the division of inheritance between a first-
named heir and his substitute when the former was a slave.99 Legal humanists tried to 
explain the text’s apparent division of the inheritance into quarters rather than into 
halves. Andreas Alciatus, a sixteenth-century Italian legal humanist who worked at 
Bourges 1529-1533, replaced the term heredem for coheredem.100 Antonius Faber, a 
late-sixteenth- to early-seventeenth-century French legal humanist, also believed that 
the passage discussed co-heirs, which he deduced from the original context of the 
passage in Julian’s work.101 This would resolve the apparent contradiction in the text 
as then it would be one half share which was divided rather than the full inheritance. 
A different solution was put forward by Jacobus Cujacius, a sixteenth-century French 
legal humanist who was cited by Stair. Osler noted that Cujacius argued that the 
phrase causing difficulty, “alter semis [one half]”, was incorrectly added by the 
compilers. Cujacius suggested that the text originally read “ut as inter eum [that the 
inheritance be divided between them]” but that the compilers assumed that “as [here 
‘the inheritance’]” was an abbreviation for “alter semis”, and that their substitution 
resulted in the text implying that half, rather than the whole, of the inheritance was 
                                                           
95 Stein: Roman law in European history, 76. 
96 “Scotstarvet’s ‘Trew Relation’”, 381. 
97 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (1). 
98 Stein: Roman law in European history, 77. 
99 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VIII. 
100 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VIII (1). 
101 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VIII (4). 
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divided.102 This attempt to resolve the apparent difficulty in the text by ‘correcting’ 
the Latin was typical of the humanist style.  
Cujacius’ attempted reconstruction of the text by identifying and correcting a 
presumed interpolation was described by Osler as “the archetypal activity of the legal 
humanists”.103 Kelley argued that Franciscus Balduinus, a sixteenth-century French 
legal humanist cited by Stair, “was the most original scholar of the group” and that 
his Iustinianus sive de iure novo commentaria libri III (Edition consulted: Basel, 
1560) was the “first comprehensive treatment of the anti-Tribonianist theme.”104 
Antitribonianus sive dissertatio de studio legum (Paris, 1603) by Franciscus 
Hotmannus, a sixteenth century French legal humanist, was perhaps the most famous 
treatise to criticise Tribonian’s compilation.105 Stair mentioned Tribonian only twice 
in the Institutions. First, he simply named Tribonian as one of the compilers of 
Justinian’s Codex.106 Secondly, he mentioned Tribonian in his discussion of 
specification.107 Stair outlined the debate between the Proculians and the Sabinians 
as to whether the owner of the original materials or the manufacturer acquired 
ownership of the nova species. He then stated: “Tribonian midseth [sic] the matter 
thus, that if the product can easily be reduced to the first matter, the owners of the 
matter remain proprietars of the whole…but otherways the materials cedes to the 
Workmanship”.108 Stair was thus aware that Tribonian made changes to the text, but 
was not critical of him. 
This attention to the language of the texts was central to the legal humanists’ 
method. It was on the basis of language as well as historical inaccuracy that Valla 
was able to prove that the Donation of Constantine was a forgery.109 Stair was also 
concerned with textual authenticity. He followed Craig in rejecting Regiam 
                                                           
102 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VIII (2). 
103 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (6). 
104 Kelley: “Rise of legal history in the Renaissance”, 180. 
105 G. Hamza: “Comparative law and antiquity in the trends of legal humanism and natural law” 
(2007) 47(3) Acta Antiqua 279-290, 282; Kelley: “Rise of legal history in the Renaissance”, 180. 
106 S.1.11/1.1.12. Tribonian also, of course, oversaw the compilation of the Digest and the writing of 
the Institutes. 
107 S.12.41/2.1.41. 
108 S.12.41/2.1.41. This, of course, is not entirely correct as already in the classical period this solution 
had been suggested: D.6.1.5.1; D.32.78.4; D.41.1.24; D.41.1.26.pr. 
109 The Donation and Valla’s Discourse have been translated by C.B. Coleman and are reproduced 
with the Latin in C.B. Coleman: The Treatise of Lorenzo Valla on the Donation of Constantine: Text 
and Translation into English (New Haven, 1922), which also includes a brief but useful introduction 
to the debate. 
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Majestatem as a source of Scots law because they “were compyled for the Customs 
of England, in 13. Books, by the Earl of Chester, and by some unknown and 
inconsiderate hand, stollen thence”.110 
The legal humanists were also able to reconstruct Roman treatises which 
survived as fragments in the Corpus iuris civilis. From the twelfth century, 
manuscripts of the Digest omitted the inscriptions of the different texts (which gave 
the name of the jurist and the work from which the excerpt was taken).111 The Index 
by Jacobus Labittus, a sixteenth-century legal humanist, identified these authors and 
treatises.112 In it, Labittus listed: the texts of the Digest according to their authors, the 
works in which they appeared, and the books of those works from which they were 
excerpted; other Digest texts which cited that jurist; those jurists who were not 
themselves excerpted in the Digest but who were referred to by other jurists therein; 
and finally those texts in the Codex and Novels which mentioned specific jurists. 
Labittus’ Index was of fundamental importance for the study or reconstruction of 
classical law. Osler noted that after it became available, Cujacius “ceased to write 
commentaries on the Digest, but instead reconstituted the original works of the 
Roman jurists on the basis of Labittus’ Index, and wrote his commentaries on these 
‘reborn’ classical works.”113 One such treatise of Cujacius, his commentary on 
Africanus, was cited by Stair.114  
The legal humanists also applied this method to the Codex. Like the 
manuscripts of the Digest, those of the Codex stopped including the subscriptions 
bearing the date on which the legislation was issued.115 Balduinus’ Iustinianus sive 
de iure novo has been lauded as the first example of the “historicisation” of the 
Codex, having “reconstituted the legislation of the Emperor Justinian from the 
excerpts scattered throughout the Corpus Iuris.”116 Earlier legislation was also 
reconstructed. For example, Balduinus attempted to reconstruct very early Roman 
                                                           
110 S.1.15/1.1.16. Below, 3.2.2.1. 
111 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (2). 
112 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (2). Edition consulted: J. Labittus: Index legum omnium 
quae in Pandectis continentur: in quo singulae ad singulos iurisconsultorum libros ex quibus 
desumptae sunt, ut earum monet inscripto, referuntur … Additur postremo eiusdem indicis (Paris, 
1557). 
113 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (2). 
114 S.10.69/1.14.7. 
115 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (3). 
116 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (3). 
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law in Libri duo ad Leges Romuli regis Romanorum Leges XII Tabularum. Ejusdem 
consilium de nova iuris civilis demonstratione (Lyon, 1550).  
Legal humanists were also concerned with applying a more systematic 
structure to Roman law. Jolowicz and Nicholas explained that, when arranging the 
titles of the Digest, “the compilers used Ulpian’s commentary as their chief guide, 
civil law topics being fitted in with the praetorian matter as had been done in the 
classical digesta”.117 The legal humanists reorganised the texts into a more scientific 
arrangement. Stein referred to the Epistula de ratione docendi discendi iuris118 by 
Franciscus Duarenus, a work cited by Stair, as “the manifesto”119 of these legal 
humanists, which was nonetheless “confined to a general plea for treating the 
material of the Corpus iuris in a more rational and systematic way”.120 Franciscus 
Connanus, a sixteenth-century French legal humanist cited by Stair, in his 
Commentaria iuris civilis libri decem attempted to re-order legal material in a more 
rational structure under the Institute’s tripartite division of persons, things and 
actions121. Hugo Donellus, a sixteenth-century French legal humanist cited by Stair, 
wrote the greatest exposition of the rational discipline of law in his Commentarii de 
iure civili libri viginti octo (Frankfurt, 1595-1597). Rather than follow the traditional 
treatment of law where actions and procedure were of primary importance, Donellus 
regarded the rights of the individual as being of greater importance, and the method 
by which he could defend or secure those rights as being secondary to this. The 
structure of his commentary reflected this.122 Donellus also separated the law of 
                                                           
117 H.F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas: Historical introduction to the Study of Roman law (3rd edition, 
Cambridge, 1972), 483. This does not appear to have been mentioned in T. Honoré: Justinian’s 
Digest: Character and Compilation (Oxford, 2010). 
118 Consulted in F. Duarenus: Omnia quae quidem hactenus edita fuerunt opera … omnia nunc 
demum unico comprehensa volumine. Editio, ut postrema, ita & caeteris umquam antehac alibi 
egressis, compluribus in locis, multo tersior ac emendatior (Frankfurt, 1592) 
119 P.G. Stein: “Donellus and the origins of the modern civil law” in J.A. Ankum et al (eds): Mélanges 
Felix Wubbe: offerts per ses collègues et ses amis à l’occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire 
(Fribourg, 1993) 439, 443.  
120 Stein: “Donellus and the origins of the modern civil law”, 443. 
121 Stein: Roman law in European history, 80; M. Scattola: “Scientia iuris and ius naturae: The 
jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” in D. Canale, P. 
Grossi, H. Hofmann (eds): A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, volume 9: A 
History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600–1900 (Dordrecht, 2009) 1, 12. 
122 P. Garnsey: Thinking about Property: from antiquity to the age of revolution (Ideas in Context 
series, Cambridge, 2007), 202; Stein: “Donellus and the origins of the modern civil law”, esp. 448-
452. 
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obligations from the law of property, originally considered to both be aspects of the 
law of things. Stein thus called Donellus “the founder of the modern civil law”.123 
Stair was also concerned with establishing “Whether Law may, or should be 
handled as a Rational Discipline”.124 He criticised those lawyers who “rest satisfied 
with any order, whereby the particular Heads and Titles may be found, whereunto the 
confused Order of the Civil Law (which is the greatest blemish in it) hath been 
instrumental”.125 In this regard, he also criticised the Italian schools: “There is little 
to be found among the Commentars and Treatises on the Civil Law, arguing from 
any known Principles of Right; but all their Debates is a Congestion of the Contexts 
of the Law, which exceedingly nauseates delicate ingines”.126 These complaints, and 
the addressing of this question generally, were typically humanist. Further, Stair 
lauded later jurists: “there are not wanting of late of the learnedest Lawers, who have 
thought it both feasible and fit, that the Law should be formed as a Rational 
Discipline, and have much regrated that it hath not been effectuated”.127 In this 
regard, he specifically mentioned Duarenus’ Epitome, a work of legal humanism, and 
Grotius’ De jure belli.128  
Finally, Osler noted that, during the sixteenth century, other Roman legal 
texts which survived independently of the Corpus iuris civilis were rediscovered. 
Legal humanists compared these to the Corpus iuris civilis to discover the method of 
its compilers,129 amongst other things. Reference was also had to works of classical 
antiquity which provided historical context and understanding, most notably to 
Cicero. Stair also cited various writers of classical antiquity, including Cicero, who 
was cited five times in the third version and six times in the fourth. 
 
3.2.2.1 Legal humanism in Scotland 
 
                                                           
123 Stein: “Donellus and the origins of the modern civil law”, 452. On the influence of Donellus, also 
R. Feenstra: “Hugues Doneau et les juristes Néerlandais du XVIIe siècle: l’influence de son 
<<système>> sur l’évolution du droit privé avant le Pandectisme” in R. Feenstra: Legal Scholarship 




 Centuries (Variorum Collected Studies series, Aldershot, 
1996) ch.4, 233-243. 





129 Osler: “Images of legal humanism”, pt.VII (5). 
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There was no satisfactory or consistent teaching of law in Scotland before the 
eighteenth century.130 Scots desiring a legal education studied abroad.131 Cairns, 
Fergus and MacQueen suggested that the failure of legal education in Scotland 
before the eighteenth century meant that “it was perhaps inevitable that there should 
have been no major contribution in Scotland”132 to legal humanism of a Romanist 
nature. Yet, although few Scots were prominent legal humanists,133 the influence of 
legal humanism was felt in Scotland. That Andrew Melville’s curriculum for the 
liberal arts was humanist has already been shown.134 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen 
noted that the various commissions to collect and print early Scottish statutes were 
“reminiscent of the directions which humanism took in contemporary France and 
                                                           
130 On failed attempts to provide legal education in Scotland before the eighteenth century see e.g. 
J.W. Cairns: “The law, the advocates and the universities in late sixteenth-century Scotland” (1994) 
73(2) S.H.R. 171-190 generally; J.W. Cairns: “Academic feud, bloodfeud, and William Welwood: 
legal education in St. Andrews, 1560-1611” (1998) 2(2-3) Edin.L.R. 158-179 (Part I) and 255-287 
(Part II) generally; J.W. Cairns: “Lawyers, law professors, and localities: the universities of Aberdeen, 
1680-1750” (1995) 46(3-4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 304-331 generally. On Scottish legal 
education in the eighteenth century see e.g. J.W. Cairns: “Rhetoric, language, and Roman law: legal 
education and improvement in eighteenth-century Scotland” (1991)  9(1) Law and History Review 31-
58 generally; J.W. Cairns: “John Spotswood, professor of law: a preliminary sketch” in W.M. Gordon 
(ed): Miscellany III (Stair Society series volume 39, Edinburgh, 1992) 131 generally; J.W. Cairns: 
“The origins of the Glasgow law school: the professors of the Civil law, 1714-61” in P. Birks (ed): 
The Life of the Law: proceedings of the tenth British Legal History Conference Oxford 1991 (London, 
1993) 151 generally; J.W. Cairns ‘“As famous a school for law as Edinburgh for medicine’: the 
Glasgow law school, 1761-1801” in A. Hook and R. Sher (ed): The Glasgow Enlightenment (East 
Linton, 1995) 133 generally. 
131 e.g. Sir George Mackenzie who studied law at Bourges; Sir John Skene who studied law at Paris 
and Wittenberg; and Thomas Craig, who studied at Paris and presumably studied law in France. For 
biographies of these three men: Jackson: “Mackenzie, Sir George, of Rosehaugh (1636/1638–1691)” 
A. Murray: “Skene, Sir John, of Curriehill (c.1540–1617)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25669> accessed 10th February 2010; and J.W. Cairns: 
“Craig, Thomas (1538?–1608)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6580> accessed 10th February 2010. On the later trend of 
studying in the Netherlands, e.g. P. Nève: “Disputations of Scots students attending universities in the 
Northern Netherlands” in W.M. Gordon and T.D. Fergus (ed): Legal History in the Making: 
proceedings of the ninth British Legal History Conference Glasgow 1989 (London, 1991) 95 
generally; J.W. Cairns: “Importing our lawyers from Holland: Netherlands influences on Scots law 
and lawyers in the eighteenth century” in G.G. Simpson (ed): Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124-
1994 (Mackie Monograph 3, East Linton, 1996) 136 generally; J.W. Cairns: “Legal study in Utrecht 
in the late 1740s: the education of Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes” (2002) 8(1) Fundamina: A 
journal of legal history 30-73 passim. 
132 J.W. Cairns, T.D. Fergus and H.L. MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland” (1990) 
11(1) J.L.H. 40-69, 40.   
133 An exception is Edward Henryson, who taught at Bourges in the 1550s [Cairns, Fergus and 
MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 40-41; M. Tucker: “Henryson, Edward 
[Henry Édouard] (1522–c.1590)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12982> accessed 24th February 2010]. 
134 Above, 1.2.1.2. 
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England.”135 Two of the Scottish jurists consulted by Stair, Thomas Craig of 
Riccarton and Sir John Skene, Lord Curriehill, were influenced by legal humanism. 
This discussion will establish, first, the extent to which they were influenced by legal 
humanism and, secondly, whether Stair was indirectly influenced by legal humanism 
through his use of their work. 
Craig graduated in the arts at St Andrews in 1555 and then went to Paris to 
continue his studies. By 1563 he had returned to Scotland, when he was admitted as 
an advocate.136 During the intervening years, he is thought to have studied law in 
France, “perhaps canon law at Paris and civil law elsewhere”.137 His most notable 
treatise, Jus feudale, was on Feudal law. Cairns showed it was probably written 
between the late 1590s and 1606.138 It was published posthumously, in Latin, in 
1655. The original manuscript has not survived.139  
Craig was certainly influenced by legal humanism. As Cairns, Fergus and 
MacQueen observed, Craig cited various legal humanists in the Jus feudale. They 
found that Hotmannus was the jurist cited most often, and that both his Francogallia 
(1573) and De feudis (1573) were cited.140 Cairns stated elsewhere that there were 
twenty-five citations of Hotmannus in the Jus feudale,141 and that the structure of 
Craig’s work bore a resemblance to Hotmannus’ De feudis.142 Cairns, Fergus and 
MacQueen also noted that “conventional humanist traits are apparent in all Craig’s 
work”, most notably: a conscientious use of Latin;143 pride in his knowledge of 
Greek;144 and the citation of at least sixteen different writers of classical antiquity.145 
They also showed that Craig’s discussion of the history of Roman law was “typically 
humanistic”,146 and that his use of Roman law as ancillary to Scottish sources is 
comparable to Cujacius’ and Hotmannus’ rejection of Roman law for French 
                                                           
135 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 43. 
136 Cairns: “Craig, Thomas (1538?–1608)”. 
137 Cairns: “Craig, Thomas (1538?–1608)”. 
138 J.W. Cairns: “The breve testatum and Craig’s Jus feudale”, 317. 
139 J.A. Clyde (trans): The Jus feudale by Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton, with an appendix containing 
the books of the feus (Edinburgh, 1934) volume 1, xvi. 
140 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 48. 
141 J.W. Cairns: “Ius civile in Scotland, ca. 1600” (2004) 2(1) Roman Legal Tradition 136-170, 151. 
142 J.W. Cairns: “Craig, Cujas, and the definition of feudum: is a feu a usufruct?” in P. Birks (ed): New 
Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas (Oxford, 1989) 75, 78. 
143 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 49-50.  
144 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 50.  
145 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 50. 
146 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 50-51. 
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practice.147 They also argued that Craig’s frequent discussions of etymology not only 
followed the humanist style but also sometimes included citations of similar 
discussions by Hotmannus and Budaeus.148 Indeed, they referred to Craig’s Jus 
feudale as “The most profound achievement of this humanist movement in 
Scotland”.149 
Yet Craig’s reliance on the legal humanists was not uncritical and should not 
be overstated. Cairns showed that Craig did at times disagree with Hotmannus and 
had “no sympathy with his political views.”150 Elsewhere he showed that Craig 
disagreed with the definition of feudum as a usufruct put forward by Cujacius. Cairns 
established that Craig instead preferred the definition put forward by inter alia 
Zasius and Petrus Rebuffus, namely of feudum as dominium utile (as distinct from 
dominium directum, which was reserved for the feudal superior).151 He has also 
convincingly undermined Robertson’s suggestion that Craig used Baro in his 
discussion of the breve testatum.152 Craig was aware of the legal humanist literature, 
but was critical in his use of it.  
Stair cited Craig in both his lecture for admission as an advocate and his 
Institutions. As his lecture was given prior to Jus feudale being printed, he must have 
had access to a manuscript copy or epitome of Craig. The first version was written four 
years after Burnet’s edition of Craig was printed in 1655. It is likely that Stair purchased 
Burnet’s edition of Craig, although, as there is no surviving catalogue of Stair’s library, 
this cannot be confirmed.153  
Stair cited Craig c.100 times in the third version. Only two of these were in the 
titles on obligations. Stair recognised his debt to Craig: 
 
                                                           
147 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 53. 
148 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 51. 
149 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 59. 
150 Cairns: “Craig, Cujas, and the definition of feudum: is a feu a usufruct?”, 78. 
151 Cairns: “Craig, Cujas, and the definition of feudum: is a feu a usufruct?”, 76. 
152 J.J. Robertson: “The Illusory ‘Breve Testatum’” in G.W.S. Barrow (ed): The Scottish Tradition: 
Essays in Honours of Ronald Gordon Cant (Edinburgh, 1974) 84, 90. Cairns: “The breve testatem and 
Craig’s Jus feudale”, 329-330. 
153 It may prove possible – by comparing manuscripts and Burnet’s printed edition of the Jus feudale, 
and the manuscripts and printed editions of the Institutions – to determine whether Stair used 
manuscript copies or the printed edition of Craig’s treatise when writing the first version. This has, 
however, been unfeasible here. 
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Our Learned Countrey-man, Mr. Thomas Craig Advocat, hath largely and 
learnedly handled the Feudal Rights of this and other Nations, in his Book 
de Feudis; and therefore, we shall only follow closely, what since his time 
by Statute or Custom hath been cleared or altered in Feudal Rights...154 
 
 To what extent Stair was influenced by the legal humanist method through 
his use of Craig? In all likelihood Gordon is correct in suggesting that Stair borrowed 
two of his citations of continental jurists from Craig: 
 
Stair’s reference to Cujas in Institutions, 2.4.26 would appear to come 
from Craig’s Jus feudale, 2.20.30. It is less clear but also probable that 
Stair’s reference to Tiraquellus in Institutions, 3.4.34 comes from Craig’s 
Jus feudale, 2.17.21.155 
 
Both Cujacius and Tiraquellus were legal humanists; this borrowing indicates that 
Stair was indirectly influenced by legal humanism through his use of Craig. This is 
particularly notable in relation to his borrowing of this citation of Cujacius. Craig 
referred to Cujacius in a discussion of the origin of relief.156 After saying that some 
Scots credited King Malcolm with introducing relief, Craig stated that he followed 
Cujacius in believing that it was mentioned in a decree of Emperor Leo which was 
preserved in the Novels:  
 
Ego altuis [sic] hujus Relevii originem repetendam puto, Cujacium in 
hoc sequutus, qui ex veteri consuetudine, nempe Leonis Imperatoris 




Following Cujace however, I think the origin of relief must be sought in 
older times. The opinion adopted by Cujace is that relief owed its origin 
to an ordinance of Emperor Leo, which is to be found in the Novels. 
[Translation: Lord Clyde] 
 
This was certainly the source for Stair’s similar comment: “Releef is generally 
treated on by the Fewdists. The Original whereof Cujace ascribeth to the constitution 
of the Emperor Leo, extant in the Novels”.158 Stair rarely referred to the Novels, so 
                                                           
154 S.13.3/2.3.3. 
155 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 265. 
156 Craig: Jus feudale, 2.20.30, 291. 
157 Craig: Jus feudale, 2.20.30, 291. 
158 S.14.26/2.4.26. 
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this reference was unusual.159 Additionally, Stair, like Craig, continued in the next 
passage by considering the different rules of French and English law.160 This 
philological concern with the origin and development of relief, in which Stair was 
indirectly influenced by Cujacius through his use of Craig, was typical of legal 
humanism.  
There is less evidence of indirect humanist influence from Tiraquellus. He was 
cited by Stair, Craig and Zoesius, another jurist consulted by Stair,161 on whether 
there can be representation in succession.162 It is probable that Craig was Stair’s 
source here as Stair also cited the relevant title of Craig within his discussion. Craig 
put forward two possibilities: either a child whose parent predeceases his grandparent 
will inherit the parent’s share of the inheritance; or the predeceased’s share will be 
distributed amongst the other heirs. Craig provided Tiraquellus’ name and the 
relevant treatise, De jure primogeniorum, but cited no particular passage and did not 
explore his argument,163 merely stating that he discussed the views put forward by 
various jurists on this matter:  
 
Hanc quaestionem tractat vir doctissimus Tiraquellus, in suo de 
primogeniture libro, ubi diversas multorum hominum & doctorum 
sententias inter se pugnantes refert,164 
 
This topic is discussed by Tiraquellus, an author of great learning, in his 
book on primogeniture, in which he collects a number of opposite 
opinions held by eminent people. [Translation: Lord Clyde]  
 
                                                           
159 Above, 3.1.2. 
160 S.14.27/2.4.27. 
161 H. Zoesius: Praelectiones feudales, nunc primum editae [known as De feudis] (Edition consulted: 
Leuven, 1641), 12, 85-89 was cited with Gudelinus’ De iure feudorum et pacis commentarii ad mores 
Belgij ac Franciae conscripti, S.14.18/2.4.18. The two treatises were bound together, at least for the 
1641 edition (the edition consulted). Examination of Zoesius and De jure feudorum confirms that Stair 
consulted those treatises.  
162 S.26.34/3.4.34; Craig: Jus feudale, 2.17.21, 258-259; Zoesius: De feudis, 11.30, 80. 
163 Tiraquellus’ Commentarii de jure primogeniorum [consulted in A. Tiraquellus: Commentarii de 
nobilitate et iure primogeniorum, quarta hac eademque postrema editione, ab auctore ipso 
diligentissime recogniti, & tertia amplius parte locupletati (Leiden, 1617), 410] asked “uter 
praeferatur in iure primogeniturae an filius primogeniti, an verò patruus ipsius. [which is preferred in 
the law of primogeniture, the oldest son or his uncle?]” Tiraquellus found for the son: “tunc haud 
dubie filius primogeniti id ius primogeniturae consequetur, patruo suo omnino excluso. [it is not 
doubted that his oldest son acquires by the law of primogeniture, and thus entirely excludes his 
uncle]”. [Quaestio 40, para.1, 591].  
164 Craig: Jus feudale 2.17.21, 259.  
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Craig then explained that Roman law, English law, French law and Scots law all 
recognised representation in inheritance, meaning that the child would inherit. Stair 
also explained that the child would inherit in Scots law, “though that be contraverse, 
by the more comon Feudall Customs, as is largely and learnedly dispute by 
Tiraquellus.”165 This reference to the “contraverse” probably reflected Craig’s 
discussion of the possibility that the inheritance be divided amongst the other heirs to 
the exclusion of the predeceased’s child. Although Stair borrowed the citation of 
Tiraquellus, Stair was here influenced by Craig himself rather than by Tiraquellus. 
“Common Principles” provides further evidence of Stair having been 
influenced by the humanist nature of Craig’s Jus feudale. Both jurists began their 
treatise with an examination of the history of law. Both the structure and the content 
of Stair’s discussion followed that of Craig to sufficient a degree as to presume that 
Craig was Stair’s source.166 Stair’s examination of the history of Roman law, for 
example, owed much to Craig’s “typically humanistic”167 discussion. Additionally, 
Stair was also influenced by Craig’s textual criticism, specifically in rejecting the 
Regiam Majestatem as a source of Scots law, believing it to be overly reliant on 
England’s Glanville.168 There was a legal-humanist theme throughout Stair’s first title, 
much of which derived from his use of Craig.  
Stair’s reliance on Craig for philological and historical examinations, typical of 
the legal humanist style, can also been seen in later titles. In his discussion of courtesy, 
Stair stated: “The original of this Liferent by the Courtesie, as Craig observeth, lib. 2. 
dieges. 22. is from the Rescript of the Emperour Constantine, whereby the Father had 
                                                           
165 S.26.34/3.4.34. 
166 For specific examples, compare: S.1.10/1.1.11 on Draco to Craig: Jus feudale 1.1.15, 7; the list of 
Roman jurists, S.1.11/1.1.12 and Craig: Jus feudale 1.2.4, 8; Cairns has shown that Stair’s confusion 
as to the date of the death of Justinian, S.1.11/1.1.12 comes from his reading of Craig: Jus feudale 
1.2.11, 9 [Cairns: “Civil law tradition in Scottish legal thought”, 204-205]; or their discussions of 
Gratian, S.1.13/1.1.14 and Craig: Jus feudale 1.3.8, 13-14. See also Ford: Law and Opinion, 218-220, 
221-222; J.M. Halliday: “Feudal law as a source” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies 
(Stair Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 136, 139. 
167 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 50. 
168 S.1.15/1.1.16 Craig: Jus feudale 1.8.11, 38-39. For more information on the Regiam Majestatem 
see e.g. Lord Cooper (ed): Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta, based on the text of Sir 
John Skene (Stair Society series volume 11, Edinburgh, 1947). Stair’s remark concerning Regiam did 
not feature in the manuscripts. Stair’s discussion of the laws of Scotland was extended both when 
Stair revised the Institutions in 1666-1667 and when preparing the third version [1662 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 1.20; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.10R-11R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 1.20. For a detailed account of the changes in Stair’s discussion of the sources of 
Scots law, see Ford: Law and Opinion, 414-439]. The reference to Regiam was added for the third 
version. This shows that Stair repeatedly turned to and borrowed from Craig’s Jus feudale.  
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the Usufruct of the heretage of his Children, befalling to them as heirs to their 
Mother”169. Stair was correct; Craig explained that “Ex Constantini enim rescripto 
sancitum est [It was decreed by a rescript of Constantine [Translation: Lord Clyde]]”, 
and that the law of courtesy was also found in Norman and English law.170 Craig’s 
interest in the origin of the rule was typically humanist, and there was at least some 
evidence of this influence in Stair. 
 Of course, Stair also used Craig for information which was not 
representative of the legal humanist style. He expressly used Craig to consult Baldus.171 
Sellar suggested that “the bulk of [Stair’s] references to English law concern matters of 
property and succession, and in this … Stair largely follows Sir Thomas Craig.”172 
There were seventeen references to English law or custom in Stair’s discussion of 
obligations in the third version. Five of these (approximately a third) were borrowed 
from Craig.173 Four of these five were in “Common Principles”.  
Stair’s reliance on Craig can be over-stated. Ford suggested, despite Stair’s 
declaration that he was merely explaining law since Craig, that: 
 
It would be going too far to say that Stair based his account of recent 
developments in land law on an epitome of Craig’s treatise, for much of his 
discussion of the feudal law was his own and the material he adopted from 
Craig was integrated into a coherent account which owed little in its 
structure to the Ius feudale.174  
 
                                                           
169 S.16.19/2.6.19. 
170 Craig: Jus feudale 2.22.40, 312. 
171 S.21.19/2.11.19. 
172 W.D.H. Sellar: “English law as a source” in D.M. Walker (ed): Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair 
Society series volume 33, Edinburgh, 1981) 140, 142. Note, however, that Thomas Craig was not 
knighted: Cairns: “Craig, Thomas (1538?-1608)”. 
173 Stair’s discussions of the different inferences of the term ‘common law’ in Scotland and England 
were both likely taken from Craig [S.1.10/1.1.11; S.1.15/1.1.16; Craig: Jus feudale 1.7.13, 32]. Stair’s 
discussion of the localised customs of the “Gavil kind of Kent” [S.1.10/1.1.10. The ‘gavelkind’ were a 
specific group of Feudal tenants peculiar to the Kentish region. They are distinguished from normal 
English feudal tenants as, on the vassal’s death, the tenancy was divided equally amongst his sons 
rather than passing by primogeniture. For more information of gavelkind tenancies, see N. Neilson: 
“Custom and the common law in Kent” (1924-1925) 38(4) Harvard Law Review 482-498, passim] 
probably used an analogous statement made by Craig, although that specific term in not used by him 
[Craig: Jus feudale 1.7.18, 34]. Stair also borrowed his discussion of the apparent failure of the 
English legal system in not having an alternative to the Scottish rule of desuetude from Craig 
[S.1.15/1.1.16; Craig: Jus feudale 1.8.9, 38]. Finally, Stair’s discussion of villainy likely derived in 
part from Craig [S.2.11/1.2.11; Craig: Jus Feudale 1.11.32, 71-72]. This final instance was the only 
one not found in “Common Principles”. 
174 Ford: Law and Opinion, 215. 
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Halliday also cautioned against the assumption that Stair was overly reliant on 
Craig.175 He argued that Stair’s principal sources for his discussion of Feudal law 
were “the customs and conveyancing practice of the 17th century and the decisions of 
the Court which had clarified and formed it”176 rather than Craig. He stated that Stair 
could not have used Craig to a great extent because there had been much 
development of the law since Craig wrote, particularly regarding registration of 
sasines, registration of adjudications, positive prescription and bounding title.177 
Further, he stated that various aspects of Feudal law only developed into concrete 
principles after Craig wrote.178 These Halliday claimed “Stair stated virtually de 
novo… [and thus] owed virtually nothing to Craig.”179 Any detailed re-examining of 
Stair’s use of Craig in the second and third books is unfeasible here, but Halliday’s 
findings that Stair was not overly reliant on Craig as a source of Feudal law is 
consistent with the findings of this thesis regarding Stair’s use of Roman law and of 
continental jurists in the titles on obligations.180 
Stair was also indirectly influenced by legal humanism through his use of Sir 
John Skene, Lord Curriehill.181 Skene was Clerk Register and a Lord of Session from 
1594. He was also part of a commission to review early acts of the Scottish 
parliament, printed as The Lawes and Actes of Parliament, maid be King James the 
First, and his successours Kinges of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1597). In the same year, 
Skene published his De verborum significatione: The exposition of the termes and 
difficill wordes, conteined in the foure buikes of Regiam Majestatem, and uthers, in 
the Acts of Parliament, Infeftments, and used in practique of the Realme, with diverse 
rules, and common places, or principalles of the Lawes (Edinburgh, 1597 rept. 
Edinburgh, 1631). Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen called this “a work of a 
characteristically humanist type”182: the name of the work was also used by Valla 
and Alciatus, amongst others; Budaeus, Zasius, Alciatus and Cujacius were all cited 
                                                           
175 Halliday: “Feudal law as a source”, 140. 
176 Halliday: “Feudal law as a source”, 139. 
177 Respectively S.13.20/2.3.20; S.13.22/2.3.22; S.-/4.35.15; and S.13.26/2.3.26. 
178 Halliday: “Feudal law as a source”, 139. 
179 Halliday: “Feudal law as a source”, 139. 
180 Below, esp. 8.1.2. 
181 A. Murray: “Skene, Sir John, of Curriehill (c.1540–1617)”. 
182 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 45. 
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by Skene;183 and Matthaeus Wesenbecius, a German legal humanist cited by Stair, 
was recognised by Skene as his teacher.184 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen also 
showed that Skene was concerned with the textual purity of the text: “excision from 
the texts of later intruding glosses and additions, the restoration of rubrics to their 
proper place… and the retention of the ipsissima verba of the originals”,185 taking 
special account of the manuscripts, was part of his method. They also showed that 
Skene made various philological notes on the text,186 and used the historical records 
available to him as Lord Clerk Register to elucidate certain points.187  
Stair used Skene’s De verborum significatione for the Institutions. Stair 
referred to it on six occasions, all which were in the titles on property law.188 The 
manuscripts reveal that, similar to his use of Craig, Stair used De verborum 
significatione both when writing and when later revising the Institutions. Two of 
Stair’s citations of Skene were found in the sample manuscripts from the 1662 stem 
and were thus included in the first version.189 Two were added for the second 
version.190 Two were added when Stair was preparing the third version.191  
Stair was influenced by legal humanism through his use of Skene. Stair’s 
second citation of Skene was in his discussion of herzelds (the gift of an animal to 
the Feudal superior on the death of his vassal). This was an etymological discussion 
                                                           
183 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 45. 
184 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 44. 
185 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 45. 
186 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 46-47.  
187 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 47-48. 
188 S.13.67/2.3.67 citing Skene: De verborum significatione under “Forestarius”; S.13.80/2.3.80 citing 
Skene: De verborum significatione under “Herrezelda”; S.14.25/2.4.25 citing Skene: De verborum 
significatione under “None-Entres”; S.14.28/2.4.28 citing Skene: De verborum significatione under 
“Releuium”; S.14.41/- citing Skene: De verborum significatione under “Maritagium” – this citation 
and the surrounding passage were removed from the fourth version; S.16.19/2.6.19 citing Skene: De 
verborum significatione under “Curialitas”. 
189 The citation at S.13.80/2.3.80 is found in the 1662 stem: Adv.MS.24.1.8, 13.52; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 
13.44; Adv.MS.25.1.11; fol.172L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 13.45; Adv.MS.25.1.7, fol.62L (folio 
reference is used because the paragraphs in this title are not numbered); Adv.MS.25.1.12, 13.44. The 
citation at S.16.19/2.6.19 is found in the 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 16.20; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 16.16: 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.195L-R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 16.17; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 16.16; 
Adv.MS.25.1.12, 16.17.  
190 The citation at S.14.28/2.4.28 is found in the 1666 stem in Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 
14.15, but does not appear in the manuscripts from the 1662 stem. The citation, S.14.41/- appears in 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 14.27; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 14.26, but not in the manuscripts from the 1662 
stem.  
191 The citation at S.13.67/2.3.67 does not feature in any of the manuscripts consulted; the surrounding 
passage was revised for the third version. The citation at S.14.25/2.4.25 appears only in 
Adv.MS.25.1.12, 14.14. This manuscript was that which was updated in places according to the third 
version; this citation of Skene was probably another example of this. 
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typical of the philological style of legal humanism. Stair defined herzelds as “the best 
Horse, Ox or Cow of the Tennent dying on the Ground, is introduced by custom, 
derived from the Germans, as the word of their Language, expressing the same 
evidenceth”.192 His source for this was undoubtedly Skene, even though Skene says 
the custom is Dutch not German:  
 
for Herr in dutch, in latine herus, dominus, signifies ane lord, or maister, 
and zeild is called ane gift, tribute, or taxation, as in the auld actes of 
parliament maid be King James the first…Swa Herrezelda, is ane gift 
given be onie man to his maister and Lord, quhilk suld be his best…193  
 
Although this passage of Skene was not discussed by Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen, 
it nonetheless agrees with what they term Skene’s “not uncritical interest in language 
and its origins [which is] of a characteristically humanist nature.”194 Stair was 
therefore indirectly influenced by legal humanism through his use of Skene, if to a 
lesser extent than through his use of Craig. 
 
3.2.2.2 Stair’s citation of works of legal humanism 
 
Just under half (nine) of the jurists cited in the titles on obligations were legal 
humanists. This number of citations is in keeping with his use of humanist methods. 
Yet, as will be shown, Stair probably did not consult any of these legal humanists.  
Rather, he borrowed these citations from other continental jurists. Nonetheless, 
Stair’s citation of so many legal humanists shows that he obviously recognised the 
prestige of legal humanism and made an effort to cite such jurists, drawing on them 
for authority.  
Stair cited Balduinus (1520-1573), along with Nicholas Boerius and 
Rebuffus, in his discussion of written contracts for debt.195 Gordon correctly 
suggested that all three of these citations were borrowed from Gudelinus.196 
Balduinus has been mentioned already as being a leading French legal humanist, 
                                                           
192 S.13.80/2.3.80. 
193 Skene: De verborum significatione, “Herrezelda”. 
194 Cairns, Fergus and MacQueen: “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland”, 47. 
195 S.10.11/1.10.11. 
196 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. Below, 5.1.4.2. 
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who: gave historical context to passages of the Codex; wrote a commentary on the 
XII tables; and was the first to write a comprehensive treatise on the interpolations 
made by Tribonian.197 He was, like many of his time, a lawyer, a historian and a 
theologian.198 He was the professor of both the Roman and Canon laws at Bourges, 
Strasbourg, Heidelberg, and at Angers. He wrote various treatises on the law; his 
Commentarij Institutiones iuris civilis was cited by Stair. Yet the small sample of 
library catalogues consulted indicates there may have been limited interest in his 
works in Scotland. None are listed in either the 1683 or 1692 catalogues of the 
Advocates’ Library, or in the journal of Lord Fountainhall.199  
Connanus (1508-1551) studied law at Orleans and later at Bourges under 
Alciatus. He went on to practise law and became a powerful public figure. He was 
regarded as one of the greatest jurists of his time and his commentary was highly 
regarded200 and was one in which he attempted to reorder legal material into a more 
rational structure.201 Connanus was cited three times by Stair, twice on promises and 
naked pactions,202 and once on specification.203 None cited any particular treatise, but 
one gave two passages within an unidentified treatise. One of these three citations of 
Connanus was correctly suggested by Gordon to have been borrowed from 
Grotius.204 This thesis shows that all three were in fact borrowed from him.205 Stair’s 
citation of Connanus on three separate occasions probably reflected the popularity of 
                                                           
197 Above, 3.2.2. 
198 R. Baier: “BAUDOIN (oder BAUDUIN), François” in B.B.K.L. volume 22 (2003) columns 61-64 
<http://bautz.de/bbkl/b/baudoin_f.shtml> accessed 28th February 2010. 
199 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers; Catalogus librorum; Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals. 
200 E. Holthöfer: “Connan (Connanus), François (1508-1551)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
140 generally; C.J. de Ferrière: The History of the Roman or Civil law: Shewing its Origins and 
Progress; how, and when the several parts of it were first compil'd; with some account of the 
prinicpal writers and commentators thereupon: and of the method to be observ'd in studying the same 
Translated into English by J.B. [John Beaver] (London, 1724 rept. Clark NJ, 2005), 147. 
201 Stein: Roman Law in European History, 80; M. Scattola: “Scientia iuris and ius naturae: The 
jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”, 12. 
202 S.10.10/1.10.10. The second of these citations appears only in the manuscripts. 1662 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.78; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.124R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 
and 25.1.12, 10.78. 
203 S.12.41/2.1.41. 
204 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 262. 
205 Below, 4.1.6.1, 4.1.8. 
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Connanus in Scotland. Both the Advocates’ Library catalogues and Lord George 
Douglas’ listed a 1610 copy of Connanus’ commentary printed at Hanover.206  
Cujacius (1520-1590) was professor of law at Cahors, Bourges, Valence, 
Turin, and Paris. He was a jurist of great reputation, and was known as the greatest 
textual critic of French legal humanism.207 A scholar writing not long after Stair 
remarked that: “his Writings have the majestick Gravity of Papinian, the rich 
Abundance of Ulpian, the Sweeteness and Chastness of Paul, and the Conciseness 
and Sententiousness of Affricanus. [sic]”208 Stair cited Cujacius three times. First, he 
cited his commentary on Africanus on risk in sale. Secondly, he gave a general 
reference to Cujacius on the origin of relief.209 Thirdly, he cited Cujacius’ 
Observationes et emendationes
210, a miscellany of notes and corrections on the law 
in twenty-eight books.211 All three of these citations were borrowed, two from 
Vinnius and one from Craig. Again, Stair’s repeated citation of Cujacius probably 
reflects his popularity in Scotland. Two copies of his Opera appeared in the 1683 
Advocates’ Library catalogue,212 although only that printed in Paris in 1658 featured 
in the 1693 catalogue.213 Fountainhall acquired a copy of his Observationes et 
emendationes, amongst other works.214 That Stair borrowed three citations of 
Cujacius indicates that he was aware of his importance and was drawing on his 
reputation. 
Donellus (1527-1591) taught at Bourges, Heidelberg, Leiden, and Altdorf. 
His work was highly influential215 and his importance in explaining law as a rational 
                                                           
206 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 46; Catalogus Librorum, 35. Kelly: Library of Lord George 
Douglas, 51. It is this edition of Connanus which has been examined for this thesis.  
207 See e.g. Stein: Roman law in European History, 77. 
208 de Ferriere: History of the Roman or Civil law, 152. 
209 S.14.26/2.4.26. 
210 Consulted in J. Cujacius: Opera, quae de iure fecit, et edi voluit. Ab ipso auctore postremum 
recognita & libris quibusdam aucta. In tomos quatuor distincta (Frankfurt, 1623). 
211 S.-/1.9.4. Kenny explained Cujacius’ use of this “selective, unsystematic approach” on the grounds 
that “he no longer believes that Roman law is a complete, coherent system” [N. Kenny: The Palace of 
Secrets: Béroalde de Verville and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge (Oxford, 1991 rept. 
Oxford, 2001), 48 n.155]. It is interesting to note that printing of this treatise began before Labbitus’ 
Index was printed. 
212 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 44. 
213 Catalogus Librorum, 8. Other works of Cujacius are listed in the Catalogus Librorum, 8, 36. 
214 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 291. 
215 Feenstra: “Hugues Doneau et les juristes Néerlandais du XVIIe siècle: l’influence de son 
<<système>> sur l’évolution du droit privé avant le Pandectisme”, 234-243. 
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discipline has already been noted.216 Stair referred to Donellus only once in the 
Institutions.
217 No particular treatise was cited, but it could be presumed that the 
citation would be of Donellus’ commentary. Whether this citation was borrowed, and 
if so from which source, is unclear. Donellus’ work seems to have been popular 
among Scottish advocates. Lord George Douglas owned three of Donellus’ treatises: 
his Commentarii absolutissimi, his commentary on D.50.17, and his Commentaria 
iuris civilis.
218 All three of these works, and his commentary on the Codex, appeared 
in the 1683 catalogue of the library of the Faculty of Advocates.219 Five copies of 
works by Donellus feature in the 1692 catalogue, including his Commentaria iuris 
civilis.
220
 Fountainhall did not list Donellus in his journal, although he may have 
acquired copies of his works before that catalogue of purchases was started.221  
Duarenus (1509-1559) was a professor of law at Bourges and Paris.222 
Duarenus’ Epitome has already been discussed as encouraging “treat[ment of] the 
material of the Corpus iuris in a more rational and systematic way”.223  This was a 
tract on the teaching of law, in which  
 
After castigating the customary teaching methods, he argued that law 
should be expounded in the same way as other sciences, by proceeding 
from what is universal and familiar to us to what is particular. To this end 
he commended the briefer and more systematic approach of the Institutes 
as superior to any other.224  
 
Stair cited this work when he lauded those who tried to treat law as a rational 
discipline in “Common Principles”.225 It is unclear whether Stair consulted this work 
directly or whether he borrowed the citation from another, unknown source. Stair 
also cited Duarenus’ In primam partem Pandectarum, sive Digestorum, methodica 
                                                           
216 Above, 3.2.2. 
217 S 10.54/1.13.8. 
218 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 60. 
219 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 46-7. 
220 Catalogus Librorum, 9 and 65. 
221 His earlier catalogue was kept “in the little black-skinned book”, see Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s 
Journals, 290. 
222 J. Otto: “Duaren (Duarenus), François (1509-1559)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
186, 186. 
223 Stein: “Donellus and the origins of the modern civil law”, 443. Above, 3.2.2. 
224 Stein: Roman law in European History, 80. 
225 S.1.16/1.1.17.  
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enarratio along with Didacus Covarruvias, Bartholomaeus Chassanaeus and 
Matthaeus Wesenbecius on the power of a husband.226 Gordon correctly suggested 
that these citations were borrowed from Gudelinus.227 The sample library catalogues 
suggest there may have been limited interest in Duarenus’ treatises in Scotland. 
Neither Lord George Douglas nor Fountainhall appear to have owned one, although 
Duarenus was included in Fountainhall’s journal in a list of jurists who taught at 
Bourges, so he was generally aware of him.228 Two copies of Duarenus’ Opera 
omnia (in which his Digestorum methodica enarratio and Epitome were printed) 
were, however, listed in the catalogues of the Advocates’ Library.229  
Petrus Gregorius (1540-1597), often styled “of Toulouse” (Tholosanus), 
taught at Cahors. Stair cites Gregorius once but does not refer to any treatise. 
Dolezalek noted that “lawyers everywhere liked to consult the encyclopaedic work 
Syntagma…because it gave a good survey of the law.”230 Stair’s reference to 
Gregorius almost certainly refers to this work, although his summary of Gregorius 
does not seem to be quite correct. This may indicate either that the reference was 
borrowed, or that Stair’s expression is unclear. Copies of Gregorius’ Syntagma were 
owned by both the Advocates’ Library in 1683 and Lord George Douglas.231 The 
1692 catalogue of the Advocates’ Library also listed other works by Gregorius.232 
While Fountainhall’s journal did not list the purchase of any of Gregorius’ treatises, 
he mentioned Gregorius in the body of the journal.233  
Claudius Salmasius (1588-1653) was an advocate in Dijon who taught at 
Leiden from 1631. Here he wrote his greatest work (published anonymously), 
Defensio regia, pro Carolo I. ad serenissimum Magna Britanniæ Regem Carolum II. 
filium natu majorem, heredem & successorem legitimum (Leiden, 1649). Although 
highly esteemed on its initial publication, it was challenged by John Milton’s Pro 
populo anglicano defensio: contra Claudii anonymi, alias Salmasii, Defensionem 
                                                           
226 S.4.8/1.4.12. 
227 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. Below, 5.1.1. 
228 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 66. 
229 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 48; Catalogus libroroum, 9. 
230 G.R. Dolezalek: “French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers 1550-1650” in B. d’Alteroche 
et al (eds): Mélanges en l’Honneur d’Anne Lefebvre-Teillard (Paris, 2009) 375, 385. 
231 The 1582 Leiden edition was held by the Advocates’ Library, see Townley: Best and Fynest 
Lawers, 106. The 1611 edition of Orleans was owned by Lord George Douglas, see Kelly: Library of 
Lord George Douglas, 72. 
232 Catalogus Librorum, 13 and 41. 
233 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 36. 
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regiam (London, 1651).234 Stair cited Salmasius without referring to any particular 
treatise. Given that the context of the citation was mutuum, one may be able to 
deduce that it may have been to Salmasius’ Diatriba de mutuo non esse 
alienationem: adversus Coprianum (Edition consulted: Leiden, 1640) that Stair 
intended to refer. Salmasius’ Diatriba and his Defensio regia pro Carolo I, along 
with other works, were listed in the catalogue of Lord George Douglas.235 Only his 
Defensio regia pro Carolo I featured in the 1683 catalogue of the Advocates’ 
Library,236 although other treatises were also acquired by the library by 1692.237  
Wesenbecius (1531-1586) was educated at Leuven, and later studied and 
taught at Jena before becoming professor of law teaching the Codex at Wittenberg. 
He was a brilliant and prolific scholar of Roman law. His most noted work was his 
Pandectae iuris civilis, & codicis Iustiniani, libros commentarij: olim paratitla dicti: 
nunc ex postrema ipsius authoris, necnon aliorum quorundam iurisconsultorum 
recognitione multo quam antehac emendatius editi cum indice gemino (Edition 
consulted: Frankfurt, 1619). It went through many subsequent editions and was used 
for over a century.238 Stair cited it with Duarenus, Chassaneaus, Covarruvias and 
Gudelinus. Gordon correctly showed that these citations were borrowed from 
Gudelinus.239 Stair also cited “Wesenbecius, Faber and others” in his discussion of 
earnest in sale.240 Gordon correctly noted that Wesenbecius’ Paratitla was cited with 
Faber by Vinnius,241 who was Stair’s source.242 Wesenbecius was certainly well 
known in Scotland. Skene was one of his pupils at Wittenberg, and recognised 
Wesenbecius’ influence in De verborum significantione.243 Lord George Douglas 
owned a copy of his Paratitla, which was bound with his treatise on Feudal law.244 
                                                           
234 e.g. W.J. Grace: “Milton, Salmasius, and the natural law” (1963) 24(3) Journal of the History of 
Ideas 323-336 passim. 
235 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 118. 
236 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 104. 
237 Catalogus Librorum, 26 and 75. 
238 M. Ahsmann: “Wesenbeck, Matthaeus (1531-1586)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
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Fountainhall referred to him in his journal.245 Finally, one of his works was listed in 
the 1692 Advocates’ Library catalogue.246 
Zasius (1461-1535) was a leading legal humanist and a professor at 
Freiburg.247 Stair cited his lectures on De verborum obligatione, specifically that on 
D.45.1.107, with Matthaeus Stephanus, on the German law on the emancipation of 
children.248 Although neither Lord George Douglas nor Fountainhall listed any of 
Zasius’ treatises in their catalogues, copies of two of his other works were present in 
the 1683 and 1692 catalogues of the Advocates’ Library.249 The particular treatise 
which Stair cited may not have been particularly sought by Scottish advocates. 
 
3.2.3  Second Scholasticism 
 
The term ‘scholasticism’ was first used by sixteenth-century humanists to disparage 
the scholarship of the old-fashioned Middle Ages.250 Southern applied the term 
‘scholastic humanism’ to the “urgent and consistent effort to enlarge the field of 
natural reason”251 in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which was particularly 
attractive to lawyers.252 It was a continuation of this method “which went on 
developing for two hundred years until it was submerged in a sea of doubts and 
contradictions in the schools of the early fourteenth century”.253 A similar definition 
of scholasticism can be found in McGrath:  
 
scholasticism is best regarded as the medieval movement, flourishing in 
the period 1200-1500, which placed emphasis on the rational justification 
of religious belief and the systematic presentation of those beliefs. 
                                                           
245 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 122. 
246 Catalogus Librorum, 29. 
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‘Scholasticism’ thus does not refer to a specific system of beliefs, but to a 
particular way of doing and organizing theology – a highly developed 
method of presenting material, making fine distinctions, and attempting 
to achieve a comprehensive view of theology.254 
 
Second scholasticism was a later adaptation, the result of the sixteenth-century 
revival of medieval scholasticism by Catholic religious orders.255 The scholars within 
these orders were generally intensely loyal to the earlier ideas and scholarship of 
their order’s previous masters.256 This led to the formation of schools of second 
scholasticism being established in the different orders: Thomism was strictly adhered 
to by the Dominicans,257 Scotism258 and Ockhamism259 were Franciscan schools, and 
in the seventeenth century Suarezianism and Molinism became popular amongst the 
Jesuits.260 Second scholasticism was thus heavily, if not exclusively,261 associated 
with Catholicism and Catholic theology.262 This led to tension between the 
predominantly-Catholic scholastic movement and the post-Reformation rise in 
Protestant scholarship. Goss noted that the scholastic method was used “to respond to 
Protestant reformers”,263 notably by the Jesuits who “gave a rigorous articulation of 
                                                           
254 A.E. McGrath: Christian Theology: An Introduction (5th edition, Chichester, 2010), 29; McGrath: 
Reformation Thought, 67. 
255 R.E. Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa [i.e. Tibetan] 
scholasticism” in J.I. Cabezón (ed): Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives 
(Albany NY, 1998) 65, 71. For an account of logic in medieval scholasticism, A. Broadie: 
Introduction to Medieval Logic (2nd edition, Oxford, 1993 rept. Oxford, 2002) generally. 
256 J.E. Gurr: “Modern or middle scholasticism” in New Catholic Encyclopedia volume 12 (New 
York, 1967) 1158, 1159. 
257 Following the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who dismissed “both the Averroistic 
interpretations of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result was a 
new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy which survived until the rise of the new physics.” 
[R. McInerny and J. O’Callaghan: “Saint Thomas Aquinas” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(September 2009 edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/> accessed 6th September 2010]. 
258 Following the teachings of John Duns Scotus (c.1265-1308), a Scot educated in England and Paris 
who taught there and in Cologne. On whom, A. Broadie: A History of Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh, 
2009), 7-33; G. Leff: “Duns Scotus, John (c.1265–1308)” O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edition, 
January 2008) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8285> accessed 2nd March 2010. 
259 Following the teachings of William of Ockham (c.1287-1347), a English monk who was 
excommunicated after claiming that Pope John XXII was a heretic who had forfeited the papacy. P.V. 
Spade: “William of Ockham” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (July 2006 edition) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/> accessed 6th September 2010. 
260 Followers of Suarez. Gurr: “Modern or middle scholasticism”, 1158-1160. 
261 Gurr: “Modern or middle scholasticism”, 1162. Reid: “Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair”, 201-
202. 
262 On Catholic scholasticism, C. Bergfeld: “Katholische Moraltheologie und Naturrechtslehre” in H. 
Coing (ed): Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren Europäischen privatrechtsgeschichte 
volume 2.1 (Munich, 1977) 999, 1016-1029. 
263 Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa scholasticism”, 72. 
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second scholasticism, producing their texts in defense of Catholic Christianity and 
the papacy.”264  
The founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), like Melville in 
Scotland, outlined a curriculum for Jesuit scholastic teaching:  
 
a rigorous three-year philosophical curriculum covering logic, natural 
and moral philosophy, metaphysics, rational psychology, and scholastic 
and positive theology. With a foundation in the study of classical 
languages, grammar, rhetoric, and Latin and Greek literature, the Jesuit 
student then pursued scholastic philosophy. Humanist classical studies 
was propaedeutic to the study of scholastic philosophy.265  
 
Goss explained that this pedagogy led to “an explosion of Jesuit scholarship” in 
various subjects.266 Gurr noted that the Jesuits were less constrained by the opinions 
of their order’s intellectual masters, which meant that their work showed a greater 
independence of thought.267 Despite being derived from the methodological basis of 
medieval scholasticism, second scholasticism differed in its method, if perhaps not 
significantly. Goss explained that there was in second scholasticism a greater 
emphasis on “dogmatic theses and proof”, creating what he described as the 
“apologetic syllogistic method of second scholasticism” (debate where conclusion is 
based on two related propositions).268 
Although second scholasticism was a movement most notably associated with 
theology, various second scholastics wrote on the law.269 Bellomo explained that the 
flourish of second scholasticism came during the Golden Age of Spanish Empire 
during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries “when, for the first time, they found 
themselves face to face with unknown lands and ‘savage’ and ‘infidel’ peoples.”270 
This and a rise in commercial activity posed questions of moral and legal philosophy. 
Gurr noted that several jurists – including Franciscus Vitoria, a sixteenth-century 
Dominican second scholastic, and Franciscus Suarez, a late-sixteenth- to early-
                                                           
264 Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa scholasticism”, 73. 
265 Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa scholasticism”, 71. 
266 Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa scholasticism”, 72. 
267 Gurr: “Modern or middle scholasticism”, 1160. 
268 Goss: “The first meeting of Catholic scholasticism with dGe lugs pa scholasticism”, 72. 
269 Bergfeld: “Katholische Moraltheologie und Naturrechtslehre”, 1017. 
270 M. Bellomo: The Common Legal Past of Europe: 1000-1800 (trans. L.G. Cochrane) (Washington, 
1995), 225.  
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seventeenth-century second scholastic – should be lauded for “their brilliant 
reworking of the scholastic position on warfare.”271 Vitoria argued that the Holy 
Roman Emperor’s authority did not reach these new lands, that the pope had no 
power over these non-Christians, and that as a result relations must be governed by 
the ius gentium.272 Among the jurists who developed these arguments was Didacus 
Covarruvias, a sixteenth-century second scholastic cited by Stair.273 
 
3.2.3.1 Second Scholasticism in Scotland 
 
There was a significant Scottish contribution to scholasticism. Scotism, as has been 
shown, was named for John Duns Scotus (c.1265–1308), the official doctor of the 
Franciscan scholastics.274 The “last great flowering” of Scots scholastic scholarship 
was in the works of John Mair (c.1467–1550) and his circle.275 He was “one of the 
last of the major scholastic thinkers”, and his theories of international law were 
influential on leading second scholastics Vitoria, his pupil, and Suarez.276  
Yet, despite there having been Scottish participation in scholasticism before 
the Reformation, there was little acceptance of it thereafter.277 The universities began 
to adopt humanist rather than scholastic methods; Melville’s “revised curriculum 
epitomised the new humanist and Ramist values designed to replace the old 
scholasticism.”278 The pupils of the Scottish scholastics did not follow their masters. 
                                                           
271 Gurr: “Modern or middle scholasticism”, 1161. 
272 Stein: Roman law in European History, 94-95. 
273 Stein: Roman law in European History, 95. 
274 Above, 3.2.3.  
275 Broadie: History of Scottish Philosophy, 89. On which, A. Broadie: The Tradition of Scottish 
Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1990), 20-26. 
276 Broadie: History of Scottish Philosophy, 54. See also A. Broadie: “Mair, John (c.1467–1550)” 
O.D.N.B. (Oxford, 2004; online edn, May 2006) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17843> 
accessed 18th February 2010]. Mair was nonetheless “not wholly opposed to the encroachment of 
renaissance humanism.” [Broadie: History of Scottish Philosophy, 48]. There does not, however, seem 
to be much support for the suggestion that Mair was a humanist made in J. MacQueen: “Aspects of 
humanism in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature” in J. MacQueen (ed): Humanism in 
Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990) 10, 19-20; J. MacQueen: “Conclusion” in J. MacQueen (ed): 
Humanism in Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990) 178, 178.  
277 Broadie: History of Scottish Philosophy, 102. 
278 J. Kirk: “‘Melvillian’ reform in the Scottish universities” in A.A. MacDonald, M. Lynch and I.B. 
Cowan (eds): The Renaissance in Scotland: studies in literature, religion, history, and culture offered 
to John Durkhan (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History series volume 54, Leiden, 1994) 276, 282. 
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George Buchanan, a pupil of Mair, was later critical of him, although probably still 
influenced by Mair’s teaching.279 As Broadie aptly summarised:  
 
There were valuable gains made by the circle of John Mair in the first 
few decades [of the sixteenth century], and there was a great loss in so far 
as most, if not all of the advances made by those immensely able men 
were discarded by the generation of philosophers which followed 
them.280 
 
3.2.3.2 Second scholastics who were cited by Stair 
 
Stair’s citation of second scholastics shows that he drew on the works of jurists who 
held religious views incompatible with his own. This in turn indicates that he was not 
inclined to cite jurists because he had sympathy with their religious views. Rather, it 
seems that Stair selected his sources on the basis of their reputations, and their 
usefulness and relevance to his own writing. 
While many prominent names were associated with the second scholasticism, 
three are of particular relevance here. Ludovicus Molina (1535-1600) studied 
Jurisprudence, Philosophy and Theology at leading universities in Spain and 
Portugal. He later taught Philosophy at Coimbra, Evora, Cuenca and Madrid.281 His 
principal legal work, De justitia et jure opus in sex tomos divisum (edition consulted: 
Mainz, 1659), quickly gained a formidable reputation. Molina was cited by Stair only 
once, in his discussion of jus quaesitum tertio.282 The passage of Molina cited was 
not on the same topic as Stair’s; this generated speculation as to Stair’s reason for 
citing Molina.283 Richter recently settled this debate by showing that Stair borrowed 
this citation from Grotius.284 There may have been limited interest in Molina’s work 
in mid-to-late seventeenth-century Scotland; no work of Molina is listed in any of the 
four library catalogues consulted.  
                                                           
279 I.D. McFarlane: Buchanan (London, 1981), 27-28. 
280 Broadie: Tradition of Scottish Philosophy, 88-89 and on this period generally, 74-91. 
281 F. Ross: “Molina, Luis de (1535-1600)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein biographisches Lexicon 
von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 449, 449; M. Plathow: 
“MOLINA, Luis de” in B.B.K.L. volume 6 (1993) columns 43-44 
<http://bautz.de/bbkl/m/molina_l.shtml> accessed 14th July 2009. 
282 S.10.5/1.10.5. 
283 Rodger: “Molina, Stair and the JQT” generally; J.T. Cameron: “Jus Quaesitum Tertio: The true 
meaning of Stair I.x.5” [1961] Jur.Rev. 103-118 generally. 
284 Richter: “Molina, Grotius, Stair and the JQT”, 221-222. See below, 4.1.6.1. 
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Covarruvias (1512-1577) was a professor of Canon law at Salamanca and 
Bishop of Segovia.285 Although he was a leading figure in the scholastic school of 
Salamanca,286 Van Liere has found both humanist and scholastic influences in five of 
the orations which Covarruvias gave when a student at Salamanca.287 His later work 
also showed humanist traits, including classical and Greek references. Seelmann 
noted: “wird er mitunter in die näha des juristichen humanismus gerückt [he 
sometimes moved into the realms of legal humanism]”.288 Stair cited Covarruvias’ In 
librum quartum Decretalium epitome (edition consulted: Salamanca, 1556) in his 
discussion of the husband’s power over his wife.289 Gordon correctly suggested that 
this citation was borrowed from Gudelinus.290 There seems to have been some 
interest in Covarruvias’ works in Scotland: copies of his Opera omnia were listed in 
the library catalogue of Lord George Douglas,291 and in the 1683 and 1692 
catalogues of the Advocates’ Library.292  
Antonius Gomezius (1500-1572) was a student and later a professor at the 
University of Salamanca.293 Along with Gudelinus and Corvinus, his Commentaria, 
variaque resolutiones juris civilis, communis et regii, tomi tres (Edition consulted: 
Leiden, 1585) was cited in the first and second versions on naked pactions.294 This 
citation was removed for the third version even though the surrounding discussion, 
and the citations of Gudelinus and Corvinus also given therein, was retained.295 
                                                           
285 K. Seelmann: “Covarubias (Covarruvias) y Leyva, Diego de (1512-1577)” in M. Stolleis (ed): 
Juristen: ein biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. 
Munich, 2001) 148 generally. 
286 J. Bordat: “Covarruvias y Leyva, Diego de (Didacus Covarruvias)” in B.B.K.L. volume 29 (2008) 
columns 319-322 <http://bautz.de/bbkl/c/covarruvias_y_l_d.shtml> accessed 14th July 2009. 
287 K.E. van Liere: “Humanism and scholasticism in sixteenth-century academe: five student orations 
from the University of Salamanca” (2000) 53(1) Renaissance Quarterly 57-107 passim. 
288 Seelmann: “Covarubias (Covarruvias) y Leyva, Diego de (1512-1577)”, 149. 
289 S.4.8/1.4.12.  
290 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. Below, 5.1.1. 
291 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 55. 
292 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 41; Catalogus librorum, 8. 
293 N. Reichardt: “Gómez, Antonio (nach 1500 – vor 1572)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
252 generally. 
294 S.10.7/1.10.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 
1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6. 
295 As this citation will be shown to have been borrowed from Grotius, its select removal does not lend 
authority to the suggestion that Stair also used, although he did not cite, another second scholastic, 
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), as is suggested by Hutton: “Stair’s philosophic precursors”, esp. 89-
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Gordon was the first to notice this citation.296 He did not speculate as to whether 
Stair may have consulted Gomezius, only that Stair’s citation of him “does not seem 
to come from Gudelinus.”297 Instead, it was borrowed from Grotius.298 Although no 
treatise by Gomezius featured in the library of Lord George Douglas or the journal of 
Lauder of Fountainhall, a copy of his Commentaria, variaque resolutiones is listed in 
both the 1683 and 1692 catalogues of the Advocates’ Library.299  
 
3.2.4  Jurists who wrote on French law 
 
A number of sixteenth-century French jurists wrote tracts on local or national law 
and practice, sometimes in addition to works on legal humanism. These lawyers built 
on the mos italicus, which was still the more important tradition (as opposed to legal 
humanism) in practice.300 Perhaps the leading jurist of this sort was Carolus 
Molinaeus (1500-1566), an advocate who wrote commentaries on the Custom of 
Paris, on general French custom, and on the Edict of Henry II. He was consulted on 
matters of practice, as his Consilia et responsa juris analytica (Leiden, 1560) 
shows.301 Another leading French national jurist was Guido Conchyleus (1523-
1603), an accomplished advocate who wrote commentaries on the customs of 
Nivernais, and the Institutions au droit des François (Paris, 1607).302 Some jurists 
wrote on French national law and wrote humanist works. Rebuffus was known 
principally as a Canonist and a legal humanist, but Stair cited his commentary on 
royal constitutions, designed to be useful in practice, and thus Rebuffus will be 
discussed here. Stair cited two other jurists in his titles on obligations relevant here: 
Nicholas Boerius and Bartholomaeus Chassanaeus. That Stair cited works written 
specifically for practice mirrors his own focus on writing for and on practice, as 
                                                           
296 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. 
297 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. 
298 Below, 4.1.6.1. 
299 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 60; Catalogus librorum, 12. 
300 N. Kenny: The Uses of Curiosity in Early Modern France and Germany (Oxford, 2004), 86; 
Wijffels: “The civil law”, 401; D.K. Shuger: The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice and 
Subjectivity (Berkeley CA, 1994 rept. 1998), 61. 
301 J. Otto: “DuMoulin (Molinaeus), Charles (1500-1566)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
188, 189. 
302 E. Holthöfer: “Coquille (Conchyleus), Guy (1523-1603)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
143 generally. 
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witnessed in his lecture for admission as an advocate in 1648 (which was untypical 
because it concerned Scottish practice),303 his Institutions (which presupposed 
knowledge of practice) and his Decisions (printed for practical use). His use of these 
particular works also agrees with their use in earlier Scottish legal writings “as 
models for the interpretation of parallel institutions in Scottish domestic law”.304 
Boerius (1469-1539) was the principal judge of the court of appeal in 
Bordeaux. He was best remembered for his Decisiones Burdegalenses summa 
diligentia et eruditione collectae et explicatae (Leiden, 1566), a collection of the 
decisions of the Parlement with reflections on Canon and criminal law. Stair cited 
his Consuetudines infrascriptarum civitatum & Provinciarum Galliae … 
Commentariis singulae illustratae. Nunc autem recognitae, dispunctae ac distinctae 
melius a Dionysio Gothofredo… (Bituricensis) (Edition consulted: Frankfurt, 1598) 
in conjunction with Balduinus and Rebuffus. Boerius’ Consuetudines was an 
exploration of French customary law and went through a number of editions.305 
Gordon correctly suggested that this citation was borrowed, with citations of 
Balduinus and Rebuffus, from Gudelinus.306 No copies of the Consuetudines were 
listed in the four library catalogues consulted; Boerius’ Decisiones Burdegalenses 
was listed in the Advocates’ Library’s 1683 and 1693 catalogues.307 Although this 
small sample seems to indicate that interest in the Consuetudines in Scotland may 
have been limited, Boerius was cited by Skene308 and in the 1641 trial of the Earl of 
Montrose.309 
Chassanaeus (1480-1541) was a doctor iuris utriusque educated at Dole, 
Poitiers, Turin and Pavia.310 Stair cited his most renowned treatise, Consuetudines 
ducatus Burgundiae fereque totius Galliae (Edition consulted: Leiden, 1574), as 
                                                           
303 Above, 1.2.2. 
304 Dolezalek: “French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers 1550-1650”, 385-386. 
Spottiswoode, for example, cited Boerius and Chassanaeus, and Craig cited Rebuffus [Cairns: “Ius 
civile in Scotland, ca. 1600”, 152, 164]. 
305 It was the 1598 edition printed in Frankfurt which was examined for this thesis. 
306 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. 
307 One printed 1547 and the other 1593; Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 30-31; Catalogus 
Librorum, 4. 
308 Dolezalek: “French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers 1550-1650”, 386. 
309 Dolezalek: “French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers 1550-1650”, 389. 
310 E Holthöfer: “De Chasseneuz (De Chassaneo), Bartholomaeus (1480-1541)” in M. Stolleis (ed): 
Juristen: ein biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. 
Munich, 2001) 161, 161. 
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authority for a wife being in the power of her husband in French law.311 The citation 
was given with those of Covarruvias, Duarenus, Gudelinus and Wesenbecius. 
Gordon correctly suggested that Gudelinus was Stair’s source for the other four 
citations. A 1599 copy of his Consuetudines was listed in the 1692 catalogue of the 
Advocates’ Library, and a 1547 copy was owned by Lord George Douglas.312 
Dolezalek has found references to Chassanaeus in Skene, Sinclair’s practicks, and 
Spottiswoode’s practicks.313 
Rebuffus (1487-1557) was a professor at the University of Paris. Principally a 
Canonist, he considered Canon and Roman law to have been intrinsically linked. He 
had a particular interest in benefices, a topic on which he often published.314 
However, Stair did not cite any of Rebuffus’ works on Canon law but rather his In 
constitutiones regias Gallicas commentarius: Ob ipsa juris Romani fundamenta, ad 
planiorem rationis & veritatis intellectum reducta & ad usum practicum 
accommodata, non solum in Scholis, sed & in foro versantibus utilissimus (Edition 
consulted: Amsterdam, 1668), a treatise designed to be useful in practice. Gordon 
correctly suggested that this citation was borrowed from Gudelinus along with those 
to Boerius and Balduinus.315 None of Rebuffus’ works are listed in the 1683 
Advocates’ Library catalogue, although his Commentaria in constitutiones regias 
Gallicas and another treatise had been acquired by 1692.316 No work by Rebuffus is 
listed in the catalogue of the library of Lord George Douglas or in the journal of Lord 
Fountainhall. This would seem to indicate that interest in Rebuffus’ works in 
Scotland may have been limited, but, given his non-canonist works were cited four 
times by Craig, this is perhaps misleading.317 
 
3.2.5  Ultramontani 
 
                                                           
311 S.4.8/1.4.12. 
312 Catalogus librorum, 7; Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 43. Chassaneaus is not listed in 
either the 1683 catalogue of the Advocates Library or in Fountainhall’s journal. 
313 Dolezalek: “French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers 1550-1650”, 386-389. 
314 C. van de Wiel: History of Canon law (Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs series 
volume 5, Leuven, 1991), 160. 
315 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264. See below, 5.1.4.2. 
316 Catalogus Librorum, 23. 
317 Cairns: “Ius civile in Scotland, ca. 1600”, 152. 
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Stair cited “Faber” in his discussion of earnest in sale without referring to any 
particular work318. There were two noted jurists named Faber: Antonius Faber (1557-
1624), who was both a legal humanist and a French national lawyer; and Johannes 
Faber (d.1340), who belonged to the French school known as the ultramontani. Stair 
borrowed this citation from Vinnius, who cited Johannes Faber.319  
Johannes Faber was the only jurist of the ultramontani cited by Stair. He 
“acquired a great reputation. He criticised the prolixity of his contemporaries, taught 
in the French language and became a great authority on the practice of the courts.”320 
He became known as “pater practicae”.321 Phillipson showed that his works had an 
“eminently practical character” typical of the ultramontani, who “endeavoured to 
impart to the customary institutions and political organisation of their time a new 
vigour and vitality by ingrafting therein principles of Roman law.”322 Stair cited his 
In Iustiniani Imp. Institutiones juris civilis commentarii: cum autographo et 
nonnullis antea editis exemplaribus collati: multis erroribus purgati, multis quoque 
(post priorem illam doctiss. Pardulphi Pratei recognitionem) adhuc desideratis 
Supplementis & Additionibus nunc recens renovati & illustrati (Leiden, 1593). No 
work of Johannes Faber was owned by Lord George Douglas or Fountainhall or 
appeared in the 1683 Advocates’ Library catalogue. However, one of his works was 
listed in the 1692 catalogue.323 It seems Faber’s works were not being sought 
particularly by Scottish advocates in the mid-to-late seventeenth century. 
 
3.2.6  Seventeenth-century jurists cited by Stair 
 
The majority of Stair’s citations of jurists of the sixteenth century and earlier were 
borrowed from his seventeenth-century sources. Stair cited five seventeenth-century 
continental jurists, most of whom were from the Low Countries (then the United 
                                                           
318 S 10.65/1.14.3. 
319 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257-258. Below, 6.1.3. 
320 J.W. Wessels: History of the Roman-Dutch Law, with a new introduction by Michael H. Hoeflich 
(Grahamstown, 1908 rept. Clark NJ, 2005), 118. 
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323 Catalogus Librorum, 10. 
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Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish Netherlands). Only these five of the 
twenty-one jurists cited in the titles on obligations can be shown to have been 
consulted by Stair. 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was educated at Leiden and Orléans and thereafter 
practised at the Bar at The Hague. He was imprisoned, escaped and fled the country 
as a consequence of his involvement in the political and religious disturbances of the 
period. Grotius’ two main treatises on the law were De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, 
in quibus ius naturae & gentium, item juris publici praecipua explicantur (Edition 
consulted: Amsterdam, 1646324) and Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-
geleertheyd (Haarlem, 1631). De jure belli was one of the first treatises on 
international law, and is the cause of Grotius sometimes being lauded as the founder 
of modern natural and international law.325  
Natural law theories had already been expounded in the Middle Ages by St. 
Thomas Aquinas and the second scholastics on the basis of Aristotle.326 Grotius’ 
theories of natural and international law were influenced by the scholastics.327 Villa 
has argued that De jure belli was “merely a repetitive echo of principles that had 
already been commonplace for generations in Spain” and was “virtually bereft of 
originality”.328 D’Entrèves has argued that what makes Grotius important was his 
secularisation of natural law.329 Although the view of Grotius’ natural law as secular 
is widely held,330 it has been challenged.331 Hallowell suggested that, to make his 
                                                           
324 As reprinted in Carnegie Classics of International Law series (Washington, 1913). 
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On Grotius generally, R. Zimmermann: “Römisch-holländisches Recht – ein Überblick” in R. 
Feenstra and R. Zimmermann (eds): Das römisch-holländische Recht-Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 
17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Schriften zur Europäischen Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte 7, Berlin, 
1992) 9, 26-32. 
326 See e.g. H. Kelsen: “Foundation of the natural law doctrine” (1973) 2(1) Anglo-American Law 
Review 83-111, esp. 103-106; F. Oakley: “Medieval theories of natural law: William of Ockham and 
the significance of the voluntarist tradition” (1961) 6(1) Natural Law Forum 65-83 generally; Reid: 
“Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair”, 195-196.  
327 A. Croust: “Hugo Grotius and the scholastic Natural law tradition” (1943) 17(2) The New 
Scholasticism 101-133 generally; d’Entrèves: Natural law, 53-54; S.M. Villa: “The philosophy of 
international law: Suárez, Grotius and epigones” (1997) 37(1) International Review of the Red Cross 
539-552 generally; P.E. Sigmund: Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge MA, 1971 rept. 
Washington, 1982), 64-65. 
328 Villa: “The philosophy of international law: Suárez, Grotius and epigones”, 545, 546 respectively. 
329 d’Entrèves: Natural law, 54-55. 
330 e.g. R.H. Cox: “Hugo Grotius 1583-1645” in L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (eds): History of Political 
Philosophy (Rand McNally Political Science series, Chicago, 1963) 344, 347. 
331 e.g. R. Vetterli and G. Bryner: “Hugo Grotius and Natural law: A reinterpretation” (1993) 22(1) 
Political Science Reviewer 370-402 generally. 
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theories of natural law acceptable to all Christians, Grotius used common sense and 
observation as to what was “morally self-evident.”332 He argued that Grotius’ 
originality was in his using a new, scientific methodology to derive the principles of 
natural law.333 Sigmund suggested that Grotius “separated natural law from the 
theologians in the sense that he used it for a secular purpose, the creation of an 
international legal system”.334 He, like Hallowell, noted the importance of this in 
post-Reformation Europe: “Grotius’ solution was to make use of natural law, long 
familiar in the West, but given a new importance because of the religious division of 
Europe.”335 He also noted that “It was to a kind of natural theology that Grotius 
appealed rather than to the modern rationalist’s denial of the relevance of God”.336 
The questions of Grotius’ originality and his formulation of a secularised natural law 
were recently examined by Haakonssen.337 He successfully established the 
differences between the theories of natural law of second scholasticism and Grotius:  
 
The scholastic point was that human beings have the ability to understand 
what is good and bad even without invoking God but have no obligation 
proper to act accordingly without God’s command. Grotius is suggesting 
that people unaided by religion can use their perfect – and even imperfect 
– rights to establish the contractual and quasi-contractual obligations on 
which social life rests. God is simply an additional source perceived by 
Christians…338  
 
The cause of this difficulty in determining to what extent Grotius’ natural law theory 
was secular has been identified by Tuck: Grotius made changes to his Prolegomena 
“to make divine law a basis for natural law in a more direct fashion”.339 These 
changes meant that God went from the creator of the universe in the 1625 edition of 
De jure belli to the law-giver in the 1631 edition.340 This change may have been to 
make Grotius’ theories “more acceptable to the Aristotelian, Calvinist culture of his 
                                                           
332 J.H. Hallowell: Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York, 1950), 96. 
333 Hallowell: Main Currents in Modern Political Thought, 95. 
334 Sigmund: Natural Law in Political Thought, 62. 
335 Sigmund: Natural Law in Political Thought, 62. 
336 Sigmund: Natural Law in Political Thought, 65. 
337 K. Haakonssen: Natural law and moral philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, 1996), esp. 15-30. 
338 Haakonssen: Natural law and moral philosophy, 29. 
339 R. Tuck: The Rights of War and Peace: political thought and the international order from Grotius 
to Kant (Oxford, 1999), 100.  
340 Tuck: Rights of War and Peace, 101. 
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opponents within the United Provinces”341 from which he was in exile. The content 
of Grotius’ work, ideas and theory of natural law and individual rights remained 
unchanged between editions.342 
Yet Grotius was also influenced by legal humanism. Tuck showed that 
Grotius’ early life “belonged wholly to the humanist world”, in that his early 
scholarly works were on topics typical of humanism, such as the writing of poems 
and histories.343 He found Grotius’ political writings to have been typically 
humanist.344 Tuck suggested that the working papers of Grotius’ early legal work, De 
Indis (as called by Grotius, but later known and printed in 1868 as De jure praedae), 
emphasised the difference between his views and those of Vitoria and showed that 
Grotius did not seem to have been familiar with the more recent scholastic 
literature.345 E.M. Wilson, however, stated that despite “The Grotian signature of 
micro-oscillation…between Late Scholasticism and Civic Humanism”,346 “Late 
Scholasticism must be understood as forming the dominant pole of [De Indis/De jure 
praedae].”347 Tuck also showed that Grotius, like the humanists but unlike the 
scholastics, stated in both De Indis/De jure praedae and De jure belli that injury 
could be inflicted on ‘barbaric peoples’ – “like the good humanist he was”.348 He 
noted that, in Grotius’ argument of rights of individuals as opposed to nations, “he 
took the old humanist account of the pursuit of self-interest by individuals or cities, 
and made it the foundation of an account of rights.”349 Indeed, Tuck said that “Far 
from being an heir to the tradition of Vitoria and Suarez… he was in fact an heir to 
the tradition Vitoria most mistrusted, that of humanist jurisprudence.”350 This agrees 
with Cox’s earlier observation regarding Grotius’ argument that a nation could 
declare a just war against another state even if neither it, nor any under its 
                                                           
341 Tuck: Rights of War and Peace, 99. 
342 Tuck: Rights of War and Peace, 102. 
343 Tuck: Rights of War and Peace 78. On Grotius’ poems, A. Eyffinger: “Hugo Grotius, poet and 
man of letters” in The World of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645): Proceedings of the International 
Colloquium organized by the Grotius Committee of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
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344 Tuck: Rights of War and Peace, 79.  
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346 E.M. Wilson: Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism and Dutch Hegemony 
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347 Wilson: Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius, 356. 
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jurisdiction, had been injured.351 He showed that Grotius’ quotation from Seneca and 
citation of Aristotle – and indeed various others – was consistent with humanist 
influence. Cox also noted that Grotius “explicitly takes issue with writers … such as 
Francisco Victoria [Vitoria], who had taught that whoever metes out punishment 
must either have suffered injury … or have jurisdiction over him who is attacked.”352 
Indeed, Grotius specifically distinguished his view from several scholastics, namely 
Vitoria, Fernandus Vasquius (a sixteenth-century secular jurist at Salamanca353), 
Molina, and Johannes Azorius (a sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian). Brett also 
argued that Grotius should be distinguished from the scholastic philosophy of natural 
law. Although she distinguished her conclusions from those of Tuck and 
Haakonssen,354 her research showed Grotius’ theories of civic philosophy were more 
akin to those of the legal humanists than of the second scholastics. She explained 
that, by the sixteenth century, there was legal humanist interest in and commentaries 
on Aristotle, and shows that Connanus drew on both Paul and Aristotle “to create a 
juridical schema based on a disjunction between the honestum and the utile … equity 
and utility were located in distinct spheres, the sphere of nature and the sphere of the 
human establishment or the city.”355 Although Brett suggested that De jure belli 1.1 
reflected a scholastic-Aristotelianism which was likely “straight from Suarez”,356 she 
showed that his discussions of civil philosophy and of rights owe much to the legal 
humanist tradition.357 Haagenmacher said that Grotius’ work was  
 
a genuine offshoot of legal humanism as it had developed during the 
sixteenth century along two main lines, the one philological and 
historical (with scholars like Budé [Budaeus], Cujas [Cujacius] and du 
Faur [Antonius Faber]), the other dogmatic and systematic (for example, 
Connan [Connanus], Le Douaren [Duarenus], and Doneau [Donellus]).358  
                                                           
351 Grotius: De jure belli ac pacis, 2.20.40. 
352 Cox: “Hugo Grotius 1583-1645”, 352. 
353 K. Seelmann: “Vasquez de Menchaca, Fernando (1512-1569)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
biographisches Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 
647, 648. 
354 A. Brett: “Natural right and civil community: the civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius” (2002) 45(1) 
The Historical Journal 31-51, 32 esp. n.3. 
355 Brett: “Natural right and civil community: the civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius”, 35-36. 
356 Brett: “Natural right and civil community: the civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius”, 38. 
357 Brett: “Natural right and civil community: the civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius”, e.g. 39-41, 44. 
358 P. Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural lecture” 
in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury, and A. Roberts (eds): Hugo Grotius and international relations (Oxford, 
1990 rept. Oxford, 2002) 133, 161. 
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The humanist and scholastic influence in Grotius’ work was reflected in his pattern 
of citation. Haagenmacher found in De Indis/De jure praedae more citations of 
canonists,359 medieval commentators,360 and second scholastics361 than of legal 
humanists.362 In De jure belli, Grotius included many citations of leading second 
scholastics: Vitoria was cited almost sixty times and Molina more than twenty times. 
Bartolus and Baldus were also cited often, both around thirty times. The legal 
humanists were again cited to a lesser extent: Connanus was cited ten times; Cujacius 
seven times; and Donellus and Duarenus were both only cited once.363 
Haggenmacher noted that where a jurist was cited repeatedly by Grotius, there was 
normally some influence, but that there was also important influence on Grotius from 
the less frequently cited legal humanists.364  
The popularity of De jure belli is demonstrated by its many editions and 
reprints; eight before 1659.365 Reeves determined that they fell into two phases: the 
first being those editions up to and including the soon-standard 1646 edition, and the 
second being those published thereafter.366 It is unknown how many of these editions 
circulated in Scotland. The Advocates’ Library catalogues listed the 1680 edition.367 
Four other works of Grotius were listed in the 1692 catalogue, including the 
Inleydinge and Mare liberum (a chapter of De Indis/De jure praedae printed 
separately in Leiden in 1609).368 A copy of the 1680 edition of De jure belli was 
                                                           
359 Sylvester Prierias, a sixteenth/seventeenth century Dominican canonist, is cited circa ninety times; 
Pope Innocent IV, a thirteenth century canonist, twenty-five times; and Panormitanus, a fifteenth 
century canonist, twenty-five times. Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas 
E. Holland’s inaugural lecture”, 146. 
360 Bartolus is cited fifty-seven times; and Baldus fifty-one times. Haagenmacher: “Grotius and 
Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural lecture”, 146. 
361 Vasquez de Menchaca, a second scholastic, is cited seventy-four times; and Covarruvias thirty-four 
times. Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural 
lecture”, 146 
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146-147. 
365 All but one were published in Amsterdam: 1625, 1626 (Frankfurt), 1631, 1632, 1642, 1646, 1650, 
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366 Reeves: “Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis: a bibliographical account”, 255.  
367 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 58 plus another work; Catalogus Librorum, 68.  
368 Catalogus Librorum, 41, 68 and 84. 
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owned by Lord George Douglas.369 Fountainhall’s journal stated that he acquired two 
texts of Grotius,370 although neither were works on law.  
Which of Grotius’ works were used by Stair? Grotius’ Inleydinge has been 
shown elsewhere not to have been a source.371 Campbell showed that Grotius’ De 
jure belli was not a source for the arrangement of the titles of the Institutions;372 it 
will be shown, however, to have been an important source for its content. Grotius 
was the jurist cited most often by Stair: there were nine citations of Grotius in the 
third version; ten in the second. An additional citation of Grotius has been found in 
the manuscripts.373 Several scholars have in recent years debated the extent of 
Grotius’ influence on Stair. Most relevant to this study, Gordon showed that various 
passages of the Institutions contained material which could likely be attributed to 
Grotius.374 This material seems to be typical of the legal humanist influence in De 
jure belli. First amongst these are twelve citations of writers of classical antiquity, 
including four citations of Cicero. Indeed, this thesis shows nearly all Stair’s 
citations of writers of classical antiquity in the titles on obligations were borrowed 
from Grotius.375 Additionally, Gordon suggested that Stair borrowed a citation of 
Connanus from Grotius; it will be shown that in fact all Stair’s citations of this 
leading legal humanist were borrowed from Grotius. Gordon also suggested that 
Stair’s etymological discussion (another typical characteristic of legal humanism) of 
the Latin term ‘damnum’ may come from Grotius.376 Grotius was also Stair’s source 
for a citation of a second scholastic: Richter showed that Stair’s citation to Molina 
was borrowed from Grotius.377 Stair was thus indirectly influenced by humanism and 
second scholasticism through his use of Grotius; both schools had influenced Grotius 
and, through his work, influenced Stair. 
Gudelinus (1550-1619) was cited six times by Stair, which made him the 
jurist cited most often by Stair after Grotius. Gudelinus was the professor primarius 
                                                           
369 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 72. 
370 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 293, 296. 
371 Wilson: “Stair and the Inleydinge of Grotius” generally. 
372 Campbell: Structure of Stair’s Institutions, 17-20. 
373 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.78; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.77; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.123R. 1666 stem: 
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376 Below, 4.1.5. 
377 Richter: “Molina, Grotius, Stair and the JQT”, 221-222; S.10.5/1.10.5. 
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(the most esteemed chair) of Civil law at Leuven from 1590.378 Gudelinus was 
influenced by legal humanism; Lesaffer commented on his “faith in the historical-
philological methods of his humanist predecessors”.379 Yet Lesaffer also noted 
Gudelinus’ interest in local law and customs.380 This was consistent with what 
Lesaffer termed “the Louvanist via media”,381 a combination of the philological 
method of legal humanism and an interest in legal practice. Of particular importance 
to this thesis is Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo, printed posthumously with additions 
by Maximilian Wittebort. It was an analysis of the civilian tradition in seventeenth-
century comparative law. The humanist influence on this “Louvanist via 
media”382was evident in, for example, Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo 3.3. Here 
Gudelinus quoted from a Roman dramatist383 and Aulus Gellius’ Attic Nights.384 
Later he cited Aristotle, Marcus Portius Cato, Plutarch, Pliny the younger,385 and 
Martial.386 Gudelinus’ citation of these classical historians, philosophers, poets and 
other writers is evidence of humanist influence. He also showed concern for 
philology, citing Isidorus of Seville’s387 philological study Etymologiae.388 He also 
gave four Greek terms389 and cited various legal humanists, including Rebuffus390 
                                                           
378 M. Ahsmann: “Gudelinus (Goudelin), Petrus (1550-1619)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein 
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Plautus” (1965-6) 18(5) Stanford Law Review 873-909, 893-896. 
384 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 100. Although Gudelinus does not specify a particular passage, 
it could be 16.12.  
385 All Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 104.  
386 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 105. 
387 A late-sixth- to early-seventh-century bishop. 
388 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 104. Gudelinus cites 18.24, although the citation does not 
appear to be correct. 
389 Three in Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 102 and the fourth, 103. 
 - 120 - 
and Nicolas Everardus,391 who is credited with bringing legal humanism to 
Leuven.392 He also cited Martinus Aspilcueta (also known as ‘Doctor Navarrus’), a 
sixteenth-century Spanish canonist,393 and Covarruvias.394 Although not every title of 
De jure novissimo had such a range of authorities, the use of such humanist sources 
and methods was important for Stair’s writing. Gordon explored Stair’s use of 
Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo,395 and correctly suggested that Stair’s citations of 
legal humanists Balduinus, Boerius, Chassanaeus, Duarenus, Rebuffus and one of 
Wesenbecius, as well as that of Covarruvias, were borrowed from it. 
This legal humanist influence is also evident is Gudelinus’ other works. 
Lesaffer noted that Gudelinus’ De jure pacis commentarius (Leuven, 1620) also 
demonstrated “an explicit use of the philological-historical methods of the 
humanists”396 – citation of classical texts – which Lesaffer notes were often 
borrowed.397 He also noted that De jure pacis commentarius cited second scholastics, 
most notably Vasquius.398  
The four catalogues of libraries from the period consulted show that multiple 
copies of De jure novissimo were available in Scotland. The 1683 and 1692 
catalogues of the Advocates’ Library listed the 1643 edition of De jure novissimo.399 
Also listed in the later catalogue were other treatises by Gudelinus.400 Fountainhall’s 
list of acquisitions also included De jure novissimo.401  
                                                                                                                                                                    
390 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 106. 
391 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 105. 
392 Lesaffer: “An early treatise on peace treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman law and modern 
practice”, 244. 
393 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 105. 
394 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.3, 104, 105. 
395 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263-265. Gordon showed that 
another work of Gudelinus, De jure feudorum, was cited by Stair in the manuscripts. An examination 
of the text suggests that Stair did consult De jure feudorum. [Gordon: “Stair, Grotius”, 263, n.14] This 
will not be discussed further as Stair’s use of this text seems to have been exclusively outwith his 
titles on obligations. 
396 Lesaffer: “An early treatise on peace treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman law and modern 
practice”, 245. 
397 Lesaffer: “An early treatise on peace treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman law and modern 
practice”, 245. 
398 Lesaffer: “An early treatise on peace treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman law and modern 
practice”, 245. 
399 Townley: Best and Fynest Lawers, 60; Catalogus Librorum, 41. 
400 Catalogus Librorum, 13 and 68. 
401 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals listed De jure feudorum, 288 and De jure novissimo, 291. 
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Arnoldus Vinnius (1588-1637) was a professor of law at the University of 
Leiden.402 He is generally regarded as one of the founders of the Dutch elegant 
school,403 a continuation of legal humanism, but this has been challenged by Van den 
Bergh.404 There was undeniable legal humanist influence in Vinnius, which was 
admitted by Van den Bergh.405 Feenstra and Waal noted that Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia 
contracta (1624-31), cited by Stair, “deals with Roman Law in a new systematic 
order” based on that of Donellus’ commentary.406 However, like Gudelinus’ works, 
Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta also emphasised modern practice, although not 
specifically Dutch practice.407 Feenstra and Waal also examined Vinnius’ 
commentary and noted that he provided a philological-historical account of the 
Institutes, typical of the legal humanist style, and provided a thorough account of 
Dutch law. Their examination of his pattern of citation in a number of titles showed 
that “humanists occupy an important place”,408 particularly Cujacius, Hotmannus and 
Wesenbecius. As with Jurisprudentia contracta, there was also an important 
emphasis placed on practice. Feenstra and Waal noted that the number of citations of 
Glossators and Commentators (still used in practice) was “considerably larger than 
one would have thought.”409 Vinnius cited various foreign jurists whose principal 
concern was with practice, including Mynsinger (a sixteenth-century German legal 
humanist also cited by Stair). Vinnius also used Grotius’ Inleydinge, the first 
institutional work of the law of Holland, and Paulus Christianaeus’ collection of 
decisions of the Grand Counsel of Malines.410 Feenstra and Waal also noted the 
influence of natural law on Vinnius’ commentary, for which he used particularly 
Grotius’ De jure belli, which was cited “relatively often”, and made use of the 
                                                           
402 M. Ahsmann: “Vinnius, Arnold (1588-1657)” in M. Stolleis (ed): Juristen: ein biographisches 
Lexicon von der antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1995 rept. Munich, 2001) 653 generally; 
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system of classification of subjective rights found in the Inleydinge.411 They 
observed that Vinnius’ Notae (1646) on the Institutes of Justinian were “of a 
predominantly humanist nature” with writers of classical antiquity and Cujacius, 
Hotmannus and Wesenbecius being cited often.412  
Stair added in the third version a citation of Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia 
contracta to his discussion of a child’s reaching the age of majority. It has been 
shown elsewhere that Stair consulted but did not cite Vinnius’ commentary;413 
Richter suggested (wrongly, at least in that instance) that Stair consulted Vinnius’ 
Notae.
414 Gordon discussed Stair’s probable borrowing from Vinnius.415 He showed 
that one of Stair’s citations of Grotius in “Rights Real” did not refer to De jure belli; 
this was borrowed by Stair from Vinnius’ commentary which actually cited Grotius’ 
Inleydinge.416 Gordon argued that Stair could not have consulted the Inleydinge 
directly as it was in Dutch and thus was indirectly influenced by the Inleydinge 
through his use of Vinnius. It has since been confirmed elsewhere that Stair did not 
consult the Inleydinge.417 Significant indirect influence through Vinnius is unlikely 
given he checked the only reference to Grotius which he borrowed from Vinnius.418 
These three texts of Vinnius were all readily available in Scotland during the 
seventeenth century. The 1683 catalogue of the Advocates’ Library listed two copies 
of the Jurisprudentia contracta and the fourth (1665) edition of the commentary; the 
Notae was not listed.419 Both of these treatises were also listed in the 1692 catalogue, 
as were two other treatises of Vinnius, not including the Notae.420 Fountainhall’s 
journal listed only a different text of Vinnius. The library of Lord George Douglas 
contained a 1665 copy of the commentary, as well as another treatise by Vinnius.421 
Vinnius’ Notae, although not listed in any of the four catalogues consulted, was 
                                                           
411 Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors, 30.  
412 Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors, 31. 
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known to Scottish scholars. It was used extensively in the education of Lord George 
Douglas under Alexander Cunningham.422  
Arnoldus Corvinus (d.c.1680), the son of jurist Johannes Corvinus, was born in 
Leiden and became professor of law at Mainz. It has been said that:  
 
Seine litterarische Thätigkeit gipfelt in der Abfassung von ganz kurzen 
Lehrbüchern, meist im Westentaschenformat...ohne wissenschaftlichen 
Werth sind.  
 
His literary activity culminated in the writing of short textbooks, usually 
pocketbooks...[which] were without scientific value.423 
 
Stair’s citation “Corvinus, de pactis”424 was identified by Gordon as having referred 
to Arnoldus Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos on D.2.14.425 He correctly suggested 
this may have been the source of borrowing by Stair.426 A sample of titles from 
Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos reveals a pattern of citation typical of treatises 
written by seventeenth-century lawyers.427 These lawyers tended to provide 
numerous citations as authority for a proposition, and often borrowed their sources’ 
citations without checking them.428 In his commentary of D.2.14, the title cited by 
Stair, Corvinus provided numerous citations for each point. The majority of these 
were of Roman law, but there were also many of jurists of the mos italicus, 
specifically Jason Maynus (cited nine times), Bartolus (cited seven times), and 
Baldus (cited six times). The only legal humanists cited were Cujacius and 
Wesenbecius. This frequent citation of jurists of the mos italicus and occasional 
citation of legal humanists was typical of the titles of Corvinus’ Digesta per 
aphorismos examined.  
The 1683 catalogue of the Advocates’ Library did not list works by Corvinus. 
By 1693, copies of Corvinus’ Jus Canonicum per aphorismos, Digesta per 
                                                           
422 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 5. 
423 Allgemeine deutsche Biographie & Neue deutsche Biographie volume 4 (Leipzig, 1876), 509. 
424 S.10.7/1.10.7. 
425 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16. 
426 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16. Below, ch.7. 
427 D.2.14, D.2.15, D.3.1-3, although Corvinus cites Vasquius, a second scholastic, and Mynsinger, 
also cited by Stair, in D.3.3, 93 and 99 respectively. 
428 Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural lecture”, 
148. 
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aphorismos and several of his other works had been acquired.429 Corvinus’ Jus 
Canonicum per aphorismos was owned by Lord George Douglas.430 It seems from 
this small sample that there was some interest in both Corvinus’ Jus Canonicum per 
aphorismos and his Digesta per aphorismos in Scotland during the later seventeenth 
century.  
The lesser-known Matthaeus Stephanus (1576-1646) was a professor of law 
at Greifswald. His Oeconomia practica juris universi civilis, feudalis & canonici in 
tres partes divisa (Frankfurt, 1614) has been called an “inquiry into the proper order 
of legal doctrine”.431 This treatise was cited by Stair three times in “Parents and 
Children”.432 These citations were the product of Stair’s direct consultation of 
Stephanus, although Stephanus’ Oeconomia was not a principal source for Stair. No 
treatise of Stephanus was listed in the library catalogue of Lord George Douglas. 
Another of his treatises was owned by Fountainhall.433 Although the Advocates’ 
Library did not own any copies of Stephanus in 1683, copies of both his Oeconomia 
and another work had been acquired by 1692.434 These sample catalogues may 
suggest that Stephanus’ Oeconomia was a minor work which was not particularly 
sought after by the Scottish advocates.  
 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The first part of this chapter examined Stair’s pattern of citation of Roman law. The 
majority of Stair’s citations of Roman law in the first, second and third versions was 
in his titles on obligations. Stair cited the Digest most often, then the Codex, then the 
Institutes, with the Novels being only occasionally cited. This infrequent citation of 
the Novels is likely the result of the use of the seemingly-corrupt Authenticum to 
access the Novels in the medieval period, and the fact that the subject matter of most 
the Novels was irrelevant to a treatise on private law. Infrequent citation of the 
Novels is thus also seen in Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo. More surprising was 
                                                           
429 Catalogus Librorum, 35 and 82. 
430 Kelly: Library of Lord George Douglas, 54. 
431 Scattola: “Scientia iuris and ius naturae: The jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”, 12. 
432 S.5.4/1.5.4; S.5.12/1.5.12; S.5.13/1.5.13. 
433 Crawford (ed): Fountainhall’s Journals, 291. 
434 Catalogus librorum, 55. 
 - 125 - 
Stair’s infrequent citation of the Institutes, especially given Vinnius’ commentary 
included the text. Yet Stair gave synopses of Institutes texts which were not cited by 
him, which shows he had a greater knowledge of it than is implied by his pattern of 
citation. 
Most of his citations of the Digest and Codex were in the early-modern style, 
but eighteen of those in the first version were in the medieval style. Twelve of these 
were borrowed from Gudelinus or Grotius. Ten more medieval-style citations were 
added for the third version (although four others were removed). Stair either removed 
altogether or added the relevant paragraph numbers to most of these medieval-style 
citations for the third and fourth versions, thereby modernising them. He also 
increased the level of detail in his citations of Roman law, adding paragraph numbers 
to 66% of those of Codex and Digest texts which had sub-paragraphs for the fourth 
version. Stair’s addition of paragraph numbers or references to sub-paragraphs 
indicates that he checked these citations for the third or fourth versions. This agrees 
with his new practice of checking the citations of Roman law which he borrowed for 
the fourth version. It also implies that Stair tried to increase the detail and accuracy 
of his citations for the printed editions. 
 The greatest change made to Stair’s pattern of citation of Roman law, 
however, was the deliberate ‘Romanising’ of the fourth version and, to a lesser 
extent, the third version. Indeed, this was one of the most notable changes made to 
the Institutions for the fourth version. This corroborates Ford’s finding that the 
greatest change made for the second and third versions was in the pattern of 
citation.435 In those versions, however, it was predominantly citations of Scottish 
authority which were added. This means that, when preparing the fourth version, 
Stair changed his practice, despite his declaration that he had continued to update his 
treatise with recent Scottish authority.436 
Finally, it was shown that Gordon and Ford were correct in suggesting that 
Stair used Roman law for the principles of equity or natural law, and in the absence 
of Scottish authority only critically.437 This was demonstrated for the titles on 
obligations in the third and fourth versions by a thorough examination of Stair’s use 
                                                           
435 Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
436 S.-/advertisement. 
437 Gordon: “Roman law as a source” passim, esp. 110-112; Gordon: “Stair’s use of Roman law” 
passim, esp. 122-3; Ford: Law and Opinion, 275. 
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of Roman law in “Recompence”. Yet McLeod argued that the majority of Stair’s 
citations of Roman law in the titles on property law in the sixth printed edition were 
seemingly used as authority for Scots law.438 It was shown, however, that the 
structure of Stair’s discussions of law – first an examination of natural law, often 
relying on Roman law, then an outline of the position of Scots law – meant that the 
citations in these titles were in fact generally being used as authority for general legal 
principles and only rarely as authority for Scots law itself. It should, however, be 
noted that many of Stair’s citations of Roman law were borrowed from the works of 
continental jurists without being checked. In such cases, whether Stair was using the 
citation as authority for Scots or natural law, he could probably not have done so 
critically. 
Stair’s use of Roman law to explain general legal principles and then 
comparing and contrasting these to Scots law was sound given his readership: a legal 
community most of whom were formally educated in Roman law. Stair explained the 
Roman law or natural law rule, with which his readership would to some extent have 
been familiar, and then explained to what extent Scots law had converged or 
diverged with that widely-understood system. This would have made his writing 
more accessible to those with a sound knowledge of Roman law but a limited 
understanding of at least certain areas of Scots law. 
This examination of Stair’s use of Roman law has shown both that Stair was 
adding citations of Roman law to the fourth version, but that he used Roman law as a 
source of equity and as authority for natural law. Citations of Roman law were 
added, in large numbers, to Stair’s discussions of natural law. This must have been a 
conscious effort on his part to provide a greater quantity of authority for these 
discussions of general legal principles in the fourth version. It is very interesting that 
he did not see fit to increase the number of citations of Scottish authority at the same 
time. This could be because his previous revisions, for the second and third versions, 
focused on adding citations of Scottish authority, which he now felt was generally 
sufficient. Stair declared that the principal changes to the text since the third version 
were to take account of changes in Scots law, when in fact it was the bolstering of his 
discussion of natural law and equity with an increased number of citations of Roman 
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law. 
 
The second part of this chapter examined Stair’s pattern of citation of continental 
jurists. Citations of twenty-two jurists have been found in the manuscripts. The sole 
citation of one jurist, Gomezius, was removed for the third version even though the 
surrounding paragraph and other citations remained substantially unaltered. A 
citation of Corvinus was replaced by one of Dutch legislation. Citations of Grotius 
and Connanus were also removed, but along with the surrounding passages. It was 
shown that eight citations of jurists were added to the third version, including 
citations of four jurists who had not previously been cited by Stair: Gregorius, 
Mynsinger, Vinnius and Cujacius. It was also shown that Stair added citations of 
Cujacius and Grotius when preparing the fourth version, but did not add citations of 
any jurists who had not been cited in the earlier versions. Approximately two-thirds 
of Stair’s citations of continental jurists appear in his titles on obligations. This focus 
of citations in these titles is also the case with his citations of Roman law and of 
writers of classical antiquity. 
The specific schools of scholarship to which these jurists belonged were 
examined. Many of the typical characteristics of legal humanism were present in 
Stair’s Institutions and in his lecture for admission as an advocate: his criticism of 
“the wearisomnesse”439 of the medieval Glosses and Commentaries on Roman law; 
the awareness of Tribonian’s amendments of the classical texts; the critical rejection 
of Regiam Majestatem as not being truly representative of Scots law; the concern 
with treating law as a rational discipline; his use of Greek; and his citation of writers 
of classical antiquity. Indeed, more than half of the jurists who were cited by Stair in 
the Institutions were legal humanists. Many of those whom he cited were leading 
figures of the movement, such as Connanus, Cujacius and Donellus. Although most 
of these citations will be shown to have been borrowed from works of seventeenth-
century jurists, this does not preclude a significant impact of legal humanism on the 
Institutions. For example, it was shown that Stair was indirectly influenced by 
Cujacius through his use of Craig.  
This humanist influence is seen in the works of other Scottish jurists, 
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particularly Thomas Craig and Sir John Skene. Indeed, Stair was indirectly 
influenced by legal humanism through his use of their works. Stair borrowed a 
citation of Cujacius,440 and possibly that of Tiraquellus,441 from Craig, and adopted 
Cujacius’ discussion of the history of relief after finding it in Craig. The structure 
and content of Stair’s first title, including his rejection of Regiam Majestatem442, was 
shown to follow Craig’s own discussion of the history and universality of law. It was 
also shown that Stair borrowed other discussions of Craig which were typical of legal 
humanism, such as that of the origin of courtesy.443 Stair used Craig both in 1648 in 
his lecture for admission as an advocate, when writing the first version and when 
preparing the third version. Each time, he was indirectly influenced by legal 
humanism. Stair’s use of Skene is less extensive; nonetheless, he used De verborum 
significatione for the first, second and third versions. Again, there is evidence of 
indirect legal humanist influence through Skene in Stair’s etymological discussion of 
herzelds.  
Stair’s use of the legal works of second scholastics was also examined. 
Although there was a greater Scottish contribution to this movement, it had less of an 
impact on Scots law given the predominance of legal humanist influence in Scotland. 
Stair borrowed his three citations of second scholastics without checking them: those 
of Molina and Gomezius from Grotius, and that of Covarruvias from Gudelinus.444 
The citation of Gomezius appeared only in the manuscripts; it was removed for the 
third version. 
Stair also cited three sixteenth-century works on French law, each by a 
different jurist, as well as a jurist of the ultramontani. His citations of all four of 
these jurists were borrowed from the works of later jurists; there is no evidence of 
indirect influence from any of these jurists.445 Nonetheless, his citation of these 
works on French law was in keeping with their use in other Scottish treatises and in 
court.446 
Stair’s principal sources were all jurists of the seventeenth century. Grotius 
                                                           
440 S.14.26/2.4.26; Craig: Jus feudale 2.20.30, 291. Above, 3.2.2.1. 
441 S.26.34/3.4.34; Craig: Jus feudale 2.17.21, 259. Above, 3.2.2.1. 
442 S.1.15/1.1.16; Craig: Jus feudale 1.8.11, 38-39. Above, 3.2.2.1. 
443 S.16.19/2.6.19; Craig: Jus feudale 2.22.40, 312. Above, 3.2.2.1. 
444 Below, 4.1.6.1, 5.1.1. 
445 Below, 5.1.1, 5.1.4.2, 6.1.3. 
446 Dolezalek: French legal literature quoted by Scottish lawyers”, 385-389. 
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was influenced both by legal humanism and by second scholasticism; the extent to 
which he was influenced by one in relation to the other is a point of contention 
amongst Grotian scholars. Nonetheless, it will be shown that Stair borrowed various 
citations of legal humanist works, as well as citations of writers of classical antiquity, 
typical of legal humanism, from Grotius. Stair also borrowed citations of second 
scholastics Molina and Gomezius from Grotius but, at least in the case of Molina, 
there cannot have been any indirect influence on Stair.447 
Stair’s tendency to borrow citations without attributing his source was not 
unusual in the seventeenth century; Hope will also be shown to have borrowed a 
citation (of an Act of Sederunt) without checking it. Haagenmacher has suggested 
that the practice of borrowing citations was humanist: “Humanist vanity and 
‘elegance’ induced scholars to hide their real, direct sources, in order to show only 
the pure wisdom of antiquity”.448 He notes that, in contrast, lawyers tended to 
provided numerous citations as authority for a proposition, and often borrowed their 
sources’ citations without checking them.449 Grotius, for example, “as both a 
humanist and a lawyer”, also borrowed citations from his sources in this way.450  
Stair’s other two principal sources, Gudelinus and Vinnius, also combined an 
interest in legal humanist methodology with one of legal practice. Stair made 
extensive use of the works of both of these jurists who were as important, if not more 
important, to his writing than Grotius. Again, he may have been indirectly influenced 
by legal humanism through his use of these jurists’ works. He borrowed various 
citations of legal humanists from both of these jurists, and citations of writers of 
classical antiquity from Gudelinus. The purpose of their works was also very similar 
to Stair’s. Both Gudelinus and Vinnius were trying to balance a study of the 
intellectual analyses of Roman law by the great legal humanists with the needs of 
contemporary practice. The similarity in their aims may have been a significant 
factor in Stair’s selection of these works as sources.    
One other observation should be made regarding the question as to why Stair 
                                                           
447 Below, 4.1.6.1. 
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148. 
449 Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural lecture”, 
148. 
450 Haagenmacher: “Grotius and Gentili: a reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s inaugural lecture”, 
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may have relied particularly on the works of Grotius, Gudelinus and Vinnius. Lord 
Cooper examined the court records of the 1660s and 1670s, from which he compiled 
a list of those authorities which were being cited often in court. Although Cooper’s 
list does not seem to be extant today, comments were made on it by both Campbell 
and Smith, who presumably saw it.451 Apparently, the Corpus iuris civilis was the 
most heavily cited source, followed by earlier Scottish cases and Craig’s Jus feudale. 
Smith noted: “Repeated reference is made to Grotius, Vinnius, Gail and Gudelinus, 
Schotanus, Matthaeus, Perezius and eight more writers.”452 He also noted that the 
lawyers of the period tended “to rely on the most modern works from the Continent 
and from the Netherlands in particular.453 The three jurists who were used most 
heavily by Stair were therefore also highlighted in Cooper’s list as having been those 
most frequently cited in court. His choice of continental legal sources was therefore 
in keeping with the use of continental legal literature by his Scottish contemporaries. 
                                                           
451 Although taking references like this second- or third-hand through other scholars’ works is not 
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seem to be among the papers of his held by the National Library of Scotland. 
452 Smith: “Scots law and Roman-Dutch law: A shared tradition”, 39. 
453 Smith: “Scots law and Roman-Dutch law: A shared tradition”, 39. 
 - 131 - 
4 
STAIR AND GROTIUS 
 
Grotius was the jurist cited most often by Stair, with nine citations in the third 
version and another added for the fourth. An additional citation of Grotius has been 
found in the manuscripts. Gordon established that Stair also used Grotius for 
passages in which he did not cite him explicitly.
1
 This chapter will expand on 
Gordon’s research to establish four points in relation to Stair’s use of Grotius. First, 
it will show that Stair used Grotius three times: for the first, third and fourth versions. 
Secondly, it will show that Stair borrowed from Grotius citations of Roman law, 
continental jurists, and writers of classical antiquity. All these citations of Roman 
law and writers of classical antiquity were borrowed by Stair from Grotius for the 
first version. Four of those of continental jurists were borrowed for the first version, 
and another was borrowed for the third version. Stair normally did not check 
citations when he borrowed them from Grotius. Thirdly, this chapter will confirm 
Gordon’s suggestion that one of Stair’s citations of Grotius was borrowed from 
another source, Vinnius’ commentary.
2
 Finally, it will draw some important 
conclusions about Stair’s use of Grotius as a source of natural law. 
 
4.1  STAIR’S USE OF GROTIUS FOR THE FIRST VERSION 
 
4.1.1  “Of Obligations” 
 
Stair included a paraphrase of Cicero’s De officiis 3.17.68 when explaining that not 
all natural obligations had civil effect: “as Cicero saith, Philosophum spectant quae 
mente tenentur, juridicum quae manu tenentur [The philosopher considers what is 
distinguished by reason, the judge what is distinguished by the hand]”.
3
 Here Cicero 
stated that philosophers responded to trickery with reason and the law with a firm 
hand. Stair’s paraphrase made three important changes to Cicero. First, Stair’s 
                                                 
1
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 258-263. 
2
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 256-257. 
3
 S.3.6/1.3.5. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 3.6; the quotation differed slightly in 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.21L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 3.6. 
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statement was broader: while Cicero wrote of astutias [trickery], Stair distinguished 
between judges and philosophers more generally. Secondly, Cicero wrote of the law, 
Stair about judges. Finally, Stair amended the structure of Cicero’s sentence, and 
thus discussed philosophers first rather than second as Cicero did.  
Gordon noted that there was an inexact comparison between Stair’s 
paraphrase and a quotation of this passage of Cicero in De jure belli 2.12.12.
4
 
Grotius quoted Cicero accurately but for the addition of words to give context in 
relation to inequitable terms in contracts. This was probably Stair’s source. Grotius 
2.12 was used extensively by Stair in “Obligations Conventional”. Stair probably 
found Grotius’ quotation of Cicero at the same time that he was borrowing material 
for “Obligations Conventional”. He would have seen it was broadly applicable to the 
nature of law, and included it here. Rather than quote Cicero, however, Stair 
amended Grotius’ quotation so that his paraphrase would support his proposition that 
not all natural obligations had legal effect. There is no evidence to suggest that Stair 
consulted Cicero directly. Stair therefore used Grotius to provide a citation of a 
writer of classical antiquity as authority for natural law. 
 
4.1.2  “Parents and Children” 
 
4.1.2.1 Stair’s citation of Grotius and Aristotle 
 
Stair distinguished between: “Infancy, or Pupilarity; Minority, or less Age; and 
Majority, or full Age”.
5
 He cited Aristotle and Grotius: “Aristotle distinguish, Polit. 
1. cap. ult. Ethic. l. 4. cap. 3. l. 5. cap. 10. And after him, Grotius, de jure belli & 
pacis, l. 2. cap. 5.”
6
 The citation of the last chapter of Politics 1 was relevant: here 
Aristotle discussed the role of the persons within the household – master, wife, child 
and slave – and stated that children were to be educated in line with the constitution 
                                                 
4
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 259.  
5
 S.5.2/1.5.2. The manuscripts gave “infancy or pupill age, minoritie & majoritie or full age”. 1662 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.2. 
6
 S.5.2/1.5.2. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 5.2 omitted the book and title of the citation of Aristotle’s 
Politics, and gave ‘E’ instead of ‘Ethics’; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38R omitted the 
book number of Aristotle’s Politics. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.2. 
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so as to fulfil their later obligations as citizens.
7
 Stair’s citations of Nichomachean 
Ethics 4.3 and 5.10, however, were irrelevant; neither discussed children.  
Stair’s error was copied from Grotius. In a marginal note in De jure belli 2.5.2, 
Grotius cited the same three passages of Aristotle: “Pol. I. c ult. Nic. IV, 3.” and then 
“Eth. V, c. 10.” Grotius’ citation of 4.3 should instead have been of 3.5.
8
 Indeed, 
Grotius gave a Greek phrase, “τoū βoυλευτικοū άτελoūς”, and term, “προαίρεσις”, 
which he took from 3.5: 
 
ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ µὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν 
πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ 
ἑκούσιοι.9 
 
If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of 
deliberation and choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means 




Grotius changed the ending of “βουλευτῶν”, added alpha to the start of “τέλους”, 
and reversed “βoυλευτικοū” and “άτελoūς”. Nonetheless, these quotations show that 
this was clearly the passage to which Grotius intended to refer. Yet this choice is 
puzzling as 3.5 principally explained that man had control over his own vices. The 
general context of this passage was therefore not particularly relevant to his overall 
discussion. 
Further, Grotius should have cited 5.6 rather than 5.10. Again, this can be 
established by his quotation from 5.6: “έως άν uή χωρισθῇ”. Aristotle at 5.6.8 stated 
“ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ [or a child till it reaches a certain age and becomes 
independent [translation: Rackham]]”. Grotius again slightly altered Aristotle’s 
wording. Although 5.6.8 did mention children attaining majority, the wider context 
of this passage is again irrelevant.  
Stair’s citation of the same irrelevant passages of Nichomachean Ethics as 
Grotius establishes De jure belli as his source. His citation of Aristotle’s Politics was 
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 Numbered 1.8 in P. Sylvestro Mauro (ed): Aristotelis opera volume 2 (Rome, 1668), 537-541; 
numbered 1.5 in H. Rackham (trans): Aristotle: in twenty-three volumes volume 21: Politics (Loeb 
Classical Library series, London, 1977), 56-67. 
8
 Kelsey’s translation gave 3.4, which is not correct. 
9
 Sylvestro Mauro (ed): Aristotelis opera, 67; H. Rackham (trans): Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics 
with an English translation (Loeb Classical Library series, London, 1962), 142. 
10
 Rackham (trans): The Nicomachean Ethics, 143. 
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also undoubtedly borrowed from Grotius at the same time. Clearly, Stair did not 
check the texts. He did, however, amend Grotius’ citation of Nicomachean Ethics 
5.10. Grotius cited “Nic. IV, 3.” and “Eth. V, c. 10”. “Nic” referred to the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s greatest work on ethics. Yet “Eth” would normally 
also refer to the Nichomachean Ethics for that reason. Aristotle wrote a lesser book 
on ethics, his earlier Eudemian Ethics, books four to six of which were incorporated 
into the Nicomachean Ethics as books five to seven.
11
 It would thus be surprising if 
Grotius had cited book five of the Eudemian Ethics independently of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Therefore Stair, who had both studied and lectured on 
Aristotle,
12
 understandably combined the citations: “Ethic. l. 4. cap. 3. l. 5. cap. 10.” 
As with the citation of Cicero in “Of Obligations”, Stair here borrowed citations of a 
writer of classical antiquity from Grotius. Here, however, he used the citations as 
authority for the stages of childhood rather than for natural law per se.  
It would also appear that Stair used this passage of Grotius for his next 
paragraph, S.5.3/1.5.3. Stair defined infancy as when “the Children are without 
Discretion”.
13
 The word “discretion” probably reflected Grotius’ use of 
“προαίρεσις”, which was quoted from Aristotle. Stair therefore used this passage of 
Grotius in his preliminary overview of the legal stages of childhood.  
 
4.1.2.2 Stair’s further citation of Aristotle 
 
Stair’s only other reference to Aristotle in the printed editions was in a passage 
which also cited Caesar’s De bello Gallico, two texts of Roman law, and the Bible. 
When discussing the parental power of life and death, Stair stated: “Arisotle testifieth 
the like of the Persians, lib. 8.  Ethic. cap. 12.”
14
 Gordon observed that Grotius 
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 F. Sparshott: Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics (Toronto 
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[Sparshott: Taking Life Seriously, 153]. 
12
 Above, 1.2.1.2-3. 
13
 S.5.3/1.5.2. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 5.2-3; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38R. 
1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.3. 
14
 S.5.6/1.5.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 5.5 cited Ethics 5.12; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.6. 
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“ma[de] the same reference to Aristotle”.
15
 What Gordon did not mention was that 
this shared citation was wrong: Aristotle discussed the tyrannical rule of Persian 
fathers in 8.10 not 8.12.
16
 That Stair also cited 8.12 proves, first, that he borrowed 
this citation from Grotius and, secondly, that he did not check the text. Again, Stair 
has borrowed a citation of a writer of classical antiquity from Grotius. Like the 
previous citation of Aristotle which he borrowed from Grotius, however, he did not 
use this citation expressly in relation to natural law. Instead, he gave Aristotle in 
relation to ancient law. Later this thesis will show that Stair’s citations of Caesar and 




4.1.3  “Restitution” 
 
4.1.3.1 Stair’s citation of Grotius 
 
Stair classified restitution as part of natural law.
18
 He stated “The learned Grotius, de 
jure belli, l.2. cap.10.”
19
 regarded such obligations to be “by tacit consent, or 
Contract” between nations. Stair was correct; Grotius here stated that restitution as an 
“obligatio tanquam ex contractu universali omnes homines tenet [obligation is 
binding on all men, as if by universal agreement [translation: Kelsey]]”.
20
 Stair 
disagreed with this, and said that restitution was obligated by natural law and “it is 
most just and sure, to attribute such obligations to the Law of God written in our 
hearts, rather than unto any other conjecture of supposed consent.” Stair therefore 
rejected Grotius’ classification; this is the first of six occasions on which Stair 
explicitly rejected Grotius. 
 
                                                 
15
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 259-260; Grotius: De jure belli, 
2.5.7. 
16
 Checked in Sylvestro Mauro (ed): Aristotelis opera volume 2, 239. 
17




 S.7.2/1.7.2. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 7.2 gave “cap.20”; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 7.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.59R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 7.2 cited 2.12; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 7.2 omitted the 
book.  
20
 Grotius: De  jure belli, 2.10.1.  
 - 136 - 
4.1.3.2 Stair’s citation of D 16.3.31.1 
 
Stair explained that if property was pledged or deposited by someone other than the 
owner, “we are bound to restore to the owner, though thereby we lose what we 
gave”. He cited D.16.3.31.1, “l.bona fide, 31.ff.§.1.depositi”, and discussed the case 
of a robber depositing Mevius’ property with Seius.
21
 Stair’s citation did not include 
the paragraph number or the reference to the specific sub-paragraph in the 
manuscripts; they were added for the third version. Stair’s citation in the first version 




Stair probably did not check this text. Gordon suggested that “Stair may 
simply have had his attention drawn to the text in the context of restitution by 
Grotius’ reference to it.”
23
 Grotius quoted a large part of D.16.3.31.1; Stair would 
thus have known that D.16.3.31 said stolen property deposited with another must be 
returned to the owner not the depositor. Grotius then went on to confirm that the 
depositee “reddere eam non teneatur [is not bound to return it [translation by 
Kelsey]]”. Stair went further and said that to restore the property to the depositor 
would be a delinquence. He then held that a contract would be void if goods were 
received by their owner in deposit. A similar statement is found in D.16.3.31.1 (but 
not in the part quoted by Grotius), which stated: “non contrahi depositum [there is no 
contract of deposit [translation by Watson]]”.
24
 Did Stair follow the Digest in saying 
the contract was void? Probably not: it is not a great intellectual leap from there not 
being an obligation to return something deposited (as found in Grotius and the 
section of D.16.3.31 cited by him) to Stair’s saying the contract is void. Stair could 
simply have expanded on Grotius. This suggestion is supported by Stair also 
referring to an “errour in the substance of the Contract” and giving a second example 
of pledge, neither of which was referred to by Grotius or D.16.3.31.1.
25
 If Stair 
applied this rule to another contractual relationship (pledge), it seems likely that he 
                                                 
21
 S.7.4/1.7.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 7.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.61L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.4; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 7.3. 
22
 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.10.1. 
23
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 260. 
24
 This was not in the section quoted by Grotius. 
25
 S.7.4/1.7.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 7.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.61L-R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.4; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 7.3. 
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would have been able to develop Grotius’ point and declare the contract void. 
Additionally, checking the Digest for the first version would not be consistent with 
Stair’s practice at that time. He did not check any of the citations of Roman law 
which he borrowed from Grotius or Gudelinus (or probably Vinnius) at that time. 
He did, however, check D.16.3.31.1 when preparing the third version; he 
specified sub-paragraph one and gave the paragraph and sub-paragraph numbers. He 
probably decided to cite the first sub-paragraph because that was where the case of 
Mevius and Seius was discussed; he had included the hypothetical discussion of 
these two characters in the first version, having taken them from Grotius’ quotation 
of D.16.3.31.1.  
 
4.1.3.3 Stair’s citation of Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, 2 Chronicles 14.13 
and Numbers 31.27 
 
Stair’s discussion of restitution from public enemies was much longer and more 
detailed in the first and second versions than in the third. In the third version there 
remained only a brief discussion, based on the opening lines of that in the earlier 
versions.
26
 When discussing the spoils of victory in the first and second versions, 
Stair cited: Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 5; Aristotle’s Politics 1; Plato’s De legibus; 2 
Chronicles 14.13; and Numbers 31.27. The removal of this passage meant there were 
no citations of Xenophon or Plato in either the third or fourth versions, despite them 
being leading writers of the classical period. Stair borrowed these citations from De 
jure belli 3.6.1-2 where these same five texts are also cited.
27
 This is shown by 
Stair’s citing and paraphrasing the same passages of these writers in the same order 
as Grotius. 
Stair cited Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 5: “Zenophon Lib: 5. de Inst: Cyri: being 
on Cyrus, saying that it is perpetual law that the enemies’ city being taken, their 
goods and moveables remain to the victor”. Xenophon did allude to a rule of spoils at 
5.5.23, but Stair’s paraphrase of Xenophon does not describe that passage. The 
                                                 
26
 S.7.6/1.7.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 7.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.61R-62R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.6; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 7.5. 
27
 The citations of the Bible were given at Grotius: De jure belli, 3.6.1, and the writers of classical 
antiquity at 3.6.2. 
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citation is obviously inaccurate. Grotius also cited Cyropaedia 5. He identified this 
as the source of a quotation which he gave from Xenophon. Kelsey showed that the 
quoted sentence was not in Cyropaedia 5 but rather at 7.5.73:  
 
“νόµος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀίδιός ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεµούντων πόλις 





for it is a law established for all time among all men that when a city is 
taken in war, the persons and the property of the inhabitants thereof 




Stair’s paraphrase is clearly of this sentence of 7.5.73; this was the passage he should 
have cited. Stair could easily have given his paraphrase of Xenophon from this 
quotation in Grotius. That Stair cited book five proves that Grotius was Stair’s 
source; that he did not realise the error in the citation shows he did not consult 
Xenophon. 
Both Stair and Grotius then cited Plato. Stair described the passage: “And 
Plato de legibus says that all the goods of the vanquished became the victors [sic]”.
30
 
This paraphrased Plato 1.626b, which was near-accurately quoted by Grotius: “Plato 
dixit, πάντα τῶν νικωµένων άγαθά τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι. bona quae victus habuit 
omnia victoris fieri [Plato said: ‘All goods of the conquered become the property of 
the conqueror’. [translation by Kelsey]]” That Grotius was Stair’s source is shown by 
his paraphrase being a direct translation of Grotius’ quotation, and its proximity to 
the citation and quotation of Xenophon which Stair also borrowed. There is nothing 
which suggests that Stair checked Plato. Indeed, Grotius did not indicate the location 
of the cited passage within De legibus. It is highly unlikely that Stair would have 
searched through Plato to find this phrase.  
Both then cited Aristotle’s Politics 1.
31
 Stair said: “The law is a commone 
paction that things taken by war should become the takers [sic]”;
32
 Grotius:  
                                                 
28
 Checked in ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΚY’ΡΟΥ ΠΑΙ∆Ε’IΑΣ, ΒΙΒΑΙ’Α ΤΕΤΤΑΡΑ: Xenophontis Cyri paediae 
libri quatuor posteriores volume 2 (Paris, 1539), 91-92. 
29
 W. Miller (trans): Xenophon: Cyropaedia volume 2 (Loeb Classical Library series, London, 1914), 
293. 
30
 Adv.MS.25.1.12, 7.5 cited “Cato de legibus”. 
31
 Two of the manuscripts cited Politics 10. This is inaccurate; Politics had only eight books. 
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Sed Aristotle quoque auctore ὁ γὰρ νόµος ὁµολογία τίς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τὰ 
κατὰ πόλεµον κρατούµενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναί φασιν Lex velut 
pactum quoddam commune est quo bello capta capientium fiunt  
 
On the authority of Aristotle also we read: ‘The law is a sort of 
agreement, according to which things taken in war belong to those who 
take them’ [translation by Kelsey].  
 
This citation of Politics 1 was correct: Aristotle classified plunder in war as a natural 
method of acquisition of property at Politics 1.6.
33
 Again, Stair paraphrased the same 
passage of Aristotle, and cited him in the same way as Grotius, giving the book but 
not the title.  
Finally, Stair’s citation of two passages of the Bible likely resulted from his 
consultation of Grotius. Stair cited 2 Chronicles 14.13 on King Asa’s winning “great 
victorie and spoyle” in his war with the Ethiopians, and Numbers 31.27 for the 
“judicial law of dividing the spoils”. These two texts were cited by Grotius in the 
same order in the passage before that in which he cited Xenophon, Plato and 
Aristotle.
34
 Did Stair check Grotius’ citations in the Bible? He almost certainly 
already knew these passages, and may have recognised the citations as being correct. 
He probably did not need to check these citations. Either way, his discussion of the 
Bible here seems to be a reflection of Grotius. 
Stair therefore used Grotius as a source for these three citations of writers of 
classical antiquity. He used the quotations given by Grotius to paraphrase the texts in 
the first version. Stair used these citations and paraphrases in relation to the natural 
law of spoil in victory. This agrees with Stair’s previous use of Grotius for citations 
of writers of classical antiquity as authority for natural law. That he also borrowed 
the citations of the Bible was unusual, and shows that Stair used Grotius here for 
texts with which he must have been familiar. This was consistent with his borrowing 
                                                                                                                                          
32
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 7.5 did not cite Aristotle; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 7.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.62L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 7.6; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 7.5.  
33
 The seventeenth-century copy consulted gave it as Politics 1.4.1: Sylvestro Mauro (ed): Aristotelis 
Opera volume 2, 522. There were minor differences in wording between the text of Aristotle and 
Grotius’ quotation.  
34
 Grotius: De jure belli, 3.6.1. 
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of citations of writers of classical antiquity; he must at least have been familiar with 




4.1.4  “Recompence” [sic] 
 
4.1.4.1 Stair’s citation of Grotius 
 
Stair classified recompense as being part of natural law
36
 and gave negotiorum gestio 
as an example.
37
 Stair justified the right of the gestor to his expenses, despite the lack 
of “Conventional Obligation”
38
 between the parties, because there was a natural, 
obediential obligation to recompense him. He said that Grotius disagreed:  
 
Grotius, l.2.Cap.10. de Jure Belli §.8. doth not own this Obligation as 
Natural, but as arising, Ex lege civili nullum enim (saith he) habet eorum 
fundamentorum, ex quibus natura Obligationem inducit [from the civil 
law; it contains none of those basic elements by virtue of which nature 




Stair therefore disagreed with Grotius’ categorisation of this aspect of unjustified 
enrichment; this agrees with his rejection of Grotius’ classification of restitution in 
relation to natural law.
40
 
The accuracy of the quotation proves that Stair consulted Grotius. Yet Stair’s 
citation in the first printed edition was inaccurate: the passage quoted was at 2.10.9, 
not 2.10.8. This was not a printing error as two of the manuscripts (Adv.MS.25.1.10 
from the 1662 stem and Adv.MS.25.1.12 from the 1666 stem) also cited 2.10.8; the 
others consulted cited only 2.10.
41
 Admittedly, Adv.MS.25.1.12 was updated 
according to the first printed edition in places,
42
 but this was not the case with 
Adv.MS.25.1.10. The implication therefore is that Stair specified De jure belli 2.10.8 
                                                 
35








 S.8.2/1.8.3. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 8.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.67R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 8.2. 
40
 Above, 4.1.3.1. 
41
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 8.2; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.67R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 8.2.  
42
 Especially at 10.20. 
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in the first version, and that it was retained for the second version. Why did the other 
four manuscripts consulted not cite paragraph eight? It is likely that copyists omitted 
the paragraph number, whether accidentally or deliberately on finding the error, and 
that this was transmitted through the stems by later copying from the manuscript(s). 
It therefore seems that Stair simply wrote down the wrong paragraph number in the 
first version, and did not correct this error when preparing the later versions. 
 
4.1.4.2 Stair’s citation of Cicero 
 
Stair discussed the need to recompense a person who built on or repaired another’s 
property as “a most Natural Obligation, as Cicero, l.3. de officiis, Sayeth, that it is 
against Nature, for a man, of anothers damnage, to increase his profite”.
43
 Although 
the implication in the wording here is that Stair has translated and quoted Cicero, in 
fact this is a paraphrase of De officiis 3.5.21.  
Gordon observed that this passage was also given at De jure belli 2.10.2 but 
that “the quotations [we]re not given in precisely the same context”.
44
 Stair gave this 
paraphrase to justify the rule that even the builder who knew the land on which he 
built was not his had to be recompensed; Grotius quoted Cicero after saying the rules 
of ownership ensured equality where a person has been enriched by another’s 
possessions. Gordon therefore noted that Stair and Grotius gave Cicero “in the same 
general context.”
45
 This was not the only occasion on which Stair used borrowed 
authority in a different context from his source.
46
 
That Grotius was Stair’s source here is clear. Grotius did not quote Cicero, 
but instead paraphrased him. However, there was an implication that Grotius was 
quoting Cicero because the paraphrase was printed in italics, which was Grotius’ 
usual way of indicating a quotation. Stair’s own paraphrase of Cicero is a literal 
translation of Grotius’. Stair’s alleged quotation from De officiis is much closer to 
Grotius than to Cicero. Further support for the suggestion that Grotius was Stair’s 
source here is that both referred to De officiis 3; this was the only time Stair referred 
                                                 
43
 S.8.5/1.8.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8, 8.5 omitted Cicero’s name; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 8.6; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.68L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 8.6. 
44
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 260. 
45
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 261. 
46
 Below, 5.1.2.4. 
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to any particular passage within a text of Cicero, despite citing him six times across 
the four versions. As in “Of Obligations”, Stair here used the authority which he 
borrowed from Grotius in relation to natural law. 
Stair’s next sentence also shows influence from Grotius. He continued: “Justice 
suffers not that with the spoil of others, we should augment our riches”.
47
 This 
reflected Grotius, who then accurately quoted De officiis 3.5.22:  
 





In another passage he adds: ‘Nature does not suffer this, that we should 
increase our means, riches, and resources from the spoils of others.’ 
[translation: Kelsey] 
 
That Grotius, not Cicero, was Stair’s source is shown by the choice and proximity of 
these two quotations in Stair and Grotius. 
 
4.1.4.3 Stair’s citation of D.13.6.3 
 
Gordon noted that “Like Grotius in De jure, 2.10.2.2 Stair goes on to mention the 
case of recovery of money lent to a person under the age of contractual capacity.”
49
 
Stair stated that pupils, although without legal capacity, must nonetheless 
recompense people by whom they are unjustifiably enriched. He then gave a Latin 
phrase and cited D.13.6.3: “in quantum locupletiores facti, l.sed mihi ff. 
commodati”.
50
 Grotius also gave this rule, and cited D.13.6.3 (also in the medieval 
style). He did so later in the same paragraph from which Stair borrowed the quotation 
from Cicero (although, admittedly, after other examples of persons who must 
recompense another).  
                                                 
47
 S.8.5/1.8.6. The manuscripts gave “nature” rather than “justice”. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 8.5; 
Adv.MS.25.1.10, 8.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.68L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 8.6. 
48
 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.10.2. Underlining in this quotation indicates use of italics in the original 
source. 
49
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 261. 
50
 S.8.5/1.8.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 8.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 8.6 omitted the citation; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.68L omitted the opening phrase. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 
25.1.12, 8.6. 
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Stair used this passage of Grotius in three ways. First, he borrowed the 
citation of D.13.6.3. Stair’s citation, which gave only the text’s opening words, was 
identical to that in Grotius. There is no evidence that he checked D.13.6.3 for the first 
version. Rather, the addition of the paragraph number in the fourth version suggests 
that Stair checked it at that point (Stair also added a citation of D.26.8.5 at that time). 
Secondly, Stair’s sentence structure was influenced by Grotius: both said pupils had 
no right to contract, then imposed an obligation of recompense. This structure was no 
particular reflection of D.13.6.3. Finally, Stair’s Latin phrase, “in quantum 
locupletiores facti”, was probably taken indirectly from D.13.6.3.pr through Grotius’ 
quotation of it – “si pupillus locupletior factus sit” – as he does not appear to have 
consulted the text directly. Stair here, as in “Of Obligations” and with his citation of 
Cicero just discussed, used the authority which he borrowed from Grotius in relation 
to natural law. 
 
4.1.5  “Reparation” 
 
Stair discussed “the private Rights of Men, arising to them by Delinquence, by 
exacting Reparation of their Damnages inferred thereby.”
51
 In the following 
paragraph, he stated:  
 
Damnage is called, damnum a demendo [loss by being diminished] 
because it damnifieth, or taketh away something from an other, which of 
Right he had. The Greeks for the like reason, call it ελαττον by which 




Stair’s interest in the etymology of the term and his use of Greek here are in keeping 
with the method of legal humanism.
53
  
Stair’s source was De jure belli 2.17.2, which stated: “Damnum forte a 
demendo dictum, est τὁ ἒλαττον [Damage, the Latin word for which, damnum, was 
perhaps derived from the word meaning to take away, demere, in Greek is ‘the being 
                                                 
51
 S.9.2/1.9.2. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 9.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.70L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 9.3. 
52
 S.9.3/1.9.3. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 9.4 omitted the Greek term; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 9.4 gave 
ελατιον; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.70L βλαbη. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 9.4 gave ελχττον; 
Adv.MS.25.1.7, 9.4 ελχπον; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 9.4 εκλειπον. 
53
 Above, 3.2.2. 
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less’ [translation by Kelsey]]”. Stair’s phrase “damnum a demendo” was clearly 
drawn from Grotius’ “damnum forte a demendo”, and his Greek term was also 
evidently borrowed from Grotius. Indeed, Stair borrowed all four of the Greek terms 




Gordon noticed that: 
 
There is a parallel in Grotius, De jure, 2.17.2.1 but in this case the 
parallel is not exact as Grotius, while referring to the derivation of 
damnum from demere and to the Greek word ἒλαττον, expresses himself 




Yet the absence of this citation in Grotius does not undermine this comparison: the 
Latin and Greek were borrowed from Grotius for the first version. The citation to 
which Gordon refers was not added until Stair’s fourth version (when it was 
borrowed from Vinnius).
56
 This paragraph of the Institutions as it was in the first 
version is therefore wholly drawn from Grotius. 
 
4.1.6  “Obligations Conventional” 
 
4.1.6.1 Stair’s citation of Grotius, Molina, Gomezius, Connanus, 
D.2.14.1, the Edict de constituta pecunia, and D.50.17.84 
 
It is helpful to give an overview of Stair’s consideration of promises and pactions 
before analysing the sources he used here. Stair devoted eight paragraphs to 
“distinguish betwixt Promise, Pollicitation, or Offer, Paction and Contract”.
57
 In 
S.10.3/1.10.3, Stair explained that obligations were “sometime absolute and pure, 
and sometime conditional”. These conditions could relate either to the performance 
of the obliged act or to an aspect of the obligation itself. He said that in the latter 
case, “when the condition is relating to the constituting of the Obligation, then the 
                                                 
54
 Below, 6.1.2. 
55
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 261. 
56
 Below, 6.3.1. 
57
 S.10.3/1.10.3. All quotations from the Institutions in this overview are found in the manuscripts 
unless otherwise indicated. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.3-7; Adv.MS.25.1.11, 
fol.88L-90R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.3-7. 
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very Obligation it self [sic] is pendent, till the condition be purified, and till then it is 
no Obligation”.
58
 He gave the example of offer, which required acceptance before it 
became binding. He explained that “an offer accepted is a Contract, because it is the 
deed of two, the offerer and accepter.”
59
  
He described promise at S.10.4/1.10.4 as “that which is simple and pure, and 
hath not implyed as a Condition, in its being the acceptance of another”.
60
 He 
rejected the contrary opinion of Grotius, who required acceptance of promises, 
before stating that “promises now be commonly held Obligatory, the Canon Law 
having taken off the exception of the Civil Law, de nudo pacto”.
61
  
In S.10.5/1.10.5, he discussed jus quaesitum tertio within this greater 
framework,
62
 and cited Molina. Stair explained that a promise on behalf of the third 
party was valid, but it could also be “made by way of offer” or conditional. Here 
Stair began to confuse his terminology: he used “promise” here generically, without 
implication that offer or conditional obligations were sub-sets of promise proper.
63
 
Instead, Stair was here saying that the jus quaesitum tertio could be: a promise; an 
offer, which required acceptance; or a conditional obligation, which required action. 
He then explained: “Hence is our vulgar distinction betwixt Obligations and 
Contracts, the former being only where the Obligation is µονοπλςυρος [unilateral] on 
the one part; the other where the Obligation is δυπλευρος [bilateral] an Obligation on 
both parts.”
64
 He therefore used these distinctions within the example of jus 
quaesitum tertio.  
                                                 
58
 The manuscripts (and fourth version) gave “relateth”.  
59
 The manuscripts gave “promise or contract” or “paction or contract”.  
60
 The manuscripts gave “the other” not “another”.  
61
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 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.3 gave µονοωλευς and διωλευρος; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.3 µονοηελευ 
and διπλευρος; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.88R µονοπλεορος οιω and διπολεορος. 1666 stem: 
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Stair defined pactions in S.10.6/1.10.6: “the consent of two or more parties, to 
some things to be performed by either of them”. Such consensus was subjective and 
thus:  
 
it must be taken by the words or other signs, so if the words be clearly 
obligator and serious, no pretence, that there was no purpose to obliege, 
will take place, if the promise be pendent on acceptation, and no more 
then an offer, it is imperfect and ambulatory, and in the power of the 
offerer, till acceptance… 
 
Here again Stair used the term “promise” generically in the context of offer.  
In S.10.7/1.10.7, but still within the context of pactions, Stair explained that 
Roman law required formalities for pactions to be enforceable, but that “the common 
Custome of Nations hath resiled therefrom, following rather the Canon Law, by 
which every paction produceth action, omne verbum de ore fideli cadit in debitum”.
65
 
He cited the Liber Extra,
66
 Gudelinus, Corvinus and, in the manuscripts, Gomezius. 
He also stated that “we have a special Statute of Session, November 27. 1592. 
acknowledging all pactions and promises as effectual”.
67
  
In S.10.8/1.10.8, he examined various actions received into Scots law. At the 
end of this paragraph, he said “Instead of the remeids of Stipulation, the 
inconveniences that rejected naked Paction among the Romans, are remeided with us 
by this means.” First, “If the matter be of great Moment, and which requireth to its 
perfection, solemnity in Write…such as Dispositions of Lands, and Heretable Rights, 
Tacks, Rentals, and Assignations to Writs, &c.”
68
 Secondly, “by a Statute of Par. 
1579. cap. 80. all Writes of great importance, are to be subscribed by the party, or by 
two Nottars and four Witnesses, wherein custome hath interpret matters of 
importance to be that which exceeds an hundred Pound Scots”.
69
 Sellar showed that 
this second rule was established by the end of the sixteenth century.
70
 This use of 
written evidence, Stair reasoned, eliminated the need for stipulation as the only sums 
                                                                                                                                          
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.3 gave µονοπλςορος and διπλεορος; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.3 µονοπλεοµος and 
διπλεορος; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.3 µονσπλεοςος and διπλεοςος. 
65
 The manuscripts generally gave “common law”; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6 gave “Roman law”. 
66
 Part of the Corpus iuris canonici, the compilation of Canon law. 
67
 The Act of Sederunt is possibly apocryphal. Below, 5.1.4.1. 
68
 S.10.9/1.10.9.  
69
 S.10.9/1.10.9. Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6 gave “1000 Merks Scots”.  
70
 Sellar: “Promise”, 254-256. 
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which could be deponed without writing (and therefore by promise or naked paction) 
were comparatively nominal.  
Finally, in S.1.10/1.10.10, Stair said “Promises or naked Paction, are morally 
Obligatory by the Law of Nature”, although he acknowledged that Connanus 
disagreed. He cited as authority for his view Canon law, Roman law, Biblical law, 
and logic:  
 
if Promises were not morally oblieging, they could have no effect, but by 
Positive Law (which is no more it self then a publick Paction,
71
 laborans 
eodem morbo) and then all Pactions and Agreements among Nations 





The importance of these paragraphs for the development of the Scots law has often 
been expressed. Hogg, for example, noted that “The acceptance of the validity of 
bare pacts, gratuitous contracts, and unilateral contracts, under Stair’s direction, was 
to provide Scots Law with a very flexible and broad law of voluntary obligations.”
73
 
Stair’s discussion of naked pactions in Scots law, and his citation of Gudelinus and 
Corvinus, will be examined later.
74
 Here it will be shown that his citations of Molina, 
Gomezius, Connanus, and Roman law were all borrowed from Grotius. 
Grotius required promises to be accepted in order to be binding. Stair rejected 
this: 
 
But a Promise is that which is simple and pure, and hath not implyed as a 
Condition, in its being the acceptance of another, in this Grotius 
differeth, de jure belli l.2. C.11.§.14.holding, that acceptance is necessar 





                                                 
71
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Stair accurately summarised Grotius’ De jure belli 2.11.14, which compared the 
requirement of acceptance in promise to that in the transfer of ownership. There is no 
doubt that this citation and summary of Grotius was the product of Stair’s 
consultation and consideration of the text. Stair’s rejection of Grotius was 
fundamental to the development of the Scots law of promise: “The result was to set 




Scholars have speculated that in departing from Grotius, Stair was following 
Molina and second scholasticism. Gordley noted that the second scholastics debated 
the requirement of acceptance in promise.
77
 Hogg and Walker both suggested that in 
accepting “that all contracts are enforceable…Stair was largely influenced by the 
Spanish Scholastic School.”
78
 Lubbe stated: “Stair was not merely aware of Molina’s 
views, but seems to have been influenced by them in adopting the position that an 
unqualified unilateral promise had an obligatory effect.”
79
 Certainly Stair cited 
Molina De jusititia et jure disp.263 in his discussion of jus quaesitum tertio as an 
example of promise and offer.
80
 The passage which Stair cited did not, however, 
discuss jus quaesitum tertio. Rather, Disputatio 263 discussed whether promises 
could be revoked before acceptance. This led the editors of the third, fourth and fifth 
printed editions of the Institutions to amend the citation to read to Disputatio 265, 
which examined donation in favour of a third party. This interpretation was later 
supported by Cameron and Smith.
81
 Furthermore, Disputatio 263 does not appear to 
support Stair’s overarching argument that promises were binding before acceptance: 
 
Convenerunt Doctores, promissionem antequam acceptetur, atque adeo 
antequam in pactum transeat, regulariter neque obligationem civilem, 
neque actionem in seculari foro parere, ut constat, tum ex aliis iuribus, 
tum ex l.pactum, ff. de pollicitationibus iuncta gloss. ibi, in verb. 
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offerentis. & l. nuda pollicitatio. Cod. de contrahen. stipul. cuius haec 
sunt verba: Nuda pollicitatione secundum ea, quae saepe constituta sunt, 





The doctores are agreed that as a rule a promise before acceptance, and 
so before it turns into a pact, gives rise to neither a civil obligation nor an 
action in a secular court, as is agreed both from other texts and from 
D.50.12.3, the gloss on the work offerentis there, and from C.8.37(38).5 
which runs as follows: according to what has often been decided the law 
does not always allow anyone to be obliged by a pollicitation to perform 




This means that the passage cited by Stair was not only on promise rather than jus 
quaesitum tertio, but also began by denying that promises were binding without 
acceptance. This has been noted by various scholars. Mackenzie Stuart said that 
“there appears no warrant in Molina for the views ascribed to him”.
84
 McBryde 
believed that “An examination of Molina’s text suggests to the writer that the 
position was much more obscure, with the arguments of the ‘doctores’ favouring the 
view that an unaccepted promise was not enforceable in a civil court.”
85
 Scholars 
have tried to explain Stair’s citation of Molina’s Disputatio 263. In Carmichael v 
Carmichael’s Executrix,
86
 an insurance contract taken out on a son’s life had 
included a term transferring the right to the proceeds to the son’s executrix and the 
duty to pay the premiums to the son on his majority; both had previously lain with 
the father. After reaching majority but before paying the first premium, the son died. 
Lord Dunedin, who heard the case, said that the appellant’s argument required Stair’s 
discussion of jus quaesitum tertio to be interpreted to mean that “the moment you 
find from the form of the obligation that there was a jus conceived in favour of a 
tertius it proved that that jus was quaesitum to that tertius.”
87
 He said that this 
interpretation “attempts too much” and would be inconsistent with Roman law, the 
                                                 
82
 Molina: De justitia et jure, volume 2, Disputatio 263.1. Underlining in this quotation indicates use 
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cases cited by Stair, and the later authorities. He stated that it would thus have been 
“a holocaust of accepted authorities in the law of Scotland; but I do not think Lord 
Stair meant any such thing.”
88
 Lord Dunedin instead suggested that “irrevocability is 
the test; the mere execution of the document will not constitute irrevocability.”
89
 This 
re-interpretation of Stair was criticised by Cameron, who said that Molina should 
have been examined.
90
 Rodger also dismissed Dunedin’s judgement:  
 
Lord Dunedin’s judgement is confused. There is no authority whatsoever 
for transposing clauses in sentences of Stair. The entire exercise is 
transparently one of adapting the text to fit in with preconceived ideas. … 
To rewrite the text and make it say the very reverse of what it appears to 




Yet he also criticised Cameron’s reading of Molina,
92
 and noted that “all the 
manuscripts and the first and fourth versions are unanimous in telling us that Stair 
referred to Molina, Disputatio 263.”
93
 He explained Stair’s structure:  
 
Stair thought that the third party beneficiary acquires his right by a 
pollicitation on the part of the promisor and so he does not need to 
‘accept’ in any way whatsoever. … what led him to include the jus 
quaesitum tertio at this stage was that he saw it as a case where a person 




Rodger explained the apparent disagreement between Stair’s and Molina’s views on 
whether promises were binding by showing that, in a later passage of Disputatio 263, 
Molina stated: 
 
Veruntamen [sic: verum tamen], quod contendimus, est, promissionem 
ipsam ex natura sua, secluso iure positivo, quod aliud statuit, vim 
habere, antequam acceptetur, ad obligandum ex parte sua promittentem, 
ita ut manifestare donatario promissionem teneatur, ut, si ea acceptare 
velit, illam adimpleat, prout ex parte sua ante acceptationem tenebatur.
95
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What we assert is nonetheless true, namely, that leaving aside positive 
law which decides otherwise, a promise itself by its very nature has force 
before acceptance to bind the promisor for his part in such a way that he 
is bound to show the promise to the beneficiary so that if he wishes to 
accept it, he [the promisor] should fulfill [sic] it, as he was bound for his 
part before the acceptance. [translation: Rodger;
96
 parenthesis in the 
original] 
 
This perhaps takes this text too far. Molina here said that the promisor is bound only 
to relay the promise to the beneficiary, but is not bound to fulfil the promise by 
performing the promised act. Stair, however, said that the promisor was bound to 
fulfil the promise by performing that act. This is a fundamental difference. 
Nonetheless, this was until recently the leading explanation. MacQueen followed 
Rodger’s interpretation, and suggested that his citation of Molina, and his discussion 
here generally, “exemplified Stair’s basic contention that Scots law was close to the 
requirements of natural law.”
97
  
All this assumes that Stair read Molina. Richter, however, has correctly 
argued that Stair’s citation of Molina was borrowed from Grotius.
98
 Grotius stated 
that promises needed acceptance. He then acknowledged the opposite view and cited 
Molina: “quae ratio quosdam induxit, ut jure naturae solum promittentis actum 
sufficere judicarent <Molina disput. 263.>
99
 [Nevertheless this consideration has led 
some to judge that the act of promising is alone sufficient. [translation: Kelsey]]”
100
 
Why Grotius cited Molina as authority here is unknown, given that Molina seems not 
to have supported this view; perhaps he also borrowed this citation from another 
source.
101
 Grotius defended his own position by drawing on Roman law, which did 
not allow a promise to be rescinded so as to allow the benefiting party the 
opportunity to accept.  
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Grotius’ discussion varied in topic from that of Stair, as Richter noted.
102
 
Stair instead discussed a third party’s right to overrule the rescission of a contract 
under which he benefits, despite the mutual consent of both parties to the contract. 
Essentially, he stated that anyone with rights under a contract must consent to its 
rescission for that rescission to have effect. There was, however, some similarity in 
the context of the citation of Molina in Stair and in Grotius: giving the promisee 
opportunity to consider whether to accept or decline the promise. It is therefore 
possible to see why Stair may have felt that the citation of Molina would have been 
broadly relevant to his own discussion; that Grotius rejected Molina may have been 
why Stair borrowed this citation. That Stair was treating jus quaesitum tertio as an 
example of promise in the greater context
103
 may also have given him the confidence 
to use the citation as authority for his broader point. Yet that Stair described Molina 
incorrectly suggests that he did not check De justitia et jure. There cannot have been 
even indirect influence, given Grotius’ wrong use of Molina. However, Stair 
believed that Molina supported the idea that promise alone was sufficient to bind a 




Stair cited another second scholastic, Gomezius, when he explained that in 
contemporary law pactions required only consent. Stair explained that in Roman law 
stipulations were required for pactions to be enforceable, but:  
 
the common Custome of Nations hath resiled therefrom, following rather 
the Canon Law, by which every paction produceth action, omne verbum 
de ore fideli cadit in debitum, C. 1. & 3 de pactis. And so observeth 




All the sample manuscripts but Adv.MS.25.1.12
106
 (and thus, presumably, the first 
and second versions) cited Gomezius 2.9.3 between Gudelinus and Corvinus.
107
 Stair 
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 Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6 cited “L.2. respons 9, ii, 3”.  
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borrowed this citation from the passage of Grotius immediately before that in which 
Grotius cited Molina. Yet Grotius cited Gomezius 2.9.1.
108
 Stair and Grotius 
therefore cited the same book and title of Gomezius, but different paragraphs. The 
difference may simply have been Stair’s error in copying the citation. Neither 
citation was correct. It was Gomezius’ Commentaria, variaque resolutiones 2.9.2 
rather than 2.9.3 which was on naked pactions. Here Gomezius stated: “Et istud 
pactum efficaciter obligat, & producit actionem de Iure Canonico [And that paction 
binds effectually, and produces an action of the Canon law]”.
109
 
Stair used the citation of Gomezius in a different context to Grotius: Stair gave 
him as authority for the Canon law prescribing that “every paction produceth action”; 
Grotius cited him on the need for acceptance of promises. These were, however, 
sufficiently similar contexts for Stair to have identified Gomezius as relevant 
authority for his discussion from reading Grotius’. That the citation is wrong 
suggests that Stair borrowed this citation without checking it. This is the same 
practice as his borrowing the citation of Molina, also from Grotius, without checking 
it.   
Stair’s final citation of a continental jurist here was of Connanus. Although 
Stair said that most jurists believed that promises or naked pactions were morally 
binding, he cited two titles within an unnamed treatise of Connanus which he said 
denied this. Grotius also cited these titles; their citations are remarkably similar. Stair 
wrote: “l.1.C.6.l.5.C.9”;
110
 Grotius “Lib. 1, c. VI: Lib. V, c. 1.”
111
 Neither referred to 
any particular treatise, both cited 1.6, and both book five, although Stair cited 5.9 and 
Grotius 5.1. The majority of the manuscripts (and thus presumably the first and 
second versions), however, cited 5.1.
112
 This indicates that the different citation in 
the first printed edition was a printing error; it was not corrected for the second 
printed edition. Both Connanus 1.6 and 5.1 were relevant. Connanus’ Commentaria 
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.11.1. 
112
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.7; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.90L cited 5.2. 1666 stem: 
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 - 154 - 
iuris civilis libri decem 1.6.12 stated that promises were not enforceable either 
legally or morally: 
 
verbis factae promissiones, etiam si ob causam essent factae, non 
constituebant obligationem …At idem multa profert exempla, in quibus 
liceat vel naturae consensu de promissis recedere: … Mihi quidem 
videtur, semper fas esse datam fidem non implere, si nihil inde veniat 




promises made by words, even if made for cause, do not constitute an 
obligation … but there are many examples advanced, in which it is 
permitted or from the nature of the agreement to recede from promises: 
… to me indeed it seems by divine law is acceptable not to satisfy the 
promise if the other party is not thereby disadvantaged. 
 
Connanus expressed the same in his commentary at 5.1.5: 
 
Pactiones autem quaecunque non habebant συνάλλαγµα, quia si non 
implerentur, nihil fraudis afferre videbantur ei, cui factae erant, non 
afferebant promittenti necessitatem, sed liberum erat ab illis resilire. 
Tam enim videbatur esse in culpa, qui temere nulla de causa pollicenti 




But pactions in any way do not have currency; if they are not fulfilled, no 
offences are spoken of or seen by the same which is made, nor obligation 
conveyed by promise, but he is free to resile from this. So indeed it is 
seen to have been the fault of he who rashly trusts promise without cause, 
which foolishness invites promises. 
 
The passage cited by Stair in the third version, 5.9, was instead on donation. This 
confirms that this change was a printing error. Stair borrowed these citations from 
Grotius for the first version: the same two passages are cited in the same manner and 
the same order. There is no evidence that Stair consulted Connanus; it is likely that 
he borrowed these citations without checking them.  
Stair cited a range of authority against Connanus, including Canon law, three 
texts of Roman law (D.2.14.1, the Edict de constituta pecunia, and D.50.17.84), and 
the Bible.
115
 All these citations appeared in the sample manuscripts, and thus 
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presumably the first and second versions.
116
 Gordon noted these three Roman legal 
texts were also cited by Grotius.
117
 Stair stated: 
  
[by] the Civil Law l.1.ff. de pactis, there is nothing so congruous to 
humane trust, as to perform what is agreed among them; the Edict, de 
constituta pecunia, saith, it is suitable to natural Equity, and saith farther, 
that he is debitor by the Law of Nature, who must pay by the Law of 





This passage reads as if it was describing D.2.14.1, then summarising the Edict in the 
two italicised phrases, then citing D.50.17.84 to show that the Edict was followed. 
Stair’s summary of D.2.14.1 was accurate, and his description of “natural Equity” in 
the first italicised phrase was found in D.13.5.1.pr, which recorded the Edict:  
 
Hoc edicto praetor favet naturali aequitati: qui constituta ex consensu 
facta custodit, quoniam grave est fidem fallere.  
 
With this edict, the praetor promotes natural equity in that he protects a 
constitutum made by agreement on the ground that it is a serious matter 
to go back on one’s word [translation: Watson]. 
 
Yet the second italicised phrase (“that he is debitor by the Law of Nature, who must 
pay by the Law of Nations”) was instead a paraphrase of D.50.17.84.1, which stated: 
“Is natura debet, quem iure gentium dare oportet, cuius fidem secuti sumus 
[Someone owed something by nature if the law of nations in which we trust obliges 
him to give it [translation by Watson]]”. Stair’s use of authority in this last part of the 
passage was therefore confused.  
This confusion reveals Grotius as Stair’s source. Grotius discussed the Edict 
and D.50.17.84.1 together; hence Stair’s muddling the content of the texts.
119
 That 
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 S.10.10/1.10.10. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.7; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.90L-R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.7. 
119
 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.11.1. 
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Stair misunderstood Grotius shows that he did not check the Digest. Another 
indication that Grotius was Stair’s source is that he, like Stair, cited D.50.17.84 in the 
medieval style. He did, however, also include the paragraph number in his citation. 
Stair does not seem to have borrowed the number for the first version.  
In sum, Stair consulted and cited Grotius, but disagreed with his position on 
the need for acceptance in promise. In doing so, he may have been following 
established Scots law.
120
 He borrowed his citations of Molina, Gomezius and 
Connanus from Grotius, checking none of them. He cited Molina and Gomezius in 
slightly different contexts from Grotius, although his use of Connanus was the same 
as that of Grotius. Stair also borrowed from Grotius his citations of Roman law. 
Again, as Stair seems to have confused D.50.17.84.1 with the Edict, it is likely that 
he borrowed these citations without checking them. All six citations were borrowed 
from only two paragraphs of Grotius. Those of Molina and Gomezius were borrowed 
from De jure belli 2.11.14, the passage cited by Stair, and those of Connanus and 
Roman law from 2.11.1. It will be shown that Stair also used Gudelinus and 
Corvinus for these passages for the first version. When preparing the third version, 
Stair removed the citation of Gomezius. It is unclear as to why he did this. Certainly 
he did not check Molina, Connanus or the texts of Roman law at that time, which 
suggests that he did not remove the citation of Gomezius because he found the error.  
 
4.1.6.2 Stair’s citation of Grotius, Pliny the Elder, C.4.44.8, Seneca and 
Saint Ambrose 
 
At S.10.14/1.10.14, Stair discussed whether there had to be equality between 
contracting parties. This passage cited many authorities: Pliny the Elder, Grotius, the 
Codex, Seneca and Ambrose. Mackenzie Stuart described this as “a passage taken 
almost in its entirety, including the literary embellishments, and with scant 
acknowledgement, from Grotius, De Jure Belli, II.12.14”.
121
 Indeed, all Stair’s 
citations here were borrowed from Grotius. 
                                                 
120
 On which, MacQueen & Sellar: “Scots law: ius quaesitum tertio, promise and irrevocability”, 357-
360; MacQueen: “Third party rights in contract: JQT”, 221-223; Sellar: “Promise”, 260-266. 
121
 Mackenzie Stuart: “Contract and quasi contract”, 258. 
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Stair cited Pliny the Elder twice in the Institutions.
122
 Here he cited and quoted 
from Pliny’s Natural History: “Plin.lib.9.cap.55 Margaritis pretium luxuria fecit”. 
This citation (in the first and second printed editions) was incorrect. The sample 
manuscripts from both stems (and thus, presumably, the first and second versions) 
cited 9.35, which is correct.
123
 This change was likely a printing error. Grotius also 
cited 9.35 and quoted the same phrase of Pliny: “Margaritis, inquit Plinius [ix, 35], 
pretia luxuria fecit.”
124
 Both Stair and Grotius used the citation within the context of 
assessing the value of property, and both paraphrased a longer sentence in Pliny:  
 
Conchylia & purpuras omnis hora atterit, quibus eadem mater luxuria 




whereas every hour of use wears away robes of scarlet and purple, which 





While this paraphrasing of Pliny is understandable, that both Grotius and Stair do so 
in the same way indicates, first, that Grotius was Stair’s source and, secondly, that 
Stair did not check this text. There is nothing in Stair that would suggest otherwise; 
none of his other examples of things which are valued disproportionately to their 
usefulness (“Portraits, Tulips, or other Flowers”)
127
 were in Pliny. Rather, these items 
reflected seventeenth-century Dutch concerns.
128
 These examples thus support the 
suggestion that Stair was influenced by Dutch sources here. However, Grotius does 
not give these examples. This might indicate that Stair also consulted another Dutch 
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 Also S.18.2/2.8.2. 
123
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.15; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.94L. 1666 stem: 
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126
 H. Rackham (trans): Pliny: Natural History with an English translation in ten volumes volume 3 




 On which, e.g. S. Schama: The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in 
the Golden Age (New York, 1988), 350-359. 
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source for this passage in addition to Grotius, although he may have furnished these 
examples himself.   
Stair explained that Roman law “did not notice every inequality, but that 
which was enorm, above the half of the just value”,
129
 but intimated that Scots law 
did not follow this, citing Farie v Inglis 1669.
130
 That this case appears in Stair’s 
Decisions establishes that Stair was the judge.
131
 The pursuer, who had contracted as 
a minor and ratified the contract after minority, sought reduction inter alia on the 
grounds of inequality of value. The defender successfully responded that “our Law 
and Custom acknowledges not that Ground of the Civil Law, of annulling Bargains, 
made without Cheat or Fraud on the inequality of the Price”.
132
 After citing this case, 
Stair explained that “Grotius, de jure belli, l.2.cap.12. is for the affirmative on this 
ground, chiefly that the purpose of the Contracters is to give one thing for an other of 
equal value, without purpose to gift on either hand”.
133
 In the first, second and third 
versions, Stair cited De jure belli 2.12. At De jure belli 2.12.8, Grotius said that if 
there was not equality then he who was disadvantaged had an action on the 
inequality. Grotius here expressed Aristotelian philosophy, although Aristotle was 
not cited.
134
 Stair disagreed with Grotius, saying that value was subjective and that it 
was “the first rule in such Contracts, when both parties being free, do agree on such a 
rate, there is here no Donation, but a particular Estimation, wherewith either ought to 
rest satisfied”.  
Stair in the fourth version cited De jure belli 2.12.11. This paragraph was on 
equality in contracts of exchange, and was thus less broadly applicable than 
2.12.8.
135
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 S.10.14/1.10.14.  
130




 June 1669. It is the earlier case which 






 “is for the affirmative” did not appear in the manuscripts. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 
10.16; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.94L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.16. 
134
 Gordley examined the Aristotelian basis of the development of the concept of liability in contract 
and delict, J. Gordley: “Contract and delict: toward a unified law of obligations” (1996-1997) 1(3) 
Edin.L.R. 345-360, esp. 347-348. 
135
 Below, 4.3. 
136
 That of Rebuffus was also amended, but was actually less accurate in the fourth version. 
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Stair then explained that precedents in transactions began to establish an 
objective value,  
 
and therefore, it is safest to conclude with the Law, l. si voluntate, C. de 
resin. vend. which saith, this is the substance of buying and selling, that 
the buyer having a purpose to buy cheap, and the seller to sell dear, that 
they come to this Contract, and after many debates, the seller by little and 
little diminishing what he sought, and the buyer adding to what he 




Stair’s citation of C.4.44.8 gave only the opening words of the text and not its 
paragraph number. This citation also appeared in the manuscripts, although ‘si’ was 
rendered ‘ff’. This mistake was probably made by the copyists, but was 
understandable given the style of lettering at the time. It probably indicates that 
Stair’s writing here was particularly difficult to read. Two points establish Grotius as 
Stair’s source. First, Stair’s citation was identical to Grotius’: “L. Si voluntate, C. de 
rescind. vend.”
138
 Grotius quoted the same part of C.4.44.8 as Stair, who seems to 
have simply translated and incorporated this quotation into the Institutions. The rest 
of the legislation, which was not mentioned by Grotius, likewise did not feature in 
Stair.  
Stair then cited Seneca: “Seneca says, l.6. de beneficiis, cap. 15. It is no matter 
what the rate be, seing [sic] it is agreed between the buyer and the seller, for he that 
buyes well, owes nothing to the seller”.
139
 Grotius also cited De beneficiis 6.15, and 




pretium autem cuiusque rei pro tempore est. Cum bene ista laudaveris: 




the price of everything varies with circumstances; though you have well 
praised your wares, they are worth only the highest price at which they 
can be sold; [translation: Basore
142
]  
                                                 
137
 S.10.14/1.10.14.  
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.12.26. 
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 S.10.14/1.10.14. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.16; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.94R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.16. 
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.12.14. 
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 L.A. Seneca: De beneficiis in Opera quae exstant omnia, variorum notis illustrata volume 1 
(Amsterdam, 1619), 6.15, 143. 
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Stair could have drawn his discussion of Seneca from Grotius. Yet Stair also said that 
if the price was lower than the value, the seller had no recourse against the buyer. 
This point was not related by Grotius here but was made by Seneca in the sentence 
immediately following that quoted by Grotius: “praeterea nihil venditori debet, qui 
bene emit [he who buys well owes nothing to the seller]”. That Stair’s sentence is a 
direct translation of Seneca suggests he consulted De beneficiis.  
If Stair did check Seneca, this represents a departure from his usual practice 
when writing the first version. He may have checked Seneca but not the other 
authorities because Grotius said that “Seneca multis exemplis ostendit [Seneca has 
made this plain by many examples [translation: Kelsey]]”.
143
 Stair probably had easy 
access to a copy of Seneca, else he would not have checked the text. Yet this was 
Stair’s only citation of Seneca in this version, so his checking De beneficiis did not 
result in his further use of it. 
Finally, Stair cited Ambrose when discussing defects in goods sold: “according 
to the Sentence of Ambrose, in Contracts, saith he, even the defects of the things 
which are sold, ought to be laid open, and unless the seller intimate the same, there 
is competent to the buyer an action of Fraud”.
144
 Grotius also cited and quoted from 
this same passage of Ambrose. Grotius’ citation, “Offic. ii. c. 10”, was wrong.
145
 
Kelsey noted in his translation of De jure belli that the citation should have read to 
3.10. Here Ambrose stated:  
 
Non solum itaque in contractibus (in quibus etiam vitia eorum quae 
veneunt, prodi iubentur, ac nisi intimaverit venditor, quamvis in ius 
emptoris transcripserit, doli actione vacuantur) sed etiam generaliter in 




Fraud, then, ought to be wanting not only in contracts, in which the 
defects of those things which are for sale are ordered to be recorded 
(which contracts, unless the vendor has mentioned the defects, are 
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 J.W. Basore (trans): Seneca: Moral Essays volume 3 (Loeb Classical Library series, Cambridge 
MA, 1935), 393-395. 
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.12.14. 
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 S.10.14/1.10.14. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.16; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.95L. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.16. 
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.12.9. 
146
 Ambrose: Opera omnia quae exstant, ex editione Romana volume 4 (Cologne, 1616), 3.10, 37.  
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rendered void by an action for fraud, although he has conveyed them 





Grotius paraphrased the portion in parenthesis; Stair’s own paraphrase gave only that 
same section and was closer to Grotius than to the actual text. It is therefore likely 
that Grotius was Stair’s source. Unfortunately, Stair did not provide a citation of 
Ambrose, and thus it cannot be known whether Stair was aware of the error in 
Grotius’ citation.  
In sum, Stair consulted and borrowed from De jure belli 2.12, from 
paragraphs nine to twenty-six. He borrowed citations of Pliny the Elder, Seneca, 
Ambrose, and C.4.44.8. It seems he only checked the citation of Seneca. This did not 
cause him to use Seneca elsewhere. Stair made no changes to these citations for the 
third version. Yet, when preparing the fourth version, he made his citation of Grotius 
more specific by referring to the eleventh subparagraph of De jure belli 2.12.
148
 He 
also added a citation of D.21.1.1.6 but, as this was not cited by Grotius, it could not 
have been borrowed from him. 
 
4.1.7  “Obligations Conventional/Depositum” 
 
Stair discussed pledge in “Obligations Conventional/Depositum”. He gave a Greek 
term in his discussion of pledge: “if the profite of the Pledge be alloted for the profite 
of the Debt, which is called αντιχρησις, it is a mixt Contract, having in it a Mandat, 
and the exchange of the Usufruct, or use of the Pledge for the use of the Debt.”
149
 
Richter gave this as one of the Greek terms which were “possibly taken from 
Grotius”.
150
 Indeed, Grotius’ De jure belli 2.12.20 read: “Atque ideo cν ἀντιχρήσς 
usus pecuniae cum fructibus praedii compensatur [And so ‘in reciprocal usage’ the 
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 P. Schaff: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers series 2, volume 10: Ambrose: Select Works and 
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148
 Below, 4.3. 
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use of money is compensated for by the fruits of an estate].”
151
 It is clear that this 
term was borrowed from this passage; this title of Grotius was used extensively by 
Stair for “Obligations Conventional”.  
 
4.1.8 Passages in “Obligations Conventional/Accessory 
Obligations” in the manuscripts only 
 
In the first and second versions, Stair cited Grotius De jure belli 2.13 and 
Deuteronomy 17 in his discussion of promissory oaths; the passage concerned the 
Israelites’ commanded destruction of other nations.
152
 The Gibeonites had falsely 
claimed to be from distant lands and the two nations had thereby sworn an oath of 




Grotius also discussed oaths procured by fraud. He said that if someone swore 
an oath after being misled (who would not have sworn it had he known the truth) 
then the oath was not binding. If, however, he would have sworn the oath anyway, he 
would still be bound.
154
 Grotius said the Israelites’ oath could have been sworn 
irrespective of the Gibeonites’ fraud. He argued that the people of Jordan could have 
surrendered because God’s command did not preclude sparing certain people (they 
spared Raban and her family for her assistance).
155
  
Stair’s citation of Grotius was therefore correct and relevant, but again he 
disagreed with Grotius:  
 
they being Hivites were amongst the nations which the people of Israel 
were commanded utterly to destroy Deut. 17. and could not spare them 
on their submission, as Grotius supposes De jure belli l.2. cap.13. for it is 
clear from that chapter that the sparing of those who willingly submitted, 
vers. 10 and 11. It is only of cities far off and not of these nations but 
these without exception are to be utterly destroyed.
156
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 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.12.20. 
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Stair cited Deuteronomy 17.10-11, which said that God’s commandments had to be 
followed exactly and his instructions not deviated from. In the case of Joshua, the 
instructions were clear: “But thou shalt utterly destroy them…as the LORD they God 
hath commanded thee”.
157
 Grotius, however, cited Deuteronomy 20.10: “When thou 
comest nigh a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it”. It is clear that 
Stair, although he consulted Grotius, did not find his argument compelling, and 
independently selected texts to support his own reading of the story of Joshua. Stair 
extensively revised this passage for the third version;
158
 the citations of Grotius and 
Deuteronomy did not appear in the printed editions. 
Stair also cited Connanus in his discussion of the effects of oaths in the first 
and second versions, but there was no comparable passage in the printed editions. He 
for the second time cited Connanus regarding his opinion that promises were not 
binding: “some have thought that promises and pactions are only obligatory by 
reason of the weight of the matter as Connanus and yet on any frivolous pretence 
may shift or retract but cannot do so after an oath is interposed.”
159
 Stair cited 
Connanus in this context earlier in “Obligations Conventional”, a citation borrowed 
from De jure belli 2.11.1.
160
 It seems very probable that Stair also borrowed this 
citation of Connanus from that same paragraph of Grotius. There Grotius refuted 
Connanus in detail, although he did not give a citation beyond ““Lib. 1, c. VI: Lib. 
V, c. 1.” which Stair borrowed for that earlier passage.
161
 While discussing 
Connanus, Grotius referred specifically to stipulations “quarum ea est efficacia, ut 
quod per se honestum est id efficere possint etiam necessarium [which have the 
effect of rendering obligatory that which in itself is only honourable [translation: 
Kelsey]].”
162
 This comment probably related to Connanus’ commentary 5.1.7: 
 
Valde enim dissentio ab iis, quę hactenus uno ore tradiderunt, quod olim 
iuregen. passim obligarentur homines quibuslibet promissis, etiam 
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 Spelling has been modernised as a result of variations between manuscripts. 1662 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.78; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.124L-R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.78. 
160
 S.10.10/1.10.10. Above, 4.1.6.1. 
161
 Above, 4.1.6.1. 
162
 Grotius: De jure belli, 2.11.1. 
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leviter & nulla de causa effutitis, infinitae lites & controversiae 
orirentur: idcirco iure civili constitutum fuisse, ut ne de huiusmodi 





Indeed, I vigorously dissent from those people who until now have 
relayed that they are related by speech because formerly, by the law of 
nations, men were bound by whatever they promised, even if made 
lightly and without cause, and so arose unlimited quarrels and debates. 
Therefore it was constituted by the civil law that none of this sort of 
agreement could be litigated without the intervention of a stipulation of 
words. 
 
Grotius’ description may have inspired Stair’s comment here. Alternatively, Stair 
may simply have remembered Grotius’ examination of Connanus and inserted 
Connanus’ name. In either case, it seems likely that Grotius was ultimately Stair’s 
source for this citation, and unlikely that Stair consulted Connanus directly. 
 
4.2 STAIR’S USE OF GROTIUS FOR THE THIRD VERSION 
 
There is no evidence that Stair borrowed from Grotius for the titles on obligations 
when preparing the third version. However, a citation of Grotius was added to Stair’s 
titles on property law. Although outwith the titles on obligations, this citation reveals 
much about Stair’s method, and probably why he returned to Grotius when preparing 
the third version. It will therefore be briefly discussed here.  
Stair added citations of Grotius and Mynsinger to “Rights Real” for the third 
version as authority for the Roman rules of accession of writing and painting being in 
desuetude.
164
 This was the first citation of Grotius which did not refer to a specific 
treatise, or any part of a treatise. These rules were discussed at De jure belli 2.8.21, 
but there was no mention there of the rule being in desuetude, and Mynsinger was 
not cited by Grotius. Gordon correctly suggested “the reference in Stair to Grotius, 
coupled with Mynsinger, comes from Vinnius.”
165
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 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257. 
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Stair consulted Vinnius when preparing the third version.
166
 He borrowed 
Vinnius’ citation of Grotius: “Grotius lib.2. manuduct. c.8.”
167
 Vinnius’ citation was 
of the Inleydinge, but Stair seems to have assumed that the reference was to De jure 
belli. Stair did not consult the Inleydinge;
168
 he checked Vinnius’ citation against De 
jure belli 2.8, probably because he had easy access to it. Coincidentally, both the 
Inleydinge and De jure belli discussed these rules at 2.8 (paragraphs three and 
twenty-one respectively). Having found the rule at 2.8, Stair did not realise his error. 
That Stair consulted De jure belli 2.8.21 is confirmed by his second citation of 
Grotius and one of Connanus, added to his discussion of specification in the third 
version.
169
 After Stair checked Vinnius’ citation of Grotius’ De jure belli 2.8, he 
must have read Grotius’ full three-paragraph discussion of Connanus’ view of 
specificatio and accessio, De jure belli 2.8.19-21. Stair’s citation here, although it did 
not refer to a specific paragraph, was clearly of De jure belli 2.8.19. From this 
paragraph he borrowed the citation of Connanus. Both Stair and Grotius referred to 
Connanus’ awarding the property according to its value. Stair’s sentence was 
structured in exactly the same way as that of Grotius. Indeed, Stair effectively 
translated Grotius’ Latin with no significant alteration. The difference between the 
two was that Grotius specified “Lib. iii. 6” whereas Stair gave only Connanus’ name. 
Grotius’ citation was accurate; Connanus’ commentary 3.6.6 stated that a picture 
whose value surpassed the board would be the principal, but that  
 





it could hardly be credible that a board worth more would accede to a 
trivial and poor picture. 
 
This was Stair’s second and final citation of Connanus in the third version. The first 
was also borrowed from Grotius, as was the additional citation of Connanus in the 
manuscripts.
171
 This means that all Stair’s citations of Connanus were borrowed from 
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 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.2.1.33.  
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 Connanus: Commentaria iuris civilis libri decem, 207. 
171
 Above, 4.1.6.1, 4.1.8. 
 - 166 - 
Grotius. There is nothing in the text which suggests that Stair consulted Connanus 
directly here. Rather, it would appear that Stair, again, used Grotius’ summary of 
him. 
No further evidence of Stair’s use of Grotius for the third version has so far 
been found. This could be because Stair only consulted De jure belli 2.8.19-21 at that 
time, his attention being drawn to it by Vinnius. 
 
4.3 STAIR’S USE OF GROTIUS FOR THE FOURTH VERSION 
 
Stair added a reference to paragraph eleven to his citation of De jure belli 2.12 in his 
discussion of equality in contracts.
172
 This paragraph of Grotius was on the need for 
equality in contracts of exchange. There were, however, more generally-applicable 
passages, such as 2.12.8. Yet, as paragraph eleven was not cited in any of the 
manuscripts or in the first printed edition, Stair must have added this for the fourth 
version. Presumably, Stair checked Grotius for this citation, rather than finding it in a 
different source.  
It seems probable that Stair returned to Grotius when preparing the fourth 
version to correct a printing error in Stair’s quotation of Grotius in “Of Liberty”. He 
may have decided to check his other references to Grotius at the same time.  
 
4.4  CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter has shown that Stair consulted Grotius when writing the first version, 
and for the third and fourth versions. De jure belli was an important source for the 
first version. Most of the titles on obligations contained material borrowed from 
Grotius; Stair cited him six times in these titles in the first and second versions (five 
in the third and fourth). This suggests that Stair wrote the first version with Grotius 
in front of him. However, Grotius was an important source only for the first version. 
That no material seems to have been borrowed for the second version suggests that 
Stair did not consult Grotius at that time. For the third version, Stair returned to 
Grotius only after being led to him by Vinnius. Having Grotius before him again, 
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Stair read the three-paragraph discussion cited by Vinnius, cited Grotius twice, and 
borrowed a citation of Connanus from this discussion. Yet this did not encourage 
him to use Grotius as a principal source again, as can be deduced from no other 
material having been borrowed from him. De jure belli was thus only a minor source 
for the third version. Stair returned to Grotius when preparing the fourth version, 
when he made minor amendments to pre-existing quotations and citations
173
 and 
added a citation of Grotius to the new book on actions.
174
 Again, however, this seems 
to have been the full extent of his consultation of De jure belli at that time. While 
Stair used Grotius as an important source of the first version, he did not thereafter 
use him as such. 
 However, Grotius was an important source for the first version. Stair was 
prepared to transplant authority borrowed from the same passage of Grotius into 
different titles of the Institutions: material borrowed from De jure belli 2.10 is found 
in “Restitution” and “Recompence”; De jure belli 2.12 was used for “Of 
Obligations” and “Obligations Conventional”. Stair’s distribution of material 
borrowed from Grotius suggests that, when he was consulting him, he was able to 
think of the relevance of his source to the Institutions as a whole. 
 What material did Stair borrow from Grotius? He borrowed two of his four 
Greek terms in the first version from Grotius: “ελαττον” (with the accompanying 
Latin phrase, “damnum a demendo”) and “αντιχρησις”. This confirms Richter’s 
suggestion that these two Greek terms were “possibly taken from Grotius”.
175
 Stair’s 
use of Grotius is most evident, however, in his borrowing of citations. 
 He borrowed six citations of Roman law for his titles on obligations. Most 
were atypical of Stair’s normal method of citing the Corpus iuris civilis: four were in 
the medieval style, and one was one of only two times that Stair cited the Edict 
independently the Corpus iuris civilis.
176
 Only one of the citations of Roman law 
which Stair borrowed from Grotius was in the early-modern style. None of these six 
citations were checked by Stair for the first version. However, the later addition of 
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 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 369 n.14. 
176
 Another reference to the Edict which did not cite the Corpus iuris civilis was added for the third 
version, S.10.46/1.12.18. This reference appeared in Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.20, but this passage had 
been updated according to the first printed edition. 
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the relevant paragraph numbers (and the reference to a sub-paragraph of D.16.3.31) 
means that D.16.3.31 and D.13.6.3 must have been checked for third and fourth 
versions respectively.  
Three of Stair’s citations of continental jurists in the printed editions, and 
another two found only in the manuscripts, were borrowed from Grotius. This 
supports Gordon’s argument that not all the jurists or treatises cited in the Institutions 
were directly consulted by Stair.
177
 Both of Stair’s citations of Connanus in the 
manuscripts, as well as that added for the third version, were borrowed from Grotius. 
Grotius was thus the source for all Stair’s citations and discussions of Connanus; 
none appear to have been checked. Stair gave two of these citations in relation to 
Connanus’ denial of any moral obligation to keep a promise; on both occasions Stair 
expressly disagreed with Connanus, without having checked the text. This chapter 
has also confirmed Richter’s suggestion that Stair borrowed his citation of Molina 
from Grotius. Stair did not check this citation; his consequent misunderstanding of 
the content of the text and the context of its citation in Grotius meant that he used it 
inappropriately. Richter has noted that the debate between Lords Rodger and 
Coulsfield concerning Stair’s reasoning for citing Molina had an incorrect 
premise.
178
 This also has wider implications. It has been shown that Stair could not 
even have been indirectly influenced by Molina. This undermines many of the 
suggestions as to Stair’s motivation for accepting unilateral promise.
179
 Stair also 
borrowed his citation of Gomezius (which appeared only in the manuscripts) from 
Grotius. Again, he did so without checking the text. This means that both of Stair’s 
citations of second scholastics were borrowed from Grotius. This suggests that Stair 
could have been influenced by this movement only indirectly through Grotius, if at 
all. 
The significant majority of Stair’s citations of writers of classical antiquity 
were borrowed from Grotius. This includes: all his citations of Aristotle, both his 
citations of Cicero in the titles on obligations, as well as citations of Pliny the Elder, 
Xenophon, Plato and Seneca. Examination of the relevant passages shows that 
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 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 256. 
178
 Richter: “Molina, Grotius, Stair and the JQT”, 222. 
179
 See MacQueen & Sellar: “Scots law: ius quaesitum tertio, promise and irrevocability”, 357-360 
esp.359. Above, 4.1.6.1. 
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Gordon was also clearly correct in suggesting that Stair’s citations of Cicero in 
“Common Principles” and “Of Liberty” as well as his citation of Plutarch in “Rights 
Real” were also borrowed from Grotius.
180
 This list of seven leading ancient Greek 
and Roman writers includes a lawyer, four philosophers, a historian, and a natural 
scientist. Stair generally borrowed these citations without checking them. The 
exception was his citation of Seneca, which was borrowed from Grotius but seems to 
have been checked against the text. If this is correct, it is the only citation borrowed 
from Grotius which Stair checked for the first version. Stair may have owned or had 
easy access to a copy of Seneca. Why Stair would have checked the citation of 
Seneca but not those to, for example, Aristotle is puzzling. Perhaps he was 
sufficiently familiar with Aristotle to recognise the philosophies being discussed as 
being correct? This is credible given the importance of Aristotle in the Scottish arts 
curriculum.
181
  Stair may have been less familiar with, but still owned or had easy 
access to a copy of, Seneca’s De beneficiis. This is, however, purely speculative. 
That Stair borrowed such citations at all is interesting, as he studied at least some of 
these writers as a student of the arts at Glasgow.
182
 He therefore used Grotius for 
citations of authority which he would have been able to generate himself. 
The wide range of citations which Stair borrowed from Grotius is not 
surprising, given that Grotius cited many works as authority or for comparative 
reference. Buckle argued that Grotius’ main method for determining natural law was 
a posteriori, that which is based on the common understanding of civilised 
nations.
183
 Grotius’ definition of a posteriori was that which is based on the pan-
European traditional views of “writers of authority”.
184
 Grotius’ historical approach 
to natural law was inherent to his building of a system of rational law.
185
 In doing so, 
Buckle challenged what he sees as the widely-held view that Grotius’ approach was 
                                                 
180
 Stair’s citations of Cicero at S.1.5/1.1.5 and S.2.3/1.2.3 from Grotius: De jure belli 1.2.3; and his 
citation of Plutarch at S.12.6/2.1.5 from Grotius: De jure belli 2.2.13. Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the 
sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 259, 262. 
181
 Above, 1.2.1.2-3. 
182
 Above, 1.2.1.2. 
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 As distinct from a priori, that inherent in the nature of society, Grotius: De jure belli 1.1.12.1. S. 
Buckle: Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford, 1991 rept. 2002), 5. 
184
 Stein: “Theory of law”, 182. 
185
 Buckle: Natural Law and the Theory of Property, 4-9.  
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a-historical.
186
 Grotius’ citation of Roman law, writers of classical antiquity, the 
Bible, and continental jurists was critical to how he established the rules of natural 
law and how he built a coherent, rational system of law. 
Stair selected his sources for specific purposes. When he wrote the first 
version, he too was attempting to make law a “rational discipline”.
187
 Natural law 
was also central to Stair’s treatise. Grotius’ treatise had been printed just over thirty 
years before Stair wrote, and had attracted international praise.
188
 Stair incorporated 
into the Institutions a reflection of Grotius’ own use of authority. Grotius had 
established and elucidated the principles of natural law by drawing on Roman law, 
Canon law, the writings of continental jurists, and writers of classical antiquity. Stair 
followed Grotius in offering this variety of authority, and drew from De jure belli a 
selection to represent and illustrate that natural law, particularly borrowing from him 
citations of writers of classical antiquity. 
However, it is less clear that “In the main he adopted the views of the great 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius”.
189
 On the majority of occasions on which Stair referred 
to Grotius’ view of natural law, he disagreed with him. This was famously the case 
when he rejected Grotius’ requiring promises to be accepted before they were 
binding. Stair believed that no acceptance was necessary; Grotius believed that it 
was. Yet Stair also disagreed with: Grotius’ classification of restoration of property, 
as Stair believed it was under natural law; Grotius’ classification of negotiorum 
gestio, which Stair also classified under natural law; the equitable principles of 
whether value in contract was required, Stair believing that there could be no such 
action given that value was subjective; and Grotius’ interpretation of Deuteronomy 
20 relating to oaths sworn as a result of fraud. In the fourth version, in the new book 
on actions, Stair also disagreed with Grotius on whether it was acceptable to lie to 
one’s enemies, Stair saying it was not.
190
 Stair only agreed with Grotius on three 
occasions: that law should be a rational discipline; that men are free unless they have 
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 The example he gave was P. Foriers and C. Perelman: “Natural law and natural rights” in P.P. 
Weiner (ed): Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas volume 3 (New 
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 Above, 3.2.6. 
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somehow been subjected to slavery or bondage; and that there are three stages of 
childhood. It is important that each of the occasions on which Stair disagreed with 
Grotius was in relation to natural law or equity. With the exception of the general 
point on the liberty of men, Stair never agreed explicitly with Grotius’ interpretation 
of substantive natural law. It is thus possible to conclude that, although Stair 
emulated Grotius’ use of authority to establish natural law, and used him as a source 
for natural law, Stair may have been significantly less influenced by Grotius’ theories 
and interpretation of natural law than is currently assumed.  
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5 
STAIR AND GUDELINUS 
 
Gordon’s comparison of five passages of Stair and Gudelinus showed that: “for [Stair’s] 
Roman law, however, he certainly used Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo.”
1
 Gordon was 
correct: Stair borrowed from Gudelinus twenty citations of Roman law without checking 
them for the first version, although he checked some against the text when preparing 
later versions. He also borrowed six citations of Roman law from Gudelinus for the 
fourth version; these were checked when borrowed. Yet Stair’s use of Gudelinus was 
much more extensive than this. Gudelinus was Stair’s principal source for references to 
contemporary continental legal systems. Seven of Stair’s citations of continental jurists 
were borrowed from Gudelinus; all were used in relation to national law rather than 
general legal principle. Gudelinus was also Stair’s principal source for his references to 
specific legal systems and about legal trends in Europe. 
  
5.1 STAIR’S USE OF GUDELINUS FOR THE FIRST VERSION 
 
5.1.1  “Conjugal Obligations” 
 
Stair explained that a husband had a “power oeconomical”.
2
 This was an authority over 
all domestic matters, which included power over his wife’s person and sole 
administration of “a community of Goods betwixt the Married persons”.
3
 This jus mariti 
Stair defined “as a Term in our Law, [which] doth signifie the right that the Husband 
                                                           
1
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. 
2
 S.4.5/1.4.9. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.29R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.5. The paragraph numbers were printed inaccurately in both copies 
of the first printed edition, and therefore the numbers of the paragraphs used are those identified in the list 
of paragraphs at the start of the title. This was the same as those printed in the text after number thirteen 
(although the number eighteen is missing at the start of that paragraph).  
3
 S.4.5/1.4.9. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.29R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.5. 
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hath in the Wifes Goods”.
4
 He did not state expressly whether this right applied to 
moveable or to all goods in the first and second versions; this was likely an accidental 
omission as this right was never recognised in heritage. Balfour discussed this power in 
only “his wife’s moveabill gudis”.
5
 A case of 1582, for another example, confirmed that 
a gift on non-entry granted by a now-deceased husband could be recovered by his 
widow, who had not consented to the transaction but who was “lawful cessioner and 
assignee of the same”.
6
 That community of goods was limited to moveables in Scotland 
was confirmed by Mackenzie:  
 
From the conjugal Society, arises, the communion of moveable Goods 
betwixt Man and Wife…but he has no further Right to her Heritage, save 
that he has Right to the Rents of it, and to Administrate and Manage it, 




Scots law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries therefore recognised community of 
moveable goods, the administration of which was in the power of the husband, but not 
community of heritage, which was administered but could not be disponed by the 
husband without the consent of the wife. 
Stair clarified his definition of jus mariti for the third version, by adding a phrase 
saying that it was peculiar to moveable property.8 He at that time defined the right as “a 
Legal Assignation to the Wifes moveable Rights, needing no other intimation, but the 
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 S.4.5/1.4.9. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.5; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.29L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.5. 
5
 P.G.B. McNeill (ed): The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, reproduced from the printed 
edition of 1754 volume 1 (Stair Society Series 21, Edinburgh, 1962), 93 “Materis concerning the husband 
and the wife” c.4. 
6
 Pennycook v Cockburn 1582 [M.5764]. 
7
 Mackenzie: Institutions 1.6, 46-47. 
8
 This paragraph was also amended for the second version. The manuscripts of the 1662 stem 
[Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.30R] ended this discussion after explaining that a 
man must provide for his family according to his means (at “quoad potest”). For the second version, Stair 
added  the passage: “hence it is, that the Aliment, or Furnishing of the Wife, is a Debt of her Husbands, 
not only for what is furnished by Merchants and others, hoc nomine, in the Husbands Life, but even her 
Mournings after his Death, if it be proper for her quality to have Mournings, burden the Executors of the 
Husband, and not the Wife” [Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 4.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 4.6 ended at “quoad 
potest”]. This was clearly a description of the case Lady Craigcaffie v Neilson 1664 [M.5921], which Stair 
heard as a judge. Stair did not cite this case in the second version but instead only added a citation of it for 
the third version.  
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Marriage”.
9
 He also added a discussion of Achinleck v Williamson and Gillespie 1667
10
 
which he heard as a judge. This case found that a pre-marital disposition to the bride’s 
son without her future husband’s knowledge was fraudulent.11 Stair’s note on this case 
explained that “the Marriage, and jus Mariti is a legal Assignation”.
12
 Nisbet also 
recorded that the Lords in this case found that the husband had “by his Marriage a 
publick Right Equivalent to an Assignation”.
13
 Presumably, Stair added this phrase and 
citation to the existing discussion to clarify the extent of this right. 
Stair’s discussion of community property was comparative. He distinguished 
Roman law in that it “hath exceedingly varied in this matter from the Natural Law”,
14
 
given that the Roman wife was not in the power of her husband, retained ownership in 
her goods, and had the right to the value of her dowry. He then explained that, like Scots 
law, the contemporary law of Europe had “returned to the natural course”.
15
 He cited: 
Chassanaeus and Duarenus as authority for French law; Wesenbecius and Covarruvias 
for “the Customs of the Germans, Spaniards, and most part of the Nations of Europe”
16
; 
and Gudelinus for the Netherlands. These were Stair’s only citations of Chassanaeus and 
Covarruvias, and one of his two citations of both Duarenus and of Wesenbecius. All 
these citations and comparative references were present in the first and second 
versions.17 




 S.4.6/1.4.10. M.6033. 
11
 S.Dec.1.496, as “John Auchinleck contra Mary Williamson and Patrick Gillespy, December 18. 1667.” 
J. Nisbet of Dirleton: The Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, in most cases of importance, 
debated, and brought before them; from December 1665, to June 1677  (Edinburgh, 1698), 50, as 
“Gilespie contra Auchinleck”, 18
th




 Nisbet of Dirleton: Decisions, 51. 
14
 S.4.7/1.4.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.7; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.30R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.7. 
15
 S.4.8/1.4.12. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.8; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.30R. 1666 stem: 




 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 4.8 omitted the reference to French law and the citation of Wesenbecius; 
Adv.MS.25.1.10, 4.8 and Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.30R-31L read as the third version, although the spelling of 
Covarruvias varied. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 4.7 and Adv.MS.25.1.7, 4.8 omitted the reference to 
French law and citation of Wesenbecius, and called Covarruvias “Lobar”; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 4.8 called 
Wesenbecius “Messen” and cited cap.17 rather than cap.7 of Covarruvias. That these errors did not appear 
consistently in the manuscripts from either stem merits further research into the nature of the manuscripts 
[Ford: Law and Opinion, 63-73].  
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Stair was correct: community property in European law is thought to have 
originated in Germanic customary law. In “the folk-laws” the wife retained ownership in 
some property after marriage, but the husband had the right to possession.18 From this, 
certain German legal systems developed community of acquests (profits and property 
acquired during the marriage).
19
 This was not as extensive as community of goods (all 
moveable property). Community of acquests was received in various European 
countries, including northern France by the twelfth century
20
 and Friesland in the 
Netherlands by the eleventh century.21 Community of all moveable goods later became 
prevalent in much of Germany.
22
 By the end of the fourteenth century, community of 
goods was recognised in Groningen.23 By the later Middle Ages community of goods 
was recognised in much of northern Europe but most of Southern Europe adopted the 
Roman notion of separate patrimonies.
24
 Howell noted that there was a varying degree 
of “hybridity”25 between these two regimes and that “marital property law was unstable 
everywhere during the Middle Ages, fluctuating over time, according to the social place 
of the people involved, and with respect to geography.”26  
Community of goods survived in various early-modern systems, but was often 
customary and varied by region. Lobinger explained that this was true of the original 
seven states of the Dutch Republic, which had diverse rules of community property until 
they were harmonised by the Dutch Civil Code in the nineteenth century.
27
 Howe 
showed that this was also the case in France, which had some customary laws (e.g. Paris, 
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 R. Huebner: A History of Germanic Private Law (translation of the second (1913) edition by F.S. 
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Companion to the Medieval World (Blackwell Companions to European History series, Chichester, 2009) 
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 Howell: “Marriage in medieval Latin Christendom”, 134. 
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 Howell: “Marriage in medieval Latin Christendom”, 134. 
27
 C.S. Lobingier: “The marital community: its origin and diffusion: A problem of comparative law” 
(1928) 14(4) American Bar Association Journal 211-218, 213. 
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Orléans, Brittany, and Anjou) which implied community property and others (e.g. 
Normandy) which expressly prohibited community property.
28
 In Spain, community of 
goods was mentioned in Fuero Real (1255), and the later Leyes de Toro (1505) and 
Neuva Recopilación (1567).
29
 This accords with what Stair said, namely that community 
of goods was recognised to some extent in the Netherlands, France, Spain and Germany. 
Stair borrowed his references to these European legal systems and his citations of 
Chassanaeus, Duarenus, Wesenbecius and Covarruvias from Gudelinus. Stair’s citation 
of Gudelinus was incomplete; in neither of the printed editions did Stair give a book or 
title of De jure novissimo. In the first and second versions, Stair referred to “cap 7”.
30
 
Gordon suggested that the relevant title was De jure novissimo 1.7: “De potestate 
maritals [sic: maritalis] & societate conjugali [of the power of the husband and 
conjugal society].”
31
 He correctly argued that this passage of Gudelinus was a source of 
borrowing for Stair, and that “The derivation seems clear.”32 
Three points indicate this. First, both jurists cited exactly the same passages of 
these four jurists: the fourth rubric of Chassanaeus’ Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae; 
Duarenus’ title “de nuptiis” in his Digestorum methodica enarratio; Wesenbecius’ title 
“De ritu nuptiarum” in his Paratitla; and Covarruvias’ Decretalium epitome 2.7. 
Secondly, both jurists referred to German and Spanish law. Finally, Stair’s reference to 
the “most part of the Nations of Europe”
33
 was nearly a direct translation of Gudelinus’ 
phrase “plerosque omnes Europae populos [all other peoples of Europe]”.34  
Gudelinus explained that the husband’s power over his wife was “veluti patrem 
atque tutorem [as if the father and even the tutor]”.
35
 He also discussed community of 
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 W.W. Howe: “The community of acquests and gains” (1903) 12(4) Yale Law Journal 216-225, 217; S 
S. Desan: “Making and breaking marriage: an overview of old regime marriage as a social practice” in S. 
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35
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goods:  
 
…ut omnis pecuniae omnisque supellectilis, omnium denique mobilium, nec 
non totius aeris alieni sit inter eos communio: & sic quae praedia constante 
matrimonio emuntur vel aliter comparantur, utrique communiter 
acquirantur:  
 
That all money and furnishings and finally all moveables, and also all other 
money, exists communally between them; and so property bought during the 




Gudelinus then discussed the division of the community property on the death of the 
husband between the widow and the deceased’s heir, and the difficulties which might 
have arisen if the husband had outstanding debts or obligations. He then cited Duarenus 
and Chassanaeus as authority for this wider proposition of the recognition of community 
of moveable goods in early-modern law.  
Stair cited Gudelinus specifically in relation to the Netherlands. Yet Gudelinus 
discussed the law generally, although he did note that the husband’s potestas over his 
wife was found in nearly all municipal laws.
37
 Stair extrapolated his authority for Dutch 
law from Gudelinus as he was from the Spanish Netherlands. He probably did the same 
when he gave Chassanaeus and Duarenus as authority for French law. Gudelinus did not 
use these citations in relation to French law, but did state on the previous page:  
 
Certe apud Belgas, caeterosque Gallos arctior semper fuit tum maritalis 




Certainly with the Belgians and the rest of the Northern French there has 
always been both marital power and a society of goods between the spouses.  
 
Stair likely extrapolated that these rules existed in French law from this earlier 
discussion and, as will be shown, from the title of Chassanaeus’ treatise and from 
Duarenus being French. 
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 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.7, 12. 
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 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.7, 12. 
38
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.7, 11. 
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Chassanaeus’ Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae was arranged into thirteen 
rubrics. Stair and Gudelinus cited the fourth, “Des droicts & appartenances à gens 
mariez, & de la communion d’iceux [Of rights and belongings of married persons and 
conjugal society]”.
39
 The first custom explained that a wife needed her husband’s 
permission to contract, appear in court, or bequeath or dispose of her property;
40
 in his 
commentary, Chassanaeus explained that a wife transferred into the potestas of her 
husband on marriage.
41
 The second custom stated:  
 
Femme mariee au Duché de Bourgonge selon la generale coustume dudict 
[sic] Duche, est participante avec sondict mari pour la moytié de tous 
meubles, & acquestz [sic] faicts constant mariage de sondict mari, & 
d’icelle  
 
A woman married in the Duchy of Burgundy by the general customs of the 
Duchy participates with her husband for half of all furniture and acquisitions 
made by virtue of their marriage.42 
 
Chassanaeus also discussed conjugal society in other regions. He explained that in 
Bourges:  
 
maritus & uxor sunt communes in bonis mobilibus & acquestibus factis 
constante eorum matrimonio  
 





He then confirmed that this community of property was recognised in Orléans, Niverne 
and “ferè quasi in tota Gallia [almost as if in all France]”.44 Chassanaeus was therefore 
relevant authority for Stair’s and Gudelinus’ discussions of community property. There 
is no evidence that Stair consulted Chassanaeus directly; he could easily have 
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 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, 491.  
40
 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, Custom 1, 499. 
41
 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, Custom 1, 502, paragraph 19.  
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 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, Custom 2, 520. 
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 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, Custom 2, 521. 
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 Chassanaeus: Consuetudines ducatus Burgundiae Rubric 4, Custom 2, 521-522. 
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extrapolated that Chassanaeus’ discussion was “in relation to the Custome of France”
45
 
from the treatise being on the customs of Burgundy.  
The citation of Duarenus was also relevant.46 Duarenus explained that in French 
law:  
 
Nam usu, moribusque receptum est in Gallia, ut viri potestati omnino 





For through use and custom, it is received in France that she is wholly 
subjected to the husband’s power, nor can she make any transaction without 
the consent and authority of her spouse.  
 
Duarenus confirmed that “moribus comparatum est ferè in Gallia, ut mobilia inter 
coniuges communicentur [by custom it is provided generally in France, that moveables 
are shared between the spouses]”.48 Stair cited Duarenus as authority for French law 
even though Gudelinus did not. It cannot be determined whether Stair consulted this text 
and was able to relate Duarenus’ discussion of specifically French law, or whether he 
simply extrapolated that Duarenus discussed French law because he was French. The 
latter is more probable given that he likely did the same with Chassanaeus. 
Gudelinus then said that conjugal society was also found in German and Spanish 
law:  
 
Simile jus, tum potestatis maritalis, tum societatis conjugalis, & apud 
Saxones seu Germanos existit, nec non apud Hispanos, & plerosque omnes 
Europae populos 
 
Similarly a right, both marital power and conjugal society, exists with the 
Saxons or Germans, and among the Spanish and all other peoples of 




 Edition consulted: F. Duarenus: Pandectarum sive Digestorum methodica enarratio in Duarenus: 
Omnia quae quidem hactenus edita fuerunt opera … omnia nunc demum unico comprehensa volumine. 
Editio, ut postrema, ita & caeteris umquam antehac alibi egressis, compluribus in locis, multo tersior ac 
emendatior (Frankfurt, 1592). 
47
 Duarenus: Pandectarum sive Digestorum, 244. 
48
 Duarenus: Pandectarum sive Digestorum, 244. 
 
 





He then cited Wesenbecius, who taught in Germany, and Covarruvias, a Spanish jurist, 
as authority. Although he just gave both citations together, and did not associate each 
jurist with a particular system, the implication would be that Wesenbecius was the 
authority for German law and Covarruvias for Spanish law. Stair also cited these two 
jurists together “[i]n reference to the Customs of the Germans, Spaniards, and most part 
of the Nations of Europe”.
50
  
It was Wesenbecius’ title “De ritu nuptiarum”, title 23.2 of his Paratitla, which 
was cited by Stair and Gudelinus. Wesenbecius explained that by divine law, Canon law, 
customary law, and Saxon law: “in eius est quasi potestate & cura [the wife is as if in 
the husband’s power and care]”.
51
 He then stated that the husband acquired all “fructus 
dotales, & quicquid constante matrimonio acquiritur [dotal fruits and whatever is 
acquired during the course of the marriage]”.52 He explained that the husband received 
these profits “pro oneribus coniugii quae marito incumbunt [for the burdens of marriage 
which rest on the husband]”.
53
 He also declared that the husband received “singulare 
dominium in donatione propter nuptias … & uniuersalem hypothecam in omnibus bonis 
[sole ownership in gifts on account of the marriage, and universal hypothec over all 
goods]”.54 He also indicated that Saxon law allowed full society of all goods between the 
spouses. This citation of Wesenbecius in Gudelinus and Stair was therefore correct and 
relevant. 
Gudelinus and Stair also cited Covarruvias’ Decretalium epitome. In the chapter 
cited, Covarruvias explained that neither Canon nor Imperial law recognised conjugal 
society, but that French and Portuguese law did. He said that, in Spain, Royal laws 
“bonis societatem quandam inter virum & uxorem constituerunt [establish certain 
                                                           
49




 Wesenbecius: Pandectas iuris civilis 23.2.6. 
52
 Wesenbecius: Pandectas iuris civilis 23.2.6. 
53
 Wesenbecius: Pandectas iuris civilis 23.2.6. 
54
 Wesenbecius: Pandectas iuris civilis 23.2.6. 
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society in moveables between husband and wife]”.
55
 Gudelinus’ use of Covarruvias was 
therefore correct. Stair borrowed this citation of Covarruvias (with those of Duarenus, 
Chassanaeus and Wesenbecius) from Gudelinus. It is unlikely that he checked 
Covarruvias; there is nothing else in the Institutions to indicate that Stair consulted him, 
and Stair did not check the other citations which he borrowed from Gudelinus. 
This comparison between Stair and Gudelinus confirms Gordon’s suggestion that 
De jure novissimo was Stair’s source for these four citations. Stair borrowed them for 
the first version, probably without checking them. He extrapolated his authority for 
Dutch law from Gudelinus as he was from the Spanish Netherlands. He did the same for 
Duarenus and Chassanaeus, whom he used as authority for French law, from a previous 
discussion of Gudelinus, from the title of Chassanaeus’ treatise, and from Duarenus 
being French. This means that Stair must have had knowledge of Duarenus as a French 
jurist, even if he did not consult him. 
 
5.1.2  “Parents and Children” 
 
5.1.2.1 Stair’s citation of Gudelinus  
 
Stair discussed the parental power of the Roman paterfamilias, and the son’s peculium.
56
 
He stated that seventeenth-century law departed from Roman law in this regard, and 
instead followed natural law in requiring parents to aliment their children, even if “they 
expell them from their Families”.
57
 He cited Gudelinus for this rule in France and the 
                                                           
55
 Covarruvias: In librum quartum Decretalium epitome (Salamanca, 1556), 2.7.1.5. In later editions [e.g. 
in Covarruvias: Covarruvias: Opera omnia. Iam post varias editiones correctiora, & cum veteribus ac 
melioris notae exemplaribus de novo collata, & ab innumeris mendis seriò repurgata. Cum auctoris 
Tractatu in tit. de frigidis & maleficiatis, septem quaestionibus distincto, quibus an matrimonium cum hoc 
impedimento constare possit, accuratè explicatur. Accesserunt de novo Iohannis Vffelii ... in variarum 
resolutionum libros, notae vberiores. Cum duplici indice, capitum & rerum locupletissimo, suis numeris 
restituto (Geneva, 1679)], 2.7.1.5 is divided into two paragraphs. Covarruvias’ remarks about Canon and 
Imperial law were still in 2.7.1.5, but those on Spanish, French and Portuguese law were in 2.7.1.6. 
56
 S.5.11/1.5.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R-43R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10. 
57
 S.5.12/1.5.12. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.12; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.12; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.11. 
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Netherlands, and Stephanus for it in Germany.
58
 
His citation of Gudelinus was incomplete in all four versions: “Gudel. de jure 
Nov. cap. 13”. He thus gave the title of De jure novissimo, but not the book. The editors 
of the third edition of the Institutions correctly concluded that the citation referred to De 
jure novissimo 1.13. Stair clearly borrowed from that title of Gudelinus. First, Stair’s 
statement that, regarding paternal power, the “Custome of the Neighbouring Nations do 
follow more closely the Natural Law”
59
 than Roman law was a reflection of Gudelinus: 
“Planè discernitur haec parentum potestas juris civilis, ab alrera [sic: altera] illa juris 
gentium seu naturali; [Clearly this Roman paternal power is discernible from the ius 
gentium and Natural law]”.60 Secondly, Stair stated that the laws of France and the 
Netherlands imposed a parental duty to aliment children “if they expell them from their 
Families”.
61
 Gudelinus explained that “mores nostri [our custom]”
62
 repudiated the 
Roman rule by which a child can be disinherited, stated that French children were not in 
potestate, then stated that “apud nos [with us]”
63
 children could not be emancipated in 
the Roman manner “quas manumissiones è pane vocitamus [which we call manumission 
‘from the bread’]”.
64
 Presumably, Gudelinus’ use of these pronouns relates to Dutch law. 
Gudelinus’ reference to French law perhaps sat a little awkwardly here, but his 
discussion of French and Dutch law certainly explains Stair’s comparative references.   
Two things are noteworthy about this comparison. First, Stair again used 
Gudelinus for references to the law of other European nations. Secondly, these two 
sentences of Gudelinus appear relatively far apart, on the first and third of the four pages 
of his title. It therefore seems that Stair read and used the full extent of this title. Indeed, 
that Stair made significant use of this chapter of Gudelinus will now be confirmed: all 
thirteen citations of Roman law in “Parents and Children” were borrowed from De jure 
                                                           
58
 S.5.12/1.5.12. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.11; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.11 . 
59
 S.5.12/1.5.12. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.11; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.11. 
60
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29. 
61
 S.5.12/1.5.12. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.12; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.12; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.11. 
62
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 32. 
63
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 32. 
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novissimo 1.13. 
 
5.1.2.2 Stair’s citation of D.1.1.2 
 
Stair cited D.1.1.2 in his discussion of the “Natural Obligations betwixt Parents and 
Children”.
65
 Three points indicate that Stair borrowed this citation from Gudelinus. First, 
both Stair and Gudelinus cited the text in the early-modern style: “l. 2. ff. de justitia & 
jure”.66 Secondly, this citation appeared in the same title of Gudelinus that Stair cited, 
De jure novissimo 1.13. Finally, there is a discrepancy in that these duties were regarded 
by Stair “as an evident Instance of the Law of Nature”,67 but they were classified by 
D.1.1.2 as part of the ius gentium. In D.1.1.2, Pomponius stated that “erga deum religio: 
ut parentibus et patriae pareamus [religious duties towards God, or the duty to be 
obedient to one’s parents and fatherland [translation by Watson]]” were under the ius 
gentium.  
This comparison is complicated by the changing concept of ius gentium in Rome. 
Cicero, the first person recorded as using the term, saw ius gentium as the same as the 
rules that exist in nature.
68
 Gaius developed this, making ius naturale and ius gentium 
“synonymous, both derived from the ratio naturalis.”69 Stein notes that “The jurists 
generally adopted the identification of ius gentium with natural law and used the two 
terms indiscriminately.”70 As Pomponius was contemporary with Gaius, this may have 
been the intended usage in D.1.1.2, the text cited by Stair. Florentinus later distinguished 
the two using the example of slavery which, although common to most nations, was 
                                                                                                                                                                           
64
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 32. 
65
 S.5.1/1.5.1. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.1; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7, and 25.1.12, 5.1. 
66
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29; S.5.1/1.5.1. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8, 5.1 read instead “l. 1. 
ff de justitia et jure”; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.1; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7, and 25.1.12, 5.1. 
67
 S.5.1/1.5.1. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.1; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.38R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.1. 
68
 R. Domingo: The New Global Law (ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory series, 2010), 6-8. 
69
 Domingo: New Global Law, 10. 
70
 P.G. Stein: “The Roman jurists’ conception of law” in A. Padovani and P.G. Stein (eds): A Treatise of 
Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence volume 7: The Jurists’ Philosophy of Law from Rome to the 
Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht, 2007) 1, 8. 
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against the natural state of man.
71
 Ulpian built on this distinction, stating that the ius 
gentium applied to man only but the ius naturale to all life.
72
 Justinian followed this 
division.73  
That Stair would have appreciated that Pomponius may have used the terms ius 
gentium and ius naturale interchangeably would have required a detailed knowledge of 
Classical Roman law and jurisprudence as distinct from post-Classical and Justinianic 
developments. More likely is that Stair’s classification here was based on his reading of 
Gudelinus:  
 
Nam alioqui nulla gens est, vel fuit sub sole, quae non tribuerit aliquam 
authoritatem & potestatem parentibus erga liberos ratione naturali, & lege 
divina cunctis gentibus hoc praescribente, ut parentes honoremus, & 




Since there is no nation, nor has there ever been one under  
the sun, which does not attribute some measure of authority and power to  
parents in respect of their children on account of natural reason and  
through divine law the nations are urged by these words to honour and 
revere their parents, and to obey and follow them. 
 
Gudelinus’ references to natural reason and divine law probably caused Stair to classify 
these obligations as part of natural law. If so, it is possible that Stair did not read 
Pomponius. This would certainly be consistent with his general practice when writing 
the first version. 
 
5.1.2.3 Stair’s citation of Caesar’s De bello Gallico, D.28.2.11 and 
C.8.46.10 
 
Stair cited Caesar’s De bello Gallico, Aristotle, the Digest and the Codex in his 












 - 185 - 
discussion of the Roman paterfamilias’ power of life and death over his children.
75
 The 
citation of Aristotle was borrowed from Grotius;
76
 Stair’s other three citations were 
borrowed from Gudelinus, who referred to this power at two points within De jure 
novissimo 1.13,
77
 the title cited by Stair in “Parents and Children”.  
Three observations indicate that Stair borrowed the citation of Caesar from 
Gudelinus.
78
 First, Gudelinus correctly cited Caesar’s sixth book; it is at 6.19 that Caesar 
discusses this power of life and death.
79
 Stair’s citation was of book two in the printed 
editions, but book six in the manuscripts.80 The implication is that his citation in the first 
and second versions was to book six; the change was presumably a printing error. Stair’s 
citation was thus both correct and the same as Gudelinus’. Secondly, both Stair and 
Gudelinus referred specifically to the Belgae and the Gauls. Caesar did not mention the 
Belgae in or near this passage. Rather, he talked about the Gauls generally. Stair must 
have borrowed his reference to the Belgae from Gudelinus. Finally, Stair’s sentence: 
“Writes that among the Gauls and Belgae, Parents had the power of Life and Death”
81
 
was virtually a translation of that of Gudelinus: “scripsit Belgarum, caeterorumque 
Gallorum moribus parentes in liberos vitae necisque habuisse potestatem [writes, by the 
customs of the Belgae and other Gauls, parents had the power of life and death in their 
children]”.82  
Stair thus used Gudelinus not only as his source for this citation of Caesar, but 
for these remarks concerning the laws of these peoples. Stair’s borrowing of the citation 
of Caesar in relation to the customs of the Belgae and Gauls is the same practice as is 
seen with his borrowing Gudelinus’ citations of Chassanaeus, Duarenus, Wesenbecius 




 Above, 4.1.2.2. 
77
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29 and 31. 
78
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 31. 
79
 W W.A. MacDevitt (trans): “De Bello Gallico” and Other Commentaries of Caius Julius Caesar (New 
York, 1915 rept. Cosimo Classics series, New York, 2007), 149; C. Cellarius: C. Iulii Caesaris 
Commentarii de Bello Gallico et Civili, cum utriusque supplementis ab A. Hirtio vel Oppio adiectis. 
Christophorus Cellarius recensuit, & notis ac novis tabulis geographicis illustravit (Leipzig, 1705), 195.  
80
 S.5.6/1.5.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 5.5; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 5.6. Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.6 did not identify the book. 
81
 S.5.6/1.5.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39L-R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 5.5; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.6. 
82
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 31. 
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and Covarruvias in relation to specific contemporary legal systems. 
Stair’s citations of Roman law here were also borrowed from Gudelinus. 
Gudelinus cited C.8.46.10 and D.28.2.11 at the end of the sentence:  
 
At jus civile hanc postestatem longius traxit, & eousque [sic] olim ut 
parentes haberent in liberos jus vitae, & necis; l. ult. C. de pat. potest. l. in 




But the civil law extended this power further and at one time parents had the 
right of life and death over their children: C.8.46.10, D.28.2.11. 
 
Stair drew on this sentence for his own description: “The like power had the Romans 
anciently”. He followed this phrase with two citations in the first and second versions. 
An average reading of these citations in the sample manuscripts is: “L. in suis de libris et 
posth.” and “L: ff: de pater potest”. 84 The ‘ff’ in the second citation should probably 
have read ‘ult’. This may have been Stair’s error, but was more likely the result of the 
copyists’ misreading his citation. If this suggestion is correct, it means that Stair did not 
give the relevant sigla in either of these citations in the first or second versions. 
Nonetheless, the similarity of these two citations in the manuscripts to Gudelinus’ 
citations is clear. That Stair gave the citations the other way around from Gudelinus does 
not undermine this comparison.  
How Stair wrote and revised this passage can be deduced. Stair borrowed the 
citations of Roman law and that of Caesar, and his comparative references to the Belgae 
and Gauls, from Gudelinus for the first version. He also reflected Gudelinus’ wording in 
his writing. It is clear that Stair did not check the reference to Caesar; he probably did 
not check the Digest or Codex for the first printed edition either. In the first printed 
edition, Stair’s citations of C.8.46.10 and D.28.2.11 read: “l. in suis haredibus, 11. ff. de 
liberis & posthumis, l. libertati, 10. Cod. de patria potestate”. Presumably, Stair checked 
these citations when preparing the third version; this allowed him to add the relevant 
                                                           
83
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29. Underlining in this quotation indicates use of italics in the 
original source. 
84
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39R. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 
5.5; Adv.MSS.25.1.7 and Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.6.  
 
 
 - 187 - 
paragraph numbers and sigla. 
 
5.1.2.4 Stair’s citation of Inst.1.9.2, Inst.1.8, D.29.2.79, C.8.46.10, 
D.28.2.11, and C.4.43.2 
 
Stair also cited C.8.46.10 and D.28.2.11 later in this title, along with Inst.1.9.2, 
D.29.2.79 and C.4.43.2. The source of these citations was again De jure novissimo 1.13. 
Each of these five citations, and the surrounding discussions, shed light on Stair’s 
method; each is therefore worth considering in turn.  
First, Stair stated: “for thereby the Parents power is so great, that no Nation hath 
the like”.
85
 This was likely drawn from Gudelinus: “nimirum quia alij homines talem in 
liberos potestatem non habent, qualem Romani [undoubtedly no other people have so 
great a power over their children as the Romans]”.86 Stair followed this sentence with a 
citation. Most of the sample manuscripts cited Inst.1.9; one specified Inst.1.9.1.
87
 This 
suggests that, in the first version, either: Stair did not specify a paragraph of Inst.1.9 and 
a single copyist added this detail, or he specified Inst.1.9.1 and the paragraph number 
was omitted by the copyists. However, Inst.1.9.1 was not relevant to the question of 
paternal power. Gudelinus also cited Inst.1.9.1, immediately after the sentence which 
Stair paraphrased. Stair borrowed Gudelinus’ citation of Inst.1.9 (with or without the 
paragraph number) for the first version, at the same time that he was also influenced by 
Gudelinus’ wording. When preparing the third version, Stair amended his citation to 
read to Inst.1.9.2, which was relevant and discussed paternal power.
88
 Depending on 
whether Stair had cited Inst.1.9.1 in the first and second versions, his citation of 
Inst.1.9.2 was either a correction or the addition of a detail. Either way, Stair must have 
checked Inst.1.9 when preparing the third version.   
Stair also cited D.28.2.11 and C.8.46.10 in the first version.
89
 Gudelinus cited 




 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 1.13, 29. 
87
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.10 specified Inst.1.9.1; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R. 
1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10. 
88
 This has been checked in the 1656 copy of the Institutes. 
89
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 
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these two texts in the same context as Stair, the power of life and death which the 
Roman paterfamilias had over his children. Stair’s citations (as found in the 
manuscripts) were identical to Gudelinus’ and were given in the same order. D.28.2.11 
and C.8.46.10 were cited by Stair earlier in this title, where (as has been shown) they 
were again borrowed from Gudelinus.
90
 Stair may either have borrowed the citations 
here from Gudelinus once again or simply re-used them for this passage. This cannot be 
confirmed either way as he used them in both instances in the same context: the 
paterfamilias’ power of life and death.  
Stair cited “L: placet ff: de acquir hered” in the first version (as can be deduced 
from the manuscripts).91 This citation was of D.29.2.79, which concerned the acquisition 
of inheritance through someone in the power of the paterfamilias. Stair incorrectly used 
it for paternal power “being almost Dominical, and the Children as Servants”. The text 
contained nothing which could explain Stair’s reference. This error is explained by his 
borrowing the citation without checking it from Gudelinus. Stair’s citation in the 
manuscripts was identical to Gudelinus’.92 Gudelinus used this citation as authority for 
the extent of paternal power in Roman law compared to early-modern law. He therefore 
used it as a specific example of this broader principle. Stair, having not checked this 
citation, obviously misinterpreted Gudelinus’ use of it. His reference to “Children as 
Servants” was also likely a misinterpretation of Gudelinus’ reference to sons having 
been sold being subject to “jus servitij [the law of slavery]”93 in the previous sentence. 
His (incorrect) association of this text to that previous sentence led him to cite it out of 
context. 
Stair’s citation “l. 2. Cod. de patribus qui filios”94 was also identical to that in 
Gudelinus. Stair borrowed it from him for the first version. Stair also used this citation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and 25.1.7, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.10 omitted the citation of the Digest. 
90
 Above, 5.1.2.3. 
91
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R gave “placet 1”. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10 gave “pluc”. The wrong paragraph number was added for the 
third version, S.5.11/1.5.11; the number 99 was added rather than 79. This was presumably a printing 
error; it was corrected for the fourth version. 
92
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29.  
93
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29. 
94
 S.5.11/1.5.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43L. 1666 stem: 
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out of context. C.4.43.2 discussed the sale and subsequent recovery of sons; he used it as 
authority for the paternal power being slowly eroded until “retrenched to cases of 
extream necessity”.95 This is explained by Stair’s having (again) borrowed this citation 
without checking it from Gudelinus. Gudelinus cited this text in a discussion of paternal 
power. He began by explaining the right of life and death that fathers had in their 
children. He then compared this with the position of slaves, saying the right of life and 
death: “abolitum fuit merito, cum & dominis in servos tanta acerbitas adempta fuerit 
[was deservedly abolished, and the great severity was withdrawn from the owners in 
respect of their slaves]”.
96
 He then went on to say that fathers could not sell their sons 
(as they could their slaves) unless driven to it by “extrema necessitas [extreme 
necessity]”.
97
 It was for this last point that Gudelinus cited C.4.43.2. The identical 
citations and reference to extreme necessity point to this passage of Gudelinus as Stair’s 
source. Why did Stair use this citation, clearly given by Gudelinus in the context of sale 
of sons, for the reduction of the father’s power? He may simply have misread Gudelinus. 
Alternatively, he may have intended that this citation, and the rule that fathers could not 
sell their sons at will, would serve as an example of a limit on paternal power. Stair may 
thus not have intended this citation to be used as authority for the overall reduction of 
the father’s power. This might, however, be a generous interpretation of an error 
resulting from Stair’s borrowing this citation without checking it. 
An additional citation appeared in the manuscripts but not the printed editions. 
Stair explained that limits were placed on the paterfamilias’ power to punish his 
children. Here the manuscripts cited: “Inst. de his qui sui”, with two of the manuscripts 
from the 1662 stem specifying Inst.1.8.1.98 Presumably, therefore, Stair cited Inst.1.8.1 
in the first version. This citation was borrowed from Gudelinus, from the passage just 
discussed. When Gudelinus compared the power over sons and slaves he stated: “id 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.10. Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.10 just reads “l.2 cap”. 
95
 S.5.11/1.5.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10. 
96
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29. 
97
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.13, 29. 
98
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.10 and Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43L specified 
Inst.1.8.1. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.10. Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.10 did not give the citation. 
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abolitum fuit meritò, cum & dominis in servos tanta acerbitas adempta fuerit, instit. de 
his qui sui vel alieni juris sunt. § 1. [it was deservedly abolished, and the great severity 
was withdrawn from the owners in respect of their slaves, Inst.1.8.1]”.99 The similarity 
in language and the citation indicate that Gudelinus was Stair’s source. Why did Stair 
remove this citation for the third version? Inst.1.8, and the legislation it discussed, 
related only to slaves, not to children in power. The subject of the text being only of an 
analogous topic may have been the cause of, or contributed to, Stair’s removal of the 
citation. If correct, this suggests that Stair did not check this citation when writing the 
first version but may have done when preparing the third version. 
In sum, Stair borrowed all six of these citations from Gudelinus for the first 
version. Two of these – of D.28.2.11 and C.8.46.10 – were cited earlier in the title, 
where they were again borrowed from Gudelinus. They may have been borrowed from 
Gudelinus anew or re-used for either this or the earlier passage of the Institutions, 
depending on which was written by Stair first. Another two citations borrowed from 
Gudelinus – D.29.2.79 and C.4.43.2 – were used out of context. This suggests strongly 
that Stair borrowed them without checking them. When preparing the third version, he 
checked the Digest and Institutes, and added the paragraph numbers to the citations of 
D.29.2.79 and D.28.2.11. That he still used D.29.2.79 out of context may suggest that he 
did not actually read it. He also seems to have realised that Inst.1.8 was not direct 
authority (and removed it for the third version accordingly), and was able to correct or 
add the paragraph number to the citation of Inst.1.9. He had no reason to consult the 
Codex, the paragraph number having been given by Gudelinus. He may therefore have 
been unaware that his use of C.4.43.2 was out of context. 
 
5.1.2.5 Stair’s citation of D.14.6.2, C.6.60.2, D.44.7.39, and Nov.117  
 
Stair cited Roman law five times in his discussion of the peculium: D.14.6.2, C.6.60.2, 
                                                           
99
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D.44.7.39, and Nov.117 twice. These texts were also cited by Gudelinus.
100
 Stair 
borrowed these citations from Gudelinus for the first version, and was also at that time 
influenced by Gudelinus’ wording.  
 First, Stair and Gudelinus gave identical citations of D.14.6.2 after discussing the 
peculium castrense and quasi-castrense. Stair’s explanation that it was acquired “by 
Arms, or liberal Arts”
101
 was similar to Gudelinus’ “militiae armatae, vel sacrae, 
togataeve acquisivit [acquired by military armed service, or sacred, or civil duty]”. This 
comparison is all the more compelling given D.14.6.2 did not discuss how the peculium 
was earned, but said only that the son managed it independently. Stair thus likely 
borrowed this citation from Gudelinus without checking it.  
Secondly, Stair’s phrase “the Father had the Usufruct and Administration; but 
not the Property or Power of Alienation” likely reflected Gudelinus’ statement 
“ususfructus autem, & plena administratio esset patris, alienatione ei interdictâ [the 
usufruct and full administration resided with the father who was prohibited from 
alienating it]”. Both followed these sentences with citations of Roman law. Stair cited 
C.6.60.2: “l. 2. Cod. de bonis maternis”;
102
 Gudelinus cited C.6.60.1 and C.6.60.2 – “l.1. 
& 2. de bonis maternis” – and two other texts. This citation of C.6.60.2 was relevant: the 
text protected such property from being alienated by the father. Stair and Gudelinus’ 
similar phrasing, as well as the significant amount of borrowing by Stair from this title 
of Gudelinus, indicates that this was his source for this citation. Why did Stair ignore the 
reference to C.6.60.1? It was certainly relevant as it discussed the father having only 
usufruct and administration over a child’s inheritance from his mother. Indeed, it was 
more relevant than C.6.60.2, which considered property from the maternal grandparents. 
It is unlikely that Stair would have dismissed this reference on purpose. Instead, it is 
probable that when he simply copied down the reference from Gudelinus he omitted to 
                                                           
100
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 1.13, 30. S.5.11/1.5.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.42R-43R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10. 
101
 The reference to the liberal arts was omitted in Adv.MSS.25.1.10 and 25.1.11. The phrase “which the 
Son acquired by Arms, or liberal Arts, the Father had no power” was omitted from Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 
25.1.7. The reference to liberal arts therefore appeared in only one manuscript from each stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.8 from the 1662 stem and Adv.MS.25.1.12 from the 1666 stem. 
102
 Some of the manuscripts have “paternis” rather than “maternis”. 
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note both C.60.60.1 and C.6.60.2.  
Thirdly, Stair said that “Children were as Fathers of Families” in relation to the 
peculia. This possibly derived from Gudelinus describing them as “si in nullius foret 
potestate [if he was not in potestate]”. Again, both followed these phrases with a 
citation. Stair in the first and second version cited D.44.7.39: “L: filiusfamilias ff: de 
obligat: et act:” In the third version, he added the (wrong) paragraph number.
103
 
D.44.7.39 was relevant: it said that a suit could be brought against a son “tamquam cum 
patre familias potest [as though against a head of the household [translation by 
Watson]]”. Gudelinus cited D.44.7.39 in exactly the same way as Stair did in the first 
version. He also cited D.5.1.57, again in the medieval style. Stair therefore borrowed 
only the first of Gudelinus’ two references. It is unlikely that he checked either 
D.44.7.39 or D.5.1.57 for the first version. It is more likely that he felt one citation was 
sufficient and borrowed the first one given by Gudelinus. 
 The final comparison which can be made is of Stair’s citations of Nov.117. He 
cited Nov.117 twice as authority for the reasons that the father’s usufruct in the peculia 
could end. First, where goods were “left to the Children, excluding the Parents” he cited 
the Novel “in principio” in all four versions.
104
 Secondly, “When the Goods came by the 
Fathers [sic] fault, as when he did unjustly Divorce with the Mother” he cited the Novel 
generally in the first and second versions but “cap. 10” in the third and fourth 
versions.105 Stair’s citations were relevant; Nov.117 did discuss the father’s usufruct 
coming to an end. Gudelinus cited Nov.117 only once, in a sentence concerned the 
appointment of guardians. Thereafter he did discuss the Novel in relation to whether the 
father obtained rights in gifts to his child from its mother or maternal grandparents. This 
may explain Stair’s borrowing the citation. When Stair revised this passage for the third 
version, he added the reference to “cap. 10” to his second citation of the Novel. It is 
                                                           
103
 The paragraph numbers which were added indicated to D.44.7.1.39 rather than D.44.7.39. As D.44.7.39 
had no sub-paragraphs, the addition of the number one cannot be explained as the paragraph and sub-
paragraph numbers being accidentally reversed when printed. The addition of the number one was an 
error. This has been checked in the 1656 edition of the Digest. 
104
 Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.10 omitted this citation. 
105
 S.5.11/1.5.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.10; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.43R. 1666 stem: 
25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 5.10. 
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possible he checked the Novel, as he did with the Digest, and found the relevant chapter 
himself.  
 In sum, Stair borrowed these five citations without checking them for the first 
version. This resulted in him using one, of D.14.6.2, out of context. When preparing the 
third version, he checked at least two of these citations against the text, as is shown by 
the addition of the paragraph number to the citation of D.44.7.39 and the chapter to the 
second citation of Nov.117. Whether he checked the other citations cannot be known, as 
it is possible that Stair sought specifically to add paragraph numbers to citations where 
they were lacking.  
 
5.1.3  “Tutors and Curators” 
 
5.1.3.1 Stair’s citation of Gudelinus 
 
Stair explained that the pupil should “recompense of one good deed for an other [sic], to 
make up to the Tutors whatsoever is wanting to them, through their faithful 
Administration: This is all the substance of the Interests and Obligations of Tutors and 
Pupils”.106 Stair acknowledged that the end of the period of tutorship “naturally is the 
Age of Discretion”
107
 but “positive Law determines a particular year”.
108
 He stated that 
Roman law followed natural law, which in turn influenced Scots, French and Dutch 
law.
109
 He cited Gudelinus as authority for French and Dutch law.
110
 Stair therefore 
again used Gudelinus as a source for comparative law, as well as for Roman and natural 
law. 
Stair cited De jure novissimo 10.8 in the third version. Most of the manuscripts 
                                                           
106
 S.6.4/1.6.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.46R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 6.4. 
107
 S.6.4/1.6.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.46R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7, and 25.1.12, 6.4. 
108
 S.6.4/1.6.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.46R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 6.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 6.4. 
109
 S.6.4/1.6.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.47L. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 6.5. 
110
 S.6.4/1.6.4.  
 
 
 - 194 - 
cited 10.18, although one cited 10.15.
111
 This was wrong; De jure novissimo had only 
six books. Given that the error is found consistently through the manuscripts and printed 
editions of the Institutions, it is probable that it was made by Stair.  The passage of 
Gudelinus to which Stair should have referred can be identified. Gudelinus discussed 
tutorship in De jure novissimo 1.17 and 1.18. Stair likely consulted De jure novissimo 
1.18, but wrote down the wrong book number in error.  
In De jure novissimo 1.18, Gudelinus stated “Mores nostri in hac materia 
perparum a jure Romano recesserunt; [Our customs have receded very little from 
Roman law in this matter]”,
112
 except that tutorship in his time ended at twenty-five.
113
 
He explained that not all countries recognised such a Roman law of tutorship, and thus, 
for example, in some nations, tutorship was an annual office. He stated finally the 
typical practice of the ius commune:  
 
alijsque similibus observanda est cujusque civitatis consuetudo, & in 
reliquis ad juris Romani aequitatem recurrendum  
 
the custom of whichever city should be observed  
in other similar matters and for the rest recourse must be sought to the  




Gudelinus therefore discussed the equity of Roman law, the differing points at which 
tutorship ends in various societies, and the closeness of most to Roman law. These 
comments were clearly the source of Stair’s own about Dutch law, Roman law, and 
natural law being similar, as well as his comments about tutelage ending “naturally” at 
majority but in all respects “positive Law determines a particular year”.  
Despite Stair giving Gudelinus as authority for French law, there was no mention 
of French law in this paragraph of Gudelinus. Stair’s reference is explained by 
Gudelinus’ referring to Cujacius in the previous paragraph, which discussed the 
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 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8, 6.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.47L cited 10.15. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 6.5. 
112
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 43. 
113
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 43. 
114
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 43. 
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administration of orphans’ estates as being “persimiles [very similar]”.
115
 This analogy 
allowed Stair to deduce that French law was influenced by Roman tutorship. As was 
seen before in the example of Duarenus, Stair drew his authority for French law here 
from Gudelinus’ citation of a French jurist, in this case Cujacius. 
 
5.1.3.2 Stair’s citation of the Authenticum, Nov.94, C.5.37.24, and 
D.26.7.7.7 
 
Before relating that an Act of 1672
116
 required that a tutor keep an inventory of his 
pupil’s estate,117 Stair stated that this was true of Roman law. This passage was included 
only in the first, second and third versions; it was removed for the fourth. Stair gave four 
citations of Roman law here: one of the Authenticum of Nov.72.8, two of C.5.37.24, and 
one of D.26.7.7.  These texts were relevant: Novel 72.8 stated that a tutor had to take a 
sacred oath to ensure that he faithfully administered a pupil’s property, but that he still 
had to render accounts; C.5.37.24 said that guardians had to make an inventory; and 
D.26.7.7.pr stated that a tutor who did not make an inventory was deemed to be acting 
fraudulently. De jure novissimo 1.18 (the title to which Stair’s citation should have 
referred) was the source for Stair’s discussion and citations. As with previous passages 
where Stair relied heavily on Gudelinus, Stair condensed this paragraph of Gudelinus, 
retaining his citations.  
Gudelinus also cited the Authenticum of Nov.72 for tutors giving oaths. The two 
jurists’ citations were essentially the same: “Nov. 72. §. ult. & Auth. quod nunc generale. 
C. eo. de curat. furiosi”118 in Gudelinus was “Nov. 72. l. ult. Authen. quod nunc generale 
l. de curat. furiosi” in the first printed edition of Stair. However, the citation in the 
manuscripts read “N. 72. 9. Last & Auth. quod nunc generale de curat. furiosi”.119 It 
                                                           
115
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 43. 
116
 R.P.S., 1672/6/9: Act Concerning Pupils and Minors and Their Tutors and Curators 1672 
<http://rps.ac.uk/trans/1672/6/9>, accessed 16
th
 July 2010. 
117
 This discussion was obviously not included in the manuscripts. 
118
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. 
119
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L omitted the citation of the 
Novel, but gave the Authenticum. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 6.6 
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seems to have specified Nov.72.9, but there were only eight paragraphs in Nov.72.
120
 It 
is clear how this error occurred. When Stair borrowed Gudelinus’ citation, he must have 
written in this first version “72 § ult”. The symbol ‘§’ was then misinterpreted by the 
copyists as ‘9’. That Stair’s own version was correct is confirmed by the first printed 
edition giving “72. l. ult.”  
 Stair gave three other citations in this passage: one of D.26.7.7 and two of 
C.5.37.24. Each appeared in the manuscripts exactly as in Gudelinus. Stair’s citation “L: 
tutores, C. de administratione tut” in the manuscripts121 was identical to that of 
Gudelinus: “l. tutores. C. de administ. tut.”.
122
 For the second printed edition, Stair 
added the paragraph number to his citation, indicating he checked it at that time. Stair 
then cited D.26.7.7.7 and C.5.37.24 together in the first version: “L: Tutorem qui ff: de 
Administratione tut: l. tutores C. eodem”. For the third version, he added the paragraph 
number to the citation of the Digest;123 the citation of the Codex remained unchanged.124 
These two citations thus appeared in the first version as in Gudelinus: “l. tutorem qui. ff. 
de administrat. tut. d. l. tutores. C. eod.”125  
Stair may also have been influenced by Gudelinus’ wording when writing the 
first version. Stair referred to the tutor needing to find caution. This may have reflected 
Gudelinus referring to satisdare [to provide security]. Additionally, Stair’s statement 
“and they behooved to make Inventar” may have been drawn from Gudelinus’ phrase: 




                                                                                                                                                                           
omitted the citation.  
120
 This has been checked in the 1614 copy of the Authenticum. 
121
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 
and 25.1.7, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 6.6 omitted the citation.  
122
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. 
123
 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 6.6. The citation in the first printed edition read “l.7. Tutor. qui 7. ff. Administratione, 
tut.” It is likely that the second ‘7’ in this citation was a printing error, as the paragraph then referred to 
was irrelevant (it concenred money deposited with a tutor for the purchase of land). Presumably Stair 
intended for there to be only one ‘7’ in that citation. This has been checked in the 1656 edition of the 
Digest. 
124
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.6 gave the siglum ‘ff’ rather than ‘C’; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.6; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L gave no siglum. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7, and 25.1.12, 6.6. 
125
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. 
126
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. 
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The strongest evidence of Stair’s borrowing from Gudelinus here is an additional 
citation found only in the manuscripts, and thus presumably removed for the third 
version. It appeared after the first of Stair’s citations of C.5.37.24 (already shown to 
have been borrowed from Gudelinus). An average reading of the citation in the sample 
manuscripts is: “nov: ut sine prohibitione”.
127
 This referred to Nov.94, which concerned 
mothers acting as guardians. Thereafter a three digit number was given, 214 or 244, then 
“in fine”. The presence of the number is inexplicable, as there was no such section of 
that Novel. However, when Gudelinus is examined Stair’s reference becomes clear. 
Gudelinus also cited this Novel, again immediately following C.5.37.24, but as: “Nov. ut 
sine prohibitione. 24. in fine.”128 Gudelinus wrongly identified Nov.94 as Nov.24 (which 
concerned the praetorship of Pisidia).
129
 Stair clearly borrowed this incorrect citation of 
the Novels from Gudelinus. The appearance of ‘244’ or ‘214’ in Stair’s citation of the 
Novel reflected Gudelinus’ error. Stair cannot have checked this citation. He probably 
removed the citation for the third version because he checked Nov.24 and found the 
error.  
In sum, Stair must have consulted Gudelinus for the first version. He was 
influenced by Gudelinus’ phrasing and structure and borrowed these citations without 
checking them, as can be deduced by the addition of their paragraph numbers only at a 
later date and the inclusion of ‘244’ or ‘214’ in his citation of Nov.94. When preparing 
the third version, Stair checked these references. He added the paragraph numbers to the 
citations of the Digest and Codex, and removed the citation of Nov.94. He also added a 
discussion of the Act of 1672 which required tutors in Scotland to make inventories. 
When preparing the fourth version, Stair removed this passage, his remarks concerning 
the Act of 1672, and his preceding discussion of a case in Nicholson’s practicks 
concerning giving caution. The reason for Stair’s removal of this passage is unknown. 
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 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5 
and 25.1.7, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 6.6 omitted the citation. 
128
 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. 
129
 This was probably an accidental error, as later in the paragraph Gudelinus gave the citation correctly: 
“N. 94. §. ult.” in Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.18, 41. The 1661 Arnhem edition also wrongly cited 
Nov.24 [at 39]. 
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5.1.4   “Obligations Conventional” 
 
5.1.4.1 Stair’s citation of Gudelinus, Corvinus, the Liber Extra, and use of 
a maxim of Canon law 
 
Stair’s discussion of naked pactions within the context of contract and promise is well 
known, and has already been discussed briefly.
130
 Stair stated:  
 
We shall not insist in these [Roman formalities], because the common 
Custome of Nations hath resiled therefrom, following rather the Canon Law, 
by which every paction produceth action, omne verbum de ore fideli cadit in 




This echoed his earlier declaration: “promises now be commonly held Obligatory, the 
Canon Law having taken off the exception of the Civil Law, de nudo pacto”.132 Stair’s 
adoption of this rule of Canon law was central to the development of Scots law.
133
 Hogg 
noted that “The acceptance of the validity of bare pacts, gratuitous contracts, and 
unilateral contracts, under Stair’s direction, was to provide Scots Law with a very 
flexible and broad law of voluntary obligations.”
134
 McBryde stated Stair’s acceptance 
of naked pactions and rejection of the requirement for acceptance of promises “was to 




Stair stated that this acceptance of naked pactions was already settled in Scots 
law: “we have a special Statute of Session, November 27. 1592. acknowledging all 
pactions and promises as effectual: So it hath been ever decided since, January 14. 
                                                           
130
 Above, 4.1.6.1. 
131
 S.10.7/1.10.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 




 Cf. J.J. Gow: “The constitution and proof of voluntary obligations” [1961] Jur.Rev. 1-20 (Part one) and 
119-142 (Part two), 3-4. 
134
 Hogg: “Perspectives on contract theory from a mixed legal system”, 653. 
135
 McBryde: “Promises in Scots law”, 56. 
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1631. Sharp contra Sharp.”
136
 Earlier cases concerned whether promises could be 
proved by witnessed or only scripto vel juramento partis [by writing or oath of the 
party].137 Stair’s use of Sharp v Sharp 1631 and the Act of Sederunt were puzzling. In 
Sharp v Sharp, half-brothers John and William signed a contract stating that whatever 
heritage was inherited by them, in the event that one predeceased their father, would go 
first to the deceased half-brother’s children; failing which to the surviving half-brother; 
failing which to his surviving children; failing which to their father’s heirs. After the 
deaths of William and his only child, John sued William’s sister and nieces and nephews 
on the contract. The defence argued inter alia that the contract was “pactum nudum, 
Remaining in the naked Terms of an intention, not Vested with any Act following 
thereon, nor no Deed done by either of the Parties…and that the nature thereof was so 
ineffectual to bind”.
138
 The Lords were not recorded by Durie as having decided such 
pactions to be lawful but merely that the contracts in this case were not found to be nuda 
pacta “but that they were good compleat Writs and Securities”
139
 because the contract 
had been subscribed. Although “Sharp v Sharp has come to be seen as significant in 
Scots law’s move towards the Canon law’s position”,
140
 the extent to which it decided 
this point can be questioned. 
There is already controversy regarding Stair’s citation of the Act of Sederunt. The 
Act of that date in the printed collection of the Acts of Sederunt stated:  
 
The quhilk day, the Lordis declaire, that, in all tyme cuming, thay will juge 
and decide on clausis irritant, conteint in contractis, takis, infeftmentis, 
bandis, and obligationis, precise according to the wordis and meining of the 
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 S.10.7/1.10.7. Sharp v Sharp 1631 [M.4229]. 
137
 See e.g. Sellar: “Promise”, 254-255; M.12381-12383. It is telling that Morison classified “Naked 
Promise” as a sub-heading of “Proof” [Division 1, section 9, begins M.12381]. 
138
 M.4299-4300; A. Gibson, Lord Durie: The Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, in most 
cases of importance, debated, and brought before them, from July 1621, to July 1642 (Edinburgh, 1690), 
553. 
139
 M.4299, 4301; Durie: Practicks, 554. 
140
 Cairns: “Ius civile in Scotland, ca. 1600”, 166. 
141
 The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, from the 15
th
 of January 1553, to the 11
th
 of 
July 1790 (Edinburgh, 1790), 19. 
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This Act therefore concerned the interpretation of irritancy clauses in (presumably 
written) contracts; it did not (as Stair claimed) acknowledge “all pactions and promises 
as effectual”.142 Sellar found a reference to an Act of Sederunt of the same date in 
Hope’s Major Practicks: “C 775 makes mentione of ane statut insert in the sederunt 
books (27 Nov. 1592) beiring that the conventions of parties should be fulfilled albeit 
not aggreable to the comone law”.
143
 Sellar suggested that: 
 
the presumption must surely be either that another Act did once exist, or that 
the known Act was generally interpreted along the lines suggested by Stair 
and by Hope’s Practicks. Either way, we have important evidence as to the 
practice of Scots law in the century before Stair.144 
 
Sellar explained that: 
 
questions are bound [to] have arisen on the matter of promises and ‘naked 
pactions’: should it follow the canon law rule pacta sunt servanda or the civil 
law maxim ex nudo pacto non oritur actio? This provides the perfect context 




If Sellar was correct, then Stair may simply have been explaining Scots law. However, it 
is more likely that this Act of Sederunt was apocryphal. Part of Stair’s practice when 
writing and revising the Institutions was to borrow citations without checking them from 
his sources. He has been shown to have done this when using his Scottish sources just as he 
did when using his continental sources.
146
 Stair’s use of Hope has not been examined for 
this thesis but it is highly probable that he also borrowed references from Hope. If this 
assumption is correct, this means that Stair and Hope cannot be considered to have been 
independent witnesses to the existence of the Act. Additionally, it seems that Hope 
borrowed this reference from a manuscript, and the implication in his wording is that he did 
                                                           
142
 As was also noted in J. Erskine: An Institute of the Law of Scotland, in four books, in the order of Sir 
George Mackenzie’s Institutions of that law (Edinburgh, 1773), 3.2.1, 426. 
143
 J.A. Clyde (ed): Hope’s Major Practicks, 1608-1633 volume 1 (Stair Society series volume 3, 
Edinburgh, 1937), 2.2.5. 
144
 Sellar: “Promise”, 261-262. 
145
 Sellar: “Promise”, 264. 
146
 Above, 3.2.2.1.  
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not check the reference. What is in Hope is, therefore, a citation and description of an Act 
of Sederunt that is at least second-hand; in Stair it is at least a third-hand reference. Both 
are wrong. It is not feasible here to examine this question further, but two relevant 
conclusions can be drawn. First, it was also seemingly Hope’s practice to borrow citations 
from his sources without checking them; this puts Stair’s practice in the context of that of 
other seventeenth-century Scottish jurists. Secondly, there is therefore doubt as to the 
extent to which Stair drew on relevant Scottish sources. It must be determined which 
sources did influence Stair when writing this passage. 
Stair used a range of continental sources for this passage. He cited Gudelinus, 
Corvinus and, in the manuscripts only, Gomezius.147 It has already been shown that Stair 
cannot have been “largely influenced by the Spanish Scholastic School”
148
 as the only 
references to second scholastics (including that of Gomezius) were borrowed from 
Grotius.149 Stair also clearly used Gudelinus here, as his citation of Gudelinus was 
sufficiently accurate to allow the presumption that the passage was directly consulted by 
him. Stair cited the ultimate passage of De jure novissimo 3.5; there was much similarity 
between the texts. However, Gordon found no evidence of Stair’s borrowing authority 
from Gudelinus in this passage;
150
 this thesis confirms his findings. Instead, it will be 
shown that Stair’s citations of the Liber Extra and his phrase “every paction produceth 
action” were borrowed from Corvinus.
151
  
Stair turned to three continental jurists when writing this passage: a natural 
lawyer in Grotius; a comparative jurist in Gudelinus; and a Canonist in Corvinus. From 
these three sources, Stair drew on a wide range of authority including Canon law and an 
additional jurist, Gomezius. 
 
                                                           
147
 Above, 4.1.6.1; below, 7.1.2.  
148
 Hogg: “Perspectives on contract theory from a mixed legal system”, 652. Above, 4.1.6.1. 
149
 Above, 4.1.6.1. 
150
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263-4 
151
 Below, 7.1.2. 
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5.1.4.2 Stair’s citations of C.4.30.14, Balduinus, Boerius and Rebuffus 
 
Stair discussed the situation where money was not delivered under a contract of loan. In 
Roman law, it was common for the debtor to acknowledge receipt of the funds before 
they were released.
152
 The late-Classical exceptio non numeratae pecuniae gave the 
debtor the defence that the money had not been paid if the creditor later raised an action 
against him. He could also raise the action querela non numeratae pecuniae to challenge 
the contract of loan.153 Both the querela and exceptio had to be brought within a 
specified period of time; under Justinianic law, both expired after two years.
154
  
In Stair’s discussion of non numerata pecunia in the manuscripts and first printed 
edition is cited “l. in contractibus, ff. de non numerata pecunia”; two of the manuscripts 
from the 1662 stem cited “§. illo”.
155
 This citation should have been of the Codex 
passage C.4.30.14; the sub-paragraph starting illo was C.4.30.14.3. Stair seems to have 
given the wrong siglum in the first, second and third versions. He corrected this error, 
and added the relevant paragraph number, in the fourth version. C.4.30.14 was relevant, 
as it concerned the prescriptive period for these actions; C.4.30.14.3 specifically 
discussed the creditor’s oath being time-barred, the context in which Stair used this 
citation. Stair increased the detail in his citations of Roman law by adding sub-paragraph 
numbers as he revised the Institutions;
156
 here, however, the reference to a relevant sub-
paragraph was removed, seemingly for the second version. It is not clear why he did 
this; perhaps he did so accidentally. 
What is clear, however, is that Stair borrowed this citation from Gudelinus. Both 
Stair and Gudelinus cited the same sub-paragraph. Additionally, both Stair and 
Gudelinus referred to this period of two years in relation to the text, but this was not 
                                                           
152
 R. Zimmermann: The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford, 
1990), 93. 
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 S.10.11/1.10.11. 1662 stem: a later unknown hand has written “§” after the citation in Adv.MS.25.1.8, 
10.11; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.11 gave ““§. illo”; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.91L gave ““§. illo”. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.11. 
156
 Above, 3.1.3. 
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mentioned in C.4.30.14.3. Stair made this association between the time period in which 
the action or defence could be brought and the Codex text because he had borrowed the 
reference from Gudelinus without checking it. Finally, this citation appeared in the same 




Stair explained that early-modern law had departed from these Roman rules. 
When writing the first version, he cited Balduinus, Boerius and Rebuffus as evidence for 
this in “the Neighbour Nations”.158 Gordon said “there must be a very strong suspicion” 
that Stair’s citations of these jurists were borrowed from Gudelinus.
159
 Indeed, Stair’s 
citations: “Baldimius [sic] testifieth, ad titulum, Just. de lit. oblig. And Boetius, de 
consuetudine, tit. de jurisdic. And Rebuffus, ad proximum, const. Reg. gloss. 5. num. 
59.”
 160
 are clearly borrowed from Gudelinus, who wrote: “Francis. Balduinus ad Inst. d. 
tit. de liter. obligat. & post Boerium de consuet. Byturigum tit. de jurisdict. §.8. & post 
Rebuff. ad proemium const. reg. glos.5. num.59.”
161
 Both Stair and Gudelinus’ citations 
were in the same order and were of the same treatises and paragraphs, with one 
exception. Gudelinus cited section eight of Boerius; in neither the manuscripts nor the 
printed editions was Stair’s citation that specific. Stair simply omitted this detail.  
Balduinus’ commentary repeated the text of Inst.3.21, “De literarum 
obligatione”, and provided annotations beneath.
162
 C.4.30.14 was cited four times by 
Balduinus. On the first of these occasions, he discussed the effect of the legislation and 
mentioned a time limit of thirty days for the exceptio. He then distinguished 
contemporary law, saying that such a rule would be inoperable in contemporary 
commerce.163 
The citation of “Boetius” was actually of Boerius’ Consuetudines, a treatise on 
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 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264.  
160
 S.10.11/1.10.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.11; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.11 omitted Balduinus’ name; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.91L. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.10 and 25.1.7, 10.11; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.11 gave 
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 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 3.6, 114. 
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 Balduinus: Commentarii institutionum iuris civilis 3.21, 551-553.  
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 Balduinus: Commentarii institutionum iuris civilis 3.21, 552 on “debere”. 
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Bourges custom. Presumably Stair and Gudelinus’ citations of “de jurisdict” related to 
Boerius’ title “Des iuges & leur iurisdition [sic] [Judges and their jurisdiction]”. When 
commenting on a custom which stated that reconventions “nont point de lieu eu ladicte 
ville & septanie de Bourges par deuant aucun iuge [have no place in the town or local 
jurisdiction of Bourges before any judge]”,
164
 he explicitly rejected the exceptio in 
French law: 
 
Et similiter de stylo & consuet. curiarum secularium & ecclesiasticae 
Biturigum exceptio non numeratae pecuniae, non habet locum, nec potest 
opponi.165 
 
Similarly, the style and customs of the Bourges secular and ecclesiastic 
courts do not have a place [for it], nor is the defence of ‘money not paid’ 
able to be raised in court. 
 
The citation of Rebuffus was amended by Stair for the fourth version:166 the words “ad 
proximum const Reg Gloss 5” were changed to “Tom 1 const in proam”. The reason for 
this alteration is not apparent, although Stair was correct in identifying the first tome. 
Nonetheless, the initial citation was more detailed and was correct.
167
 It is unlikely that 
the change was made after Stair consulted the text. In the prooemium of the passage 
cited, Rebuffus referred to and explained the effect of C.4.30.14 before distinguishing 
French law: “sed in Francia semper recipitur opponens non numeratam [but in France 
the opponent can always recover unpaid money]”.
168
 
All three jurists therefore distinguished contemporary law from Roman law. It is 
unlikely that Stair checked any of them. He did not give any of the details given in these 
three passages (e.g. the time limit of thirty days), nor did he borrow any of their 
authorities, nor was he otherwise influenced by them. Additionally, although these 
jurists discussed French law, Stair unusually gave them as evidence for “the Neighbour 
Nations” rather than any particular legal system. This was likely because Gudelinus did 
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 Boerius: Consuetudines infrascriptarum, 1.2.8, 36.  
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 Boerius: Consuetudines infrascriptarum, 1.2.8, 36, glossa 1.  
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 Rebuffus: Commentaria in constitutiones regias Gallicas. 
167
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not specify any legal systems, but just gave them as authority for seventeenth-century 
practice generally. Stair has previously been shown to have extrapolated that a jurist was 
authority for a specific legal system from the name of the treatise or their nationality. 




 Gudelinus (after citing Balduinus, Boerius and Rebuffus) cited Philibert 
Bugnyon, a sixteenth-century French jurist.
170
 Stair did not borrow this citation. Gordon 
did not suggest any reason for this. Perhaps Stair rejected this citation because Gudelinus 
gave Bugnyon’s treatise as “in tract. quem Gallice scripsit legum abrogatarum”.
171
 The 
Leges abrogatae et inusitatae in omnibus curiis, terris, jurisdictionibus, & dominiis 
regni Franciae tractatus (Edition consulted: Brussels, 1677) was a summary of which 
Roman texts were not used in the different French regions.
172
 Perhaps Stair disregarded 
it because of its title, which was essentially “the abrogated and disused laws in France”. 
He may, of course, have simply rejected it as he felt three citations here were sufficient. 
 
5.2 STAIR’S USE OF GUDELINUS FOR THE FOURTH VERSION  
 
5.2.1 “Obligations Conventional/Location and Conduction” 
 
The structure of Stair’s discussion of location and conduction was typical of his practice. 
He began with a jurisprudential discussion of the ideal and equitable position of the law, 
in which he gave only one citation of Roman law (of C.4.65.8) in the first, second and 
third versions.173 He then examined the law in seventeenth-century Scotland. When 
preparing the fourth version, Stair added six citations of Roman law to his 
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jurisprudential discussion. He used Gudelinus when revising this passage. Their citations 
are compared in table two: 
 
Table Two: 
  Stair Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 3.7 
Inst.3.24 
Pr.1 & §.1. 
Inst.de.Locat.cond.  d. §. adeo. inst. de locat. & conduct. 
D.19.2.25pr  l.25 in prin. ff. eod. - 
D.19.2.15  
vid. l.15. ff. h. t. l. ex conducto. §.1. & §. ubicunque. Eod. 
tit.  
D.19.2.15.4  
d.l.15.§.4. ff.h.t d. l ex conducto. §. cum quidam & §. 
Papinianus. 
C.4.65.8  l.8. Cod. Locati. l. licet. C. de locat. & cond. 
D.19.2.25.6 
or 9 
l.25.§. 9. ff h.t. 
l. si merces §. vis major. ff. locati. 
C.4.65.9 l.9.C.h.t. l. emptorem. C. d tit. de loc. & cond. 
Comparing Stair and Gudelinus’ citations (bold font denotes citations 
added for Stair’s fourth version). 
 
Stair’s citation of D.19.2.25.9 was wrong; there was no such paragraph. The citation 
should have been of D.19.2.25.6. This may have been a simple printing error, the relief 
being inserted upside down. If this is correct, both Stair and Gudelinus cited Inst.3.24, 
D.19.2.15, D.19.2.15.4, C.4.65.8, C.4.65.9 and D.19.2.25.6. The difference was that 
Gudelinus identified the Roman texts by their opening words, while Stair gave the 
paragraph numbers. Stair must have checked and amended these citations when he 
borrowed them. This agrees with his practice of adding the paragraph numbers to his 
medieval-style citations for the printed editions.  
There is additional evidence that Stair examined these texts. First, Stair added for 
the fourth version the sentence and citation: “Neither is there any abatement where the 
Hire is a propertion [sic] of the Fruits l.25.§.9. ff h.t.” Here he paraphrased D.19.2.25.6, 
the text which he probably intended to cite. He could not have taken this from 
Gudelinus, who did not paraphrase D.19.2.25.6 and gave the citation in the context of 
common land used for grazing. Stair could only have paraphrased the text if he had 
                                                                                                                                                                           
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7, 10.53; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.53 cited C.4.65.1. 
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consulted it. Additional evidence that Stair consulted D.19.2.25.6 is his citation of 
D.19.2.25.pr. The prooemium of D.19.2.25 was not cited by Gudelinus. Stair must have 
read D.19.2.25.pr when checking D.29.2.25.6, decided that it was relevant, and included 
a citation of it in the fourth version.  
Secondly, Stair in the first, second and third versions stated: “this will take no 
place, if the abundance of another year compense the sterility of the former, l. 8. Cod. 
Locati.” For the fourth version he replaced the phrase “this will take no place, if the 
abundance of another year” with “but the plenty of the former year doth not”. This was 
likely a reflection of C.4.65.8: “et quae evenerunt sterilitates ubertate aliorum annorum 
repensatae non probabuntur [if the meagreness of the crop is not shown to have been 
offset by the abundance of other years [translation: Blume]]”. Stair borrowed a citation 
of C.4.65.9 from Gudelinus for the fourth version. He probably consulted C.4.65.8 (the 
text cited in the first, second and third versions) while checking C.4.65.9.  
Thirdly, Stair was led to a passage of the Institutes with which he was already 
familiar. Gudelinus cited Inst.3.24.3; Stair added a citation of Inst.3.24.pr-1. Although 
this was the first citation which Stair gave of Inst.3.24, the Institutes’ example of a tailor 
was reflected in Stair’s discussion of dying cloth as an example of location in the first, 
second and third versions. Stair may have been led back to Inst.3.24 by Gudelinus when 
preparing the fourth version, and added the relevant citation at that time.  
Finally, Gudelinus cited D.19.2.33, D.19.2.15.1, D.29.2.15.7 and C.4.65.8 
together: “d. l. si fundus. l. ex conducto. §.1. & §. ubicunque. eod. tit. l. licet. C. de locat. 
& cond.”
174
 Stair seems to have checked these texts. He rejected Gudelinus’ citation of 
D.19.2.33, likely because it concerns forfeiture of leased lands and was thus not strictly 
relevant, even though it did become associated with remissio mercedis in the literature 
of the ius commune. He did, however, borrow that of D.19.2.15, which was directly 
relevant. He did not cite the first sub-paragraph of the text, however, although he did 
later cite D.19.2.15.4. This is likely because D.19.2.15.1 was only broadly relevant. 
There was, however, an error in Stair’s use of two of the citations: D.19.2.15 and 
D.19.2.15.4 would have provided better authority if used the other way around. Stair 
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used D.19.2.15 as authority for the rule that “if there be any profite of the Fruit above 
the expenses, or work, the rent or hire should be due” and D.19.2.15.4 for the situation 
“in publick Calamities by War, not only the Cropt is taken away, but the Tennants are 
disinabled, and hindered to Labour”. Rather, D.19.2.15.4 applied to the rent and profits 
when arable land was sterile, while D.19.2.15 (specifically D.19.2.15.2) discussed 
“public Calamities”. These texts were used correctly by Gudelinus. Stair probably 
confused these citations when borrowing them, although the error could also have been 
made by the printer.  
Stair did not rely on Gudelinus when writing this passage for the first version: 
their structure was different (even though there were some parallels in language), and 
Stair’s citation of C.4.65.8 gave the paragraph number while Gudelinus’ gave the 
opening words (Stair does not seem to have made such changes to citations when 
writing the first version). When preparing the fourth version, Stair consulted Gudelinus 
and used him as a source of Roman law. He checked Gudelinus’ citations, which 
allowed him to: supplement them with the relevant paragraph numbers, include an 
additional citation of D.19.2.25.pr, cite Inst.3.24.pr and Inst.3.24.1, and make 
amendments to his general discussion.  
 
5.2.2 “Liberation from Obligations” 
 
Stair expanded his discussion of consignation for the third version.
175
 When preparing 
the fourth version, he added two citations: C.4.32.6 and C.4.32.19. These were borrowed 
from Gudelinus, who also discussed the consignation of funds with a magistrate.176 
These same citations were both given by Gudelinus in the medieval style, without 
paragraph numbers. Stair checked these citations and gave the paragraph numbers 
instead of the texts’ opening words. This suggests that Stair checked these citations 
when he borrowed them from Gudelinus. Additionally, both were also used by him in a 
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 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo, 3.7, 115. 
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 S.11.4/1.18.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 11.4, and Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.127L-R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 11.4. 
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 Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 3.12, 131-132. 
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manner which indicates some knowledge of the texts. C.4.32.19 allowed a debtor whose 
creditor refused payment to deposit the money with a temple or judge to avoid interest 
accruing. Stair used it as authority for depositing funds with the Clerk of Bills to stop 
“the running of Annuals” [i.e. annually accruing interest payments] where there is 
“absence, lurking or refusal of the Creditor”. C.4.32.6 allowed a debtor whose creditor 
was absent to deposit the money owed with a suitable office-bearer.
177
 Stair cited it as 
authority for depositing of money with “authore pretore”. Although the surrounding 
passage was otherwise unchanged, Stair’s use of the citations in these places indicates 
that he checked them. Further support for Stair having checked these citations is his 
rejection of Gudelinus’ citation of C.8.42.9, given after that of C.4.32.19. C.8.42.9 stated 
payment could only be effected at the location where the debt was due; it was thus 
irrelevant to Stair’s discussion. He presumably realised this when checking Gudelinus’ 
citations, which allowed him to reject this citation but borrow the other two.  
 
5.3  CONCLUSIONS  
 
Stair used Gudelinus for the first and fourth versions. Gudelinus was the only one of 
Stair’s three principal sources which was not consulted for the third version.178 Stair 
used De jure novissimo books one and three for his titles on obligations. This is 
expected: book one was on the law of persons and book three on obligations. Stair 
probably also consulted book two, on property law, for later titles of the Institutions.
179
 It 
is doubtful that Stair consulted the other books of De jure novissimo for the first version: 
the fourth was on judges and procedure, the fifth on public law (including criminal law), 
                                                           
177
 The Latin term used in the Codex text, “praesidem”, is translated “governor”. 
178
 Above, 4.2; below, 6.2. 
179
 Compare e.g. Stair and Gudelinus on the SC Trebellianum and Falcidian law [S.26.15/3.4.15. 1662 
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Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263 n.14. S.14.18/2.4.18 cited instead De jure novissimo. 
1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 14.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.174L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 
14.7; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 14.6; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 14.6 cited De jure novissimo.] It seems Stair borrowed the 
citation of the Libri feudorum 2.24 which he gave in that same passage from Gudelinus: De jure 
feudorum, 3.6.8, 89. This was Stair’s only citation of the Libri feudorum.  
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and the sixth on divine law. None were relevant to the first version.  
What material did Stair borrow from Gudelinus? Gordon said: “For his Roman 
law, however, [Stair] certainly used Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo.”180 Gordon was 
correct; twenty (15%) of Stair’s citations of Roman law in the titles on obligations in the 
first version were borrowed from Gudelinus. This included eight medieval-style 
citations. Indeed, all the citations of Roman law in “Parents and Children” were 
borrowed from Gudelinus.
181
 He borrowed these citations without checking them, 
although he checked some when preparing the third and fourth versions, as is seen from 
his addition of the relevant paragraph numbers to most of these citations. Stair also 
borrowed six citations from Gudelinus for his fourth version, and included another two 
citations, of the Institutes and a sub-paragraph of the Digest, after being led by 
Gudelinus to the surrounding title and paragraph respectively. Gudelinus identified these 
texts by their opening phrases, yet Stair gave the paragraph number. This shows that 
Stair checked these citations at the same time as he borrowed them. This is in keeping 
with his practice of checking the citations which he borrowed, and increasing the 
accuracy and detail of his citations, for the printed editions.
182
 
Stair also borrowed his citation of Caesar’s De bello Gallico from Gudelinus. He 
included this in the same passage as he inserted a citation of Aristotle which he 
borrowed from Grotius, Stair’s principal source for citations of writers of classical 
antiquity.  
More importantly, Gudelinus was Stair’s principal source for references to 
continental legal systems, specifically for five discussions in his titles of obligations. 
This included, from these titles: three of his five references to French law,183 three to of 
his four references to that of the Netherlands, his reference to Spanish law, one of his 
four references to German law, and two of his more general remarks about legal trends 
in Europe. Additionally, a reference to Portuguese law, a reference to Spanish law, and 
                                                           
180
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. 
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 The nine citations of Roman law in “Of Liberty” in the manuscripts were all also clearly borrowed 
from Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.3, 3-4. 
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 Above, 3.1.3. 
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another of his more general references to European law were borrowed from Gudelinus 
for the first version for “Of Liberty”.
184
 Gudelinus was also Stair’s source for his only 
reference in these titles to the laws of the Gauls and Belgae.  
Although Gudelinus was Stair’s source for these references to foreign systems, 
Gudelinus did not always explicitly refer to that particular nation. Rather, Stair 
sometimes extrapolated information about legal systems from citations of jurists from 
that country, from earlier discussions in Gudelinus, or from the title of the treatises cited. 
This included Stair’s remarks concerning French law, extrapolated from Gudelinus’ 
citation of French jurist Duarenus and from the title of Chassanaeus’ treatise. One of his 
references to Dutch law must likewise have been derived from Gudelinus as he was 
from the Spanish Netherlands.  
Further, the seven citations of continental jurists Stair borrowed from Gudelinus 
were all used in relation to continental law, including Stair’s only citations of 
Chassanaeus, Covarruvias, Balduinus, Boerius and Rebuffus and one of his two citations 
of Duarenus and Wesenbecius.185 A quarter of Stair’s citations of continental jurists in 
the third version was either of or borrowed from Gudelinus.
186
 Gudelinus was thus a 
very important source for Stair’s knowledge of continental jurisprudence in the first 
verion. This changed for the fourth version, for which Stair borrowed no additional 
juristic authority from Gudelinus. Instead, Vinnius was the more important source for 
continental juristic authority for the fourth version.187 
That Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo was Stair’s principal source for comparative 
law is unsurprising. The title of his work translates as ‘a commentary on the most recent 
law’. Stair recognised this and utilised Gudelinus to access that novelty. In taking from 
Gudelinus so many references to contemporary systems and continental jurists, Stair 
first made the Institutions as modern as possible and, secondly, drew on the law of 
neighbouring legal systems. This supports the idea that Stair wrote within the historical 
                                                           
184
 S.2.11/1.2.11. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 2.13; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.19L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 2.12; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 2.13. Gudelinus: De jure novissimo 1.4, 6. This was 
also noted by Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 265. 
185
 The other citation of Wesenbecius was borrowed from Vinnius: below, 6.1.3. 
186
 Eleven of the forty-five citations in the third version; forty-seven in the second. 
187
 Below, 6.3, 6.5. 
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and intellectual tradition of continental jurisprudence and learned law. It also shows as 
unsound Hutton’s declaration that Stair was “traditional, conservative and in many 
respects medieval in outlook and structure of thought”.188  
The structure of Stair’s discussions may have been inspired by Gudelinus. Stair 
began his discussions with an overview of natural law or Roman law, and then set out 
the rules in Scots law. This pattern was seen in Gudelinus. In De jure novissimo 1.13, a 
title used heavily by Stair, Gudelinus introduced Roman law then briefly mentioned 
“nostros [our]” reception. He then set out Roman law in greater detail, before outlining 
“moribus nostris [our customs]” going back to the law of the Gauls and Belgae with 
citation of relevant continental jurists, including Gregorius. This structure was also used 
in De jure novissimo 1.18, where Gudelinus discussed Roman and Canon law before 
discussing where “mores nostri [our customs]” diverged from Roman law. In De jure 
novissimo 3.5, Gudelinus set out Roman law, the Canon law, and then compared these 
with seventeenth-century law. This structural comparison has not been examined in any 
particular detail and further investigation would be required to determine whether Stair 
did model his structure, however loosely, on Gudelinus. At this point, all that can be said 
is that there was a similarity between the structures which the two jurists used and, as 
Gudelinus was a principal source for the first version, it is possible that Stair was 
influenced by Gudelinus in this way. 
How did Stair’s use of Gudelinus compare to his use of Grotius? More titles of 
the Institutions contained material borrowed from Grotius than Gudelinus, and there are 
more citations of De jure belli ac pacis than De jure novissimo. However, overall Stair 
borrowed more material from Gudelinus than from Grotius. Stair also used Gudelinus as 
a principal source not only for the first version but also for the fourth, whereas he used 
Grotius only as a principal source for the first version. Weighing the relative importance 
of these two jurists to Stair’s writing is inexact. For example, it was shown in the last 
chapter that Stair’s pattern of citation of natural law sources is, at least to some extent, a 
reflection of Grotius’ establishing natural law a posteriori. The comparison of Stair and 
Gudelinus’ structure may, however, indicate influence on this wider level. What this 
                                                           
188
 Hutton: “Stair’s philosophic prescursors”, 87. 
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brief comparison has shown is that Grotius cannot simply be accepted as Stair’s 
principal source.  
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6 
STAIR AND VINNIUS 
 
Three of Vinnius’ works are relevant to this thesis. The first is his Commentarius 
academicus et forensis, an extensive commentary on Justinian’s Institutes. It 
revealed influence from legal humanists, natural lawyers, and jurists writing on 
national law,
1
 and combined a philological-historical explanation of the law with a 
detailed account of Dutch practice. The second is his Notae,
2
 a work of annotations 
of Justinian’s Institutes “of a predominantly humanist nature”.
3
 The third is his 
Jurisprudentia contracta, a treatment of law and practice based on the systematic 
structure of Donellus’ commentary.
4
  
Stair did not cite Vinnius’ commentary. Gordon suggested Stair may have 
consulted it as it was popular in Scotland.
5
 Gordon put forward three passages of the 
Institutions as examples of Stair’s possible borrowing from either Vinnius’ 
commentary or Jurisprudentia contracta.
6
 The first was a discussion of accession of 
writing and painting which contained citations of Grotius and Mynsinger. This 
passage has already been shown to have been the source of Stair’s citation of 
Grotius. It will not be examined further here, as it is not in Stair’s titles on 
obligations, other than to confirm that the citation of Mynsinger was also borrowed 
from Vinnius’ commentary for Stair’s third version. The second and third of the 
passages noted by Gordon, both of which were on sale, were also borrowed from 
Vinnius’ commentary.
7
 Elsewhere, this writer has confirmed Stair’s use of Vinnius’ 
commentary in his discussion of partnership.
8
  
Passages of Vinnius’ Notae often included some of the same citations as the 
corresponding passages of his commentary. Some of the citations that Stair borrowed 
from Vinnius for the first version appeared only in the commentary: that must have 
                                                 
1
 Above, 3.2.6. 
2
 This was the name given to this work when incorporated into later editions of Vinnius’ commentary 
and that used in Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors. 
3
 Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors, 31; above, 3.2.6. 
4
 Above, 3.2.6; Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors, 27. 
5
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257. 
6
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257-258. 
7
 Below, 6.1.3, 6.2.2. 
8
 Wilson: “Stair and the Inleydinge of Grotius”, 267-268. 
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been Stair’s source. Other citations that he borrowed appeared in both the 
commentary and Notae. However, it seems probable that Vinnius’ commentary was 
still his source, but that these citations coincidentally appeared in the Notae because 
it was, in some respects, a heavily abbreviated version of the commentary.  
Stair did not use Vinnius for the second version but must have consulted 
Vinnius’ commentary for the third; there was no correlation with the Notae. When 
preparing the fourth version, Stair again consulted Vinnius’ commentary. Some of 
the citations added also appeared in the Notae. The 1665 edition of Vinnius’ 
commentary had included some of Vinnius’ Notae on certain texts.
9
 It is possible that 
Stair consulted a post-1665 edition of Vinnius’ commentary when preparing the third 
and fourth versions. The Notae will thus be discussed along with Vinnius’ 
commentary. 
Vinnius commentary (possibly with his Notae) was an important source for 
the authority cited in the Institutions. Stair borrowed four citations of Roman law in 
the first version and a further eleven in the fourth version. Stair borrowed four 
references to continental jurists from Vinnius for his titles on obligations: to 
Wesenbecius and Faber for the first version, to Cujacius for the third version, and 
another to Cujacius for the fourth version.  
Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta was less important as a source for Stair. 
Although Stair cited this treatise, he consulted it only when preparing the third 
version and made very limited use of it. 
 
6.1 STAIR’S USE OF VINNIUS’ COMMENTARY AND NOTAE FOR THE FIRST 
VERSION 
 
6.1.1 “Tutors and Curators” 
 
6.1.1.1 Stair’s citation of D.26.2.3 
 
Stair cited Inst.1.13.3 and D.26.2.3 in his discussion of tutors nominated in the will 
of a Roman paterfamilias: “A Tutor Testamentar, by the Civil Law, behoved to be 
                                                 
9
 Feenstra and Waal: Leyden Law Professors, 31. 
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either named in the Testament, or Codicills confirmed by Testament, l. 3. ff. de 
testamentaria tutela, and could only be given to such as were in patria potestate, §. 
3. Inst. de tutelis.”
10
 Both texts were relevant: Inst.1.13.3 said tutors could have been 
appointed by testament; D.26.2.3.pr said tutors could be legally constituted by 
testament or a codicil.  
Four points indicate that Stair borrowed his citation of D.26.2.3 from 
Vinnius. First, Stair cited D.26.2.3 with Inst.1.13.3; Vinnius cited D.26.2.3 in his 
commentary and Notae on Inst.1.13.3. Secondly, Stair and Vinnius cited D.26.2.3 in 
the same context, specifically in relation to confirmation of tutors named in a codicil. 
Thirdly, both Stair and Vinnius cited D.26.2.3 in the early-modern style. Finally, 
neither cited the prooemium, despite its particular relevance. 
  The similarity of the relevant passages in the commentary and the Notae 
make it impossible to determine which was Stair’s source. It is unlikely that Stair 
checked D.26.2.3; there was nothing in the surrounding passage of the Institutions 
which Stair could only have included had he read D.26.2.3 and doing so would have 




6.1.1.2 Stair’s citation of D.26.4.5 and D.26.4.6 
 
Later in “Tutors and Curators”, Stair again discussed Roman tutorship, specifically in 
relation to agnates as tutors. He cited D.26.4.5 and D.26.4.6 and referred to the XII 
Tables when discussing the rule that agnates became tutors of the children who were 
formerly in the deceased’s power.
12
 These texts were relevant: D.26.4.5.pr stated that 
“lex duodecim tabularum fecit tutores [the Law of the XII Tables made [agnates] 
tutors [translation by Watson]]”; D.26.4.6 discussed agnates being made tutors where 
the paterfamilias had died intestate, had not provided for a tutor in his will, or that 
tutor had died.  
The average reading of the reference in the manuscripts is: “l. 5. & 6. ff. de 
legit. tut”, although there were variations, which were probably errors made by the 
                                                 
10
 S.6.6/1.6.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 6.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.47R. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 6.5 and Adv.MS.25.1.7, 6.6 omitted the title and cited “L.3. Inst.”; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 
6.6.  
11
 Below, 8.1.3. 
12
 S.6.8/1.6.8. 
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copyists.
13
 This was therefore presumably how Stair wrote this citation in the first 
and second version. The citation in the third version was exactly the same. In the 
second printed edition, however, there was variation in the print-run: the Edinburgh 
University Law Library copy wrongly cited “l.6. & 6. ff. de legit. tit” but the 




Stair’s reference to the XII Tables was unusual. This was one of only six 
paragraphs of the third version which referred to the XII Tables.
15
 Three referred to 
the XII Tables simply as a source of ancient Roman law;
16
 another two referred to 
the XII Tables relating to inheritance.
17
 Stair’s reference to the XII Tables in “Tutors 
and Curators” was the only time he accompanied such a reference with citations of 
Roman law or any other authority.   
Stair borrowed these two citations and his reference to the XII Tables from 
Vinnius. It was established in the last comparison that Stair consulted and borrowed 
from Vinnius’ commentary or Notae on Inst.1.13. In both works on Inst.1.13.1, 
Vinnius also cited these two Digest texts and referred to the XII Tables. Both Stair 
and Vinnius gave these citations together. The difference was that Vinnius cited 
D.26.4.5.pr but Stair cited D.26.4.5 in its entirety in all four versions.
18
 Stair was not 
concerned with including references to sub-paragraphs before the fourth version;
19
 
that he omitted it here does not undermine this comparison. The relevant passages of 
Vinnius’ commentary and Notae were almost identical: which was his source is 
unclear.  
                                                 
13
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 6.8 read “L.15 of 6 ff de legit tutoribus”; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 6.8; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.48L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 6.8 read “L:5. C. d: degest: de legit”; 
Adv.MS.25.1.7, 6.8 read “L.5. C.6. digest: de legitt tutor:”; Adv.MS.S 25.1.12, 6.8. 
14
 Similar variations in the print-run were found in Mackenzie’s Institutions, Cairns: “The moveable 
text of Mackenzie: bibliographical problems for the Scottish concept of Institutional Writing”, 242-
244. 
15
 S.1.11/1.1.12, S.1.15/1.1.16, S.6.8/1.6.8, S.26.15/2.4.15, S.26.16/2.4.16, and S.30.2/3.8.2. 
16
 S.1.11/1.1.12, S.1.15/1.1.16, and S.26.15/2.4. 
17
 Stair quoted from Table 5.3 and described Table 5.4 [S. 30.2/3.8.2. and S.26.16/2.4.16 
respectively]. His quotation and description were correct to the Tables as preserved in seventeenth-
century copies of Justinian’s Institutes [Inst.2.22.pr; Inst.3.1.1; Inst.3.1.2]. Neither was correct to the 
modern understanding of the language of this source [M.H. Crawford (ed): Roman statutes, volume 2 
(Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 64, supplement, London, 1996), 580, 581].  
18
 The later editions of the Institutions (excluding Walker’s sixth edition) cited D.26.4.5.pr. This was a 
more detailed citation than ever appears to have been given by Stair himself. 
19
 Above, 3.1.3. 
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It seems unlikely that Stair checked the Digest. Although D.26.4.5.pr said it 
was by the law of the XII Tables that statutory tutors were made, Stair could have 
taken this information second-hand from Vinnius. Additionally, neither Stair nor 
Vinnius noted that the XII Tables were not discussed in D.26.4.6, although this may 
not be significant. Stair did, however, refer to agnates. This was a term not used in 
Vinnius or Inst.1.13 but used twice in D.26.4.6, but this was not an uncommon term 
and Stair could have used it independently of the Digest.   
 
6.1.2 “Obligations Conventional” 
 
Stair used two Greek terms when distinguishing bilateral (διπλευρος) contracts from 
unilateral (µονοπλευρος) obligations. These terms appeared in the manuscripts and 
both printed editions, although the spelling varied.
20
 Mersinis suggested that Stair 
invented these terms.
21
 Richter disputed this, and argued that Stair borrowed them 
from Vinnius’ Notae on Inst.3.13 and Inst.3.14 respectively.
22
 Although Richter was 
correct in rejecting Mersinis’ suggestion, given the terms’ appearance in the Notae, 
Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.3.14.2
23
 was in fact Stair’s source. 
The terms appeared in relation to two different titles of the Institutes in 
Vinnius’ Notae. They appeared together, however, in Vinnius’ commentary:  
 
Nimirum, quod hic notandum est, contractuum quidam sunt µονόπλευροι, 




without doubt, this is observed, certain contracts are unilateral, which 
oblige only one side, others bilateral, which oblige both sides.  
 
                                                 
20
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.3 gave µονοπ-ευρος and διπλευρος [‘-’ indicates that a letter has 
been obscured by a later unknown hand]; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.3 µονοηελευρος and διπλευρος; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.88R µονοπλεορος οιω and διπολεορος. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.3 gave 
µονοπλςορος and διπλεορος; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.3 µονοπλεοµος and διπλεορος; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 
10.3 µονσπλεοςος and διπλεοςος. The third version gave µονοπλςυρος and δυπλευρος. The fourth 
version gave µονοπλευρος and δευπλευρος. These were orthographical fluctuations rather than errors. 
The spellings may have been decided by the copyist or printer. 
21
 T. Mersinis: “Stair, Institutions, 1.10.5: a linguistic note” (1996-1997) 1(3) Edin.L.R. 368-370, 369. 
22
 Richter: “Did Stair know Pufendorf?”, 374-375. He referred to the Notae as Vinnius’ commentary. 
23
 Vinnius’ numbering of the titles of the third book of the Institutes was correct to seventeenth 
century copies. Krueger’s edition of the Institutes changed the order of titles. For clarity, here the 
citations will refer to the Institutes title as it is now known to be numbered, then give its number in 
Vinnius in brackets. Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.3.14.2 (Inst.3.15.2), para 2. 
24
 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.3.14.2 (Inst.3.15.2), para 2. 
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Stair’s wording was very similar to that in Vinnius’ commentary. Vinnius’ phrasing 
probably influenced Stair, who distinguished “Obligations and Contracts, the former 
being only where the Obligation is µονοπλςυρος on the one part; the other where the 
Obligation is δυπλευρος an Obligation on both parts.”
25
 
Two points should be noted in relation to Stair’s borrowing these terms from 
Vinnius’ commentary. First, although both terms were included when Stair wrote the 
first version, it was only in the fourth version that Stair cited Inst.3.14 (the title to 
which Vinnius’ commentary related). This shows that Stair for the first version used 
Vinnius’ commentary on titles of the Institutes which he did not cite at that time.
26
 
Stair did the same when using Vinnius for the later versions of the Institutions. 
Secondly, Stair’s borrowing these two Greek terms from Vinnius mirrors his drawing 
other Greek terms from Grotius.
27
 All four of the Greek terms in the first version 
have therefore been shown to have been borrowed.  
 
6.1.3 “Obligations Conventional/Permutation and Sale”  
 
Stair discussed two alternative interpretations of the role of earnest in sale: that as 
“evidence of the Bargain closed and perfected” (arra confirmatoria); and that of a 
method of compensating one party should the other withdraw from the contract (arra 
poenalis).
28
 These two views can be traced back to Roman law. Roman earnest 
(arra) has been the subject of much academic controversy. Arra poenalis featured in 
two plays by Plautus, a Roman dramatist who lived 254-184BC. Plautus’ plays were 
based on Greek stories. It has been debated whether he was presenting Greek arra or 







 suggested that arra poenalis was not recognised in Roman law but was 
used in Roman practice during the Republic. Thomas believed arra had “primarily 




 This would still be true had Stair used Vinnius’ Notae, as the term µονοπλευρος would still have to 
have been borrowed from Vinnius’ notes on Inst.3.14. 
27
 Above, 4.1.5, 4.1.7. 
28
 S.10.65/1.14.3. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 10.49; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.109R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.49. 
29
 M. McAuley: “One thousand years of arra” (1977) 23(4) McGill L.J. 693-706, 695-698; 
Zimmermann: Law of Obligations, 231-232. 
30
 A. Watson: The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1965), esp. 53.  
31
 J.M. Thomson: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law” (1970) 5(1) Irish Jurist 179-187, 184. 
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an evidentiary function but provision could be made for its use in a penal role for 






 argued that 
the law of the Roman Republic recognised arra poenalis
35
 before the development of 
consensual contracts.  
250 years after Plautus, Gaius stated that Roman law recognised only arra 
confirmatoria.
36
 This was markedly different to Plautus’ description of arra. Again, 




 suggested that, 
by the classical period, arra confirmatoria had replaced penal arra. Thomson 
disagreed: “we would be wrong to conclude, that in the day to day business of the 
commercial world its rôle was so restricted.”
39
  
The particular focus of academic debate has been Justinianic law. C.4.21.17.2 
is generally read as providing for arra poenalis in written contracts.
40
 Depending on 
one’s view of the role of arra in classical law, C.4.21.17.2 can be seen either as “a 
continual evolution of Roman legal principles”
41
 or as Justinianic reform. 
Understanding of Roman arra has been complicated by Inst.3.23.pr, which first 
described earnest as arra confirmatoria in unwritten contracts of sale, but then seems 
to have allowed for arra poenalis in both written and unwritten contracts.
42
 Scholars 
attempting to reconcile these texts have argued that law and practice were not the 
same,
43
 or have reinterpreted the wording of the texts.
44
 Tylor suggested that arra 
was evidentiary in “informal sales”, those perfected by the agreement on the price, 
but that it was penal for “formal sales”, those perfected by a required formality.
45
 
                                                 
32
 J.A.C. Thomas: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law” (1956) 24 T.v.R. 253-278, 261.  
33
 J.A. Crook: Law and Life of Rome, 90B.C. – A.D.212: Aspects of Greek and Roman Life (Ithaca 
NY, 1967 rept. Ithaca NY, 1984), 220. 
34
 McAuley: “One thousand years of arra”, 698. 
35
 G. MacCormack: “A note on arra in Plautus” (1971) 6(2) Irish Jurist 360-366, 364-366. 
36
 Gai.3.139; D.18.1.35.pr. 
37
 McAuley: “One thousand years of arra”, 699. 
38
 Crook: Law and Life of Rome, 220. 
39
 Thomson: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law”, 184. 
40
 e.g. McAuley: “One thousand years of arra”, 703, Thomson: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law”, 180; 
Cf. A.M. Honoré: “Arra as you were” (1961) 77(2) L.Q.R. 172-175 generally. 
41
 Thomson: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law”, 187. 
42
 e.g. McAuley: “One thousand years of arra”, 704-5. 
43
 Thomas: “Arra in sale in Justinian’s law”, 275-277; confirmed in J.A.C. Thomas: “A postscript on 
arra” (1959) 10(1) Iura 109-112 generally. 
44
 A. Watson: “Arra in the law of Justinian” (1959) 6(3) R.I.D.A. 385-389 generally; Honoré: “Arra as 
you were” generally; M.L. Marasinghe: “Arra – not in dispute” (1973) 20(3) R.I.D.A. 349-353 
generally. 
45
 T.H. Tylor: “Writing and arra in sale under the Corpus iuris” (1961) 77(1) L.Q.R. 77-82 passim. 
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Thomson argued that the texts cannot be reconciled as the compilers of the Institutes 
did not compare their text to the Digest and Codex, hence such inconsistencies.
46
 It is 
unfeasible here to re-assess Roman arra. What this overview has shown is that, 
taking account of written or unwritten contracts, arra had a two-fold purpose under 
Justinianic law: both evidentiary and penal. 
Stair presented evidentiary and penal earnest as two different juristic 
interpretations of the same legal institution rather than rules which seem to have 
differentiated between written and unwritten contracts. He believed that Scots law 
had accepted arra confirmatoria because “ordinarly with us, Earnest is so 
inconsiderable that it cannot be thought to be the meaning of the parties to leave the 
Bargain Arbitrary, on the losing or doubling thereof”.
47
 This agreed with 
Mackenzie’s description of earnest: “though earnest, or arles be given as a Symbole 




Stair summarised the Roman position as arra poenalis; as authority he cited 
C.4.21.17 and Inst.3.23.pr “And many Interpreters” (who he did not name). He thus 
cited the most important Roman texts, although he did not acknowledge the 
evidentiary role of earnest discussed at the beginning of Inst.3.23.pr. He gave 
“Wezenbecius, Faber and others” as authority for arra confirmatoria. Stair did not 
provide enough detail in his citation of either Wesenbecius or Faber to determine the 
passages to which he intended to refer; the relevant passages have been found by 
examining Stair’s source for these citations.  
Gordon discussed Stair’s use of Vinnius only briefly. This was one of two 
examples that he used to show that “Stair used Vinnius’s commentary or his 
Partitiones [Jurisprudentia contracta] or both”.
49
 He observed:  
 
Vinnius in his Partitiones [Jurisprudentia contracta] cites Wesenbeck 
and refers for fuller information to Donellus on C 4.21.17. In his 
commentary on Inst 3.23pr (Inst 3.24pr in the numeration used by 
Vinnius) at no 13, Vinnius cites Johannes Faber, Cynus, Bartolus, 
                                                 
46




 Mackenzie’s Institutions 3.3, 233. He did not mention an alternative interpretation of earnest. 
49
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257. 
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Oldendorp, Wesenbeck, Donellus, Diodorus Tuldenus and Christinaeus 




Gordon did not say whether he thought Vinnius’ commentary or his Jurisprudentia 
contracta was Stair’s likely source here, or whether he believed that Stair used both 
treatises. Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta was probably not Stair’s source. Stair 
cited Wesenbecius with Faber; Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta cited Wesenbecius 
with Donellus.
51
 It is unlikely that Stair would have been led to Vinnius’ 
commentary on Inst.3.23.pr by the citation in the Jurisprudentia contracta, as there 
is no evidence that Stair consulted the latter before he revised the third version.
52
 
Checking references was also not generally part of Stair’s method when writing the 
first version. Vinnius’ Notae could not have been Stair’s source as neither 
Wesenbecius nor Faber were cited anywhere within the Notae on Inst.3.23.  
Stair’s source was Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.3.23. Vinnius, like Stair, 
discussed penal and evidentiary earnest as two juristic interpretations of the same 
legal institution. Vinnius favoured penal earnest. He explained that C.4.21.17 did not 
allow a party to unilaterally recede from a perfected contract. He then set out the 
opposing view of earnest, as money given when the contract was perfected as 
evidence of the perfected contract. Vinnius admitted that the latter was usual 
practice, but defended his view by explaining that both written and unwritten 
contracts took time to negotiate, and during this period penal earnest gave protection 
to the contracting parties.  
Stair’s discussion reflected Vinnius in two ways. First, both Stair and Vinnius 
set out the different roles of earnest as these two differing views of the same legal 
institution. This was a different interpretation of earnest than that in the Institutes, 
which set out the roles of earnest according to whether a contract was written or 
unwritten. This brings us to the second similarity. Vinnius regarded earnest as penal, 
irrespective of whether the contract was written or “verum etiam cum sine scriptis [in 
truth also when without writing].”
53
 Stair also omitted to address the role of writing 
in relation to earnest, despite this being important in both Inst.3.23.pr and C.4.21.17. 
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Stair was influenced by Vinnius’ rejection of the criterion of writing regarding 
Inst.3.23.pr. Yet Stair was not influenced by Vinnius’ preference for penal earnest. 
Stair preferred evidentiary earnest on the basis of scripture and the nominal value of 
earnest in Scottish practice.
54
 This, again, shows that Stair was influenced by, but did 
not accept unquestioningly, the views of his sources.  
Stair borrowed his authority from Vinnius. In his commentary on Inst.3.23.pr, 
the paragraph of the Institutes cited by Stair, Vinnius cited C.4.21.17 around ten 
times. He also referred to five different jurists commenting on the text. Stair would 
thus have known from reading Vinnius not only the content of the Codex passage, 
but also that it was a key text in relation to arra. It is unlikely that Stair checked 
C.4.21.17 as he does not discuss the text, but merely used it to support the view 
(which he rejected) of earnest as penal. That he did not check the text is also 
supported by his lack of reference to the issue of writing in relation to Justinianic 
arra. 
That both jurists cited Wesenbecius and Faber further supports the argument 
that Stair used Vinnius. Gordon referred to a passage of Vinnius’ commentary where 
Wesenbecius and Faber were cited with six other jurists.
55
 Examination of various 
titles of Vinnius’ commentary shows that he generally divided strings of citations of 
continental jurists into two categories: those who belonged to the first schools after 
the rediscovery of the Corpus iuris civilis (the Glossators, ultramontani and 
Commentators), and those who wrote in the more recent period. Vinnius’ 
commentary on Inst.3.23.pr
56
 cited Faber, an ultramontani,
57
 with the Commentators 
Bartolus (1313/1314-1357) and Cynus de Pistoia (1270-1336/1337). Wesenbecius 
was cited after Johannes Oldendorp (1488-1567), a German humanist, with Donellus, 
Diodorus Tuldenus (c.1595-1645), a Dutch jurist and professor at Leuven, and 
Paulus Christinaeus (1553-1631), who wrote on the law of the Spanish Netherlands 
(now Belgium). Stair may have borrowed the citation of Faber as the first in Vinnius’ 
list of earlier jurists. His citation of Wesenbecius is more complex, being given after 
Oldendorp. Perhaps Stair rejected the citation of Oldendorp because he felt that one 




 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257-258. 
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of Wesenbecius was more compelling, being the more famous jurist. This was one of 
various instances in which Stair borrowed from his source a limited number of 
citations from a list of jurists.
58
  
Vinnius cited Wesenbecius’ Paratitla, which he edited, enlarged, and had 
published in 1648.
59
 Wesenbecius also discussed the two views of earnest. He agreed 
with the use of earnest as a penalty:  
 
Arrharum tamen datio, quasi contractus quidam per se existens l.3.C. de 





However, by the giving of earnest a certain quasi-contract exists. C.5.1.3 
will operate in this case, so that whoever turns his back on completing 
the contract loses what he gave. 
 
Vinnius’ citation of Wesenbecius was thus correct and relevant. What Wesenbecius 
did not do was distinguish between earnest in written and unwritten contracts.  
Earnest was discussed in the first set of additiones to Faber’s commentary on 
Inst.3.23.pr.
61
 At paragraph seven, the differing views of earnest were discussed, but 
there was no distinction made between earnest in written and unwritten contracts. As 
in Stair, Wesenbecius and Vinnius, the two purposes of interest were set out as two 
different interpretations of the same legal institution. Faber’s text in the edition 
consulted has been corrupted by later amendments and printing errors, which seems 
to have had the result of making the text internally incoherent and inconsistent.
62
 
However, it seems that penal earnest was preferred.
63
 Vinnius’ citation certainly 
identified the relevant passages of Faber’s work.  
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 It is highly unlikely that Stair consulted Faber. This is confirmed in that that 
he gave Wesenbecius as authority for confirmatory earnest, when in fact 
Wesenbecius supported penal earnest; he clearly did not check Wesenbecius. It is 
even less likely that Stair would have checked a reference in an ultramontani work. 
The comparison between Stair and Vinnius is complicated. In the period 
since Justinian, the focus of the debate regarding earnest seems, on this short survey, 
to have shifted. The distinction between the role of earnest in written and unwritten 
contracts seems no longer to have been the principal concern, at least among the 
jurists examined here. Rather, the two roles of earnest, evidentiary and penal, became 
two differing views of the same institution. That Stair cited Wesenbecius and Faber 
as supporting the view that earnest was evidentiary was neither consistent with their 
views nor with their citation in Vinnius. This makes it unlikely that he consulted 
either treatise. Additionally, there does not seem to be anything in this passage of 
Stair which could have been borrowed from either Wesenbecius or Faber. Although 
there remain questions about the reception of arra into the continental literature, and 
Stair’s slightly different use of these citations to that of Vinnius, it is clear that 
Vinnius’ commentary was Stair’s source here. 
 
6.2 STAIR’S USE OF VINNIUS’ COMMENTARY FOR THE THIRD VERSION 
 
6.2.1  “Conjugal Obligations” 
 
Stair revised his discussion of whether parental consent was needed for a marriage 
between young people in the third version. He added a new explanation of the law of 
Holland: “the Magistrate or Minister, Celebrator of the Marriage, may refuse to 
proceed without consent of the Parents; as by the Law and Custom of Holland, Art. 
3. Ord. Pol.”
64
 This citation was of the Politieke Ordonnantie van de Staten van 
Holland 1580, an ordinance which for the first time in Europe allowed civil marriage 
as well as religious marriage.
65
 The citation was correct and relevant; article three 




 L. Kooijmans and C. Misset: “Van rebellen tot ‘koningen in eigen huis’: opstand, regentenbewind 
en politieke cultuur” in T. de Nijs and E. Beukers (eds): De Geschiedenis van Holland verschijnt 
onder auspiciën van de Stichting Geschiedschrijving Holland volume 2 (Hilversum, 2002) 9, 25. 
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explained that a young couple would not be married before the magistrate was 
informed of their parents’ consent. Ford noted that this citation was unique: 
“Elsewhere, information on the laws of neighbouring nations was always drawn from 
the descriptions provided by other writers”.
66
 This was the only statute of a 
continental jurisdiction cited by Stair.
67
 The ordinance was in Dutch. There has 
previously been speculation as to whether Stair could read Dutch. Elsewhere, this 
writer has shown that there was little reason for him to have learned Dutch before 
going into exile in the Netherlands, after the Institutions was printed in 1681.
68
 
Presumably, therefore, Stair borrowed this citation from a treatise without checking 
it: but which was his source? 
Ford previously suggested that Stair borrowed this citation from Corvinus, 
who was cited in this discussion in the first and second versions of the Institutions.
69
 
It will be shown in the next chapter that Corvinus was not in fact Stair’s source for 
this citation. Indeed, Stair borrowed this citation from Vinnius’ commentary on 
Inst.1.10.pr. Here Vinnius explained that a celebrant would only marry a couple 
should their intentions have been announced, and should their parents have had a 
certain period to object to the marriage.
70
 This was an accurate description of the 
Ordonnantie and could easily be the source of Stair’s comment concerning the 
celebrant’s right to refuse to conduct the ceremony. Vinnius then cited the 
Ordonnantie “art.3. ord. pol.”
71
 Stair’s citation was thus identical to Vinnius’. It is 
therefore clear that Stair borrowed this citation from Vinnius without checking it 
when preparing the third version. 
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6.2.2 “Obligations Conventional/Permutation and Sale” 
  
Stair’s view, as expressed in the printed editions of the Institutions, that risk in sale 
pertained to the seller was in contrast to the majority view that the buyer bore the 
risk. It was the majority view which was the position of Roman law, and of 




Stair may not always have been of the minority view. A large passage of text, 
which featured in the manuscripts, was removed for the third version.
73
 It stated that:  
 
the intention and tendency of the property being to the buyer, if the seller 
be not in mora, the case is as if the delivery were made and the property 





This passage seems to have held that the buyer bore the risk. Stair’s first and second 
versions therefore seem to have supported the majority view. That Stair removed this 
passage when preparing the third version suggests that he had changed his view from 
the majority to the minority view.  
Following on from that passage, Stair questioned whether, according to Scots 
law, the buyer would have to pay if the property had been destroyed. This discussion 
was expanded as Stair revised the Institutions. In the first version, he stated it was 
likely that “the buyer would not have payed willingly, which therefore seems to be 
our Custome”.
75
 In the second version, he added: “seeing none have obtained price, 
who did not deliver or offer”.
76
 In the third version, he added a citation of Cujacius’ 
commentary on Africanus on D.19.2.33.
77
  
It seems that Stair was originally aware of, but did not hold, the view that the 
risk should fall on the seller by virtue of his continued ownership of the property 
until delivery. Indeed, Grotius explained this in De jure belli 2.12, a title used 
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extensively by Stair for the first version.
78
 Here Grotius gave the example of risk 
passing to the buyer as one of the “commenta sunt juris civilis, quod nec ubique 
observatur [fictions of the civil law not universally recognized [translation: 
Kelsey]]” and said of seventeenth-century law “res erit commodo & periculo 
venditoris [both gain and loss in the commodity will fall to the seller [translation: 
Kelsey]]”.
79
 Stair was not persuaded by Grotius’ view when writing the first version. 
Later, when preparing the third version, Stair changed his mind, amended his text 
accordingly, and added this citation of Cujacius as authority.  
What was the reason for this change? Stair did not consult Cujacius himself. 
Cujacius discussed D.19.2.33 in its limited context, namely where the confiscation of 
farmland subject to a lease gave rise to an action for simple damages for the value of 
the price. He stated that this was not the normal understanding of risk in sale: “Quod 
est contra id, quod vulgo dici solet, perfecta emptione periculum omne pertinere ad 
emptorem [but this is contrary to what is commonly said, that after the sale is 
perfected, all risk pertains to the buyer]”.
80
 He did not suggest that risk in sale 
generally fell on the seller. Stair’s using this text incorrectly is explained by his 
borrowing this citation from Vinnius without checking it.  
Gordon noted the similarity of this passage of Stair’s Institutions to both 
Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta and commentary.
81
 Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia 
contracta can be dismissed as Stair’s source; it discussed Cujacius in relation to 
confiscation of property, not risk in sale. Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.3.23.3
82
 was 
Stair’s source. Here Vinnius stated that Cujacius believed that risk fell on the seller 
rather than the buyer; he thus misinterpreted Cujacius’ discussion.  
Stair’s and Vinnius’ citations of Cujacius were not identical. Stair cited 
“Cujac. Ad L 33 ff Locati.” while Vinnius stated “Africani in l. si findus. 33. locat. 
turbavit summos viros, Cujacium tract. 8. ad African. [Africanus D 19.2.33, perturbs 
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the greatest of men, including Cujacius On Africanus]”.
83
 This difference in their 
citations is easily explained: Vinnius cited D.19.2.33 as a text of Africanus, and then 
just three words later gives Cujacius on Africanus. Stair could easily have combined 
these two citations to read “Cujac. ad L.33. ff Locati”.  
Vinnius also cited Borcholten, a sixteenth century German jurist, and 
Vultejus, a late-sixteenth- to early-seventeenth-century German jurist, as supporting 
the minority view that the seller bore the risk.
84
 Therefore, although Vinnius did not 
hold the minority view, he nonetheless indicated that there was significant support 
for it. It is possible that Stair reconsidered his view of risk in sale after learning that 
such “summos viros [greatest men]” supported the minority view when reading 
Vinnius for the third version, or that he had already been thinking along these lines 
and simply borrowed these citations to support his new view. This again shows that 
Stair used Vinnius but did not support the view of the law held by him. Rather, as in 
the case of earnest, Stair adopted the opposing side of the academic debate without 
consulting the treatise of the jurist whom he purported to follow. 
In sum, when writing the first version, Stair seemingly supported the 
dominant view, derived from Roman law and received into Scots law,
85
 that the 
buyer bore the risk in sale. He clearly knew that there were opposing views. He 
might have learned this from his experience in practice or from his consultation of 
Grotius’ De jure belli. Grotius supported the view that the seller bore the risk, but 
Stair was not influenced by this when reading Grotius for the first version. When 
preparing the third version, Stair consulted Vinnius and learned that some of the 
great jurists – including supposedly Cujacius – supported the minority view that the 
seller bore the risk. He may also have recalled Grotius’ support for that view. Either 
way, before or during his preparation of the third version, Stair changed his view of 
risk in sale and began supporting the minority view. He removed a large passage of 
text from the Institutions; this meant that the third version supported the minority 
view. He also borrowed Vinnius’ citation of Cujacius as authority. Stair clearly 
regarded Cujacius as persuasive; he cited him three times in the Institutions.
86
 He did 
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not check Cujacius, however, and was thus unaware that he did not actually support 
the view for which he was cited by Vinnius’ commentary.  
 
6.2.3  “Rights Real” 
 
For the third version, Stair borrowed a citation of Grotius from Vinnius.
87
 Stair 
checked this citation, but his use of Grotius at that time was limited to the paragraphs 
surrounding the one Stair was led to by Vinnius. This observation was fundamentally 
important because it shows why Stair returned to Grotius for the third version.
88
  
 It is worth noting that the citation of Mynsinger, which Stair gave with that of 
Grotius, was also borrowed from Vinnius.
89
 Vinnius’ citation here read: “Mynsing. 
hic. ex nostris Grotius lib.2. manuduct. c.8. add. Diod. Tuld. hic. c.38.” Although 
Stair cited Grotius then Mynsinger, it is clear that Vinnius was his source.  
Vinnius cited Tuldenus with Grotius and Mynsinger. Again, Stair did not 
borrow all the citations of jurists given by his source (in this case Vinnius). However, 
Stair’s comment “Grotius, Minsynger [sic] and others” clearly reflects this additional 
citation in Vinnius. 
 
6.3 STAIR’S USE OF VINNIUS’ COMMENTARY AND NOTAE FOR THE 
FOURTH VERSION 
 
6.3.1  “Reparation” 
 
Stair’s discussion of reparation has received some attention in recent years, much of 
which has focused on two passages: S.9.4/1.9.4 and S.9.6/1.9.6.
90
 In S.9.4/1.9.4, he 
divided delinquencies into five categories, specifically those against: “Life, and 
Members, and Health”; “our Liberty”; “Fame, Reputation and Honour”; “Content, 
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Delight, or Satisfaction” (praetium affectionis); and “Goods and Possession”.
91
 
MacQueen and Sellar suggested that these categories were “clearly influenced by 
Grotius.”
92
 Stair’s preceding paragraph was also influenced by Grotius.
93
  
Yet Stair used Vinnius, not Grotius, when revising his discussion of “Life, 
and Members, and Health” for the fourth version, when he added a citation of 
Cujacius. This was one of only two citations of continental jurists added in the fourth 
version.
94
 There were no other changes made to this brief passage since the first 
version.
95
 The passage Stair used here was Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.4.3, which 
was on the lex Aquilia, the Roman statute on wrongful damage to property.
96
 The lex 
Aquilia never allowed for damages resulting from the death of a freeman, but the 
reparation of the deceased’s family (recognised in Germanic customary law) was 
treated by the Dutch jurists as an extension of the Aquilian action.
97
 Although Stair 
added more than forty citations of Roman law to “Reparation” for the fourth version, 
he never cited Inst.4.3. Yet MacQueen and Sellar observed that, in Stair’s discussion 
of dolus and culpa, “the influence of the contemporary natural law interpretation of 
Aquilian liability is clearly apparent.”
98
 Stair, therefore, again used Vinnius’ 
commentary on a passage of the Institutes which was not cited in the Institutions.
99
  
Stair and Vinnius cited Cujacius’ Observationes et emendationes in the same 
context: reparation for the family of the person killed. Stair’s citation, “Cuja. Obs. 
14. c.4.”, was almost exactly the same as Vinnius’: “Cuiac.14. obs.4.”
100
 The citation 
was accurate and relevant; this chapter of Cujacius was entitled “non esse novum, ut 
pars bonorum eius qui caedem fecerit addicatur occisi liberis, vel parentibus, vel 
uxori [it is not new that a part of the killer’s goods is adjudged to the children, 
parents or wife of the deceased]”. He stated that this rule “invenio factitatum [I come 
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across frequently]”, before giving a historical account of the issue.
101
 There is 
nothing to suggest that Stair checked Cujacius.  
In sum, when writing the first version, Stair read and was seemingly 
influenced by Grotius and natural law. When preparing the fourth version, he 
consulted Vinnius and found and borrowed, without checking it, a citation of 
Cujacius. Another of Stair’s citations of Cujacius, added for the third version, was 
borrowed from Vinnius’ commentary without being checked. 
 
6.3.2 “Obligations Conventional/Mandate or Commission”  
 
6.3.2.1 Stair’s citation of D.47.10.11.3 and C.9.2.5 
 
In the third version, Stair added a passage which explained that the giving of advice 
was not the same as entering into a contract of mandate. This was a synopsis of 
Inst.3.26.6. He did not cite Inst.3.26.6 but must have consulted it, or a source which 
described it closely, when preparing this version.
 102
 
In the fourth version, he added to this passage citations of D.47.10.11.3 and 
C.9.2.5. These were relevant: D.47.10.11.3 explained that both the mandator and 
promissor were liable for any action of iniuria arising from the mandate; C.9.2.5 said 
that there was no defence in claiming that a crime was commissioned by another. 
Stair borrowed these two citations either from Vinnius’ commentary or from 
his Notae on Inst.3.26.7.
103
 In the following sentence of the fourth version, Stair 
added a citation of Inst.3.26.8. Inst.3.26.7 was thus immediately between the passage 
of which Stair gave a synopsis in the third version and that which he cited in the 
fourth. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Stair would have known this passage, 
and read Vinnius’ commentary on it. 
There are three indications that Vinnius was Stair’s source for these citations. 
First, both Stair and Vinnius gave the same two citations, including the same sub-
paragraph of D.47.10.11. Stair did not often cite specific sub-paragraphs of the 
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Digest or Codex, although he was trying to make his citations more detailed in the 
fourth version.
104
 Secondly, the citations appeared together, in the same order, and in 
the early-modern style in both the Institutions and in both works of Vinnius. Finally, 
the surrounding passage in Vinnius was on the same topic as that which Stair had 
discussed in the first edition. Stair could have realised the relevance of these citations 
to his own discussion when reading Vinnius. As Vinnius gave these citations in both 
his commentary and Notae, and as there are no other changes made to Stair’s 
surrounding text, it is unclear which was Stair’s source. It was, however, most likely 
his commentary, given his obvious use of it elsewhere when preparing the fourth 
version. 
Did Stair check these citations? In both of Vinnius’ works, D.47.10.11.3 and 
C.9.2.5 were cited with other Roman law texts; Stair did not borrow the full list of 
authority given by Vinnius. Vinnius gave four citations of Roman law in the 
commentary; D.47.10.11.3 and C.9.2.5 were the second and third texts cited. The 
first citation was of D.48.8.15, which stated that it made no difference whether 
someone killed or occasioned the death. The final citation of Roman law in that list 
was of C.9.6.6, which discussed the effect of the death of the accused (in the 
prooemium) or the accuser (in the first sub-paragraph) where an appeal had been 
made against a sentence of relegation or capital punishment. Vinnius gave three 
citations in the Notae. The other text cited was D.47.10.44, which discussed someone 
who allowed smoke to affect his neighbour’s property or dropped or poured 
something onto a neighbour. None of these other three texts would have lent support 
to Stair’s discussion. If Vinnius was Stair’s source, he must have checked, and 
decided to reject, these citations.  
In sum, when preparing the third version, Stair added a synopsis of, but did 
not cite, Inst.3.26.6. Whether he read the Institutes directly or indirectly through a 
different source is unknown. When preparing the fourth version, he consulted 
Vinnius on Inst.3.26.7, the following paragraph. Here he found these citations of 
Roman law, and borrowed them. These were checked by Stair, which allowed him to 
reject the citations of less relevant texts also given by Vinnius.  
  
                                                 
104
 Above, 3.1.3. 
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6.3.2.2 Stair’s citation of D.50.17.47 
 
Stair also amended his next paragraph in the fourth version. In the third version, he 
had stated that a mandate could benefit the mandator or a third party but not the 
promissor only. In the fourth version, the reference to the third party he replaced with 
one to fraud, and added a citation of D.50.17.47.
105
 The acknowledgement of liability 
for fraud did not sit well with the general context of the passage. It seems likely that 
Stair borrowed this citation from a source in which liability for fraud was discussed 
in the wider context of the rule that the promissor could not be the only party to have 
benefited from the mandate. 
Stair’s previous paragraph had explained that giving advice was not enough 
for mandate. This was the point made in Inst.3.26.6. Vinnius cited D.50.17.47 in his 
commentary and Notae on Inst.3.26.6. There are two other indications that Vinnius’ 
commentary on Inst.3.26.6 was Stair’s source here. First, Stair borrowed from 
Vinnius’ commentary or Notae on Inst.3.26.7 (the next paragraph of the Institutes) 
for the previous passage of the Institutions for the fourth version.
106
 The proximity of 
these citations in both Vinnius and Stair supports the suggestion that Vinnius was his 
source. Secondly, Vinnius discussed liability for fraud (for giving malicious advice) 
within the context of Inst.3.26.6. This explains Stair’s addition of this remark 
concerning fraud, and the odd manner in which it was inserted into the fourth 
version.  
D.50.17.47 did discuss liability for fraudulent advice. The discussions in both 
Vinnius’ commentary and Notae here were very similar. In the Notae, this text was 
cited alone. If Stair’s source was Vinnius’ commentary, it is probable that he checked 
this text. Vinnius gave this as the first in a list of five citations.
107
 The other four 
were not relevant to mandate but concerned: fraudulent declarations of solvency 
(D.4.3.8), fraudulent oaths by legatees (D.4.3.23), fraudulently encouraging slaves to 
leave the possession of their master (D.4.3.31), and said that slave-traders who had 
become surety for a debt were not mandators (D.50.14.2). If Vinnius’ commentary 
was Stair’s source (which seems probable), Stair seems to have checked these 




 Above, 6.3.2.1. 
107
 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.3.26.6 (Inst.3.27.6), 3 
 - 235 - 
citations, found them irrelevant, and rejected them accordingly. This indicates that he 
checked D.50.17.47. This would be consistent with his method generally for the 
fourth version.  
 
6.3.3 “Obligations Conventional/Society” 
 
Stair added twenty-four citations of Roman law to “Obligations 
Conventional/Society” for the fourth version. Seven were of paragraphs of Inst.3.25. 
Another eight were borrowed from Vinnius’ discussion of Inst.3.25. These eight 
citations appeared in two strings within two paragraphs of the fourth version: “l.63.in 
fin. ff. h. t. l.77.§.20.de Legat.2 l.14. & l.70. eod.”
108
 then “§.4. & seq. Inst. hoc. tit. 
l.4.§.1 l.59. l.63.§.ult l.65.§.9. ff. eod.”
109
 
 These citations appeared in Vinnius’ commentary, Notae and Jurisprudentia 
contracta. The Notae on Inst.3.25.4-5 can be dismissed as Stair’s source: it omitted 
the citation of D.17.2.59. Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta 2.76 can also be 
dismissed as Stair’s source. First, these citations were scattered throughout the title 
of that treatise, which was different to their appearance in two strings of citations in 
Stair. Secondly, D.31.77.20 was incorrectly cited as D.31.77.29. That this error did 
not appear in Stair indicates either that Stair did not borrow these citations from the 
Jurisprudentia contracta or that he checked and corrected the citation. The former of 
these alternatives is more likely; Stair did not borrow citations which he found to be 
irrelevant. 
Stair’s source was Vinnius’ commentary. The citations in his first string were 
borrowed from Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.3.25.4, cited by Stair in his second 
string of citations. They did not appear in a string as in Stair, but appeared in almost 
the same order in an eighty-five-word passage. Stair reversed the order of D.17.2.14 
and D.17.2.70, but this is not significant. Stair did not follow Vinnius in giving the 
opening phrases of D.17.2.63, D.31.77.20 and D.17.2.70. This practice of removing 
these phrases in favour of the relevant paragraph numbers of citations borrowed for 
the fourth version was also seen in his use of Gudelinus. 
                                                 
108
 S.-/1.16.4. D.17.2.63, D.31.77.20, D.17.2.14, and D.17.2.70 respectively.  
109
 S.-/1.16.5. Inst.3.25.4, D.17.2.4.1, D.17.2.59, D.17.2.63.10, and D.17.2.65.9 respectively. 
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It has elsewhere been shown by this writer that Stair’s second string of 
citations (of Inst.3.25.4, D.17.2.4.1, D.17.2.59, D.17.2.63.10, and D.17.2.65.9) was 
borrowed from Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.3.25.5.
110
 This was the paragraph 
following that of the Institutes cited by Stair. He rejected two of Vinnius’ citations: 
D.17.2.35 and D.17.2.20. Both texts contradicted his point that partnerships could 
have been the subject of testament if there was agreement amongst the partners to 
that effect: D.17.2.35 stated that a partner’s heir did not inherit the role in the 
partnership; D.17.2.52.9 stated that a partnership could not continue after the death 
of a partner. The other four texts cited by Vinnius did support Stair’s discussion and 
were thus borrowed by him. Stair’s rejection of two of Vinnius’ citations indicates 
that he checked these citations. 
 
6.4 STAIR’S USE OF VINNIUS’ JURISPRUDENTIA CONTRACTA FOR THE 
THIRD VERSION 
 
6.4.1 “Parents and Children” 
 
Stair’s discussion of the attainment of majority by a child appeared in the 
manuscripts, citing Stephanus’ Oeconomia as authority.
111
 Stair added a reference to 
Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta 1.7 in the third version.
112
 Stair cited Vinnius as 
authority for the statement: “the Custome of Holland dissolveth the power of Fathers, 
by the Childrens age of 25”.
113
 A marginal note to the first word of Jurisprudentia 
contracta 1.7 read:  
 
Moribus apud nos receptum est, ut etiam nuptiae filii, item aetas 25. 




                                                 
110
 Wilson: “Stair and the Inleydinge”, 267-268. Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.3.25.5 (Inst. 3.26.5), 
para 1. 
111
 S.5.4/1.5.4. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 5.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 5.4; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.5 omitted the citation of Stephanus.  
112
 The Edinburgh copy of the fourth version cited only “Vinnius partitionum l. I. cap. in principio”, 
1.5.4. This was a printing error; the Aberdeen copy correctly cited 1.7, 1.5.4. This is the second 
instance where there has been evidence of a variation in the print-run.  
113
 S.5.4/1.5.4. S.1.5.5 in the third, fourth and fifth editions. 
114
 Jurisprudentia contracta 1.7, 24, para.1, n.z. 
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It has been received through custom with us  
that also through the marriage of children, and similarly at the age of 25,  
what remains with us of the paternal power dissolves. 
 
Their language was similar enough to suggest that Stair’s reading of this passage of 
Vinnius influenced his own writing. Stair gave Vinnius as a source of comparative 
law on the laws of Holland. While Vinnius did not specifically mention Holland, he 
did say that these rules were received “apud nos [with us]”. This sort of deduction 
has been seen in Stair’s use of Gudelinus. 
Why did Stair add this citation of Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta when he 
already gave that of Stephanus? In no other place did Stair add a citation of another 
continental jurist where he already gave one. Such an addition is, however, seen in 
his use of Scottish authority: in the third version, he added a citation of Skene to a 
passage which already cited Craig.
115
  
There is no evidence that Stair consulted Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta 
for the first or second version. When Stair used Jurisprudentia contracta for the third 
version, there is no evidence that he used it beyond this passage. Did Stair turn to 
Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta because he had found the commentary useful? He 
certainly used two treatises by Gudelinus, so the use of more than one treatise by the 
same author was part of his method. However, he used both of the treatises by 
Gudelinus for the same version. With Vinnius, however, he used the Jurisprudentia 
contracta only later. 
 
6.5  CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter has shown that, despite not being cited by Stair, Vinnius’ commentary 
was a principal source for the Institutions. Stair consulted and borrowed from it for 
the first, third and fourth versions. Unlike Grotius and Gudelinus, it was used by 
Stair as a principal source of borrowing for all three of these versions. Additionally, 
for the third version, Stair used it when making a significant change to his text, 
specifically when changing his view of risk in sale.  
                                                 
115
 S.14.25/2.4.25.  
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Vinnius’ commentary and Notae were very similar in many places. There are 
three passages in the Institutions where Stair could have used either work. Vinnius’ 
commentary seems the more likely source. Yet the possibility of Stair’s use of the 
Notae should not be dismissed. What can be said, however, is that if Stair did rely on 
the Notae, his borrowing from that source seems to have been limited. He used 
Vinnius’ commentary on passages of the Institutes which Stair did not cite. For 
example, for the first version, Stair borrowed two Greek terms from Vinnius’ 
commentary on Inst.3.14.2; he did not cite Inst.3.14 until the fourth version. 
 What material did Stair borrow from Vinnius? He borrowed from Vinnius’ 
commentary two Greek terms, διπλευρος and µονοπλευρος. He also borrowed two 
Greek terms from Grotius; all the Greek in the titles on obligations in the first version 
were therefore borrowed. He also borrowed, for the third version, the only citation of 
a continental statute in the Institutions from Vinnius’ commentary. 
As with Grotius and Gudelinus, Stair used Vinnius as a source of Roman law. 
For the first version, he borrowed four citations of Roman law and a reference to the 
XII Tables. One of these citations was certainly borrowed from the commentary, 
although the other three and the reference to the XII Tables could also have been 
drawn from the Notae. He did not borrow any citations of Roman law for the titles on 
obligations from Vinnius for the third version. He did, however, borrow some for his 
titles on property law.
116
 For the fourth, he borrowed eleven, eight of which could 
only have been drawn from the commentary. He also borrowed his citations of 
Roman writers Seneca and Cicero, added to the new fourth book on actions, from 
Vinnius.
117
 It is unlikely, although it cannot be confirmed, that he checked the 
                                                 
116
 First, S.12.37/2.1.39 cited Inst.2.1.33, D.10.4.3.14, Grotius and Mynsinger. Vinnius’ commentary 
on Inst.2.1.33 was Stair’s source for the citations of Grotius and Mynsinger. Vinnius also cited 
D.10.4.3.14, and was likely Stair’s source for that citation. Stair’s citation of Inst.2.1.33 also certainly 
reflects his use of Vinnius’ commentary on that passage of the Institutes here. Secondly, S.22.3/2.12.3 
cited Inst.2.6 and the Authenticum of Nov.119.7. Vinnius cited the same passage of the Authenticum 
in his commentary on Inst.2.6.2, para 2.  
117
 S.-/4.3.41; Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.4.6.28, paras 2-3; Vinnius’ Notae on Inst.4.6.28. These 
citations also appeared in Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo 3.13, 129. The more likely source was 
Vinnius’ commentary, however, as Stair and Vinnius gave “ex bono & aequo” but Seneca “ex aequo 
& bono”. Seneca: De Clementia 2.7 [edition consulted: De Clementia in L.A. Seneca: Opera quae 
exstant omnia, variorum notis illustrata volume 2 (Amsterdam, 1619), 258]. Stair directly consulted 
Cicero: De officiis 3.70. He gave a list of obligations in that passage. He used the order of Cicero’s 
own list of obligations and actions initially, and then started copying the order of that found in 
Inst.4.6.28, but omitting those actions which he had already included by virtue of copying from 
Cicero. Stair’s consultation of this Institutes passage supports his use of Vinnius’ commentary on it. 
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citations which he borrowed from Vinnius for the first version. If he did not, this 
would be in keeping with his use of Grotius and Gudelinus at that time. For the 
fourth version, he did check the citations which he borrowed from Vinnius. Again, 
this change in his practice from the first version is seen in his use of Grotius and 
Gudelinus.  
Stair borrowed four citations of continental jurists from Vinnius’ commentary 
for his titles on obligations: of Wesenbecius and Faber for the first version; of 
Cujacius for the third version; and another of Cujacius for the fourth. Stair used those 
of Wesenbecius, Faber and the first of Cujacius to engage with pan-European juristic 
debates, specifically on the role of earnest in sale and which party bore the risk in 
sale. In both cases, Stair took the opposing view to that held by Vinnius. As he did 
not check any of these citations, he actually used them as authority for views which 
they did not support. In the case of risk in sale, after reading that leading jurists 
supported the minority view, Stair may have amended his own in agreement. The 
citations of Grotius and Mynsinger which Stair borrowed from Vinnius were used in 
a slightly different manner, specifically to establish that a debate was no longer 
relevant, as the rules were then in desuetude. The citation of Cujacius added for the 
fourth version was simply added to Stair’s existing text with no further discussion. 
This citation was used neither to enter a juristic debate nor in relation to any 
particular legal system. 
Vinnius became an increasingly important source of juristic authority as Stair 
revised the Institutions. Only two of the citations of jurists found in the manuscripts – 
of Wesenbecius and Faber – were borrowed from Vinnius. However, when preparing 
the third version, Stair added eight citations of jurists, six of which were either: of 
Vinnius, borrowed from Vinnius, or borrowed from De jure belli after Stair was led 
to it by Vinnius. Vinnius was therefore the most important source for the juristic 
authority added for the third version. This was also true of the fourth version, as one 
of the two citations of jurists which were added for that edition (that of Cujacius) was 
also borrowed from Vinnius. 
Gordon has suggested that Stair used Vinnius to indirectly consult Grotius’ 
Inleydinge.
118
 Stair did borrow a citation of Grotius’ Inleydinge from Vinnius, but 
                                                 
118
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 256-257. 
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believed it to be of De jure belli and checked that text. Stair’s consultation of De jure 
belli meant that he was not reliant on Vinnius’ description of the Inleydinge. While 
Gordon may have been correct, the extent to which Stair was indirectly influenced by 
the Inleydinge through his use of Vinnius was likely limited. 
 
Stair also consulted Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta, but seemingly only for the 
third version. This was different to his use of Vinnius’ commentary (and possibly 
Notae), which he had used for the first version. It is possible that Stair decided to 
consult this other treatise of Vinnius after having been impressed with his other 
works. He cited it for comparative law, as evidence that a rule existed in Holland. 
This use of Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta for comparative law was markedly 
different to Stair’s use of Vinnius’ commentary, but was consistent with his use of 
Gudelinus. There is not further evidence of Stair’s borrowing from any additional 
titles of Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta.   
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7 
STAIR AND CORVINUS 
 
Stair used his three principal sources for specific purposes. He also did this with one of 
his minor sources, Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos. This chapter will show the extent 
of Stair’s use of Corvinus. Unlike his principal sources, he used Corvinus only once: 
when writing the first version. Moreover, he used Corvinus in only three of his titles on 
obligations. This chapter will also show that Stair used Corvinus as his source of Canon 
law. Most of Stair’s general references to, and all seven of his citations of, Canon law in 
the first version were borrowed from Corvinus. Therefore, although Corvinus was only a 
minor source for the Institutions, he was an important one. It is thus necessary to 
examine Stair’s use of him in detail. 
 
7.1  STAIR’S USE OF CORVINUS FOR THE FIRST VERSION 
 
7.1.1  “Conjugal Obligations” 
 
7.1.1.1 Stair’s citation of Liber Extra 4.1.10, 4.1.2 and 4.8.3 
 
Stair briefly discussed the legal effect of a couple becoming engaged. He first set out 
Canon law:  
 
Espousals be naturally obligatorie and effectual also by the Canon Law, 
whereby the espoused Persons may be compelled to perfect the Marriage, 
unless there arise some eminent Discoverie of the Corruption or Pollution of 
either Party, or defect or Deformity, through Sickness or some other 
Accident. C.de literis extravag. de sponsalibus, & cap. 2. eodem, c. ult, de 
Conjug.1 
                                                 
1
 S.4.2/1.4.6. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 4.3 gave “carpiter 2
do 
de” for the second citation and “4
o
” 
instead of the final ‘C’; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 4.2 omitted the first ‘C’ and gave ‘4’ instead of the final ‘C’; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.26L also gave ‘4’ instead of the final ‘C’. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 4.2 and 
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He then said that Roman law allowed a party to withdraw from an engagement, and 
confirmed that Scots law had followed Roman law in this matter. These three citations 
of Canon law – of Liber Extra 4.1.10, 4.1.2 and 4.8.3 respectively – were relevant to 
Stair’s discussion. He borrowed them from Corvinus, who stated in his title on D.23.1: 
 
Jure Pontificio ne poenitere quidem licet. c. ex literis. Ext. eod: nisi 
sponsalia mutuo dissolvantur consensu, c.2.Ext.eod.ubi Panor. aut 
justissima aliqua ex causa, puta deformitatis subsecutae, c.ult.de conjug. 
lep.2  
 
By the Canon law it is not even permitted to withdraw [from the 
engagement], Liber Extra 4.1.10, unless the betrothal is dissolved by the 
consent of both parties, Liber Extra 4.1.2, or on account of the very most just 
cause, such as subsequent disfigurement, Liber Extra 4.8.3. 
 
Three points indicate that Corvinus was Stair’s source for these citations. First, they 
appear in exactly the same order in both Stair and Corvinus. Secondly, both Stair and 
Corvinus give the first citation in the medieval style, the second in the early-modern 
style, and indicate that the third is the final one in the title. This comparison is not 
undermined by the very minor differences between Stair and Corvinus’ citations.
3
 
Finally, Stair’s wording here is essentially a translation of Corvinus (although he omitted 
the clause in Corvinus which explained that the parties could withdraw from the 
engagement by mutual consent). Stair thus condensed this passage of Corvinus, giving 
all three of the citations at the end rather than scattered through the text. Why he did so 
is unclear; perhaps it was simply to ensure that the citations did not interrupt the flow of 
the discussion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
25.1.7, 4.2 omitted the first ‘C’ and seem to have given ‘R’ before the second citation; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 
4.2 gave ‘4’ instead of the final ‘C’. 
2
 Corvinus: Digesta per aphorismos on D.23.1, 305. Underlining in this quotation indicates use of italics 
in the original source. 
3
 Corvinus referred to the relevant title in the first two citations as “eod” not “de sponsalibus”; as the title 
in which Corvinus gave these citations was “de sponsalibus”, Stair could easily have made that change. 
Stair also omitted “lep” from the third citation, probably accidentally. 
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7.1.1.2 Stair’s citation of Liber Extra 4.2.9 and 4.2.14 
 
Stair explained that consent was necessary to enter into marriage, and a “commixtion of 
bodies” could be evidence of “discretion and capacity” to marry. He stated that “this also 
is the sentence of the Canon Law”.
4
 The citation which follows in the first printed 
edition reads: “de illic.[sic]
5
 cap. 9. ult. de spons.”
6
 The title to which this citation seems 
to refer, “De sponsalibus et matrimoniis”, is Liber Extra 4.1. However, this title does not 
fit with the description given in the rest of the citation. Paragraph nine does not begin 
“de illic”, and “ult” cannot refer to paragraph nine, which has no sub-paragraphs and 
was not at the end of the title.
7
 In fact, there are two errors in the citation (presumably 
printing errors) which are apparent on comparison with that in the manuscripts: “C. de 
illis 9 Cap: ult: de spons <imp/pup>.”
8
 The printed edition omitted “imp” at the end of 
this citation. Stair did not cite Liber Extra 4.1 but 4.2, “De desponsatione impuberum”. 
This is confirmed as 4.2.9 began “de illis”. The first printed edition also gave “9” and 
“cap” the wrong way round. Stair actually cited two paragraphs of Liber Extra 4.2: nine 
and fourteen (the last paragraph). Yet there is still a problem: these texts considered 
marriage between minors and so did not give comprehensive authority for Stair’s point.  
Stair’s citations are explained by his borrowing them (without checking them) 
from Corvinus for the first version. Corvinus also cited Liber Extra 4.2.9 and 4.2.14 
together: “c. de illis. 9. c. ult. de despons. imp.”.
9
 These citations appear in his title on 
D.23.2, the title after that from which Stair borrowed his citations of Liber Extra 4.1.10, 
4.1.2 and 4.8.3. Here Corvinus said that people without capacity (children, the mentally 
handicapped) could not marry. The broader context of Corvinus’ discussion was thus, 
like Stair, the necessity of consent to enter into marriage. Corvinus’ focus on young 
                                                 
4
 S.4.2/1.4.6. The manuscripts attributed this rule to the common law. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 
25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.3. 
5
 This should have read “illis”. 
6
 The reference was removed for the fourth version.  
7
 Edition consulted: Corpus juris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum. Gregorii XIII. pont. max. iussu 
editum volume 2: Decretales d. Gregorii papae IX (Rome, 1582).  
8
 The manuscripts generally gave “pup”; this is not correct but is clearly an error made by the relevant 
copyists. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.5, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 4.3 omitted the 9; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 4.3. 
9
 Corvinus: Digesta per aphorismos on D.23.2, 308.  
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persons explains the citation of Liber Extra 4.2.9 and 4.2.14. Later in his title on D.23.2, 
Corvinus again cited Liber Extra 4.2.9 (again by its opening phrase) in connection with 
“copulam carnalem [a carnal bond]”.
10
 It is therefore clear why Stair would have 
thought Liber Extra 4.2.9 and 4.2.14 relevant to his own discussion, which considered 
discretion, capacity, and a “commixtion of bodies”. It is unlikely that he checked these 
citations; he does not seem to have been aware that the texts focussed on minors 
marrying (although he could have dismissed this and used the citations anyway). He 
must have recognised them as being of Canon law, however, as Corvinus did not 
mention Canon law here. 
 
7.1.1.3 Stair’s citation of D.48.19.17 and D.48.5.14(13) 
 
Stair also said that marriages without parental consent “may be disalowed [sic], and the 
Issue repute as unlawful, but the Marriage cannot be annulled, l. 11. de stat. hom. l. 13 §. 
6. de Adult”.
11
 Both of these citations were amended for the first printed edition: that of 
D.1.5.11 was rather “L.17 ff: de poenis” (D.48.19.17) and that of D.48.5.14(13) did not 
give a paragraph number in the manuscripts.
12
 Neither D.48.18.17 nor D.48.5.14(13) 
were relevant to Stair’s discussion of parental consent: D.48.19.17 said that people 
relegated to an island as punishment lost their rights under positive law and retained 
only those under the ius gentium; D.48.5.14(13) concerned the husband’s right to accuse 
his wife of adultery. 
Stair’s citations are explained by his borrowing them, without checking them, 
from Digesta per aphorismos. Corvinus cited both texts together in the same order as 
Stair: “l.17. de poen. l.13.pen.§.plane. de adult.”13 Stair ignored the reference to sub-
paragraph one of D.48.5.14(13); this corroborates the suggestion that he generally did 
not seek to provide sub-paragraphs in the first and second versions.
14
 These citations 
                                                 
10




 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27R. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.3. 
13
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.23.2, 308. 
14
 Above, 3.1.3. 
 - 245 - 
appeared in the same title of Corvinus as (actually only ten lines above) the citations of 
the Liber Extra just discussed. Corvinus gave these citations in the same context as Stair. 
Why he did so is unclear, but this does explain Stair’s use of these texts. 
When Stair revised this passage for the first printed edition, he replaced the 
citation of D.48.18.17. This suggests that he checked it, found the text to be irrelevant, 
and removed the citation. He certainly checked D.48.5.14(13); he added a reference to 
sub-paragraph six. D.48.5.14(13).6 said that if a woman had committed adultery in a 
previous marriage, she could not be accused by her current husband. Why he felt that 
this paragraph was relevant to his discussion is unclear; perhaps it was a printing error.  
Stair’s writing was also influenced by Corvinus. Stair’s phrase “may be 
disalowed [sic], and the Issue repute as unlawful, but the Marriage cannot be annulled”
15
 
is a direct translation of Corvinus’ statement at the beginning of the paragraph: “non 
quidem dissolvebantur … sed tamen nuptiae injustae, liberi injusti [are indeed not 
dissolved … but nevertheless the marriages are unlawful, the children illegitimate]”.16 
Stair and Corvinus both followed this by saying such children were excluded from 
succession rights.  
 
7.1.1.4 Stair’s citation of Corvinus (in the manuscripts only) 
 
In the manuscripts, Stair cited Corvinus for Dutch law: “By the custom of Holland 
marriage contracted without either parents consent though never so fully consummated 
is dissolved. Corvinus ad tit ff de ritu nuptiarum”.
17
 On the same page as the citations of 
Roman and Canon law borrowed by Stair, Corvinus said that Dutch custom required 
either parent’s consent for the marriage of a person under twenty-five, without which a 
marriage which had not been consummated could be dissolved. This is the third time 
Stair used this page of Corvinus as a source of authority for “Conjugal Obligations”. 
                                                 
15
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27R. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 4.4; 
Adv.MS.25.1.7, 4.3. 
16
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.23.2, 307. 
17
 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.3; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.27R. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 
25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 4.3. 
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Stair’s citation of Corvinus on D.23.2 was correct, relevant, and clearly the product of 
Stair’s consultation of the text; indeed Stair seems to have simply translated Corvinus 
here.  
When preparing the first printed edition, Stair replaced this citation of Corvinus 
and this point about the unconsummated marriage being dissolved with his discussion of 
the Ordonnantie.
18
 Ford was the first to notice this revision. However, his two 
conclusions here were incorrect. First, he said that Stair’s change in citation from 
Corvinus to the Ordonnantie was a straight-forward substitution. In fact, Stair revised 
the surrounding passage and changed the focus of his discussion from one aspect of 
Dutch law to another. The change in his citation reflects this change in topic. Secondly, 
Ford stated that Corvinus was Stair’s source for his citation of the Ordonnantie.
19
 In 
fact, Stair borrowed this citation from Vinnius.
20
 Corvinus cited the Ordonnantie for the 
point about the unconsummated marriage not being dissolved (in the 1649 and 1656 
editions21); Stair and Vinnius cited it to show that the celebrant had the right to refuse to 
marry the couple if he was unsure whether there was parental consent. Corvinus cited 
articles three and thirteen of the Ordonnantie; both Stair and Vinnius cited only article 
three and gave identical citations.  
It is interesting that Stair revised this passage for the first printed edition. He 
knew that his citation of Corvinus was correct, and presumably he trusted him on this 
point or he would not have used this passage as authority in the first and second 
versions. Yet, when preparing the third version, Stair read Vinnius’ discussion of a 
different rule of Dutch marriage law which was supported by a citation of the statute. He 
then changed this passage of the Institutions to discuss this other rule and borrowed the 
citation. He did not check the citation, so he could not have been as sure of its accuracy 
as he was about his own citation of Corvinus. Nonetheless, he may have found the 
citation of the statute more authoritative than the one of Corvinus, which was a very 
                                                 
18
 Above, 6.2.1. 
19
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
20
 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.1.10.pr, para 7; Above, 6.2.1. 
21
 Of the three editions printed before Stair wrote the first version, only the 1649 and 1656 editions cited 
the Ordonnantie; the 1642 edition of Corvinus described the custom of Holland but did not cite it. That the 
1642 edition did not give this citation was also noted by Ford: Law and Opinion, 65 
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simple text compared to the likes of Grotius and Vinnius.
22
 This could allow insight into 
Stair’s concept of authority, although this could be pushed too far: he may simply have 
found the particular legal rule a more interesting comparison. 
 
7.1.1.5 Stair’s reference to Canon law on the effect of adultery 
 
Stair later explained that, where adultery could be established: “the Canon Law doth not 
thereon dissolve [the marriage], that the Party injured may be free to marry again, but 
only granteth Separation”.23 Stair criticised this rule of Canon law, and gave examples 
from the Bible which contradicted it. He then set out the ways in which Scots law had 
departed from this rule.  
Corvinus was probably Stair’s source for this point of Canon law. Corvinus said:  
 
Ius Canonicum dumtaxat ob haereseos … vel adulterij causa … permittit 
divortium, non vinculi, sed tantummodo quoad separationem tori24 
 
Canon law to this extent on account of heresy … or adultery … permits 
divorce, not of the chains, but only a separation of the bed 
 
Stair essentially paraphrased Corvinus here, again using him as his source for a rule of 
Canon law. 
 
7.1.2   “Obligations Conventional” 
 
Stair cited Corvinus only once in the printed editions, with Gudelinus, as authority for 
“Canon Law, by which every paction produceth action, omne verbum de ore fideli cadit 
                                                 
22
 It is criticised as being of no scientific merit in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie & Neue deutsche 
Biographie volume 4, 509.  
23
 S.4.3/1.4.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.8 and 25.1.10, 4.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.28L. 1666 stem: 
Adv.MSS.25.1.5 and 25.1.7, 4.4; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 4.4. The manuscripts generally gave “common law”. 
24
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.24.2, 319. 
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in debitum [all words from the mouths of faithful men result in obligation]”.
25
 Stair’s 
citation, “Corvinus de pactis”, omitted the relevant treatise’s name. The editors of the 
third, fourth and fifth printed editions of the Institutions identified the treatise as 
Corvinus’ Ius Canonicum per aphorismos;26 this was not correct. Gordon said “It is 
tempting to suppose that Corvinus is an erroneous extension of an abbreviated reference 
to Covarruvias”,
27
 who was cited by Gudelinus. He correctly suggested that, 
alternatively, Stair may have consulted Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos on D.2.14, the 
Digest title “de pactis”.
28
 This is confirmed, as Stair borrowed from this title of 
Corvinus. 
Stair borrowed his two citations of Canon law, correctly identified by Gordon as 




 The average reading of the citations in 
the manuscripts is: “C. 1. & 3. ubi. con. opt. de pactis”.
31
 Corvinus cited Liber Extra 
1.35.1 and 1.35.3 in an identical manner and in the same context.
32
 Indeed, Corvinus 
gave these citations after the sentence: “Iure Pontificio, ex quolibet pacto oritur actio 
[by Canon law, from whatever paction proceeds action]”.
33
 Gordon correctly suggested 
that Stair’s famous phrase “every paction produceth action” was a translation of this 
phrase of Corvinus.
34
 Additionally, Stair’s statement that the adoption of Canon law was 
“the common Custome of Nations”
35
 was probably drawn from Corvinus’ phrase “Quod 
hodie in omni foro, ubi ex bono & aequo, & ex suprema potestate judicatur, obtinet 
                                                 
25
 S.10.7/1.10.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6. The manuscripts generally gave 
“common law”, with the exception of Adv.MS.25.1.10 which gave “Roman law”. 
26
 Walker’s edition did not attempt to identify any treatise. 
27
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. 
28
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16. 
29
 Cf. Walker (ed): Institutions, which gave C.2.3.1 and C.2.3.2. 
30
 S.10.7/1.10.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6. 
31
 The printed editions omitted “ubi. con. opt”.  
32
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.2.14, 75.  
33
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16; Corvinus: Digesta per 
Aphorismos on D.2.14, 75. 
34
 MacQueen suggested it was a “translation of the canonist maxim, pacta servanda sunt” [H.L. 
MacQueen: “Scots law and English law: the case of contract” (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems 205-
229, 217; H H.L. MacQueen: “Good faith in the Scots law of contract: an undisclosed principle?” in 
A.D.M. Forte (ed): Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (Oxford, 1999) 5, 14 n.40]. 
35
 S.10.7/1.10.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.89R. 1666 
stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 10.6; Adv.MS.25.1.7, 10.5; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 10.6. 
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[which is maintained today in all courts where from good and equity and from the 
supreme power is judged].”
36
 However, Stair’s Latin maxim of Canon law, omne 
verbum de ore fideli cadit in debitum [all words from the mouths of faithful men result 
in obligation], cannot be attributed to Corvinus. Snyder suggested that “perhaps he was 
the aphorist himself”.
37
 The similar maxim omne promissum cadit in debitum [all 
promises result in obligation] was used by various jurists before Stair, including by 
Samuel Rutherford.
38
 It is possible that Stair simply adapted this existing maxim to meet 
his own requirements.  
 
7.1.3  “Obligations Conventional/Location and Conduction” 
 
Stair also referred to Canon law when discussing usury:  
 
So doth the Canon Law disapprove [usury], and most Nations, where that 
Law is in vigor; yet we, and generally other Protestant Nations do allow of 
the profite and hire of Money.39 
 
This sentence was also probably drawn from Corvinus, who said “praecepto divino 
prohibitae [usury is prohibited by divine law]” but acknowledged “Iure Civili & 
constitutionibus Principum Christanorum (licet sint odiosae) permittuntur [by the Civil 
law and by the constitutions of the leading Christian nations (although it is odious) 
[usury] is permitted]”.
40
 That Corvinus was Stair’s source is suggested by the common 
                                                 
36
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.2.14, 75. 
37
 D.V. Snyder: “Hunting promissory estoppel” in V.V. Palmer and E.C. Reid (eds): Mixed Jurisdictions 
Compared: Private Law in Louisana and Scotland (Edinburgh Studies in Law series volume 6, 
Edinburgh, 2009) 281, 299 n.71.  
38
 S. Rutherford: Lex Rex, or the Law and the Prince: a dispute for the just prerogative of king and people 
containing the reasons and causes of the wars of Scotland (London, 1644), q.50. For a comparison of Stair 
and Rutherford, specifically regarding their treatment of slavery and persons alieni iuris, see Ford: “Stair’s 
title ‘Of Liberty and Servitude’”, esp. 143-156; J.D. Ford: “Divine right and constitutional settlement: 
traces of political theory in Stair’s Institutions”, presented to the Scottish Legal History Group in 1989 and 
abstracted in (1990) 11(1) J.L.H. 134-135. 
39
 S.10.74/1.15.7. 1662 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.8, 10.54; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 10.54 omitted “is in vigor”; 
Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.114R. 1666 stem: Adv.MSS.25.1.5, 25.1.7 and 25.1.12, 10.54. The manuscripts gave 
“common law”. 
40
 Corvinus: Digesta per Aphorismos on D.22.1, 279. 
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structure of their discussion and the similarity in their wording. Corvinus did not here 
mention Canon law; his stating that usury was considered odious by Christian nations 
may have precipitated Stair’s saying that the Canon law “disapprove it”. 
 
7.2  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Both of Stair’s references to Corvinus (one of which appeared only in the manuscripts) 
omitted the name of the treatise cited. This chapter has shown that Gordon was correct 
in suggesting that the relevant work was Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos.41  
Stair borrowed two citations of Roman law from that treatise. However, the main 
purpose for which Stair used Corvinus was as a source of Canon law. Most, but not all, 
of his general references to Canon law were taken from Corvinus, including his famous 
phrase “every paction produceth action”. Moreover, all seven citations of Canon law in 
the first version’s titles on obligations were borrowed from Corvinus. That Stair used 
Corvinus specifically for Canon law is comparable to his use of Grotius, Gudelinus and 
Vinnius’ commentary for specific material. 
However, it seems that Stair did not use Corvinus again after he completed the 
first version. He added four citations of Canon law; none were borrowed from Corvinus. 
It has also been shown that Ford was wrong to attribute Stair’s citation of the Dutch 
Ordonnantie, added in the third version, to his reading of Corvinus.
42
  
It is possible to identify the edition of Corvinus which Stair used. Almost all the 
passages and citations discussed here were the same in the 1642, 1649 and 1656 editions 
of Corvinus. However, the sentence on usury, paraphrased by Stair, did not appear in the 
1642 or 1649 editions.43 If the suggestion that Corvinus was Stair’s source here is 
correct, Stair must have used the 1656 edition of Corvinus for the first version. This 
means that he was using the most recent edition of this work, printed only three years 
before he wrote the first version.  
                                                 
41
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 264 n.16. 
42
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 65. 
43
 Another difference was Corvinus’ addition of a citation of the Ordonnantie for the 1649 edition. Above, 
7.1.1.4. 




This thesis has established many important points about the nature of the Institutions and 
Stair’s sources and method when he wrote it. It has shown that the manuscripts within 
the two stems are generally similar. It has confirmed Ford’s finding that the changes 
made between the first and second versions were essentially limited to updating the 
work with citations of recent Scottish authority and adding small paragraphs. It has also 
confirmed his finding that some of the manuscripts were updated, most notably 
Adv.MS.25.1.12,1 but only to a limited extent.2 Furthermore, it has shown that the entry 
in the Glasgow University library catalogue for MS.Gen.1495 was not correct in stating 
that it was without reference to cases or other legal authorities dated after 1659.
3
 Rather, 
MS.Gen.1495 can be located within the 1662 stem generally.
4
  
This thesis has shown that there were variations in the print-runs of the 
Institutions.5 In the two sample copies of the first printed edition, this was limited to 
minor changes in the punctuation of citations and the omission of the last leaf of the 
dedication in the Harvard copy. In the second printed edition, variations have been found 
in three citations.
6
 These were probably as a result of letters having been dislodged, or of 
the accidental incorporation of different or additional reliefs. However, the variations 
within the manuscripts and printed editions are limited, and thus it can be concluded that 
                                                 
1
 Ford: Law and Opinion, 68 n.295. 
2
 The manuscript was updated at paragraph 10.20. However, the copyist did not check the citation of 
D.50.17.54 in the manuscripts from the 1666 stem (“L: Conanus: ff: de regulis juris”), which was 
evidently an error and which he attempted to make sense of: “we have followed Conanus Lib. de regulis 
juris” [10.7]. This suggests that he did not have the first printed edition in front of him. 
3
 Glasgow University Library Special Collections Online Catalogue entry for MS.Gen.1495 
<http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/manuscripts/search/detaild.cfm?DID=2830> accessed 16
th
 July 2010; Ford: 
Law and Opinion, 69. See, however, e.g. E. Lauderdale v Tenants of Swintoun 1662 [M.10023] 
MS.Gen.1495, fol.54 (wrongly cited this case as having been heard in 1660). Musbon v Lawrie of 
Macvissorms 1662 [probably Monsual’s Children v Laurie of Naxwelton 1662 [M.2614]], MS.Gen.1495, 
fol.55. 
4
 Cf. Ford: Law and Opinion, 69.   
5
 This was also the case with Mackenzie’s Institutions [Cairns: “The moveable text of Mackenzie”, 242-
244]. 
6
 In the citations of: Vinnius, S.5.4/1.5.4; D.26.4.5, S.6.8/1.6.8; and D.14.2.4.pr, S.-/1.8.7. 
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they are close enough to Stair’s own version to be deemed reliable, which is what one 
would expect.  
 Other conclusions can be drawn from the research done for this thesis. When 
preparing the second and third versions, it is likely that Stair was working from his 
original manuscript, which he had written for the first version. It has been shown that 
printing errors were introduced into the text for the first printed edition; these probably 
did not appear in Stair’s third version, because they were not found in the manuscripts. 
Some of these errors also appeared in the second printed edition. This suggests that Stair 
worked from a copy of the first printed edition rather than his original manuscript when 
preparing the fourth version. This is credible, as he may well have sent his hand-written 
copy of the third version to the printers and never had it returned. 
 The main purpose of this thesis has been to identify the sources and method of 
Stair when he wrote and revised the Institutions. The particular focus of this has been his 
use of continental legal literature. It has not been possible in the previous chapters to 
analyse Stair’s use of all the continental legal treatises which he consulted. Those jurists 
who were used to a very limited extent
7
 or outwith the titles on obligations
8
 have not 
been discussed. However, this research has established significant points in relation to 
Stair’s use of his principal sources (Grotius, Gudelinus, Vinnius and Corvinus), and 
about his use of Roman and Canon law. 
 
                                                 
7
 Stair certainly consulted Stephanus: Oeconomia, 2.7 and 2.1. The passages cited by him were only 
relevant if interpreted broadly. He does not seem to have borrowed authority from Stephanus, but drew his 
Latin phrase “pietate & reverentia [with loyalty and reverence]” from him [S.5.4/1.5.4. 1662 stem: 
Adv.MS.25.1.8, 5.4; Adv.MS.25.1.10, 5.4; Adv.MS.25.1.11, fol.39L. 1666 stem: Adv.MS.25.1.5, 5.4; 
Adv.MS.25.1.7, 5.4; Adv.MS.25.1.12, 5.5 gave the Latin phrase but not the citation. Stephanus: 
Oeconomia, 2.7.7, 40]. 
8
 He certainly consulted Gudelinus’ De jure feudorum and Zoesius’ De feudis for his titles on property 
law. He may also have consulted Menochius, whose discussion of the instances in which good faith is not 
presumed by the possessor is accurately described by Stair (although the citation is wrong in the 
manuscripts) [J. Menochius: De arbitraria iudicum quaestionibus & causis: centuriae sex (Edition 
consulted: Cologne, 1630), 2.226, 464 esp. para 4 &seqq.]. 
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8.1  STAIR’S USE OF HIS PRINCIPAL SOURCES 
 
8.1.1  Stair’s choice of his principal sources  
 
Stair drew on his principal sources for specific types of material. It is probable that he 
chose them for these purposes. He used Grotius as his source for natural law. Although 
he never explicitly agreed with Grotius’ interpretation of natural law, he followed 
Grotius’ method of drawing on citations of ancient and modern authorities to establish 
the principles of natural law. He emulated Grotius’ pattern of citation, borrowing from 
him citations of writers of classical antiquity, the Bible, Roman law, and legal humanist 
and scholastic jurists. He used these citations, even those of early modern jurists, in the 
context of establishing natural law and jurisprudential principle. Stair did not check 
these citations when writing the first version (with the possible exception of that of 
Seneca and those of the Bible). Accordingly, he did not engage with the texts; his 
citations of writers of classical antiquity can be seen as merely supplementary to his 
argument. This may have implications for both the humanist and natural law traditions 
in Scotland. 
Gordon was correct in stating “for [Stair’s] Roman law, however, he certainly 
used Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo.”9 Stair used Gudelinus as a principal source of 
Roman law for both the first and fourth versions. Indeed, Stair may have returned to 
Gudelinus when preparing the fourth version specifically for citations of Roman law. 
Furthermore, Gudelinus was also Stair’s principal source for references to contemporary 
continental national law. In his titles on obligations, Stair drew from Gudelinus: three of 
his five references to French law, three of his four references to that of the Netherlands, 
his one reference to Spanish law, one of his four references to German law, and two of 
his more general remarks about legal trends in Europe. He also borrowed from 
Gudelinus citations of seven continental jurists. All seven citations were used by Stair 
either in relation to specific legal systems or to establish a principle in the contemporary 
                                                 
9
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 263. 
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law of the “Neighbour Nations”
10
 generally. Gudelinus did not always refer specifically 
to the legal system for which Stair used him as authority. Stair extrapolated his authority 
for Dutch law from Gudelinus as he was from the Spanish Netherlands. He did the same 
for Duarenus and Chassanaeus: he extrapolated that they discussed French law from a 
previous discussion of Gudelinus, from the title of Chassanaeus’ treatise, and from 
Duarenus as he was French.  
Stair also used Vinnius’ commentary (and possibly his Notae) as an important 
source of Roman law. Moreover, he used Vinnius to engage with continental juristic 
debates, most notably in relation to the role of earnest in sale, and whether the buyer or 
seller bore the risk in sale. In both cases, Stair disagreed with Vinnius; he used him as a 
source of authority but did not support his views of these laws. He may even have 
changed his view of risk in sale after reading Vinnius (he certainly borrowed authority 
from him to support his newly-held view), although this cannot be confirmed as he may 
have changed his view at any point between completing the second and third versions. It 
is interesting that Stair had not, when writing the first version, been influenced to follow 
the minority view (that the seller bore the risk) when reading that Grotius supported it. 
This is in keeping with his repeated express rejection of Grotius’ interpretation of natural 
law. 
Stair borrowed citations of Roman law from Corvinus, and cited him as authority 
for Dutch law.
11
 However, Stair’s principal use of Corvinus was as a source for Canon 
law. All the citations of Canon law in the first version were borrowed from Corvinus, 
and many of his more general references to Canon law were likewise drawn from him. 
Yet this work of Corvinus was not a work of Canon law, despite it having made frequent 
reference to Canon law. Corvinus had written a work on Canon law: his Jus Canonicum 
per aphorismos was comparable in style to his Digesta per aphorismos. Yet, even 
though some of the citations of the Liber Extra which Stair borrowed from Corvinus’ 
Digesta per aphorismos appear in his Jus Canonicum per aphorismos,
12
 it does not seem 




 This citation and the discussion of the rule which it supported were removed for the third version. 
Above, 7.1.1.4. 
12
 e.g. Liber Extra 4.2.9 and 4.2.14 were also cited in Corvinus: Jus Canonicum per aphorismos, 2.13, 73, 
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that Stair consulted that second work. This may suggest that Stair did not turn to 
Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos specifically for Canon law, but instead examined it 
for different reasons, then found it a useful exposition of Canon law and used it as such. 
This is, of course, mere speculation. 
All Stair’s principal sources were printed in the seventeenth century. Stair was 
thus selecting and using as sources the leading treatises from the most recent continental 
literature. Indeed, Stair can even be shown to have used the 1656 edition of Digesta per 
aphorismos for the first version, printed just three years before he started to write. There 
is an obvious parallel here between his focus on recent continental legal literature and 
his use of recent sources of Scots law. The practicks of Durie, Hope, Spottiswoode, 
Haddington and Nicholson were those which Stair used to the greatest extent; all were 
collections of decisions of cases heard in the seventeenth century. Stair also focused on 
citing the most recent interregnum cases in the first version. Stair’s determination to use 
recent sources clearly shows that his purpose in writing was to create a modern treatise 
of law. 
 
8.1.2  Stair’s method in using his principal sources 
 
Stair did not always return even to his principal sources when preparing later versions of 
the Institutions. He used Gudelinus for the first version, and then only returned to De 
jure novissimo for the fourth version. He may have done so specifically to use Gudelinus 
as a source of Roman law. He used Grotius as a principal source only for the first 
version. He returned to De jure belli for the third version only when led to it by Vinnius, 
and his use of Grotius at that time seems to have been limited to the three-paragraph 
discussion cited by Vinnius. His use of Grotius for the fourth version seems to have been 
limited to him having checked that citations and quotations were accurate. He did not 
return to Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos at all after using it for the first version. Nor 
did he return to Vinnius’ Jurisprudentia contracta after using it for the third version. 
                                                                                                                                                
but here these texts were cited with Liber Extra 4.2.3 and 4.2.8. It is therefore more probable that Stair 
borrowed these references from Corvinus’ Digesta per aphorismos [Above, 7.1.1.2]. 
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Instead, Stair’s usual method seems to have been to use his sources extensively the first 
time he consulted them, and to take everything that was useful or relevant in order that 
he did not need to return to that work. The exception to this general practice was 
Vinnius’ commentary. This treatise Stair used as a principal source for the first, third 
and fourth versions. Why did he return repeatedly to Vinnius’ commentary? Perhaps it 
was the depth of detail which he found in Vinnius; or the fact that (because it 
commented on the full extent of the Institutes) it covered the entirety of private law as 
well as actions; or perhaps it was the fact that Vinnius combined an account of juristic 
analysis and debate with reference to practice, which was Stair’s aim also. It was likely 
be a combination of these factors. It is one of the wonderful quirks within Scottish legal 
history that the treatise which Stair arguably used to the greatest extent was nowhere 
cited by him. 
 Even though Stair’s usual practice was not to return to his principal sources, he 
made considerable use of them when he wrote the first version. All his titles on 
obligations contain material drawn from these four works. The structure which he used 
in his discussions of points of law (setting out natural law then distinguishing Scots law) 
may have been modelled on the way that Gudelinus structured his passages.
13
 In several 
places, the structure of specific discussions, as well as Stair’s language and phrasing, 
was a reflection of his principal sources. This level of influence suggests that Stair had at 
least Grotius’ De jure belli, Gudelinus’ De jure novissimo and Vinnius’ commentary in 
front him when he wrote the first version of the Institutions. 
Stair used his sources critically. He expressly disagreed with Grotius’ 
interpretation of several points of natural law. In neither risk in sale nor the role of 
earnest in sale did Stair follow Vinnius’ views. This agrees with Halliday’s findings that 
Stair was not overly reliant on Craig as a source of Feudal law.
14
 Even though Stair 
could be critical of continental jurisprudence, he nonetheless saw it as persuasive 
authority. Three times he dismissed the view of his principal source, but borrowed 
authority from it to support his own view. This was the case when he rejected: Grotius’ 
                                                 
13
 Above, 5.3. 
14
 Below, 3.2.2.1. 
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view of promise and cited Molina; Vinnius’ view of earnest as penal and cited 
Wesenbecius and Faber; and Vinnius’ view of risk in sale and cited Cujacius. In the first 
two cases, it is currently impossible to establish for how long Stair had held his views, 
and thus to what extent he was convinced by the citations of these scholastic and 
humanist jurists. In the case of risk in sale, however, Stair seems to have changed his 
view between completing the second and third versions. Whether that was a result of 
reading in Vinnius that the “summos viros [greatest men]”
15
 supported the minority view 
is unclear but possible. 
 
8.1.3  Stair’s method of borrowing from his principal sources 
 
Stair borrowed a significant quantity of authority and other material from his principal 
sources. More than a quarter of the citations of Roman law in Stair’s titles on obligations 
in the first version were borrowed from these four jurists. All his citations of Canon law 
were borrowed from Corvinus. All his citations of fourteen of the twenty-six jurists cited 
in the Institutions (as well as one of his two citations of a twenty-seventh, Duarenus) 
were borrowed from Grotius, Gudelinus, Vinnius or Craig. It is unknown whether Stair 
consulted directly, or whether he borrowed the relevant citation from another source, for 




Stair borrowed from his sources citations of material with which he must have 
been familiar. For example, he borrowed citations of Cicero, Aristotle and other writers 
of classical antiquity from Grotius. Yet he must have had an extensive knowledge of at 
least Aristotle, having studied the liberal arts at Glasgow.17 He borrowed a citation of the 
                                                 
15
 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.3.23.3 (Inst. 3.24.3), para 8. 
16
 Stair mentioned Donellus, Gregorius and Salmasius’ names only, but gave a full citation of Zasius. 
Stair’s citation was correct and relevant [S.5.13/1.5.13; U. Zasius: Lectura in titulum Digesti novi,, de 
verborum obligationibus in U. Zasius: Opera volume 3: Commentaria, seu lecturas eiusdem in titulos 
tertiae partis Pandectarum (quod vulgò Digestum novum vocant) complectens (Leiden, 1550), D.45.1.107, 
497, esp. para 4]. It does, however, seem likely that Stair borrowed this citation from an unidentified 
source. 
17
 Above, 1.2.1.2. 
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Libri feudorum from Gudelinus’ De jure feudorum,
18
 despite having lectured on a title of 
the Libri feudorum in 1648.
19
 He borrowed all the Greek terms in the titles on 
obligations in the first version (two from Grotius and two from Vinnius) despite having 
had a good knowledge of Greek, as can be deduced from his appointment to teach Greek 
at Glasgow.
20
 Stair was therefore not revisiting the knowledge which he had acquired 
before being admitted as an advocate. Of course, more than ten years had passed since 
he had studied and taught at Glasgow and written his lecture for admission as an 
advocate. Perhaps he found it more expeditious to rely on his seventeenth-century 
juristic sources for this material. 
 The method Stair used when borrowing from his principal sources has thus been 
established for his titles on obligations. He used this same method for his other titles. For 
his titles on jurisprudence, Stair borrowed from Grotius two citations of Cicero and one 
of Gaius. One of these citations of Cicero was of Cicero’s Pro Milone. He borrowed this 
citation, and a quotation of Cicero, from De jure belli 1.2.3 for his discussion of the 
difference between natural and positive law.
21
 Peculiarities common to the quotations in 
both Stair and Grotius, which do not correspond to the text of Cicero, establish Grotius 
as Stair’s source, and show that he did not check this text. Later, Stair explained that 
self-defence was a right under natural law. He borrowed the citation of Gaius and the 
other citation of Cicero from De jure belli 1.2.3, and followed Grotius in quoting only 
the last seven words of the full passage of Gaius.
22
 Stair therefore borrowed from 
Grotius citations of Roman law and writers of classical antiquity, without checking 
them, for his titles on jurisprudence. He used these citations in relation to natural law. 
This was the same method that Stair used when borrowing from Grotius for his titles on 
obligations.  
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 Gudelinus: De jure feudorum 3.6.8, 89; S.14.18/2.4.18. Above, 1.2.2. 
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21
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Stair also used Gudelinus for the first version’s titles on jurisprudence; he used 
an identical method here as he had in his titles on obligations. With the exception of the 
citation of Gaius borrowed from Grotius, all Stair’s other nine citations of Roman law in 
“Of Liberty” in the first version were borrowed from Gudelinus.23 They were all 
borrowed without being checked, as is shown by the fact that D.15.1.41 and 
D.50.17.22.pr would have been more relevant authority if given inversely. As with many 
of the other citations borrowed from Gudelinus for the first version, eight of these 
citations were in the medieval style. Stair removed two for the third version and added 
paragraph numbers to another two. For the fourth version, he removed another and 
added paragraph numbers to the last two. Stair also used Gudelinus for references to 
continental legal systems for the first version’s titles on jurisprudence. Stair’s reference 
to “Spaniards, Portugals, and other Christian Nations, bordering on the Turks”
24
 was a 
direct translation of Gudelinus.
25
 
Stair also used Vinnius’ commentary in the same way for his titles on property as 
he did for his titles on obligations. First, it has been shown that he borrowed his citations 
of Grotius and Mynsinger for the third version from Vinnius.
26
 Both Stair and Vinnius 
also cited D.10.4.3.14 in those passages; Stair’s citation was certainly borrowed from 
Vinnius.
27
 Secondly, he borrowed his citation of D.46.3.78 in his discussion of accession 
from Vinnius’ commentary on Inst.2.1.28; Stair cited neighbouring paragraphs of this 
title of the Institutes in the third version.
28
 There was, in addition, much similarity 
between Stair’s and Vinnius’ discussions of these points, suggesting that Stair’s passage 
was a reflection of Vinnius. Thirdly, later in his discussion of accession, Stair added a 
passage outlining the opposing views of Paul and Gaius on accession of paintings, in 
which he cited two texts of the Digest and Inst.2.1.34. This passage, including the 
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 De jure novissimo 1.4, 6. 
26
 Gordon: “Stair, Grotius and the sources of Stair’s Institutions”, 257; above, 6.2.3. 
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 S.12.38/2.1.39. Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.2.1.33. 
28
 S.12.34/2.1.34. Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.2.1.28, para 2. Vinnius did not cite this text in the Notae 
on this passage. 
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citations of the Digest, was drawn from Vinnius’ commentary on the Inst.2.1.34.
29
 There 
is nothing which suggests that Stair checked either Digest text. Finally, Vinnius was also 
probably Stair’s source for the citation of the Authenticum which he added to his 
discussion of prescription for the third version.30 Stair also used Vinnius in this way for 
the new fourth book on actions in the fourth version. It is likely that his citations of 
Seneca and Cicero too were borrowed from Vinnius.
31
 
From this brief survey of Stair’s use of his sources outwith the titles on 
obligations, it is clear that the method which he used when writing and revising his titles 
on obligations (as has been established by this thesis) was also that which he used for his 
other titles.  
 
8.1.4 How Stair was influenced by other movements of continental 
jurisprudence indirectly through his principal sources 
 
This thesis has shown that Stair was influenced to a material extent by legal humanism 
and second scholasticism, both through his education, and indirectly through his use of 
Scottish and continental treatises.  
 Scholastic influence can be detected in Stair’s tenth title, and has been found in 
his seventh and eighth by Reid.32 That scholastic influence can be found in the 
Institutions is unsurprising, given the debt that Grotius’ theories of natural law owed to 
scholastic jurisprudence.
33
 Indeed, it is probable that most of the scholastic influence 
found in Stair’s writing came indirectly through his use of Grotius. Both of Stair’s 
citations of second scholastics were borrowed, without being checked, from Grotius. 
Stair drew on Grotius heavily in his titles “Restitution”, “Recompence” and “Obligations 
Conventional”, which is where the scholastic influence in Stair is found. It does not 
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 Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.2.1.34. 
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 S.22.3/2.12.13. Vinnius: Commentary on Inst.2.6.2, para 2 
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seem likely that Stair consulted the works of any second scholastics directly:
34
 by the 




There is a significant humanist aspect to the Institutions. Stair was influenced by 
the method of legal humanism. He showed an interest in the etymology of legal terms 
and the origin of legal rules. He was concerned with textual authenticity and with 
establishing law as a rational discipline. That he drew on writers of classical antiquity 
was in keeping with the methods of both legal humanism and natural law. Further, nine 
of the jurists cited in the titles on obligations were legal humanists. This was just under 
half of those jurists cited in the titles on obligations. He cited some legal humanists more 
than once: Connanus was cited three times in the titles on obligations; Cujacius was 
cited twice in the titles on obligations and three times in the entire Institutions; and 
Wesenbecius and Duarenus were both cited twice in the entire Institutions. Stair 
therefore repeatedly drew on the authority of these leading legal humanists. This not 
only indicates the respect in which he held these jurists, but also shows that he believed 
that citations of their work would be well received, possibly even expected, by his 
readership.  
In contrast, there is hardly any explicit recognition of the mos italicus in the 
Institutions: just one citation of Baldus, which was expressly drawn from Craig.36 This 
was a noticeable omission: Craig and Stair’s continental sources made sometimes 
considerable use of the mos italicus. However, Cairns has shown that “Spottiswoode’s 
work largely ignored the older authors” and that the only such jurist he actually 
consulted was Bartolus.
37
 This rejection of the mos italicus literature was thus in keeping 
with the practice of Stair’s contemporaries if not with that of his sources. 
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 Cairns: “Ius civile in Scotland, ca. 1600”, 163-164. 
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8.1.5 Stair’s use of continental legal authority in the Scottish 
context 
 
This thesis has not considered Stair’s writing within the Scottish context. However, it is 
worth noting that his choice, and his method of use, of his continental sources was 
typical of Scottish jurists of the period. The catalogues of the three sample private 
libraries showed that Stair’s principal sources were popular amongst late-seventeenth-
century Scottish advocates. His use of Grotius, Gudelinus and Vinnius was in keeping 
with Cooper’s having found them as among the fifteen continental jurists to whom 
“Repeated reference is made” in Scottish courts in the 1660s and 1670s.
38
 Indeed, his 
focus on Low Countries jurisprudence was in keeping with the courts of the period: “the 




Stair also borrowed citations of other continental jurists, particularly of legal 
humanists but also of second scholastics and jurists who wrote on French national law. 
These same jurists were also cited in other Scottish works. Spottiswoode, Skene and 
other Scots cited Boerius and Chassanaeus on French national law.
40
 Spottiswoode also 
cited humanists Connanus, Cujacius, Duarenus and Mynsinger.
41
 Craig cited Rebuffus
42
 
and Zasius43 and was Stair’s source for citations of Cujacius and Tiraquellus.44 
Dolezalek has shown that Gregorius’ Syntagma was popular.
45
 The treatises of the jurists 
cited by Stair were often held by more than one of the sample libraries.
46
 He therefore 
drew on his principal sources for citations of jurists to whom his contemporaries were 
also referring, and who would therefore be seen as authoritative.  
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Stair’s practice of borrowing authority from other jurists, even without checking 
it, was also typical of juristic writing of the period.  Hope has been shown to have 
borrowed a citation of an Act of Sederunt, without checking it, from a manuscript.
47
 On 
the continent this practice was also seen: one of Grotius’ citations of Covarruvias was 
borrowed without having been checked from second scholastic Leonardus Lessius (it 
should rather have been of Lancellotus Conradus).
48
  
Earlier in this thesis, it was shown that some Scottish seventeenth-century jurists 
had an extensive knowledge of continental legal literature (including Mackenzie and 
Fountainhall). Stair was probably not as well versed in the continental legal literature as 
Mackenzie and Fountainhall (if they had read everything they cited). However, Stair 
used his principal sources to indirectly consult and to draw on the leading jurists of the 
early modern period, to learn the bases of their arguments, and to engage with the 
debates which they entered into. That he used his principal sources to consult the earlier 
continental literature, rather than checking it directly, does not undermine the 
scholarship of the Institutions, taking account of the standards of the period in which it 
was written. 
 
8.2  STAIR’S USE OF ROMAN AND CANON LAW 
 
8.2.1  Stair’s use of Roman law 
 
It has already been shown that Stair used Roman law “for its equity”
49
 rather than as 
direct and binding authority for Scots law. This was true even of the fourth version, in 
which the number of citations of Roman law doubled in the titles on obligations and 
increased fourfold in those on property law.  
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What has not, until this study, been addressed is the extent of Stair’s knowledge 
of Roman law. When Stair gave his lecture for admission as an advocate in 1648, he 
declared that he had found Roman law, with its many glosses and commentaries, 
unmanageable. He began writing the first version of the Institutions eleven years later. 
Even in the titles on obligations there were over 130 citations of Roman law, and two 
citations of the Gloss. To what extent did Stair increase his knowledge of Roman law in 
those eleven years? 
More than a quarter of the citations of Roman law in Stair’s titles on obligations 
in the first version were borrowed from Grotius, Gudelinus, Vinnius and Corvinus. It is 
probable that none of these were checked. Most were of the Digest or Codex, which 
Stair had called in 1648 the “indigested digested & confused Cod”.
50
 However, Stair 
must have been familiar with the Digest and Codex. The Corpus iuris civilis was the 
authority which was most frequently cited in court in the 1660s and 1670s, being 
referred to more often than even earlier Scottish cases or Craig’s Jus feudale. Most of 
the references to Roman law in court were to the Digest.
51
 If this was also correct of 
cases heard in the interregnum, then Stair must have quickly gained some knowledge of 
the Corpus iuris civilis after 1648. Indeed, he clearly knew Justinian’s Institutes: he gave 
synopses of passages in the first version, and consulted Vinnius’ commentary, which 
included the Institutes’ texts above the comments on them. 
Stair added a few citations of Roman law for the second version, and there were 
approximately forty more in the titles on obligations in the third version than in the 
second. However, the doubling of the number of citations of Roman law in the titles on 
obligations (quadrupling in those on property law) for the fourth version was one of the 
greatest changes in the Institutions. He also became much more concerned with the 
accuracy and detail of his citations of Roman law: he specified sub-paragraphs in a large 
proportion of his citations of Digest and Codex texts which had sub-paragraphs; and 
added paragraph numbers to those which had previously been in the medieval style. He 
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also checked a large number of his earlier citations of Roman law, and all those which 
he borrowed for the fourth version.  
Why did he so heavily ‘Romanise’ the fourth version? A possible reason for this 
might be found in the circumstances of his life between completing the third and fourth 
versions. Ford has suggested that during Stair’s exile in the 1680s, predominantly spent 
in the Netherlands, “he matriculated as a member of the University of Leiden … and he 
became acquainted with the professors of law both there and at Utrecht.”
52
 It has already 
been shown that Johannes Voet and Gerard Noodt were among the professors at Leyden 
and Utrecht at this time. If Stair had attended lectures by these great jurists, or discussed 
Roman law with them, he may have acquired a better working knowledge, or greater 
appreciation, of Roman law. If so, this may account for the change in his pattern of 




8.2.2  Stair’s use of Canon law 
 
Stair’s use of Canon law has also been examined for this thesis. The leading study of 
Stair’s use of Canon law is currently that by Robertson, but this did not recognise the 
full extent of Stair’s use of this source.
54
 Robertson said that, in “Conjugal Obligations”, 
“the references to canon law are, perhaps surprisingly, not extensive.”55 He then pointed 
to two places within “Conjugal Obligations” where Stair referred to Canon law: on 
engagements, and for the maxim “consensus, non coitus, facit Matrimonium”. He finally 
noted that Stair cited Covarruvias in this title, whom Robertson classified as a canonist.
56
 
Robertson erred in classifying Stair’s citation of Covarruvias as a reference to Canon 
law: Stair did cite Covarruvias’ Epitome on the Liber Extra, but in relation to Spanish, 
not Canon law. More importantly, Stair also cited five Canon law texts in this title (Liber 
Extra 4.1.2, 4.1.10, 4.2.9, 4.2.14, and 4.8.3) and referred to Canon law in his discussion 
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of the prohibited degrees of kinship, and in his discussion of adultery.
57
 Robertson’s 
assessment does not therefore appreciate the full extent of Stair’s reference to Canon law 
in this title; his conclusion that it was “not extensive”
58
 is wrong. Indeed, Stair made 
significant reference to Canon law here; nearly always these references were borrowed 
from Corvinus.  
 Further, Robertson’s discussion of “Obligations Conventional” failed to take 
account of Stair’s citation of the Liber Extra 1.35.1 and 1.35.3.
59
 Robertson also gave 
Stair’s citation of Rebuffus as an example of his citation of a canonist. As with 
Covarruvias, however, Stair was in fact citing Rebuffus on national law. 
 Finally, Robertson found two citations in “Obligations/Accessory Obligations”, 
which he called Stair’s “only direct and full reference to canon law”.
60
 This was 
incorrect for two reasons. First, Stair gave seven citations of Canon law in earlier titles. 
Secondly, the two citations which Robertson discussed were not actually given by Stair. 
In the third version, Stair added citations of four texts of Canon law here: Liber Sextus 
2.11.2 and Liber Extra 2.24.28, 1.40.3, and 1.40.4.
61
 These were replaced without 
explanation in the third printed edition with “C. cum continget, 28. De jurejurando”, 
“cap.8. De jurejurando” and “C.15. De jurejurando”. This cannot have been done 
because of differences found in the manuscripts, as this passage appeared in none of 
those consulted. This change was followed in the fourth and fifth printed editions, but 
not in the sixth. Robertson referred to the first two of these replacement citations (but, 
oddly, not the third) as Stair’s only citations of Canon law.
62
 
 Stair’s use of Canon law has thus never been fully considered. Unfortunately, 
this cannot be done here. Three points, however, should be observed. First, when Stair 
referred to Canon law in the titles on obligations in the first printed edition, the 
manuscripts usually gave instead “common law”. This may indicate that Stair called 
Canon law “common law” in the first and second versions, but changed this terminology 
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when preparing the third version. Alternatively, this might have been an amendment 
made by the copyists that became perpetuated through the manuscript stems.  
 Secondly, Stair made many more references to Canon law than is currently 
appreciated. Indeed, in the printed editions, Stair gave almost as many citations of 
Canon law texts (eleven) as he did of writers of classical antiquity (thirteen). He also 
made around ten additional general references to rules of the Canon law. Admittedly, 
Stair’s citations of Canon law seem to have been borrowed from other seventeenth-
century jurists without being checked.
63
 Yet this is no different to his citation of writers 
of classical antiquity or his citation of Roman law in the first version. In the greater 
context of Stair’s pattern of citation and use of authority, therefore, Canon law was an 
important source for Stair’s titles on obligations. This is very interesting, given that the 
first version of the Institutions was written exactly 100 years after the Scottish 
Reformation.  
 Finally, all Stair’s citations of Canon law in the titles on obligations in the first 
version were of the Liber Extra. Three of those added for the third version were also of 
the Liber Extra; one was of the Liber Sextus. He nowhere cited Gratian’s Decretum. The 
Liber Extra was “a more orderly and complete statement of the canon law than 
[Gratian’s Decretum]”
64
 and replaced the Decretum as the basis of canonist teaching.
65
 
By the early fourteenth century, the principal texts in the canonist curriculum were the 
Liber Extra, Liber Sextus and Clementines; the Decretum “became a distinctly 
secondary subject in the curriculum.”
66
 However, seventeenth-century jurists still cited 
the Decretum. Grotius, for example, cited it around seventy times, the Liber Extra over 
forty times, and the Liber Sextus only five times. Stair’s focus on the Liber Extra is not 
found in Corvinus, who did not show a preference: his commentary on D.23.1 cited the 
Liber Extra more often than the Decretum, both were cited often in his commentary on 
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D.23.2, and the Decretum was cited almost twice as often as the Liber Extra in his 
commentary on D.24.2. Stair’s choice of citations was not even a reflection of Corvinus’ 
citations in the passages which he used. For example, he paraphrased a sentence of 
Corvinus on adultery which had several citations of Gratian’s Decretum. Although not 
conclusive, this may indicate that, for whatever reason, Stair was hesitant to cite the 
Decretum. 
 
8.3  CLOSING REMARKS  
 
Much of Stair’s aim in writing can be gleaned by considering the title he chose for his 
work: The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Deduced from its Originals, and Collated 
with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations. 
Why did Stair choose to call his work the Institutions? There was no Scottish precedent 
for calling a work ‘institutions’. The first, second and third versions did not follow the 
typical institutional division into four books, and contained no account of procedure; he 
did not choose this title because his structure exactly mirrored Gaius’ and Justinian’s.  
He did not call his work a commentary, as Gudelinus had done. In choosing the name 
Institutions, he was placing his work in an emerging category of European writing which 
focused on national law, with the likes of John Cowell (whom he cited67), Conchyleus 
and Grotius’ Inleydinge. The clause “Collated with the Civil, Canon, and Feudal Laws, 
and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations” resembled other earlier continental 
works. Stephanus’ Oeconomia had been “juris universi civilis, feudalis & canonici [of 
the universal Civil, Feudal and Canon law]”. Craig’s Jus feudale had been an 
examination of the law “in Scotia, Anglia, & plerisque Galliae [in Scotland, England, 
and most of France]”. The titles of Boerius and Gomezius also reflected similar aims. 
More than that, however, Stair’s title precisely conveyed what he had done. He 
had set out Scots law, taking account of natural law, the learned laws, the law of 
England and various continental systems, and continental jurisprudence. He drew on the 
philosophies and methods of the leading schools and movements of the early-modern 
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period: legal humanism, second scholasticism, natural law, jurists who wrote on national 
law, and Dutch jurisprudence. This was not a work cobbled together from second-rate 
sources. Rather, Stair had been selective when choosing his sources, which he had used 
critically, and thereby had engaged with the arguments and debates between the leading 
jurists of the early-modern period. The Institutions was not just a book of Scots law; it 
was an expression of Scotland’s place within the intellectual tradition of European 
jurisprudence.  
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